Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous

by George Berkeley, Jonathan Dancy (Editor)

First published in 1713, this work was designed as a vivid and persuasive presentation of the remarkable picture of reality that Berkeley had first presented two years earlier in his Principles of Human Knowledge. His central claim there, as here, was that physical things consist of nothing but ideas in minds--that the world is not material but mental. Berkeley uses this thesis as the ground for a new argument for the existence of God, and the dialogue form enables him to raise and respond to many of the natural objections to his position. The text printed in this volume is that of the 1734 edition of the Dialogues.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Classics, Religion, 18th Century, Metaphysics, Ireland

192 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1713

About the author

George Berkeley (/ˈbɑːrklɪ/;[1][2] 12 March 1685 – 14 January 1753) — known as Bishop Berkeley (Bishop of Cloyne) — was an Anglo-Irish philosopher whose primary achievement was the advancement of a theory he called "immaterialism" (later referred to as "subjective idealism" by others). This theory denies the existence of material substance and instead contends that familiar objects like tables and chairs are only ideas in the minds of perceivers, and as a result cannot exist without being perceived. Berkeley is also known for his critique of abstraction, an important premise in his argument for immaterialism.

Librarian note: There is more than one author in the Goodreads database with this name.

George^Berkeley

Reviews

[Fergus, Weaver of Autistic Webs · Rating 5 out of 5]

My 1970's buddy George lived in the wrong era. Had he been young now, when university enrolment in the Humanities is at a tragic low, he would have felt right at home.

Back in the 1960's, we had a thundering-loud but exceptionally wise Philosophy Professor. We students in the back rows, especially myself and my friend George - a star defensive linebacker for our football team - would stare down upon his energetically gesticulating form (while he commanded the stage below with a musical Highland brogue).

George was a down-to-earth gentle giant of a kid with a big heart. And every lesson the prof gave went right over his head!

So, at nights (forget the weekends, prime party time for football stars) I would coach him in metaphysics. When next I saw him, that summer at his parents' upscale local home, I forgot to ask how he had fared with his marks - though perhaps I demurred out of friendly politeness. Oh, well...

Now, though, in yet another viral Plague Year, we are all FORCED to constantly pay good mind to every act we carry out each day, and I’m sure George - now a septuagenian like me, his loyal muscle tissue now gone to fat - has perforce adopted Mindfulness as his motto.

Mindfulness. A Buddhist word, but Berkeley would readily buy it.

You see, in this thin volume, Berkeley agrees. Mind is the Primary Substance of the world - the Mind of God which pervades all things. Including what we call matter, for that - as these two seventeenth century fictional gentlemen profess - is mere Illusion.

Do I hear the Buddha chuckling “I told you so!”?

Mind over Matter, as my beloved Mom, the librarian, would endlessly repeat. Cynics beware…

Whether or not you buy that is your call. It helped my Mom smile, though, when stricken with terminal cancer - and THAT’s saying a lot.

So as you read this little book, muse a little about it.

Kick the idea around a bit.

And - who knows? - you may gain some of the oodles of respect my prof and I had for these dialogues.

And George too - if he had paid half a Mind to the development of his OWN mind and morals!

[Roy Lotz · Rating 4 out of 5]

--Hylas: I say, Philonous, can I talk to you about something? I have just read a bizarre, horrible book by George Berkeley, where he argues all sorts of nonsense.

--Philonous: Is that so, Hylas? Pray, what was this book?

--Hylas: Why, it was none other than Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous.

--Philonous: Really? I thought that book was quite wonderful. What problems do you have with it?

--Hylas: He argues that matter doesn't exist! That everything that exists only exists in a mind, and the world exists because it is perceived by God. Now, that's patent nonsense, wouldn't you say?

--Philonous: My dear Hylas, you must remember the context in which Berkeley wrote his book. He was reacting against one of John Locke's ideas, which was really just a echo of the old Aristotelian notion of 'substance'.

--Hylas: What was that idea?

--Philonous: John Locke differentiated between 'primary' and 'secondary' qualities. Secondary qualities are things like color, texture, and timbre, that are not part of the object itself, but are only perceived by humans. But primary qualities are things like shape, weight, and extension, which are part of the object itself.

--Hylas: Isn't that how modern people think of it?

--Philonous: Sort of, but Berkeley makes the point that there is no reason to differentiate between those sorts of qualities, since they all are dependent on a perceiving mind.

--Hylas: Alright, but musn't we posit something that's some sort of substratum for material objects, even if it doesn't have the qualities of extension, weight, etc.?

--Philonous: Well, that's exactly what the Aristotelians said when they posited 'substance'. It's also essentially the same idea as a 'thing-in-itself' or a 'noumena' that Kant hypothesized almost 100 years later. But Berkeley shows that both of those ideas are unnecessary.

--Hylas: How's that?

--Philonous: Well, put simply, there is no reason to postulate the existence of some unknowable entity that undergirds reality. It violates the parsimony principle, and reality can be explained perfectly well without it. It's conjured up by the metaphysician's magic wand, based on an analogy with physical objects. But what purpose does it serve? Why go around talking about things you can, by definition, never know anything about?

--Hylas: I see, I see... So, you're saying that Berkeley anticipated and refuted Kant's system of metaphysics?

--Philonous: Not only that, Hylas, but Berkeley's ideas came to be what is now known as phenomenalism, and it has been embraced by both Edmund Husserl (in his phenomenology) and Bertrand Russell (in his book, Our Knowledge of the External World), and they were two of the most influential philosophers of the last 100 years.

--Hylas: My God!

--Philonous: Well... The whole 'God' part of Berkeley's thinking is sort of passé, but the rest of it still holds up rather well. Read David Hume's Enquiry into Human Understanding to see this line of thinking pushed to its extreme.

--Hylas: You read too much, man.

--Philonous: You're just jealous!

[Becky · Rating 3 out of 5]

I was a terrible philosophy major. I think that they all sound like great arguments. One moment I was reading Aristotle thinking “Well, that makes complete sense,” and the next moment I was reading Plato thinking, “Ah, a good point, yesyes!”. In my defense, they were generally good arguments, that’s why they are still taught. I’m just stating this now because I find Hylas and Philonous a great read. I’m not saying its good metaphysical philosophy- I have no right to label any of that sort of thing good or bad, unless its obviously and outrageously bad, and its ethical philosophy. I won’t say it’s a fun read either, unless you are interested in the history of thought. I highly recommend it to people that enjoy classics, to people that do enjoy the history of thought, and the evolution of man questioning things. Its well written, and easy enough to understand. There isn’t an overabundance of Greek words who’s definition are still being argued about, and the conversation style keeps it from getting overly stale.

[Sam · Rating 2 out of 5]

While reading this book for a philosophy course, I wrote this limerick to describe my feelings:

There once was a man from Nantucket,

Who put one hand in hot water and the other hand in cold water and then both hands into the same water and discovered that the conflicting sensations of heat and cold indicated that there was no way to objectively determine the temperature of the water in the bucket,

And little did he know,

'Twould cause a young girl centuries later to go,

"Oh my god, I'm getting really bored of talking about immaterialism."

[Josh · Rating 1 out of 5]

Presented as a socratic dialogue, Berkeley argues for his classic positions: immaterialism, divine perception causing the endurance of objects, etc. Really has not aged well at all. I like it even less on second reading. I find the pseudo-dialogue incredibly obnoxious. There are very few philosophers who I believe have no worth in modern times, and Berkeley is one of them. Not only are his arguments flawed conceptually, a lot of his arguments rely on the science of his day, and don't really work with what we know of modern neuroscience (and I'm always reluctant to invoke empirical science against a philosopher).

[J. Aleksandr Wootton · Rating 2 out of 5]

I'd been looking forward to reading Berkeley for some time; can't tell whether my anticipation was misplaced, or Three Dialogues was simply the wrong book to start with.

Berkeley gains very little by the conceit of dialogue; unlike the Socratics, which aren't even great at it, his speakers never develop into characters in their own right. Philonous ("spirit lover") is aptly if baldly named; why Hylas for his interlocuter is unclear. And these friends' first two dialogues are largely a waste of ink, doing little more than revolve slowly in place (or beat the dead horse from every fractional angle).

In the third dialogue Berkeley finally starts going somewhere and saying definite things, which are indeed interesting, despite feeling almost rushed by comparison. But in his anxiousness (or pugnaciousness?) to engage with certain early modern philosophers (Descartes, Locke, Malebranche, et al.), Berkeley follows them into their fundamental error of method, so that his work, although significant in its contribution, amounts "merely" to a refutation of philosophical materialism, rather than a definite schema about the nature of things in its own right.

That error is of starting from mind (or more accurately, physical sense-perception) as the fundamental and indispensable avenue to accessing any reality. Perhaps those early moderns could scarcely have assumed anything else; but by engaging them on their own terms, Berkeley is stuck arguing that finite minds perceive the representational ideas of all mindless phenomena via divinely-initiated connection to the infinite mind of God, which sustains all things. His intention was, it seems, to show that early modern philosophic materialism provides ironical evidence for Christianity, but Christianity is a non-unique solution for Berkeley's argument: it is also potentially compatible with Hindu or Buddhist maya, the simulation hypothesis, Judaism, and Islam.

This in no way nullifies the value of Berkeley's contribution; materialism is absurd in many dimensions, and Three Dialogues spotlights this one starkly. But I had been led by previous reading to hope for something less constrained: A broader and more imaginative contribution to philosophy of mind.

[Isabelle · Rating 2 out of 5]

it’s pronounced “bark-ly” cause all he does is yap (but even an empiricist is right twice a day)

[Beauregard Bottomley · Rating 5 out of 5]

Berkerley explains Being as thought not as becoming, nor appearance, nor ought. Sounds absurd until you realize the Copenhagen Interpretation (CI) appeals to an observer for the existence of reality in order to collapse the wave function. Applying Ockham's razor, by not assuming entities unnecessarily and eliminating the observer, leads to Hugh Everett III's Multi-World Interpretation (MWI). A situation that sounds just as absurd. The later Einstein joins the anti-realist (positivist) and knows 'truth is out there' (similar to Fox Mulder) and believes there must be hidden variables to explain reality and truth is only waiting to be revealed by David Bohm until of course John Bell's theorem shows spooky action at a distance is real.

Being never understands itself. There is an ontological difference that will always leave a gap between the totality (form or nature) and the gathering of the things or ideas (logos). Our understanding transcends this gap. Berkerley calls this God. Berkerley will lead to a necessary universe without free will except by Grace from the mind of God and all is idea and representation.

I was led to this book because Schopenhauer in his "The World as Will and Representation" credits Berkerley for his approach to being. In itself it's not possible to refute Berkerley's arguments from the first two sections (the third section defends his version of God against other Christians and assumes Bible verses. A debate for which I take no position due to my lack of interest). We have to put Being somewhere. The author puts Being (and matter) inside the mind of man which is inside the mind of God. Berkerley hates materialism (positivism) because that leads to Skepticism and that's just another name for lukewarm atheism. He saves God by eliminating matter and replacing all being with thought (idea) and defining God to be that thought. While it's possible to give the name of God to this placeholder, others might call it something different such as the ontological difference, or being knowing itself.

I would call this dialog a remarkable book. The 'measurement problem' in physics is real. This book gives one possible coherent solution (people criticize the CI but they still think of reality as particles when observed, waves otherwise). One can not refute Berkerley by kicking a stone and saying "I refute it thus'. That just shows that the person did not take the time to read this book. The truth is out there or maybe not!

[Yann · Rating 5 out of 5]

J’avais déjà été familiarisé avec la doctrine de Berkeley en lisant ses Principes de la connaissance humaine, et comme ils m’avaient laissé la meilleure impression du monde, j’ai eu la curiosité de jeter les yeux sur ces petits dialogues dans lesquels l’auteur se flatte d’avoir donné dans un ton populaire et agréable l’essentiel de sa doctrine, au lieu d’une longue démonstration numérotée. Berkeley met donc aux prises deux personnages ; Hylas (du mot grec ὒλη qui signifie matière) et Philonous (encore du grec, qui aime l’esprit). Philonous se propose de détruire l’athéisme de Hylas en lui démontrant tout d’abord que la matière n’existe pas. Quoique paradoxale puisse paraître cette proposition, la chose est aisée : s’appuyant sur la méthode empirique de Hobbes et de Locke, il n’est besoin que d’isoler la matière des impressions qu’elle fait sur les sens pour reconnaître qu’on a posé là une substance (en latin, une chose qui en soutient une autre, l’équivalent en grec est hypostase, ὑπόστᾰσις). Cette substance n’étant jamais appréhendée par les sens, il suffit de s’obstiner à nier son existence par la même obstination avec laquelle les athées refusent l’existence de Dieu. Le tour de bonneteau réside dans le fait que Philonous presse ensuite Hylas d’expliquer la nature tout en refusant de recourir à la matière, et il ne reste plus qu’à faire intervenir Dieu, chargé de régler la cohérence des impressions que chaque esprit reçoit.

Ce qui est intéressant avec cette théorie, c’est que tout extravagante qu’elle puisse paraître, elle se tient entièrement debout de manière parfaitement logique, et il est très difficile, pour ne pas dire impossible, de la confondre. Les quelques critiques de celle-ci que j’ai pu lire, dont une de Bertrand Russel lors de sa période réaliste (au sens philosophique), se bornent à dénoncer son écart avec le sens commun, ce qui ne prouve rien. Le dialogue ou le théiste désespère l’athée par son refus inflexible ne manque pas de sel. Et quel plaisir de substituer aux fables, aux menaces et aux invectives, des paroles raisonnables, des caresses, et des idées ingénieuses. C’est à mon avis une excellente lecture introductive à la Critique de la Raison Pure.

[Alina · Rating 5 out of 5]

These dialogues are delightful to read. Berkeley has a terrific sense of humor, and the progression of arguments are suspenseful and bewildering in the best possible way. I felt myself feeling such pity for Hylas being bombarded by Philonous, and for his not being equipped by arguments such as Sellars's in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, or points based in findings in the cognitive penetration literature. I think, in the end, a particular notion of an "idea" (Berkeley's term for sense-datum or qualia) must be presumed in order for Berkeley's idealism to get off the ground. This "idea" is defined as a sensation that is consciously accessed by us and that is constitutively independent any factors outside of our own cognition (or at least, we cannot know with certainty that it is constituted by mind-independent factors). Berkeley is able to argue for his idealism because he pretends this notion of "idea" is intuitive and indubitable (and surely it seemed to be the case, given the philosophical climate of his time, and the inheritance of Cartesianism); but in fact it is as metaphysically loaded as the notion of material substance. Reading these Dialogues shows how strange Western philosophy is; and how these historical, conventional assumptions still bias philosophers today.

I'm totally on board with Berkeley's arguments up to a certain point, before he leaps to the conclusion that all that exist are these narrowly construed ideas. Berkeley refutes that we can know anything independent of our perspective; this seems like commonsense, but in fact many people assume that we can 'imagine' that objects in themselves have primary properties, such as shape or mass. Berkeley deftly shows that even these primary properties are perspective-dependent. This is an enormous philosophical contribution, which many philosophers, and people generally, still fail to understand. I would totally recommend any person, no matter their background, to read these dialogues, or at least the first one (which has the most interesting arguments and plausible conclusions). Berkeley does a tremendous job of derailing us from our naive egocentric perspective.

[David · Rating 5 out of 5]

Beautifully written. Berkeley believed that everything is in the mind. The reason things still exist in a room when you have left it is because God keeps it there in His mind as He keeps you in His mind, hence overcoming the problem of continuity without sense perception. A very eloquent argument.

[Ryle]

Matter doesn't exist O.O

[VII · Rating 4 out of 5]

I have an important exam on this that will be really short on time, so I am kind of rumbling (even more than usual) as practice for what I might have to write. I would have never read this -so closely- if I didn't have to. It's not that his system is stupid, on the contrary it is very clever and is able to solve many problems if someone were to take it seriously. It's because almost nobody cared about it so the effect that it had to later philosophers and to our culture in general seems minimal. Right now it is history for the sake of history or at best, abstract philosophical training.

With his central thesis Berkeley asks us why are we so inclined to posit an unknown material substratum that underlies things and is mind-independent when the only thing that we have access to is some impressions, some sensible qualities. Why not stay only on what can be sensed, the ideas that our spirits form as they interact with the world. This targets not only direct realists but also representationists since they admit that we use ideas to represent things, but then go ahead and claim that these ideas resemble real material things. But how can we ever get outside of our ideas to compare them with something other than them? And how can an idea resemble anything other than another idea?

So if everything is a mind-dependent idea, then only minds can create or cause anything. Something passive, like matter can never actively create anything and certainly not something different from itself, like an idea. But ideas are passive also and can't create anything either. Their essence is to be perceived. In general, the world seems to be inhabited only by spirits and ideas. Spirits like us or God, because they will, are active and cannot be represented by ideas. We understand we are spirits intuitively and from that we infer that other spirits and the perfect version of them, God, exist. When spirits will something they can act; when they sense however, they are passive as sensing is not voluntary. Anything other than spirts is always passive and can't cause anything.

Because he is using the word "idea", one can be mislead into thinking that these ideas are not real or are completely subjective. Berkeley certainly doesn't want this; technically he is making everything an appearance but the goal is to get rid of the appearance / reality distinction all-together, . After showing that all must be ideas, the next step is to explain the fact that, unlike what we imagine or dream, (external) ideas are beyond our control and are quite predictable and useful, by claiming that they must be the contents of something quite powerful and benevolent: God. Conveniently, this is also a direct proof for the existence of God: since neither we created most of the ideas, nor passive and mind-dependent things like ideas did, there must be something else that created them. The goal is not to turn things into (internal) ideas but (external) ideas into things. This allows him to claim that his philosophy is in line with common sense, since almost nothing has to change. We can still even call these external ideas matter, as long as we understand that they are not absolute beings that have an existence on their own, but ideas in God's mind. His philosophy is also branded as able to defeat scepticism (with overcoming the aforementioned distinction) and atheism (by making God necessary). Matter, by making Deism available, certainly helped those ideas, and indeed after Berkeley's time, an even more extreme version of the mix of materialism with idealism he is arguing against appeared, pure materialism.

The question is whether he successfully shows that this material substratum is as impossible as he claims. A cheap argument of his is that matter involves contradictions, one the infinite regress of requiring itself another substratum and two, that we accept both that it is passive and that it causes things. We also claim that something like pain for example, comes from a needle, but how can something non-living carry pain? It seems laughable but it's just that we have different ontology. We accept that there are some invisible forces, like gravity, which are not spirits but can cause things to move and we also accept that the effect that something produces can be different from the entity that produces it. I am not so sure that, at least when it comes to metaphysics which can't be confirmed with experience, these are anything more than premises that we or he have to take for granted to make our theories coherent. We would say that they are empirically self-evident, but Berkeley would repeatedly asks us if we ever really sensed something material in gravity or better, at its cause or this change that I spoke of. He will say that we intuitively know from our own case that since we are spirits we can will and cause things to happen, but why would we say that anything else can, on its own? We would ask about his knowledge of God but he would say that we can be sure of his existence by starting from our spirit and imagine a flawless version of it. It's all about what kind of argument passes as good or bad, something that changes depending on one's culture.

Berkeley thinks that he proves that all there is are perceptions (which again, are real) by using the relativity argument that he extends to primary qualities too. We accept that secondary qualities like colours, pains and sounds are in our mind and not properties of the external objects since different people experience them differently but he claims that the same applies for length and shape. An ant will see as huge something we see as small. Strictly speaking, he won't even accept that we see the same thing. There is not one image of a table, but a huge amount of images of it that are connected with each other in a very predictable way, making us posit a table and agreeing that it is the same by giving it a name, just because it is convenient. There is no train that we both see and listen; they are different things that usually come together, making us think that there is a train. What we get is infallible, though we can make wrong inferences, for example by assuming that we will see the same thing under different conditions. We find regularities and connections between ideas with science.

What one can even answer to all this? He seems to cut everything so early that it's hard to find a hole in his destructive part. One of course can criticize his constructive part, by challenging the existence of God, but to me his destructive part is great if one wants to stay in scepticism. Then we can just say that we cope with the world by creating the concepts that look like they can provide us with the most comfort. It used to be God, now it's matter and all the other concepts that replaced him, but none is better than the other.

I think that one could "force a draw" by challenging what counts as knowledge. Berkeley, despite being an empiricist accepts other forms of knowledge too. He knows he is a spirit intuitively and he also mentions thought (inferences), memory and revelation as potential ways of knowing things. One then could deny that all we get are perceptions and claim that somehow we know more. Berkeley gives priority to experience, but others, like Descartes, who, in a similarly reductive way tried to shave everything so that he could rely only on certain things, can choose rationality as the tool that provides us with certain knowledge. One could claim that we know intuitively or rationally that objects are something different than ideas and that a better way to explain their stability is to posit this material substratum. It would still be a less parsimonious way of seeing the world, but closer to what prevailed as common sense.

I also read three secondary sources. The stanford encyclopedia which actually takes it really seriously and examines it as if it was a modern theory, Woolhouse, who is better at showing the interactions with previous philosophers and Avgelis who is closer to Woolhouse but in an extreme way -he almost twists him to fit his narrative and doesn't even stress that rejecting materialism and defending Christianity was Berkeley's primary motivations.

[Köksal KÖK · Rating 4 out of 5]

Hylas İle Philonous Arasında Üç Konuşma
George Berkeley,
Çevirmen: K. Sahir Sel
Sosyal Yayınları, 1984.

George Berkeley, (1685-1753)

"Maddeciliği ve tanrı tanımazlığı kesin olarak altetmek amacıyla yola çıkan İrlandalı rahip Berkeley, İngiliz duyumculuğunu en aşırı kertesine vardırarak, duyu verilerini algılayan zihin dışında hiçbir şeyin var olmadığını ileri sürüyor.

Zihin tarafından algılanan şeyler de fikirden başka bir şey olamayacağına göre, var olan her şey fikir cinsindendir. Evren de, algısı her şeyi kucaklayacak kadar geniş ve yüce olan bir Tanrısal Zihnin fikirlerinden ibarettir. Madde diye bir şey yoktur.

Solipsizm'in (yalnızca düşünen süjenin varlığını kabul eden felsefe çeşidi) ve çağdaş sübjektif idealizmin atası olan Berkeley, bu eserinde felsefesini polülarize ederek sunuyor." Arka kapak.

kitabın içeriği hakkında;

kitap, üç bölümden-üç konuşma-sohbetten oluşuyor;

1. bölümde-konuşma-sohbette, renk, ses, tat, görme, zaman, hareket gibi duyusal organlar üzerine bir tartışma yapılıyor.

2. bölümde-konuşma-sohbette, (s.60), beyin, madde, zihin, tanrı, araç-amaç konuları ele alınmış.

3. bölümde-konuşma-sohbette, (s.89), bilgi, maddi cevher, fikir, zihin, eşya, espri-esprit-ruh, sezgi, Tanrı, spiritüel cevher, maddi cevher, Musa, Vahiy, yaratılış konularını ele alan diyalog.

"duyulur şeyler, onları algıladığımız için vardır."

"Tanrı, sonsuz zihin".

"algılanan, fikirlerin bir kümesidir".

"objeler zihinde varlardır."

"şey, duyularımızın objeleridirler."

Tanrı, Musa, Vahiy, Yaratılış.

-fikir-idea,
-anatip-arşetip, archetype, arketip,
-intellect, entellekt, tanrısal akıl.

YORUMUM;

kitapta Hylas İle Philonousun tartışmasına şahit oluyoruz. burada Philonous rolünü konuşturan sanırım, Berkeley. ve dominant bir tip olarak şiddetle savunduğu fikirleri, bizim garibana zorla benimsetiyor. üstad platon bile, bu kadar insanı zorlamamış, fikrini söylemiş, yolu göstermiştir. Börkli ise, neredeyse adamı dövecek, ağlata ağlata fikrini kabul ettiriyo garibana.

neyse, gelelim, ne savunduğuna; "ancak fikirler vardır, madde yoktur. bunlar sanı dır, duyularımızın aldatmasıdır."

bu görüşe, şu basit veriyle-soruyla katılmadığımı belirtiyor ve taşı kuyuya atıyorum:

e o zaman, acıktığımda duyularımın aldanışına mı geldim, elimi sobaya tuttuğumda da cildim beni fena mı aldattı.

BAZEN, GERÇEK, YAINBAŞIMIZDADIR: BEN VARIM, kanımla canımla tüm varlığımla varım, düşünüyorum o halde varım; hissediyorum, o halde varım, ayaklarım toprağa bastığı müddetçe varım, aşağı bakıp doğa anaya yüz sürdükçe gerçeğim; başımı yukarı kaldırıp güneşe baktıkça canlıyım, şimdi ve burdayım, kendimin veyahut birbaşkasının rüyası değil. matrix felsefesi, tasavvuf ve doğu öğretilerinin ilhamı, insana kamil olma yolunu gösterir açar.

yine de itiraf etmem gerekirse, şu Tanrı, Musa, Vahiy, Yaratılış konularındaki anlatımını çok beğendim. bu koonuda hakkını vereyim yazarın. Tanrıyı yüce bir güç, sonsuz bir zihin olarak tanımlaması bilgece, ve de bence doğrusu.
12.12.2017

[فؤاد · Rating 3 out of 5]

رؤیای الهی

اسقف جورج بارکلی فیلسوف ایرلندی، توی این کتاب نظریه اساسی خودش رو مطرح می کنه که بهترین و جذاب ترین راه برای آغاز کنجکاوی فلسفیه. اگه من کاره ای بودم، اولین درس فلسفه رو توضیح این کتاب میذاشتم تا کنجکاوی دانش آموز به اندازه کافی برای سفر دشواری که قراره آغاز کنه، تحریک بشه.

ما همواره در رؤیا اشیایی رو می بینیم، صداشون رو می شنویم، لمس شون می کنیم، و در حین رؤیا هرگز متوجه نمی شیم که اینا واقعیت ندارن. متوجه نمیشیم که اینا تنها تصویری بدون حقیقت هستن. بلکه حتا گاه بعد از بیدار شدن هم فکر می کنیم که واقعیت داشتن؛ می پرسیم: وقتی خواب بودم کی بود که مدام من رو صدا می کرد؟ هیچ کس!
اسقف بارکلی می گه: از کجا معلوم که بیداری هم همین نباشه؟ از کجا معلوم که خدا، بدون اون که در حقیقت سیبی باشه، تصویر و بو و طعم سیب رو توی ذهن من ایجاد نکرده باشه تا من فکر کنم که حقیقتاً سیبی به کاره؟ از کجا معلوم که خدا بودن این که در حقیقت تنبوری باشه، آهنگ تنبور رو توی ذهن من ایجاد نکرده باشه؟ یا خنکای آب رو؟ یا سنگینی وزنه رو؟ از کجا معلوم که کلّ جهان یک رؤیای الهی نباشه؟

به عبارت دیگه: ما تنها تصویری از اشیا می بینیم. از کجا می تونیم ثابت کنیم پشت این تصویر، "چیزی" هست؟

[Khristy · Rating 3 out of 5]

Berkeley makes so many mistakes in this work that his philosophical position appears absurd by its nature. However, it is by far the most entertaining philosophical read in Modern Philosophy, as when read aloud, and in character. It is a work through which the reader can follow a man in the prime of his youth through the initial conception of a theory, and watch him unfold it, to its maturest state, right before her eyes. It also happens to be a pretty good case against a bold and unyielding empiricism, in favor of a more rationalistic epistemology. Berkeley is to Modern Philosophy what Plato is to Ancient Philosophy--this is true both in style, complexity, and philosophical import.

[Steven · Rating 3 out of 5]

This has to be one of the most outrageous books I've ever read. When I was starting I thought he was a bit mad since Berkeley (yes, the same Berkeley as UC Berkeley) is famous for his denial of the existence of matter. But it was a famous book so why not.

I think Berkeley is a genius. He's famous for only this one idea that is so contrary to common sense that it cannot be true but it cannot be refuted. His main argument is basically that something only exist when perceived. Trees only exist when someone is looking at it. They exist in the form of ideas in our mind. Without minds, such objects cannot be conceived. No object can be imagined without sensual qualities (e.g. form, color, heat, motion) and that means they cannot be imagined to contain qualities that are not perceived. "Well surely things continue to exist even when we're not looking?" you might ask. Here comes God to the rescue, since God is an absolute being who always exists and who relies on his own existence. Since he perceives all objects, the objects exist in him alone. Note that Berkeley does not deny the existence of everyday objects. He argues that tables, chairs continue to exist. It's that they are ideas, not matter.

In fact, Berkeley was even more trusting on common sense than other philosophers such as Locke or Hume, since they argued that we only perceive aspects of matter that can be seen. As of those that can't be seen, that remains a mystery, awaiting further scientific discovery to unravel them. While this is how most scientists nowadays think, Berkeley wants none of it. He considers this 'things that can't be seen' as nonsense. It's an assumption that we don't need. According to Berkeley, what exists are things that seem as what they look like, not some "matter in its truest form whose form is a mystery to us due to our senses' limitations". In fact, this is his way of combating the materialism and atheism so common in his days, by asserting that matter don't exist. God need to intervene in such a world. If Berkeley is right, then atheism and materialism would be destroyed in one fell swoop. Yep, such ambition.

What distinguishes Berkeley's idea from a mere curiosity that it might have been is his deep analysis on what it means to perceive. He is one of the most original idealist - that is someone who only recognizes the existence of ideas as opposed to matter, and one of the most consistent at that. He can be considered as one of the founding fathers of idealism. Kant, Hegel and Fichte owes a lot to him. Hume acknowledges his debt to him. In the modern days, his concept of time prefigures Einstein's relativity in that absolute time does not exist. Curiously, the Heisenberg Uncertainty principle might have something to do with Berkeley's ideas too, for according to a layman's way of understanding it, the act of perceiving a particle changes its position/momentum.

As for me, I think his philosophy is a mere curiosity. It was based on some outdated ideas on physics (he thought objects contain 'heat' or 'cold'). Also, I have some issues with it, for instance who perceives God? Also, some of the objections that he tried to answer in the third dialogue didn't really settle the issue. Berkeley pointed out that some of the issues that might be challenging for his immaterialism are actually the same challenges for materialism e.g. when multiple people see an object, how do we know that it's the same object? Berkeley said the same objection could be raised to materialism in that we cannot know the underlying substance that results in the perception. But still, the objection remains unanswered. Funnily, none of my objections (nor other people's throughout history) are conclusive disprove of this curious idea. I think Berkeley's main idea is wrong, but the way he got to it, oh man, so clever.

Do I recommend it? This is one of those books which has an easy language free of jargon but tough to get through because the ideas move quickly and the topic is so fundamental. I got through it slowly, often rereading sentences and entire paragraphs. Also, that Philonous dude is a pretty sharp fellow. If you're into philosophy, I recommend it, otherwise there's no need.

[BonGard]

نمیدونم چرا جدیدن هر متن فلسفی میخونم افسردگیم به شدت برمیگرده و شایدم تصادفی نیست و از دل متن میاد ولی برکلی اصطلاح معروفی داره با عنوان " بودن، درک شدن است " که برای درک مفهومی که مدنظرش بوده این متن کمک می‌کند و شاید هم گیج‌تر کند واقعن دیگر نمی‌دانم

[Noah Goats · Rating 3 out of 5]

I've been working on a science fiction story that in small part explores some of Berkeley's ideas about reality, and I realized I've only read about his philosophy secondhand. I thought I'd better go to the source if I wanted to make sure I was getting it right.

The Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous explore the nature of reality. Berkeley had some rather odd ideas about reality, in that he believed that reality consisted entirely of ideas. When you see an object, he claimed, you are looking at something that was created by your perception itself, something that has no material existence. Philonous presents Berkeley's side of the debate between Idealism and Materialism, and the hapless Hylas argues the contrary. As in almost any philosophical dialogue, the character arguing for the philosopher's own view mops the floor with his opponent. I found myself wishing I could push Hylas out of the way and take over the argument myself.

Berkeley's ideas, although ridiculous, are interesting, and yet this book manages to be dull and I never would have finished it if it hadn't been so short. I should have been content with my second hand understanding of Berkeley.

[Peter J. · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent work challenging the materialists, though I haven't entirely decided if I agree or not with the ultimate conclusion, that all is either spirit or idea. Was an interesting thought experiment either way.

[Laurent Dv]

C’est un dialogue publié après ses fameux Principes de la connaissance pour présenter sa pensée (son immatérialisme qui dit que la matière n’existe pas mais qu’il n’existe que des choses immatérielles, des pensées et des esprits) d’une façon plus accessible. Il est très agréable et facile à lire. Son but est de réfuter le scepticisme et l’athéisme qui conquéraient beaucoup de gens en prouvant l’immatérialisme et en détruisant le matérialisme. Son œuvre a été mal accueillie à son époque.

Philonous le représente (un immatérialiste) et Hypas un sceptique de ses thèses (matérialiste puis sceptique radical).

Dialogue 1 :
Il montre d’abord qu’il n’y a de sensations que dans notre esprit pas dans les choses en dehors (par exemple la chaleur n’existe que dans notre esprit et pas vraiment dans les choses externes). Il passe en revue chaque type de sensations un par un : le toucher, le son, les couleurs. L’argument est le même : comme chacun sent une même chose différemment (ex : un objet est froid pour un et chaud pour un autre, un objet a une couleur différente pour plusieurs personnes en fonction de l’environnement comme la présence ou l’absence de lumière, etc.), cela montre que les objets ne possèdent pas ces attributs qu’on leur attribue. Ce ne sont que des qualités secondaires (Berkeley reprend la division classique de Locke dans Essai sur l’entendement humain) : des idées dans nos têtes (même si pour Locke ce sont plutôt des qualités capables de susciter des idées). Les qualités primaires sont des qualités quantitatives comme l’étendue, la masse, etc.

L’étape suivante est de montrer que les qualités primaires n’existent également que dans l’esprit. Comme on ne peut concevoir les qualités secondaires sans les qualités primaires et que les qualités secondaires n’existent que dans l’esprit, alors les qualités primaires n’existent aussi que dans l’esprit.

Ils traitent ensuite des sens, actif, passif, etc. (pas trop compris à relire).

Hylas essaye de sauver sa peau en défendant qu’il existe quand même un substratum sensible (substance) non perceptible (donc il existe bien des choses matérielles) par les sens qui existent sous ces qualités subjectives. Phylonous répond par l’absurde avec une régression à l’infini : sous l’étendue, il faudrait que le substratum ait un autre type d’étendue, etc. Et ainsi de suite. On ne peut donc rien connaître, rien concevoir de ce substratum, il reste donc trop contradictoire pour exister.

Dialogue 2 :
Dans ce deuxième dialogue, Berkeley interagit avec les diverses positions de son temps (mécanisme cartésien, Spinoza, Hobbes, la vision en Dieu de Malebranche etc.). Pour la différence avec Malebranche, Berkeley ne dit pas comme lui que nous connaissons les choses (même physiques) en voyant directement les idées des choses en regardant les idées EN Dieu. Ce qui veut dire que les perceptions physiques (toucher, entendre, voir, etc.) ne sont en fait pas vraiment des expériences sensibles. Au contraire, il maintient fermement l’existence des sensations physiques mais qui ne sont possibles que parce que nous nous trouvons tous dans les pensées de Dieu (et non dans une matière qui a une expérience indépendante/auto-suffisante).

Il est aussi de nouveau longuement question de la matière. Hylas se réfugie dans ses derniers retranchements : il persiste à défendre l’existence de la manière mais sans savoir ce que c’est, c’est quelque chose qu’il ne comprend pas du tout. Phylonous va montrer l’inanité de son concept de la matière, il n’y a même pas possibilité de pointer une contradictoire dans ce concept car il est pur néant.

Dialogue 3 :
Dans ce dernier dialogue, les rôles s’inversent : c’est à Hylas (il joue le rôle d’un sceptique convaincu, qu’on ne peut pas connaître la nature profonde de quoi que ce soit) de poser les questions à Phylonous, de remettre en doute sa théorie. Il enchaîne une série d’objections (ex : la théorie de Philonous fait de Dieu l’auteur du péché, un malin génie comme Descartes qui trompe tout le monde, l’apologie du solipsisme/le subjectivisme), en particulier il essaye de retourner les objections de Philonous face à sa croyance en la matière contre lui-même.

[Fatimah · Rating 3 out of 5]

Wanna document my notes of this reading;
This book is like a meta-debate; the main debate is Idealism VS Materialism, but inside this big debate, lie other 2 debates: Skepticism (Empiricism ((Direct Realism VS Indirect Realism)) VS Rationalism), as well as Atheism VS Faith.
Well, of course the latter wasn't all-inclusive. It was stated tho at the end of the dialogues as a crucial result.

Anyway , I sorted Berkeley's arguments as following:
1:
- The Argument from pleasure & pain
- The idea of primary & secondary qualities (Locke's)
from which he concluded that nothing we're experiencing in mind-independent. Everything depends solely on our minds.
2:
- The Master Argument
from which he concluded his famous "Esse est percipi."
and that only sensations recognized by our minds, exist.
And that we cannot anymore distinguish between reality & appearance.
And that only God protects us from ceasing to exist, as he's the ultimate observer. So as long as he keeps observing us, we exist.
___________________________________________________________

Other interesting ideas i linked to this reading:
1. Descartes's "Cogito, ergo sum."
2. The likeness principle
3. The Master Argument's raised rejections
4. The matrix triology
Well, isn't 1 & 4 are basically the same thing? lol

[Ehab mohamed · Rating 4 out of 5]

باركلي أحد هؤلاء الفلاسفة الذين لم يكتف ناقدوه بتسفيه فلسفته ولكن قصدوا عمدا عرضها بشكل هزلي، مضحك، سخيف، وخاطيء.

والسبب معلوم، ألا وهو أنه رجل دين هاجم المفكرين الأحرار، أنبياء العصر الحديث، عصر لا يحل فيه إلا الإلحاد أو اللأدرية، أما الفلسفات الدينية فلا مكان لها بين المتنورين، فالبنسبة لهم باسكال ساذج وأحمق برهانه الساذج ، وباركلي رجعي، متعصب، بل وحمار أنكر الوجود الواقعي، وأنكر وجود المادة، وعاش في عالم من الأفكار المثالية التي لا تمت للواقع بشئ!

فهل باركلي أنكر الوجود الواقعي، وأنكر وجود المادة، وهل هو ساذج ينكر وجود كل شيء؟

باركلي أثبت الوجود المحسوس بكل لذاته وآلامه، ولكنه قال أن هذا الوجود وجود عقلي، والوجود العقلي هو هو وجود الأشياء.

والوجود عقلي إما معقولات أو محسوسات، ولا سبيل للمحسوسات إلا بدخول الجسم كصور عقلية وتمثلات، وليس في إمكان إنسان أن يتمثل الوجود المحسوس بغير ذلك: صور عقلية وتمثلات، وليس هناك وجود غير ذلك الوجود العقلي، وبالتالي هو ألغى ثنائية الفلاسفة القائلة بوجود عالمين، وجود مدرك محسوس، ووجود في ذاته لا سبيل للحس لإدراكه، وقال أن الوجود ما يعقله ويتصوره الإنسان ويحسه، وهو وجود حقيقي، ولا وجود لشيء في ذاته لا يمكن إدراكه.

ولكن هذا الفيلسوف الأخمق قد أنكر وجود المادة، فهل هو أعمى لا يرى، وأصم لا يسمع!

بيركلي أنكر بالفعل المادة، ولكن ما هي المادة التي أنكرها؟! المادة التي قصد بيركلي إنكارها هي الهيولي أو الجوهر المادي باعتباره وجود مستقل لا يمكن إدراكه.

حاول يا صديقي أن تتصور مفهوم (المادة) في (عقلك) فهل يمكنك تصور شيئا إلا أن يكون ذو شكل وامتداد وصفات بعينها، أم تتصور شيئا آخر؟! فإذا تصورتها كشكل له امتداد ووزن وصفات ويكون احتوائها في مكان، فإنك لم تتصور إلا صفات وصور حسية جمعتها من ذاكرتك لتكوين هذه الصورة، إذا المادة مجرد صورة عقلية لا وجود لها باستقلال عن العقل! ولكن إذا تصورتها شيئا أوليا خلوا من الصفات كجوهر موضوعي مستقل لا يمكن إدراكه، فإنك تصورت ما لا يمكن تصوره وإدراكه، بل صورتها كإله لا قدرة على سبر أغواره، وتكون المادة تحولت لإله معبود، وهذا بالضبط ما قاله الماركسيون، لا وجود إلا للمادة والحركة، ولا سبيل لتعريف المادة لأنها جنس الأجناس، وبالتالي لا يمكن تعريفها بجنس تقع تحته مع صفته الفصل، حسب منطق أرسطو!

قال أفلاطون بوجود مثل واقعية موضوعية لها وجود مستقل يصاغ الواقع على شاكلته وما الواقع إلا نماذج صيغت من النموذج الأصلي، ثم جاء أرسطو وأنزل مُثل أفلاطون إلى الأرض وقال أن كل شيء مكون من : صورة (شكل) و هيولي (مادة)، وأن المادة قديمة قدم الإله، وأن هذه المادة القديمة كانت بلا صورة أو شكل، وسماها الهيولي، وهي المادة التي قال بيركلي باستحالة تصورها، لأنه من المستحيل تصور مادة بلا صورة، وأن الفصل ما بين المادة والصورة والذي قال به أرسطو، هو فصل ذهني، لا يتم إلا داخل العقل، ويستحيل إدراك المادة إلا مصورة ذات امتداد وصفات وشكل!

وبالتالي خرج بيركلي من شك الفلاسفة - وكان هذا هدف كتابه - الذين أثبتوا وجودين أحدهما مدرك محسوس وآخر موجود لذاته يستحيل إدراكه، وقال بوجود واحد فقط حقيقي وملموس، وسار ومؤلم، وهو الوجود العقلي.

فهل فلسفة كهذه، اتفقنا أو اختلفنا معها، ساذجة ودوجمائية ومتعصبة وتنكر الوجود؟!

والغريب أن منهج باركلي أشبه بمنهج ديكارت، ديكارات المبجل، رائد الفلسفة الحديثة والفاتح والممهد لعصر التنوير!

ولكنني أعلم جيدا أنني إذا قلت: إن منهج باركلي الموصوم بالسذاجة وفقا (لمنطقه الداخلي) لهو أكثر تماسكا ومنطقية وعقلانية من منهج ديكارت صاحب السعادة الموسوم بأنه رائد العقلانية الحديثة، أعلم جيدا أنني سأوصم أنا أيضا بالسذاجة وعدم الفهم!

ولكن فلنعقد - قبل الحكم - مقارنة بين المنهجين.
فكما نعلم استخدم ديكارت منهجه الشكي، لا لإنكار كل شيء، ولكن للوصول أولا لحقيقة واضحة ومحددة بذاتها لا شك فيها، ثم ينتقل منها لإثبات غيرها بنفس الوضوح والتحديد.

وأول ما أثبته ديكارت هو الوجود العقلي (الفكر) باعتباره أول حقيقة واضحة ومحددة بذاتها لا يمكن الشك فيها، لأنه قد يشك في كل شيء إلا في أنه يشك، بالتالي أول ما يمكن إثباته بوضوح هو الفكر، ولكنه لا يمكنه إثبات شيء آخر لنفسه إلا أنه يفكر، أما جسده والعالم الخارجي، فلا يمكن إثباتهم بمجرد الفكر، إذًا لا وجود إلا للوجود العقلي إلى الآن!، ولكنه وجد أن فكره الذي لا شك فيه يؤدي به بالضرورة إلى إثبات وجود لكائن أزلي كلي العلم كلي القدرة ألا وهو الله، وذلك بعدها الفكرة الثانية الأكثر وضوحا وتحديدا، فلا وجود إلى الآن إلا للوجود العقلي الروحي البسيط المجرد من المادة، ولكن ديكارت عاد من السماء نزولا إلى الأرض لإثبات وجود المادة والعالم الخارجي، لا باعتباره وجود أدركه بشكل مباشر، ويمكن البرهنة عليه فكريا، ولكن أثبته من خلال إيمانه بالله الذي لا يمكن أن يخدع عباده بوهم ومظاهر لا حقيقة لها ولا وجود لها، إذًا الوجود المادي حقيقة بحكم الإيمان والتسليم بوجود الله، ومن هنا نجد ثنائية المادة والعقل عند ديكارت!

لم يفعل باركلي إلا ما فعله ديكارت، ولكنه كان أجرأ وأكثر عقلانية ومنطقية، بأنه أخذ الفكرة إلى أقصى حدودها، فهو أثبت كما أثبت ديكارت أن أولى الحقائق الواضحة والمحددة بذاتها هي الفكر (الوجود العقلي) ولكنه اعتبرها أولى الحقائق وآخرها، فهو كما فعل ديكارت عرج بعقله إلى السماء ولكنه لم ينزل إلى الأرض مرة آخرى، حيث وجد أنه لما كان غير ممكن للإنسان العاقل أن يدرك الوجود إلا من خلال التصورات العقلية، و لما كان عقل الإنسان محدود وضعيف وعاجز عن إدراك الكون (حسيا) في كليته وإدراك ما كان وما سيكون بل وإدراك كل الوجود في لمحة واحدة بكواكبه ونجومه ومجراته، فيلزم لإدراك هذا الوجود في كليته وأبديته ولا تناهيه عقل أزلي أبدي لا نهائي ، كلي العلم والقدرة، لا يغيب عنه مثقال ذره في الأرض ولا في السماء يحفظ للكون وجوده في كليته، إذًا الوجود كله حقيقي وواقعي باعتباره إدراك عقلي لعقل (إلهي) أزلي كلي العلم والقدرة، وإدراك عقلي لعقل إنساني جزئي ونسبي ومحدود العلم والقدرة ، ولا حاجة إلى إثبات مادة إلى جانب العقل، لأن فكرة (العقل) التي لا شك فيها كافية للتفسير!

وبالتالي نجد أن ثنائية ديكارت مصطنعة لأنه سلم بوجود المادة إيمانيًا بعد أن سلم بوجود الفكر والله عقليًا، ولكن باركلي أثبت وجودا واحدا، وجودا عقليا ، شاملا، لا حاجة فيه لثنائيات مصطنعة نلجأ فيها لمجرد التسليم والإيمان!

فهل بذلك يكون من سلم بوجود المادة إيمانيًا أكثر عقلانية ممن لم يدخل الإيمان في منهجه، ولم يحتاج في منطقه، بمسلمات عقائدية!

نعم، هدف باركلي كان دينيا ، فهو يسعى منذ بداية الكتاب إلى دحض ثنائية الفلاسفة، وإلى إثبات وجود الله، لا صعودا من المادة ، ولا نزولا من الفكر، ولكن باعتباره شرط للوجود اللانهائي، الأزلي، الأبدي، الذي يستلزم عقلا أبديا، أزليا، كلي العلم، كلي الوجود، وذلك لأن العالم الحسي لا يمكن إدراكه إلا عقليا، فوجب وجود مثل هذا العقل ليحفظ للكون وجوده ولا تناهيه!

وأنا هنا لست بصدد التدليل على أن فلسفة باركلي أكثر عقلانية ولا أن برهانه عن وجود الله يقيني لا يقبل الشك، فكلاهما - إذا استخدمنا لغة كيركيجارد - قد قفزا قفزات إيمانية، ولا أسعى لذلك، ولكنه تفكير وحوار مع النفس بصوت عالي، ومحاولة لقراءة نصوص مورس ضدها أنواعا من التشويه، ونقل للمغالطات التي تزيت بزي الحقيقة وأكسبها الزمن بهرج اليقين، وذلك دون عودة للنص الأصلي!

[Will E Hazell · Rating 4 out of 5]

A persuasive argument with some fun deductions, and a surprisingly easy read. You can feel the utter frustration of Berkeley at his contemporaries. They can concede to every step in his logic chain, but still won’t let go of their intuition. Berkeley’s Idealism asserts that there is no external world (and that matter is an illusion). It’s a hard thing to refute.

G.E. Moore has a fun ‘refutation’ which goes something like: on the one hand, the Bishop may be right, but the other hand proves him wrong! It’s not exactly a slam dunk, but at a certain point you need to agree on some point of reality so you can talk about more important things than hyper-theoretical philosophy (let’s focus on meaningful things like ethics). In Moore’s case that line in the sand is: that we have two hands. Apparently these are called “Moorean Facts”, which are intuitive ‘truths’ you’re not willing to argue further on. It might seem like a break in epistemic etiquette to deploy it in an argument. But it’s something to keep in the back pocket when talking with the most insufferable subjectivist or moral relativist.

[jude · Rating 4 out of 5]

berkeley offers a very interesting — one could almost say charming — dialogue between two characters who somehow seem to rise above their station as the author's mere talking points and actually deliver to the reader witty repartees and delightful character development.

as for the philosophy, what can i say? berkeley makes fair points for his position, and philonous excellently handles hylas' retorts and refutations with ease for the most part (though, quite tellingly, he appears weak in certain points, most notably in trying to argue that murder can't be justifiably traced to God's great grace) and hylas is simply hitched along a philosophical ride that leads to illumination at long last.

students of philosophy should read this at least once. the edition i read (broadview press, 2012) also offers quite the helpful introduction and some handy appendices that would help for people who want to gain a deeper understanding.

[Kimberly Thorson · Rating 5 out of 5]

Thoroughly enjoyed this. Am slightly concerned that I may be becoming an objective (or at least epistemological) idealist... We'll see.

Philonous' monologues at the start of Dialogue 2 were beautiful.

I loved the contrast between 'I'm just returning to common sense' "NOTHING EXISTS" 'it's literally self-evident' "MATERIALISM IS STUPID" 'I'm just appealing to the common-man' "WE ARE ALL FINITE SPIRITS" 'strictly speaking I dont know God at all' "OBVIOUSLY IM NOT A SCEPTIC"

I also kind of ship Hyl and Phil? Cuties meeting up in a garden to do a sassy Socratic dialogue

[Luna · Rating 5 out of 5]

Basically the material world does not exist per se, and it's repugnant to think it does exist.

[Cal Davie · Rating 4 out of 5]

Bishop Berkeley had an astonishing capacity for deep philosophical reflection, and is an example to us all. He here defends his views in a fictitious dialogue, arguing that the world is made of ideas, rather than matter. All being sustained in the mind of God, it gives substantial reality to life.

You may disagree with his conclusions, but his writing and depth of thought are nothing short of excellent. The only critique I have is that it's a tad repetitive, and Hylas could have come up with some stronger arguments. However, this is a brilliant read for anyone who wants to be more philosophically engaged.

[Plato · Rating 5 out of 5]

berkeley haters are actually cringe

[sophia]

i need to get on this vibe of writing as myself destroying my biggest hater