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Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason
Michael E. Bratman develops a planning theory of intention. Intentions are treated as elements of partial plans of action. These plans play basic roles in practical reasoning, roles that support the organization of our activities over time and socially. Bratman explores the impact of this approach on a wide range of issues, including the relation between intention and intentional action, and the distinction between intended and expected effects of what one intends.
208 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1987
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
January 15, 2018
Bratman explores intention, a topic previously studied by Anscombe, Davidson, and others.
Unlike them, he begins his investigation with "future-directed intention", rather than "present-directed" intentional action. For Bratman, intentions cannot be reduced to belief and desire; they are a specific, third kind of "elementary" mental state. They are best understood in the context of planning; thus, it is only once we have a basic theory of their role in planning that we should seek to investigate the notion of "doing something intentionally".
For Bratman, intentions enable us to develop reasonings over time, with prior intentions serving as inputs and guides in our further reasoning. For instance, they form "partial plans" that will later be fleshed out. This leads to puzzling questions about the revocability of intentions (one must be able to change one's intention after forming it; but if all intentions had to be be re-examined before acting on them, there would be no point to them!), about what exactly it is that we intend (do we also intend all the expected consequences of an intended action?), about when it is rational to intend something (when is our reconsideration of an intention rational or not rational, and is that the same as asking whether the intention itself is rational?).
The style is precise but not excessively technical. The chapters are for the most part intriguing and stimulating. Not all examples are very inspired: the US presidential debate between Reagan and Mondale over the "star wars" initiative, was, I am sure, very engaging in 1987; not so much nowadays. Nonetheless, Bratman proposes convincing answers to the questions he tackles, and it seems a bit unfair to criticize him for not foreseeing that his book would remain an indispensable after 30 years later.
If I had to formulate one objection to Bratman's treatment of intention, it would be that it has too much of a "cognitive" flavor, in contrast to a "statistical" or "dynamical" flavor (as well as to Anscombe's "behaviorist" flavor). That is, Bratman takes a logical or symbolic approach even though, sometimes, the phenomena being considered seem more suited to explanations in terms of quantities and magnitudes rather than pure dichotomies.
Unlike them, he begins his investigation with "future-directed intention", rather than "present-directed" intentional action. For Bratman, intentions cannot be reduced to belief and desire; they are a specific, third kind of "elementary" mental state. They are best understood in the context of planning; thus, it is only once we have a basic theory of their role in planning that we should seek to investigate the notion of "doing something intentionally".
For Bratman, intentions enable us to develop reasonings over time, with prior intentions serving as inputs and guides in our further reasoning. For instance, they form "partial plans" that will later be fleshed out. This leads to puzzling questions about the revocability of intentions (one must be able to change one's intention after forming it; but if all intentions had to be be re-examined before acting on them, there would be no point to them!), about what exactly it is that we intend (do we also intend all the expected consequences of an intended action?), about when it is rational to intend something (when is our reconsideration of an intention rational or not rational, and is that the same as asking whether the intention itself is rational?).
The style is precise but not excessively technical. The chapters are for the most part intriguing and stimulating. Not all examples are very inspired: the US presidential debate between Reagan and Mondale over the "star wars" initiative, was, I am sure, very engaging in 1987; not so much nowadays. Nonetheless, Bratman proposes convincing answers to the questions he tackles, and it seems a bit unfair to criticize him for not foreseeing that his book would remain an indispensable after 30 years later.
If I had to formulate one objection to Bratman's treatment of intention, it would be that it has too much of a "cognitive" flavor, in contrast to a "statistical" or "dynamical" flavor (as well as to Anscombe's "behaviorist" flavor). That is, Bratman takes a logical or symbolic approach even though, sometimes, the phenomena being considered seem more suited to explanations in terms of quantities and magnitudes rather than pure dichotomies.
March 4, 2021
read for phil class: Actions
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January 6, 2014i do not know because i have not read yet
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews