Traditionally, Americans have viewed war as an alternative to diplomacy, and military strategy as the science of victory. Today, however, in our world of nuclear weapons, military power is not so much exercised as threatened. It is, Mr. Schelling says, bargaining power, and the exploitation of this power, for good or evil, to preserve peace or to threaten war, is diplomacy—the diplomacy of violence. The author concentrates in this book on the way in which military capabilities—real or imagined—are used, skillfully or clumsily, as bargaining power. He sees the steps taken by the U.S. during the Berlin and Cuban crises as not merely preparations for engagement, but as signals to an enemy, with reports from the adversary's own military intelligence as our most important diplomatic communications. Even the bombing of North Vietnam, Mr. Schelling points out, is as much coercive as tactical, aimed at decisions as much as bridges. He carries forward the analysis so brilliantly begun in his earlier The Strategy of Conflict (1960) and Strategy and Arms Control (with Morton Halperin, 1961), and makes a significant contribution to the growing literature on modern war and diplomacy. Stimson Lectures.Mr. Schelling is professor of economics at Harvard and acting director of Harvard's Center for International Affairs. "An exemplary text on the interplay of national purpose and military force."—Book Week. "A grim but carefully reasoned and coldly analytical book. . . . One of the most frightening previews which this reviewer has ever seen of the roads that lie just ahead in warfare."—Los Angeles Times. "A brilliant and hardheaded book. It will frighten those who prefer not to dwell on the unthinkable and infuriate those who have taken refuge in the stereotypes and moral attitudinizing."—New York Times Book Review.
Thomas Crombie Schelling was an American economist and professor of foreign affairs, national security, nuclear strategy, and arms control at the School of Public Policy at University of Maryland, College Park. He is also co-faculty at the New England Complex Systems Institute. He was awarded the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics (shared with Robert Aumann) for "having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis."
[Disclaimer: This is a snapshot of my thoughts on this book after just reading it. This is not meant to serve as a summary of main/supporting points or a critique – only as some words on how I engaged with this book for the purposes of building a theoretical framework on strategy.]
-- Assigned reading for School of Advanced Air & Space Studies, chapters 1-3 only --
I must admit up front that I became biased in favor of Schelling’s ideas almost immediately. While he makes a distinction between war and coercion, his theories seem very much on track with Sun Tzu – the target is the enemy’s mind. Schelling presents a profound theory on compellence as a subset of coercion, where “the ideal compellent action would be one that, once initiated, causes minimal harm if compliance is forthcoming and great harm if compliance is not forthcoming, is consistent with the time schedule of feasible compliance, is beyond recall once initiated, and cannot be stopped by the party that started it but automatically stops upon compliance, with all this fully understood by the adversary” (89). His theory is proposed during the bipolar international order of the US-USSR at a time when relative balance has been established post Cuban Missile Crisis.
While I won’t highlight all of Schelling’s major points, one of his more impressive observations is the difference between violence and latent violence (3). The manipulation of the enemy’s willingness to accept risk based on what threat he believes still exists is a significant factor in compellence. Schelling offers: “Military victory is often the prelude to violence, not the end of it, and the fact that successful violence is usually held in reserve should not deceive us about the role it plays” (13). Every violence act has a long-term consequence, and the belief in latent (or residual) capabilities matters. Not only the capability, but the will to use it – that is a fundamental aspect of this theory. The will is not so much the action, but the belief in the action, as well as the fear of escalation beyond what is acceptable (nuclear exchange in this case) are all part of the international chess game of compellence.
Technology has made nuclear exchange a possibility, and devastation can be delivered across oceans within 30 minutes. Passive defenses allow leaders the opportunity to be more calculated in determining response options, and vulnerability limits the time in which decisions must be made. Active defenses, or even the belief in them, have the opposite effect in the balance of risk, and can in fact increase the chances of nuclear exchange. Where once military strategy was simply a plan of how to win against other military forces, technology has brought force back into the realm of diplomacy. Every act of violence becomes part of a risk calculation that could potentially lead to general nuclear war.
Credibility becomes important as a means to coerce. Given limited resources, a state can only commit to so many actions and remain credible, and when tested, that state must be able to follow through on its commitments. Once a state does not follow through, it loses credibility in all of its commitments, thereby losing its ability to coerce. Schelling proposes that a little uncertainty adds to a state’s ability to coerce, since it provides some margin in the enemy’s risk calculus. Being absolutely predictable is not a good thing.
While Schelling does not use Sun Tzu’s “death ground” language, he provides the same solution. Paraphrasing Sun Tzu, “death ground” is where the forces have no choice but to fight – they are surrounded, and the only options are death or victory. Sun Tzu believed it was a military’s strongest fighting position, and maneuvering your own weaker force into a death ground situation was the best way to get the most out of that force. Schelling proposed the same idea with relinquishing the initiative: “[the enemy] must decide instead what he ought to do if you were incapable of anything but resisting him” (43). If the enemy believes you have options to not fight, then your offensive, compelling position has less value. The follow-through with compellence is that it “requires that the punishment be administered until the other acts, rather than if he acts” (70). Compellence is initiating the offensive shift of risk, with definite objectives within a definite amount of time.
Finally, brinkmanship involves sharing a risk with others so that if disaster occurs, the shared risk is felt by all. Brinkmanship becomes the game of risk manipulation, compelling the opponent to comply by balancing between offensive and defensive maneuvers. Limited wars becomes more practical in this context, since they serve not only as mechanisms to bolster credibility, but also to use risk to gain ground against the opponent.
Schelling provided me some hope that advancing technology does not guarantee great devastation for humanity down the road. Technology simply becomes part of the risk calculus – a way to affect the mind of the enemy. Certainly, the balance the world “enjoyed” (for lack of a better word) during the Cold War showed signs of weakness by the introduction of the Cuban Missile Crisis. A third party with nuclear weapons makes the complexity of risk calculation almost unmanageable. As a result, arms reduction, arms control, and non-proliferation have become defensive mechanisms to limit the risk of a nuclear exchange. Nevertheless, Schelling provides a template that we have seen in Sun Tzu, Fuller, and even Boyd – ultimately, the target is the mind of the enemy, and every offensive and defensive action (or inaction) affects our ability to manipulate the international political environment in our favor.
5/10. Read for class. Informative, interesting, easy to understand, and definitely must-read for those interested in political-science and security studies. However, not a super entertaining book if you're not into the subject matter. Author gets very very repetitive, which is a good thing for students but could get tedious.
Originally written during the Cold War, Arms and Influence addresses the issue of how countries use military power to bargain. I love that Schelling is willing to talk about what is, in polite conversation, considered unspeakable. The fact is that governments must do away with niceties when considering issues of national defense (though he considers "defense" a misnomer) in order to understand the benefits and tradeoffs of different communication strategies. Posturing and pre-commitment to action on a national scale affect other countries' perception of the United States, which in turn affects their willingness to engage in conflicts.
Schelling also notes that nuclear weapons greatly change the playing field, though not simply due to their destructive power. Instead, they have the capacity to invert the traditional order, in which a country is first defeated militarily and then suffers heavy losses to their people. In addition, nuclear weapons have only destructive power and no capacity to
Unfortunately, the book is dryly written and not particularly fun to read. Schelling finds an infinitude of ways to repeat himself and I could not will myself to finish this book.
Schelling’s book is as relevant now as it was during the Cold War. This is the seminal book on deterrence, and important reading for anyone involved in or interested in the Great Power Competition taking place between the U.S and China. While a lot of the text focuses on nuclear deterrence (nuclear weapons serving as the ultimate deterrent), the book is relevant to all forms of deterrence. Schelling opens up discussing the miracle that is the nuclear “taboo” which is partially responsible for explaining how all of the nuclear powers have thankfully abstained from using nuclear weapons since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. There are so many excellent examples of how nations have done deterrence and compellence both well and poorly, and a handful of easy to understand concepts that support his overall theory on deterrence. All in all, reading the book makes the reader realize how empathetic one must be to play the deterrence game well, because if the message sent from one nation to another is received differently than intended, things can easily escalate towards conflict.
4.5 stars. In the beggining I found this reading dense and really complicated to understand. But, after a few chapters I really started to appreciate it, and found Schellng's perspective interesting. I've never liked game theory before, but after reading this I have realized I actually love it. The key for this to happen is the way in which in approch. The author talks about game theory from a trully theoretical point of view in the context of internationa relations. Explaning the behavior of all actors and analyzing strategies to the core.
I know some people might argue that Schelling is cold in the way he talks about human life, but I think that is the way I more enjoy it.
The cat is black. Black is the cat. Now, imagine if I filled 303 pages with variations of that one statement. If you would conclude that such a book would not only be slightly above useless, but in fact would be a chore on par with any one of Hercules 12 Labors, your conclusion would be as mine is, MADDENING ! Having been the second book I have taken the time to read of late concerning government policy as regards to nuclear weapons I have reached the following opinion ; The complete global destruction that nuclear weapons represent has, for all intents and purposes (not to mention cost) has relegated them, and I do mean ALL of them, to threats of total destruction utilized by the respective countries who possess them to forward their diplomatic agendas. There you have it ! Unlike Thomas Schelling in Arms and Influence, I didn't need an additional 302 pages !
"The most spectacular event of the past half century is one that did not occur. We have enjoyed sixty years without nuclear weapons exploded in anger." Schelling's spectacular events has now not occurred for nearly 80 years, a marvellous fact that would have seemed nearly unthinkable for long stretches of the Cold War during which the thread of nuclear annihilation was the dominant issue of public policy. This classic, clear-eyed and penetrating book, first published in 1966, broke new ground in the strategy of conflict in the age of nuclear weapons and remains highly relevant today for understanding the fundamental importance of nuclear arsenals - influence, not destruction - and why the taboo around the non-use of such weapons is so critical.
Schelling's key strategic insight is that nuclear weapons, by raising the cost of military conflict unacceptably high, divorced military power from coercive power. Until 1945, the ability to coerce an opponent rested on the credible thread of some form of military *victory*. Nuclear weapons alter this picture by allowing an opponent to inflict unbearably high costs even in the process of losing a war. in other words, nuclear capacity gave actors the ability to deter and compel adversaries without every actually using military power. Analyzing their actions, therefore, required a new type of strategic understanding: the strategy of coercion, in which both sides touted and invested in nuclear capacity while simultaneously explicitly and implicitly acknowledging that the benefit of avoiding nuclear war vastly exceeded any potential military gains.
Schelling's training as an economist is evident in his focus on incentives and decision-making. There is little, if any, discussion of technical or implementation details of carrying out nuclear strikes and there is strikingly little data about actual military conflict. Rather, the work is important for the rich and deep insights into how the altering of incentives through access to nuclear capabilities changes decision-making. In particular, Schelling incorporates concepts of reputation, chance and commitment from game theory to construct a theoretical framework of decision-making in the nuclear age. Regarding commitment, he argues that the ability to coerce opponents with nuclear weapons depends on making a credible commitment to inflict pain in the event of non-compliance and to *not* apply that pain in the event they do comply. Yet, commitments are hard to make and harder to verify. So, paradoxically, Schelling argues for reducing policy options and eliminating escape hatches to signal clearly to adversaries that, in the event of a particular escalation of event of non-compliance, there will be no choice but to inflict the painful nuclear cost. This shifts the escalation decision to your counterpart who now has the "last clear chance" to avoid catastrophe. By binding oneself to take an action that is intolerable to your enemy, you provide strong incentive for them to comply. He refines this concept through discussion of commitments to deter and compel, respectively. With this framework, policy decisions such as mutual self-protection treaties (NATO) and the ongoing presence of national troops in foreign countries yields strategic value by reducing policy options and binding the party to action in the event of an escalation by your enemy.
Another brilliant insight is Schelling's elucidation of brinkmanship, the deliberate introduction of chance into a conflict as a means of making coercing your opponent. This recognizes that the costs of nuclear conflict are so high that no one would rationally opt for a nuclear exchange, yet the element of chance introduces some likelihood of such exchange beyond the control of rational actors. By raising the expected cost so high, this element of chance again strongly incentivizes your enemy to comply with whatever demand you have made.
Finally, Schelling's concept of focal points is incorporated to explain the development of the convention, and now strong taboo around the use of nuclear weapons. This level of self-restraint by nuclear armed actors was not preordained, nor ever explicitly committed to. There were multiple plausible conventions regarding the use or non-use of nuclear weapons (multiple equilibria), yet the complete non-use was the clearest. Schelling analogizes this to natural geographic features and universal conventions, such as lat/long, to describe how parties in conflict can align on a course of action in the absence of explicit coordination. The resulting taboo on nuclear weapon use for any purpose is extraordinarily beneficial and it remains a vital goal of public policy to maintain.
This book was one of the required readings for a class I am currently taking. The author is a Nobel Prize winner for his contributions to game-theory analysis and this book is considered to be one of the classics on nuclear strategy. It's not hard to see why. While many books on nuclear deterrence and strategy go into the different policies and can get policy wonky, this book takes an almost philosophical approach to the questions that nuclear strategy and deterrence pose. Indeed, many of the thoughts that Mr. Schelling has apply just as much to conventional war as to nuclear war as deterrence, compellence, and just the threat of violence can be used to achieve national goals. It is fascinating. It is also incredibly ponderous. At times it feels like Mr. Schelling just recorded some thoughts on a tape recorder and had someone transcribe them into book as topics are tackled without any apparent rhyme or reason. And considering that one or two of his chapters are 60+ pages long, it can be difficult to track his thoughts. Still, this is a genuinely thought provoking book that, in spite of the end of the Cold War, has not lost its relevancy and, indeed, will not until nuclear weapons are abolished or they are used once again in war.
Though the writing is oddly paced and strangely redundant (even within sentences), the discussion of how violence can be used as a means of coercion -- assuming clear communication, the deliberate assurance of options for concessions, an effective balance of capabilities, and so forth -- is hugely useful for thinking about force and influence. This is true not only for the Cold War, when Schelling wrote this, and not only in the context of nuclear weapons, which overshadows the book, but more generally.
The concept of an elite squad of perfectly unaccountable usurpers equipped with tactical nukes to speedily regime-change any upstart nuclear powers is batshit and betrays a weird but very human obsession with centralization as the ultimate problem solving tool, otherwise this book is pretty legit I guess.
Well-written with enduring insights. Also valuable as a historical text on the development of strategic thought and strategic studies. Final chapter does tend to be very slow and too rooted in Cold War narrative for contemporary use though.
Weirdly reassuring to see how much academic thought and discourse has been going into nuclear deterrence and modern war, and how much posturing, even as Russia again threatens nuclear attacks as part of the war in Ukraine.
Arms and Influence by Thomas Schelling is one of the classics of international security literature. Coming out in the middle of the 20th century, there's a lot of empirics that no longer seem as intuitive without the historical context, but the underlying concepts - particularly as they pertain to security - remain solid. The last chapter, in particular, is rather excellent. The main focus of the book pertains to thinking through some of the strategic game centered around warfare and conflict in a nuclear age and whether the nuclear taboo is something that is truly going to become a settled norm in international conflict. There's a lot of talk about bargaining, strategy, uncertainty, signaling, conventional, and unconventional warfare. This book is from an era where a lot of these ideas were just starting to become solidified, though now much has since transitioned into the realm of common sense for defense policy wonks. So, its pretty great, if not a bit outdated and potentially basic for later students of the subject.
The ideas presented here about nuclear capabilities, war decisions and the calculation of risk are good. However, it reads like a droll textbook so I was often going off in my mind on tangents then had to rewind the Hoopla audio. Originally written in the late 60s, the focus is mainly on American versus Soviet ideologies, but it was updated a bit to include some more modern concerns.
What I found to be an amazing realization is that every action described here, whether hypothetical only or based on events in history, is covered in Craig Alanson's Expeditionary Force sci-fi series that kicks off with the book Columbus Day. As I listened to Schelling's circular explanations I'd recall moments in Alanson's fun books that spoke of the exact same dilemmas, but in a way that involved the reader and really made you both care about the outcome and invest yourself in the analysis of decision making. I'd like to know if Craig studied Schelling.
It was good. It made me think about strategy and deterrence in a different light. Honestly, he had me up until the acknowledgments. When he started talking about how the US shouldn’t want to develop new technology for deterrence, he lost me.
Especially with how our adversaries are increasing their technology and their deterrence weapons, the US needs to think about ours. We are absolutely behind the curveball on this and modernization needs to be at the forefront. Innovation and modernization are the key to deterrence and if we can’t keep up with our peer adversaries, then what are we doing?
Really enjoyed this one - I'd say it's more of a 4.5/5 than a 4, but I docked it a bit for some of Schelling's Vietnam takes aging very poorly. Overall this book really changed how I think about deterrence, military conflicts, and nuclear weapons in general. It's one of those books that opens your mind to new ways of thinking, and I think it's required reading for anyone interested in conflict management or diplomacy in general. I thought the afterword is also an excellent addition, reflecting on 60 years (at the time) of the nonuse of nuclear weapons. Here's to hoping that trend continues.
Schelling's work, which is I believe associated with the old RAND Corporation, was awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics, though his work is primarily in studying the implications of game theory on the analysis of war, especially mutually assured destruction, to due the Oppenheimer led Manhattan Project. Always interesting to see how theory matches reality, especially such a simple one.
I now see why this is essential reading for anyone who works in the nuclear weapons field. Many questions are discussed and many viewpoints analyzed. The analysis is widely applicable to politics, warfare, and everyday life. As one of the most-cited thinkers on deterrence, Schelling explains the language, thinking, and gamesmanship involved in deterrence theory.
Professional work on strategy, government war planning , deterrence and an interesting concept called compellence. There have been some new developments on the global stage with attendant shifts in balances and priorities which are incongruous to some of the author’s theories and conclusions. Nevertheless, it is an eminent work that is a must read in its field of study.
What it has to say about deterrence and the nature of war is very profound. However, how it makes its case is like listening to a rambling old man talk about what life was like when he was a kid. I recommend this as a skim and not reading to comprehend.
The most astonishishing fact about this book is that it is written by a Nobel laureate. I find it hard to follow the main thoughts as these are explained by lengthy examples which seem often not well chosen.
A weak 4 but this is a classic. His Nobel speech afterword really ties a lot together and hammers home the importance of nuclear weapons as a tool of influence, rather than an actual weapon to be used. Some weird moments of pro-peaceful nuclear energy advocacy?
Sophisticated if occasion is casuistic reasoning applied to questions of deterrence and compellence in warfare. esp. nuclear warfare. Somewhat dated now, but at the time of writing must have seemed of existential importance.
Among the most important books in international security. Schelling reminds us that threats and the capacity to hurt are the primary currency of international politics and that nuclear weapons have profound effects on how we practice coercion.
Great primer on the calculations and nature of nuclear bargaining, arms control, and deterrence. Does a really great job illustrating principles with examples and metaphors. I would recommend this as a starting point for anyone interested in nuclear strategy.
A Cold War classic that is relevant today. If you want to understand the relationship between the United States, Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, this is a great book to read.