Orest Subtelny
Born
in Kraków, Poland
May 07, 1941
Died
July 24, 2016
Genre
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Ukraine: A History
19 editions
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published
1988
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The Mazepists
2 editions
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published
1981
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Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948 (The Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series)
by
8 editions
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published
2001
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Rethinking Ukrainian History
by
2 editions
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published
1981
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Die Ukraine: Prozesse der Nationsbildung
by
2 editions
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published
2011
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Ukrainians in North America: an Illustrated History
3 editions
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published
1991
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Domination of Eastern Europe: Native Nobilities and Foreign Absolutism, 1500-1715
2 editions
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published
1986
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Пласт: Унікальна історія українського скаутського руху
by |
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Nationalities papers, Spring Fall 1986 , vol XIV no 1-2
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Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity
by
2 editions
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published
1999
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“To celebrate the Russian/Ukrainian partnership, in 1954 the 300th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Treaty was marked throughout the Soviet Union in an unusually grandiose manner. In addition to numerous festivities, myriad publications, and countless speeches, the Central Committee of the all-union party even issued thirteen "thesis", which argued the irreversibility of the "everlasting union" of the Ukrainians and the Russians: "The experience of history has shown that the way of fraternal union and alliance chosen by the Russians and Ukrainians was the only true way. The union of two great Slavic peoples multiplied their strength in the common struggle against all external foes, against serf owners and the bourgeoisie, again tsarism and capitalist slavery. The unshakeable friendship of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples has grown and strengthened in this struggle." To emphasize the point that the union with Moscow brought the Ukrainians great benefits, the Pereiaslav anniversary was crowned by the Russian republic's ceding of Crimea to Ukraine "as a token of friendship of the Russian people."
But the "gift" of the Crimea was far less altruistic than it seemed. First, because the peninsula was the historic homeland of the Crimean Tatars whom Stalin had expelled during the Second World War, the Russians did not have the moral right to give it away nor did the Ukrainians have the right to accept it. Second, because of its proximity and economic dependence on Ukraine, the Crimea's links with Ukraine were naturally greater than with Russia. Finally, the annexation of the Crimea saddled Ukraine with economic and political problems. The deportation of the Tatars in 1944 had created economic chaos in the region and it was Kiev's budget that had to make up loses. More important was the fact that, according to the 1959 census, about 860,000 Russians and only 260,000 Ukrainians lived in the Crimea. Although Kiev attempted to bring more Ukrainians into the region after 1954, the Russians, many of whom were especially adamant in rejecting any form of Ukrainization, remained the overwhelming majority. As a result, the Crimean "gift" increased considerably the number of Russians in the Ukrainian republic. In this regard, it certainly was an appropriate way of marking the Pereiaslav Treaty.”
― Ukraine: A History
But the "gift" of the Crimea was far less altruistic than it seemed. First, because the peninsula was the historic homeland of the Crimean Tatars whom Stalin had expelled during the Second World War, the Russians did not have the moral right to give it away nor did the Ukrainians have the right to accept it. Second, because of its proximity and economic dependence on Ukraine, the Crimea's links with Ukraine were naturally greater than with Russia. Finally, the annexation of the Crimea saddled Ukraine with economic and political problems. The deportation of the Tatars in 1944 had created economic chaos in the region and it was Kiev's budget that had to make up loses. More important was the fact that, according to the 1959 census, about 860,000 Russians and only 260,000 Ukrainians lived in the Crimea. Although Kiev attempted to bring more Ukrainians into the region after 1954, the Russians, many of whom were especially adamant in rejecting any form of Ukrainization, remained the overwhelming majority. As a result, the Crimean "gift" increased considerably the number of Russians in the Ukrainian republic. In this regard, it certainly was an appropriate way of marking the Pereiaslav Treaty.”
― Ukraine: A History
“Located far beyond the reach of government authorities, the Zaporozhian Sich continued to flourish even after the death of its founder. Any Christian male, irrespective of his social background, was free to come to this island fortress, with its rough wood-and-thatch barracks, and to join the Cossack brotherhood. He was also free to leave at will. Women and children, regarded as a hindrance in the steppe, were barred from entry. Refusing to recognize the authority of any ruler, the Zaporozhians governed themselves according to traditions and customs that evolved over the generations.
All had equal rights and could participate in the frequent, boisterous councils (rady) in which the side that shouted loudest usually carried the day. These volatile gatherings elected and, with equal ease, deposed the Cossack leadership, which consisted of a hetman or otaman who had overall command, adjutants (osavuly), a chancellor (pysar), a quartermaster (obozny), and a judge (suddia). Each kurin, a term that referred to the Sich barracks and, by extension, to the military unit that lived in them, elected a similar subordinate group of officers, or starshyna. During campaigns, the authority of these officers was absolute, including the right to impose the death penalty. But in peacetime their power was limited. Generally, the Zaporozhians numbered about 5000-6000 men of whom about 10% served on a rotating basis as the garrison of the Sich, while the rest were engaged in campaigns or in peacetime occupations. The economy of the Sich consisted mainly of hunting, fishing, beekeeping, and salt making at the mouth of the Dnieper. Because the Sich lay on the trade route between the Commonwealth and the Black Sea, trade also played an important role.”
― Ukraine: A History
All had equal rights and could participate in the frequent, boisterous councils (rady) in which the side that shouted loudest usually carried the day. These volatile gatherings elected and, with equal ease, deposed the Cossack leadership, which consisted of a hetman or otaman who had overall command, adjutants (osavuly), a chancellor (pysar), a quartermaster (obozny), and a judge (suddia). Each kurin, a term that referred to the Sich barracks and, by extension, to the military unit that lived in them, elected a similar subordinate group of officers, or starshyna. During campaigns, the authority of these officers was absolute, including the right to impose the death penalty. But in peacetime their power was limited. Generally, the Zaporozhians numbered about 5000-6000 men of whom about 10% served on a rotating basis as the garrison of the Sich, while the rest were engaged in campaigns or in peacetime occupations. The economy of the Sich consisted mainly of hunting, fishing, beekeeping, and salt making at the mouth of the Dnieper. Because the Sich lay on the trade route between the Commonwealth and the Black Sea, trade also played an important role.”
― Ukraine: A History
“To the modern mind, which views national sovereignty as a natural condition (although the concept did not gain wide currency until after the French Revolution of 1789), the question arises of why Khmelnytsky did not declare independence for Ukraine. During the uprising there were, in fact, rumors to the effect that he wished to reestablish the "old Rus' principality," and even that he planned to form a separate "Cossack principality." Although such ideas may have been considered, it would have been impossible under the circumstances to realize them.
As the interminable wars demonstrated, the Cossacks, although able to administer severe defeats to the Poles, were incapable of permanently preventing the szlachta from launching repeated efforts to regain Ukraine. To assure themselves of a lasting victory over the Poles, Khmelnytsky needed the continuing and reliable support of a major foreign power. The usual price of such aid was acceptance of the overlordship of the ruler who provided it. In the view of the masses, the main thrust of the uprising was to redress socioeconomic ills, and to many in Ukraine the question of whether these problems were to be resolved under their own or under foreign rule was of secondary importance.
Finally, in 17th-century Eastern Europe, sovereignty rested not in the people, but in the person of a legitimate (that is, generally recognized) monarch. Because Khmelnytsky, despite his popularity and power, did not possess such legitimacy, he had to find for Ukraine an overlord who did. At issue was not self-rule for Ukraine, for Ukrainians already had gained it. Their goal was to find a monarch who could provide their newly formed autonomous society with legitimacy and protection.”
― Ukraine: A History
As the interminable wars demonstrated, the Cossacks, although able to administer severe defeats to the Poles, were incapable of permanently preventing the szlachta from launching repeated efforts to regain Ukraine. To assure themselves of a lasting victory over the Poles, Khmelnytsky needed the continuing and reliable support of a major foreign power. The usual price of such aid was acceptance of the overlordship of the ruler who provided it. In the view of the masses, the main thrust of the uprising was to redress socioeconomic ills, and to many in Ukraine the question of whether these problems were to be resolved under their own or under foreign rule was of secondary importance.
Finally, in 17th-century Eastern Europe, sovereignty rested not in the people, but in the person of a legitimate (that is, generally recognized) monarch. Because Khmelnytsky, despite his popularity and power, did not possess such legitimacy, he had to find for Ukraine an overlord who did. At issue was not self-rule for Ukraine, for Ukrainians already had gained it. Their goal was to find a monarch who could provide their newly formed autonomous society with legitimacy and protection.”
― Ukraine: A History
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