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Masters of Command: Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, and the Genius of Leadership
In Masters of Command, Barry Strauss compares the way the three greatest generals of the ancient world—Alexander, Hannibal, and Caesar—waged war and draws lessons from their experiences that apply on and off the battlefield. Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar—each was a master of war. Each had to look beyond the battlefield to decide whom to fight, when, and why; to know what victory was and when to end the war; to determine how to bring stability to the lands he conquered. Each general had to be a battlefield tactician and more: a statesman, a strategist, a leader.
Tactics change, weapons change, but war itself remains much the same throughout the centuries, and a great warrior must know how to define success. Understanding where each of these three great (but flawed) commanders succeeded and failed can serve anyone who wants to think strategically or has to demonstrate leadership. In Masters of Command, Barry Strauss explains the qualities these great generals shared, the keys to their success, from ambition and judgment to leadership itself.
The result of years of research, Masters of Command is based on surviving written documents and archeological evidence as well as the author’s travels in Italy, France, Greece, Turkey, and Tunisia in the footsteps of Alexander, Hannibal, and Caesar.
Tactics change, weapons change, but war itself remains much the same throughout the centuries, and a great warrior must know how to define success. Understanding where each of these three great (but flawed) commanders succeeded and failed can serve anyone who wants to think strategically or has to demonstrate leadership. In Masters of Command, Barry Strauss explains the qualities these great generals shared, the keys to their success, from ambition and judgment to leadership itself.
The result of years of research, Masters of Command is based on surviving written documents and archeological evidence as well as the author’s travels in Italy, France, Greece, Turkey, and Tunisia in the footsteps of Alexander, Hannibal, and Caesar.
320 pages, Hardcover
First published May 1, 2012
152 people are currently reading
1896 people want to read
About the author
Barry S. Strauss
46 books332 followersBarry Strauss, professor of history and classics at Cornell University, is a leading expert on ancient military history. He has written or edited several books, including The Battle of Salamis, The Trojan War, The Spartacus War, Masters of Command, The Death of Caesar, and Ten Caesars.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 90 reviews
July 7, 2024
Alexandru, Hannibal și Cezar au fost comandanți talentați care au înfruntat adversari cu resurse umane și financiare aparent infinite. Fiecare comandant a avut la dispoziție o armată loială, experimentată și victorioasă.
Cartaginezii au pierdut războiul din cauza unei erori de strategie. Și-au imprăștiat forțele pe prea multe fronturi (în Italia, Hispania, Sicilia și Sardinia). Un alt factor care a contribuit la înfrângerea cartaginezilor a fost reținerea lui Hannibal de a asedia cetățile. Alexandru și Cezar au fost asediatori renumiți.
Mi-a fost greu să urmăresc desfășurarea bătăliilor. Doar cele mai importante bătălii (Gaugamela, Canae, Pharsalos) au atașate hărți.
Recomand
Cartaginezii au pierdut războiul din cauza unei erori de strategie. Și-au imprăștiat forțele pe prea multe fronturi (în Italia, Hispania, Sicilia și Sardinia). Un alt factor care a contribuit la înfrângerea cartaginezilor a fost reținerea lui Hannibal de a asedia cetățile. Alexandru și Cezar au fost asediatori renumiți.
Mi-a fost greu să urmăresc desfășurarea bătăliilor. Doar cele mai importante bătălii (Gaugamela, Canae, Pharsalos) au atașate hărți.
Recomand
September 28, 2015
Compelling account of three of the world's most famous conquers.The book purposes to show their successes,their failures and their similarities through the stages of battle.Who had the best attack,resistance,clash and who knew how and when to end it?What were their plans to govern their new found empires and who succeeded with these plans and who failed?The author brings some interesting and insightful perspectives into these three geniuses of war and I thought it was well written and knowledgeable.
December 30, 2020
After being bit disappointed by The Ten Caesars, I was a bit weary about reading something else by Barry Strauss. But his other book sounded so interesting so I decided to bite the bullet and how surprised I was. This is a great informative non fiction that keeps you focused on the information without being boring. It's written with great talent and it was a joy to read. Have big hope for the other books now and I hope I will enjoy them just as much.
March 3, 2018
Saggio davvero bello e godibile, tipicamente anglosassone nello stile di scrittura.
Tre vite, tre nomi leggendari della storia mondiale (antica e moderna) messi a confronto nel segmento centrale della loro vita, giudicati secondo i canoni della loro epoca (com'è giusto che sia) e secondo quelli senza tempo dell'arte della guerra, del comando e della politica.
Sapere chi fu il più grande è abbastanza inutile e plenoastico, e Strauss investe come risposta a questo domando l'ultimo capoverso dell'ultimo capitolo. Giustamente. Furono uomini eccezionali, fulmini a ciel sereno e protagonisti di cammini assolutamente irripetibili e presi letteralmente a modello e a esempio da innumerevoli personaggi nel corso della storia.
Forse solo Napoleone ebbe un impatto sul suo tempo e sui secoli a venire così importante, sia come stratega militare che come capo politico; tuttavia quei tre hanno influenzato i 2000 anni di storia a noi più prossimi in maniera pesantissima. Il che, non è poco.
Dice Strauss che dei tre, Cesare fu il miglior politico (senza dubbio) e il più lucido nel delineare strategie efficaci a lungo termine. Figura straordinaria, d'intuito forse inarrivabile, Cesare dalla sua ebbe gli anni passati da giovane nella politica romana, dove da bravo aristocratico maneggione cominciò a comprendere il funzionamento della macchina del potere (esperienza che agli altri due mancò, invece) e il fatto di cominciare la sua sfolgorante ascesa da uomo fatto e finito (Cesare va alla guerra in Gallia alla veneranda età di 42 anni): ciò gli garantì una maturità di pensiero e di azione senza pari.
Alessandro fu grande stratega, grandissimo comandante di campo, dotato di intuito fulmineo e pensiero rapidissimo, entrò nella storia come un lampo: una luce sfolgorante e un successivo tuono che cambiarono per sempre lo sviluppo successivo dell'Europa e dell'Asia occidentale. Fu tuttavia anche uomo dai notevoli vizi, posseduto da manie di grandezza senza confini che lo portarono a ampliare l'impero conquistato oltre i limiti fisici entro cui esso poteva essere contenuto, perdendo la fiducia del nucleo macedone del suo esercito (che come noto si ammutinò in India) e disinteressandosi quasi totalmente delle questione amministrative dopo la conquista. La sua opera venne proseguita dai suoi generali, i diadochi, che allegramente passarono i successivi decenni a ammazzarsi fra loro dividendo le spoglie dello sterminato territorio. Non fu un gran politico insomma, ma un comandante straordinario e un visionario che diede il là alla prima globalizzazione (culturale, soprattutto) conosciuta.
Infine, la palma di miglior comandante in campo va all'uomo che osò l'impossibile, ossia sfidare lo stato più potente del mondo antico sul suo territorio, dopo aver attraversato le Alpi d'inverno (e mica c'erano i trafori autostradali) e aver sconfitto Roma in tre sanguinose battaglie per poi disintegrarne quasi completamente le forze, sbaragliando l'esercito campale più grande da loro mai messo in campo fino a quel momento nel più perfetto e letale balletto bellico che la storia d'Occidente avesse (e abbia) mai visto. Ma, dopo Canne, ad Annibale mancò l'audacia di Cesare e Alessandro, e invece di assaltare Roma temporeggiò, sperando che la città si arrendesse: ma Roma era un monolite di granito all'epoca, e non si arrese. La guerra si trascinò negli anni, a totale deleterio dei Cartaginesi, che in una guerra di logoramento non potevano vincere contro le infinite risorse dei Romani. Alla fine, tutto ebbe termine a Zama, in Africa, dove il genio di Annibale trovò pane per i suoi denti (Scipione) e comunque quasi riuscì a vincere: tuttavia, anche nella sconfitta, Annibale seppe essere lungimirante e negli anni che successivamente i Romani gli lasciarono passare a Cartagine seppe dimostrarsi ottimo politico, risollevandone l'economia. Ormai tuttavia Annibale aveva liberato il mostro, che nei decenni successivi avrebbe finito per divorare la sua città e l'intero Mediterraneo.
Un'osservazione: viviamo in tempi bui, di democrazia in agonia e politica rissosa e priva d'idee, incapace di affrontare i grandi problemi del presente. I tempo assomigliano insomma a quelli in cui venne a trovarsi Cesare, che fu semplicemente il migliore a emergere dalle ceneri della seconda guerra civile; differentemente da Silla, il vincitore della prima guerra civile che non tenne per sé il potere ma dopo appena un paio d'anni lo riconsegnò contro ogni previsione al Senato, Cesare non ebbe scrupoli a farsi dittatore a vita e re di fatto (ma non di nome), semplicemente perché aveva perfettamente capito che la vecchia Repubblica aveva fatto, da qualunque parte la si guardava, il suo tempo e che c'era disperato bisogno di pace e stabilità, di un nuovo ordine politico imperniato sulle nuove classi emergenti (provinciali e notabili popolani) e sul decisionismo. Infatti le cose, con Augusto, andarono esattamente in quella direzione.
Banalmente, mi sa che siamo nelle stesse condizioni, e che il Cesare dei nostri tempi sia ancora di là da venire, ma che prima o poi arriverà (e non giudico se sia un bene o un male - probabilmente un male, dato che anche il pur lungimirante e clemente Cesare, al bisogno, sapeva essere lupo fra i lupi e che comunque finire alla mercede delle bizze di un uomo solo al comando non ha MAI portato bene ai singoli individui).
Chiudo con l'ultimo paragrafo del libro, che nella sua concisione estrema mi pare un'ottima anticipazione dello stile dell'opera per chi volesse cimentarsi con la lettura:
"In conclusione fu Cesare il più grande dei comandanti del mondo antico. Annibale è l'eroe della cause perdute e delle battaglie perfette. Alessandro è un astro senza paragoni. Cesare, con tutti i suoi difetti, si avvicinò più di tutti all'arte dello statista."
Amen, mi verrebbe da dire.
Lettura molto consigliata.
Tre vite, tre nomi leggendari della storia mondiale (antica e moderna) messi a confronto nel segmento centrale della loro vita, giudicati secondo i canoni della loro epoca (com'è giusto che sia) e secondo quelli senza tempo dell'arte della guerra, del comando e della politica.
Sapere chi fu il più grande è abbastanza inutile e plenoastico, e Strauss investe come risposta a questo domando l'ultimo capoverso dell'ultimo capitolo. Giustamente. Furono uomini eccezionali, fulmini a ciel sereno e protagonisti di cammini assolutamente irripetibili e presi letteralmente a modello e a esempio da innumerevoli personaggi nel corso della storia.
Forse solo Napoleone ebbe un impatto sul suo tempo e sui secoli a venire così importante, sia come stratega militare che come capo politico; tuttavia quei tre hanno influenzato i 2000 anni di storia a noi più prossimi in maniera pesantissima. Il che, non è poco.
Dice Strauss che dei tre, Cesare fu il miglior politico (senza dubbio) e il più lucido nel delineare strategie efficaci a lungo termine. Figura straordinaria, d'intuito forse inarrivabile, Cesare dalla sua ebbe gli anni passati da giovane nella politica romana, dove da bravo aristocratico maneggione cominciò a comprendere il funzionamento della macchina del potere (esperienza che agli altri due mancò, invece) e il fatto di cominciare la sua sfolgorante ascesa da uomo fatto e finito (Cesare va alla guerra in Gallia alla veneranda età di 42 anni): ciò gli garantì una maturità di pensiero e di azione senza pari.
Alessandro fu grande stratega, grandissimo comandante di campo, dotato di intuito fulmineo e pensiero rapidissimo, entrò nella storia come un lampo: una luce sfolgorante e un successivo tuono che cambiarono per sempre lo sviluppo successivo dell'Europa e dell'Asia occidentale. Fu tuttavia anche uomo dai notevoli vizi, posseduto da manie di grandezza senza confini che lo portarono a ampliare l'impero conquistato oltre i limiti fisici entro cui esso poteva essere contenuto, perdendo la fiducia del nucleo macedone del suo esercito (che come noto si ammutinò in India) e disinteressandosi quasi totalmente delle questione amministrative dopo la conquista. La sua opera venne proseguita dai suoi generali, i diadochi, che allegramente passarono i successivi decenni a ammazzarsi fra loro dividendo le spoglie dello sterminato territorio. Non fu un gran politico insomma, ma un comandante straordinario e un visionario che diede il là alla prima globalizzazione (culturale, soprattutto) conosciuta.
Infine, la palma di miglior comandante in campo va all'uomo che osò l'impossibile, ossia sfidare lo stato più potente del mondo antico sul suo territorio, dopo aver attraversato le Alpi d'inverno (e mica c'erano i trafori autostradali) e aver sconfitto Roma in tre sanguinose battaglie per poi disintegrarne quasi completamente le forze, sbaragliando l'esercito campale più grande da loro mai messo in campo fino a quel momento nel più perfetto e letale balletto bellico che la storia d'Occidente avesse (e abbia) mai visto. Ma, dopo Canne, ad Annibale mancò l'audacia di Cesare e Alessandro, e invece di assaltare Roma temporeggiò, sperando che la città si arrendesse: ma Roma era un monolite di granito all'epoca, e non si arrese. La guerra si trascinò negli anni, a totale deleterio dei Cartaginesi, che in una guerra di logoramento non potevano vincere contro le infinite risorse dei Romani. Alla fine, tutto ebbe termine a Zama, in Africa, dove il genio di Annibale trovò pane per i suoi denti (Scipione) e comunque quasi riuscì a vincere: tuttavia, anche nella sconfitta, Annibale seppe essere lungimirante e negli anni che successivamente i Romani gli lasciarono passare a Cartagine seppe dimostrarsi ottimo politico, risollevandone l'economia. Ormai tuttavia Annibale aveva liberato il mostro, che nei decenni successivi avrebbe finito per divorare la sua città e l'intero Mediterraneo.
Un'osservazione: viviamo in tempi bui, di democrazia in agonia e politica rissosa e priva d'idee, incapace di affrontare i grandi problemi del presente. I tempo assomigliano insomma a quelli in cui venne a trovarsi Cesare, che fu semplicemente il migliore a emergere dalle ceneri della seconda guerra civile; differentemente da Silla, il vincitore della prima guerra civile che non tenne per sé il potere ma dopo appena un paio d'anni lo riconsegnò contro ogni previsione al Senato, Cesare non ebbe scrupoli a farsi dittatore a vita e re di fatto (ma non di nome), semplicemente perché aveva perfettamente capito che la vecchia Repubblica aveva fatto, da qualunque parte la si guardava, il suo tempo e che c'era disperato bisogno di pace e stabilità, di un nuovo ordine politico imperniato sulle nuove classi emergenti (provinciali e notabili popolani) e sul decisionismo. Infatti le cose, con Augusto, andarono esattamente in quella direzione.
Banalmente, mi sa che siamo nelle stesse condizioni, e che il Cesare dei nostri tempi sia ancora di là da venire, ma che prima o poi arriverà (e non giudico se sia un bene o un male - probabilmente un male, dato che anche il pur lungimirante e clemente Cesare, al bisogno, sapeva essere lupo fra i lupi e che comunque finire alla mercede delle bizze di un uomo solo al comando non ha MAI portato bene ai singoli individui).
Chiudo con l'ultimo paragrafo del libro, che nella sua concisione estrema mi pare un'ottima anticipazione dello stile dell'opera per chi volesse cimentarsi con la lettura:
"In conclusione fu Cesare il più grande dei comandanti del mondo antico. Annibale è l'eroe della cause perdute e delle battaglie perfette. Alessandro è un astro senza paragoni. Cesare, con tutti i suoi difetti, si avvicinò più di tutti all'arte dello statista."
Amen, mi verrebbe da dire.
Lettura molto consigliata.
July 26, 2012
Good analysis of the leadership qualities of the three great commanders of the ancient world. Strauss discusses each of their campaigns and the political environment in which they took place.
Strauss notes that all three had to go to war: Alexander needed a successful conquest to earn respect in the kingship he inherited; Caesar had too many enemies to distinguish himself in Rome; and Hannibal had limited career options in Carthage or Spain and perhaps none outside of the military. This makes you ponder how much of war is waged, throughout history to today, for career purposes.
While these commanders had brilliant careers, they had weaknesses and there were losses among their historic wins. Both Caesar and Alexander, who inspired incredible loyalty, experienced mutinies. Alexander didn't grasp the strategic importance of a navy. Hannibal had great tactics but, overall, poor strategy. One, among many interesting observations is that while all were great, none of them really ended their war(s) in a satisfactory way.
Military parts are written in a way the general reader can understand, which puts the focus on the discussion of leadership.
Strauss notes that all three had to go to war: Alexander needed a successful conquest to earn respect in the kingship he inherited; Caesar had too many enemies to distinguish himself in Rome; and Hannibal had limited career options in Carthage or Spain and perhaps none outside of the military. This makes you ponder how much of war is waged, throughout history to today, for career purposes.
While these commanders had brilliant careers, they had weaknesses and there were losses among their historic wins. Both Caesar and Alexander, who inspired incredible loyalty, experienced mutinies. Alexander didn't grasp the strategic importance of a navy. Hannibal had great tactics but, overall, poor strategy. One, among many interesting observations is that while all were great, none of them really ended their war(s) in a satisfactory way.
Military parts are written in a way the general reader can understand, which puts the focus on the discussion of leadership.
April 24, 2018
Short. Succinct. Well-written. A fantastic book comparing the greatest conquerors of ancient times. Ceaser, the cunning politician turned military commander. He conquered Gaul and turned his troops against Pompey and his fellow Romans. He destroyed the Roman Republic and died by its hands. Hannibal, the Carthaginian general who was never defeated until his best student destroyed his army at Zama. He fought for over 18 years against the Roman republic and devastated its armies. Yet, no one flocked to his banner. Reinforcements never came. He was chronically short of manpower while Roman armies rose from the ashes. His war only succeeded in destroying his homeland, Carthage and started the Roman Republic down its path to Roman Empire. Alexander, the youngest of them all was never defeated. He destroyed the Persian Empire but he did not stop war. Alexander the quintessential warlord continued war. Alexander was bored by statecraft. His empire disintegrated upon his death issuing in the age of the Hellenic Kingdoms. Which is best. Well it depends as usual. I will end with a curious fact. The word Tsar and the word Kaiser are Russian and German forms of the word Ceaser.
August 10, 2015
This is a great introduction to three of the most important historical figures of the Classical Age. Since lack of historical knowledge is a plague upon the land in these latter days, Strauss does us a great service by providing a popular, concise history of these men. He compounds this service by drawing parallels and contrasts among them, making it easier to understand and remember each, and caps his effort by drawing permanent, generally applicable lessons from the lives of each.
Strauss’s focus is, of course, on the military aspects of each of Alexander, Hannibal and Caesar, though he does touch on their political abilities as well. The campaigns of each are viewed through five stages: Attack; Resistance; Clash; Closing The Net; and Knowing When To Stop. Coupled with this are ten qualities of successful commanders: ambition; judgment; leadership; audacity; agility; infrastructure; strategy; terror; branding; and divine providence. The structure of the book is to, in essence, rate the performance of each of the three protagonists, in each stage, on each quality. Then, ultimately, Strauss gives a #1 ranking to the Most Successful Commander. (No, I won’t spoil it by saying who that is!)
This is not an executive leadership book, of course. Strauss does not generally try to suggest that you should try this at home (particularly “terror”). But the qualities he analyzes are certainly frequently applicable to other life contexts, and therefore the book works both as history and, to a limited extent, as guidance for one’s own life, if one has the ambition to command and succeed.
Strauss manages to cover a wide range of important events, mostly battles, without seeming cursory. The Granicus River. Gaugamela. Cannae. Zama. Thapsus. Pharsalus. It’s quite an accomplishment, if you stop and think about it, given that most of these events could rate a short book of their own. And Strauss manages to coherently weave each of them into the overall narrative, while writing about each of them compellingly. Somehow he manages to add enough anecdotes, written in vivid language, to bring each event alive, without drifting into history by anecdote. It’s a pretty impressive accomplishment.
Many of the lessons Strauss draws out, though well drawn out, are common sense. But many are not. One of his big focuses is “closing the net,” where he emphasizes the need to follow-up on victories, along with the difficulties in doing so. “A victor’s biggest mistake after winning a great battle is to expect success to fall into his lap. On the contrary, since necessity is the mother of invention, the vanquished are likely to be more ingenious than ever, and perhaps even more dangerous.” This is useful to remember.
None of this is idol-worship. Strauss criticizes his protagonists as much as he recognizes their accomplishments. And he notes the overriding vice of successfully military men—that though “No one every understood better than these three that war is politics. . . . then, at the moment of triumph, no one ever forgot the rule that war is politics as completely—or as disastrously—as they. Flush with victory and drunk with success, each man did the one thing that no successful general can ever dare do: he succumbed to his own vanity. Modern generals are not immune to excessive pride. But, in democracies at any rate, laws prevent any one individual from doing too much damage. History tells a cautionary tale.”
And that’s the real value of this book. It informs us today, both in what to do, and in what not to do. Great history transmits universal principles, and the more people read books like this, the better off our society will be.
Strauss’s focus is, of course, on the military aspects of each of Alexander, Hannibal and Caesar, though he does touch on their political abilities as well. The campaigns of each are viewed through five stages: Attack; Resistance; Clash; Closing The Net; and Knowing When To Stop. Coupled with this are ten qualities of successful commanders: ambition; judgment; leadership; audacity; agility; infrastructure; strategy; terror; branding; and divine providence. The structure of the book is to, in essence, rate the performance of each of the three protagonists, in each stage, on each quality. Then, ultimately, Strauss gives a #1 ranking to the Most Successful Commander. (No, I won’t spoil it by saying who that is!)
This is not an executive leadership book, of course. Strauss does not generally try to suggest that you should try this at home (particularly “terror”). But the qualities he analyzes are certainly frequently applicable to other life contexts, and therefore the book works both as history and, to a limited extent, as guidance for one’s own life, if one has the ambition to command and succeed.
Strauss manages to cover a wide range of important events, mostly battles, without seeming cursory. The Granicus River. Gaugamela. Cannae. Zama. Thapsus. Pharsalus. It’s quite an accomplishment, if you stop and think about it, given that most of these events could rate a short book of their own. And Strauss manages to coherently weave each of them into the overall narrative, while writing about each of them compellingly. Somehow he manages to add enough anecdotes, written in vivid language, to bring each event alive, without drifting into history by anecdote. It’s a pretty impressive accomplishment.
Many of the lessons Strauss draws out, though well drawn out, are common sense. But many are not. One of his big focuses is “closing the net,” where he emphasizes the need to follow-up on victories, along with the difficulties in doing so. “A victor’s biggest mistake after winning a great battle is to expect success to fall into his lap. On the contrary, since necessity is the mother of invention, the vanquished are likely to be more ingenious than ever, and perhaps even more dangerous.” This is useful to remember.
None of this is idol-worship. Strauss criticizes his protagonists as much as he recognizes their accomplishments. And he notes the overriding vice of successfully military men—that though “No one every understood better than these three that war is politics. . . . then, at the moment of triumph, no one ever forgot the rule that war is politics as completely—or as disastrously—as they. Flush with victory and drunk with success, each man did the one thing that no successful general can ever dare do: he succumbed to his own vanity. Modern generals are not immune to excessive pride. But, in democracies at any rate, laws prevent any one individual from doing too much damage. History tells a cautionary tale.”
And that’s the real value of this book. It informs us today, both in what to do, and in what not to do. Great history transmits universal principles, and the more people read books like this, the better off our society will be.
May 26, 2014
I’ve never read too much about ancient history before reading this, so a lot of it was new to me. That being said, it is still worth a read.
However, it does seem like Strauss maybe oversimplified his subjects in order to make them conform to his own theories. Also, there is very little on actual leadership; it’s mostly just opinion, and with little insight into what made people follow these leaders.
Strauss’ book is more a work of history than an analysis of leadership. Still, it is very readable, detailed and well-paced.
However, it does seem like Strauss maybe oversimplified his subjects in order to make them conform to his own theories. Also, there is very little on actual leadership; it’s mostly just opinion, and with little insight into what made people follow these leaders.
Strauss’ book is more a work of history than an analysis of leadership. Still, it is very readable, detailed and well-paced.
August 7, 2012
Outstanding analysis of three of the arguably greatest military leaders in world history: Alexander, Hannibal and Caesar. And who better to break down the discussion than Barry Strauss who is a history and classics professor at Cornell University.
In the book Strauss breaks down the 10 Qualities of Successful commanders: 1. ambition 2. judgment 3. leadership 4. audacity 5. agility 6. infrastructure 7. strategy 8. terror 9. branding 10. divine providence. From here here he gives us the 5 stages of war, seen in every war known to man throughout all history: attack, resistance, clash, closing the net, and knowing when to stop. It is these 5 stages of war where Strauss builds the rest of his book with examples from all three men, showing leadership traits that we modern mortals can use in our lives and businesses.
It is a brilliant tour de force and an unusual read for those like me who normally read straight up business books on leadership. With this book you can learn from the best of the best. Thank you Barry Strauss for showing us the way.
In the book Strauss breaks down the 10 Qualities of Successful commanders: 1. ambition 2. judgment 3. leadership 4. audacity 5. agility 6. infrastructure 7. strategy 8. terror 9. branding 10. divine providence. From here here he gives us the 5 stages of war, seen in every war known to man throughout all history: attack, resistance, clash, closing the net, and knowing when to stop. It is these 5 stages of war where Strauss builds the rest of his book with examples from all three men, showing leadership traits that we modern mortals can use in our lives and businesses.
It is a brilliant tour de force and an unusual read for those like me who normally read straight up business books on leadership. With this book you can learn from the best of the best. Thank you Barry Strauss for showing us the way.
September 10, 2023
Scrisă bine dar personajele meritau o analiză mai în detaliu. Impresia de superficialitate a fost prezentă pe tot cuprinsul cărții. În schimb, pentru cine dorește să aibă informații generale cu privie la cei trei mari comandanți, cartea vine în ajutor.
November 29, 2018
As someone who likes reading about classical military history [1], this book is something that is pretty obviously something that would interest me. And given the author's own work as one of the main contemporary classicists with a strong interest in military history in the ancient Greek and Roman world, this book is well within the author's wheelhouse. This is the sort of work that fulfills expectations--you know enough of the author's work to know that he is quite capable of writing very well about the subject matter and find that he does so in a way that is not necessarily surprising but is definitely excellent. This book has the feel that the author is trying to pivot from writing about ancient history for a small audience to writing about a larger audience that wants to view military history as a way to examine successful leadership qualities in general. The work does not make a full shift to shallow numbered leadership principles as some authors make their career on, but it certainly is a move to try to make classical military history more generally accessible and more obviously relevant to a wider audience. How you feel about that aim will greatly influence how you feel about this book.
In about 250 pages or so, the author manages to conduct a parallel analysis of three of the most notable ancient military history commanders in Alexander of Macedon, Hannibal Barca, and Julius Caesar. He begins with an author's note, chronology, glossary, and maps to set the context for the analysis that follows. After that the author defines ten qualities of successful commanders (1) and examines how they apply to the three leaders in question. The author then examines the three ancient generals according to six criteria, namely how they handled their initial attacks (2), dealing with resistance (3), the clash between these leaders and their most powerful adversaries (4), closing the net towards victory (5), and knowing when to stop (6), something the author does not believe any of these leaders knew how to do well. The author then gives a conclusion, acknowledgements, and notes and an index. Overall, the work does a good job at presenting some of the notable aspects of Alexander's conquest of the Persian Empire, Hannibal's efforts in the Second Punic War, and Julius Caesar's career after crossing the Rubicon.
Is this a great book? I'm not sure. It is a very good book, a very competent book, a thought provoking work that offers a skillful comparative analysis of three famous generals about whom much has been written and whose efforts have served as an inspiration to many. The author is candid about their flaws--he notes that Alexander was careless about political matters, that Hannibal had a major strategic flaw in not seeking to defeat Rome and in not understanding the strength of its political system, and that Julius Caesar had an immense laxity with regards to logistical matters. This book is no hagiography, but it does give appropriate praise as well as trying to keep an air of drama and reflecting on the fact that great commanders often do not fit in well with their own political cultures. It is easy for a successful leader to seek political power and to denigrate the political process and to solve social and political and diplomatic problems mainly through force. It was as true in the ancient world as it is true today that when you are a hammer, everything starts to look like a nail. And if you like reading about ancient military leaders in parallel, even if you already know about them a great deal, this book certainly has a great deal to offer.
[1] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2018...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
In about 250 pages or so, the author manages to conduct a parallel analysis of three of the most notable ancient military history commanders in Alexander of Macedon, Hannibal Barca, and Julius Caesar. He begins with an author's note, chronology, glossary, and maps to set the context for the analysis that follows. After that the author defines ten qualities of successful commanders (1) and examines how they apply to the three leaders in question. The author then examines the three ancient generals according to six criteria, namely how they handled their initial attacks (2), dealing with resistance (3), the clash between these leaders and their most powerful adversaries (4), closing the net towards victory (5), and knowing when to stop (6), something the author does not believe any of these leaders knew how to do well. The author then gives a conclusion, acknowledgements, and notes and an index. Overall, the work does a good job at presenting some of the notable aspects of Alexander's conquest of the Persian Empire, Hannibal's efforts in the Second Punic War, and Julius Caesar's career after crossing the Rubicon.
Is this a great book? I'm not sure. It is a very good book, a very competent book, a thought provoking work that offers a skillful comparative analysis of three famous generals about whom much has been written and whose efforts have served as an inspiration to many. The author is candid about their flaws--he notes that Alexander was careless about political matters, that Hannibal had a major strategic flaw in not seeking to defeat Rome and in not understanding the strength of its political system, and that Julius Caesar had an immense laxity with regards to logistical matters. This book is no hagiography, but it does give appropriate praise as well as trying to keep an air of drama and reflecting on the fact that great commanders often do not fit in well with their own political cultures. It is easy for a successful leader to seek political power and to denigrate the political process and to solve social and political and diplomatic problems mainly through force. It was as true in the ancient world as it is true today that when you are a hammer, everything starts to look like a nail. And if you like reading about ancient military leaders in parallel, even if you already know about them a great deal, this book certainly has a great deal to offer.
[1] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2018...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
May 8, 2020
Elefanții lui Hannibal traversează Alpii, legionarii lui Caesar luptă pe străzile Alexandriei și în deșertul Numidiei, iar temuta cavalerie macedoneană a lui Alexandru aruncă in haos mărețul imperiu persan. Mii si zeci de mii de bărbați care-și urmează comandantul fără să clipească. Cannae, Pharsalis, Munda, Issos și Gaugamela sunt doar câteva din încleștările armate care au zguduit din temelii lumea veche, momente astrale ale omenirii în care s-a plămădit geopolitica următoarelor secole. Alexandru cel Mare, Hannibal si Iulius Cezar sunt studiați pentru prima dată împreună ca într-un țintar prin timp si spațiu. Au visat, au iubit și s-au stins la veacuri distanță, dar prin pâcla timpurilor i-a legat o insușire comună, acea putere harismatică a liderului, o forță subtilă care naște arta conducerii. Tenacitatea mesianică a lui Alexandru l-a împins până în junglele Indiei, renumele lui Hannibal a înfricoșat Senatul Republicii Romane, iar pofta de sânge a lui Caesar a pavat calea viitorilor împărați pentru sute de ani. Ei schimbau granițe la micul dejun și câștigau bătălii cu ochiul de vultur al geniilor din șahul modern, dar cu toate acestea nu s-au bucurat de roadele anilor de lupte. Alexandru s-a stins prematur la vârsta starurilor rock, imperiul său fiind împărțit grosolan de generali fără viziune, pe Hannibal l-a urmărit toată viața gândul că ar fi avut Roma în buzunar dacă îndrăznea mai mult, iar Caesar chiar trebuia să rămână acasă în acea dimineață de Idele lui Martie.
October 21, 2019
This review is for the audiobook.
I'm torn on this book. On the one hand, Strauss's comparative biographies are very well done, and present the three main historical figures in concise and clear terms. But it also feels like Strauss had to force each of them into a particular category based on the book's premise, as if he was writing to the strictures of a book proposal where he had to pick the best representative for three categories of military considerations: strategic, operational and tactical.
I liked it enough to loan it to a friend (who never returned it). So listen and enjoy, and prepare for a possible occasional minor. irritant.
I'm torn on this book. On the one hand, Strauss's comparative biographies are very well done, and present the three main historical figures in concise and clear terms. But it also feels like Strauss had to force each of them into a particular category based on the book's premise, as if he was writing to the strictures of a book proposal where he had to pick the best representative for three categories of military considerations: strategic, operational and tactical.
I liked it enough to loan it to a friend (who never returned it). So listen and enjoy, and prepare for a possible occasional minor. irritant.
January 17, 2025
Inciteful and relativelly easy to digest.
February 2, 2023
Truth: I wanted to chuck the book even before I was done with the first chapter. The reason? Too many cliched, hackneyed phrases about wars and the men behind them. It's a good thing I checked the back jacket, and saw the price I paid for it. That made me decide to soldier on. Things get interesting by the second chapter, and the momentum carries all the way until the last page.
No doubt Barry Strauss's research was thorough, but his narration glosses over the details. This reader soon got over that once I realized that hey--his narrative style was not out to compete with that of Edward Gibbon's. Strauss's is more of a conversational approach, like attending a series of free-wheeling lectures on the military and tactical strategies, and failures, of Alexander, Hannibal and Caesar.
All three were ambitious, with the audacity to see that ambition through. Yes, Alexander preferred military manoeuvres to running an empire, and very likely, men over women. A superb general, especially at a tactical level, where quick, decisive decisions were required. Fought among his men out in the field. Among the three discussed in the book, he exposed himself most to physical danger. Kid thought he was a god, heir to Achilles, and given his two-million square mile booty, I don't blame him. He took off with ambition. Ambition did him in. Didn't know when and where to stop (he did, at India, but he had plans to take over Arabia, before dying of a fever a month short of his thirty-third birthday). Like the author, I agree with his deathbed edict that only "the strongest" should take over his abominably large sandals. In the many years to come, Alexander would be the yardstick for excellence for men like Caesar.
It is Hannibal who seems to me the most human among the three, even though no mention is made of his personal relationships--a tragedy; another reason may be his failure at siegecraft, made all the more glaring because the other two excelled at it. Hannibal also strikes me as the most audacious (anyone who risked crossing the Alps, with elephants, and in late November, could only be crazy or audacious or both). He may have been the most capable combatant on the field. While ambitious, history insists he did it for Carthage, not so much for personal ambition. Hannibal must have been a terrible yet gentle force to reckon with, having convinced whole Celtic tribes to join him on that remarkable trek to Italy. And, as the author constantly reminds us, unlike the other two conquerors discussed in this book, Hannibal's ragtag, multi-cultural, multi-racial and multi-lingual army, whom he could bend so skilfully to his will, never mutinied against him. This in spite of being away from the home country for seventeen harsh years. Hannibal betrayed his pragmatic, sensible side when he asked to meet with arch-enemy Scipio Africanus on the eve of his last battle, and defeat, at Zama. This is further confirmed when, safely ensconced at Carthage after Zama, he reinvented himself as a maverick politician and statesman.
One of my recent reads was The 12 Caesars. It mentions Caesar having once been the catamite of a rich, influential old man, King Nicomedes of Bythinia. Given his ambition, it's very believable--he seems like the kind of guy who was up for anyone for as long as it got him a leg up militarily, and politically. A seasoned conqueror of Gaul by the time he crossed the Rubicon in his fifties, he gets the author's (and my) nod as the most pragmatic and thorough strategist. Unlike Alexander, he fought with the big picture in mind, and that was to be Rome's dictator for life. Among all three, it's Caesar I'm most familiar with, having read up on quite a few books about him and the other, less interesting Caesars. He still intrigues me the most. And because it mentions his military and psychological failures, this book humanizes Caesar to me in a way the other, more detailed books, did not. But I'm still on the prowl for the book that can truly define this complex, enigmatic man for me.
Visuals that will stay with me long after I forget my musings here are the carnage at those pitched battles (imagine slipping on blood and entrails while battling at some dusty valley), calmly narrated by the author, death counts ticked off as if he were counting heads of tilapia. He writes in a way that makes you feel you were actually there, observing from some safe slope, silently rooting for your bets, as the trumpets sound the impatient call to battle.
https://www.pinterest.ph/pin/65006652...
No doubt Barry Strauss's research was thorough, but his narration glosses over the details. This reader soon got over that once I realized that hey--his narrative style was not out to compete with that of Edward Gibbon's. Strauss's is more of a conversational approach, like attending a series of free-wheeling lectures on the military and tactical strategies, and failures, of Alexander, Hannibal and Caesar.
All three were ambitious, with the audacity to see that ambition through. Yes, Alexander preferred military manoeuvres to running an empire, and very likely, men over women. A superb general, especially at a tactical level, where quick, decisive decisions were required. Fought among his men out in the field. Among the three discussed in the book, he exposed himself most to physical danger. Kid thought he was a god, heir to Achilles, and given his two-million square mile booty, I don't blame him. He took off with ambition. Ambition did him in. Didn't know when and where to stop (he did, at India, but he had plans to take over Arabia, before dying of a fever a month short of his thirty-third birthday). Like the author, I agree with his deathbed edict that only "the strongest" should take over his abominably large sandals. In the many years to come, Alexander would be the yardstick for excellence for men like Caesar.
It is Hannibal who seems to me the most human among the three, even though no mention is made of his personal relationships--a tragedy; another reason may be his failure at siegecraft, made all the more glaring because the other two excelled at it. Hannibal also strikes me as the most audacious (anyone who risked crossing the Alps, with elephants, and in late November, could only be crazy or audacious or both). He may have been the most capable combatant on the field. While ambitious, history insists he did it for Carthage, not so much for personal ambition. Hannibal must have been a terrible yet gentle force to reckon with, having convinced whole Celtic tribes to join him on that remarkable trek to Italy. And, as the author constantly reminds us, unlike the other two conquerors discussed in this book, Hannibal's ragtag, multi-cultural, multi-racial and multi-lingual army, whom he could bend so skilfully to his will, never mutinied against him. This in spite of being away from the home country for seventeen harsh years. Hannibal betrayed his pragmatic, sensible side when he asked to meet with arch-enemy Scipio Africanus on the eve of his last battle, and defeat, at Zama. This is further confirmed when, safely ensconced at Carthage after Zama, he reinvented himself as a maverick politician and statesman.
One of my recent reads was The 12 Caesars. It mentions Caesar having once been the catamite of a rich, influential old man, King Nicomedes of Bythinia. Given his ambition, it's very believable--he seems like the kind of guy who was up for anyone for as long as it got him a leg up militarily, and politically. A seasoned conqueror of Gaul by the time he crossed the Rubicon in his fifties, he gets the author's (and my) nod as the most pragmatic and thorough strategist. Unlike Alexander, he fought with the big picture in mind, and that was to be Rome's dictator for life. Among all three, it's Caesar I'm most familiar with, having read up on quite a few books about him and the other, less interesting Caesars. He still intrigues me the most. And because it mentions his military and psychological failures, this book humanizes Caesar to me in a way the other, more detailed books, did not. But I'm still on the prowl for the book that can truly define this complex, enigmatic man for me.
Visuals that will stay with me long after I forget my musings here are the carnage at those pitched battles (imagine slipping on blood and entrails while battling at some dusty valley), calmly narrated by the author, death counts ticked off as if he were counting heads of tilapia. He writes in a way that makes you feel you were actually there, observing from some safe slope, silently rooting for your bets, as the trumpets sound the impatient call to battle.
https://www.pinterest.ph/pin/65006652...
June 11, 2024
Početno poglavlje – „Deset kvaliteta najuspješnijih vojskovođa“ – znameniti istoričar Straus (i honorarni član desničarskog trusta mozgova Huver Instituta), poznat po knjigama o pomorskoj bici kod Salamine i studiji o Trojanskom ratu, počinje kratkim opisom juriša Aleksandrove vojske u prvom sukobu sa Persijancima, na rijeci Graniku.
Zamislite generala koji odluči da prvi jurne na nadmoćniju neprijateljsku vojsku (koju predvodi vrsni grčki plaćenik, Memnon sa Rodosa) utaborenu na višem položaju od njegovog; a prije toga mora da pregazi rijeku koja razdvaja dvije zaraćene strane.
Slične obračune posjeduju i druga dvojica generala. Iako je njihova politika na kraju svega bila daleko od savršenstva, čini se da u vojnoj i političkoj istoriji nisu postojali veći mudraci po pitanju komandovanja i upravljanja građanima te su priče ovih ljudi i danas svježe kao i prije dvije hiljade godina. Ako pitate autora, baš zbog njihovih propasti ova tri života ponudiće lekcije, ali i upozorenja, vođama u brojnim poslovnim branšama, od generalštabova i predsjedničkih fotelja, pa do konferencijskih sala.
Pomenuta tri generala su bili vojni čudotvorci, premda i kockari. Sukobljavali su se sa čitavim carstvima: sa nadasve brojnijim neprijateljima; protivnicima koji su uživali stratešku komandu nad morem; kao i vojskama sa prednošću domaćeg terena. Pa ipak, ovi generali su zbog pobjede sve stavljali na kocku. Takođe su sva trojica vodili svoje armije na duge puteve. Cezar je prešao Rubikon (da bi, poslije osvojene Galije, objavio rat Senatu), Hanibal je doslovno prešao Alpe (da bi udario na Rim), a Aleksandar je prešao Helespont (da bi osvojio čitavu Persiju i Indiju). I sve se ovo dogodilo u rasponu od dvjesta godina.
Hanibal je za Aleksandra rekao da će dovijeka ostati najveći vođa u istoriji, a Cezar je, kao mladić, zaplakao pred Makedončevom bistom, jer još ništa nije osvojio. Da bi se onda desilo šta?
Pored toga što se radilo o neprevaziđenim vojskovođama, Aleksandar je zanemarivao mornaricu, Hanibal je ignorisao opsade (u suprotnom, Rima kakvog poznajemo možda nikada ne bi ni bilo), a Cezar po svoj prilici ništa nije znao o možda najbitnijoj sitnici neke vojne – a to je logistika. Hanibal je naposljetku izgubio svoj rat, a Aleksandar i Cezar su dobili beznačajne bitke.
Straus ističe da su pojedini njihovi kvaliteti za svaku pohvalu i divljenje, a da drugi uopšte nisu, dok se pojedinim kvalitetima vrijedi diviti samo umjereno. Osvajači su poznati kao najmanje umjereni ljudi, a naročito kad su ova trojica u pitanju. Naime, oni su bili kameleoni; nijedan nije bio čovjek iz naroda, ali su svi igrali na kartu populizma.
Deset Strausovih ključeva za uspjeh: ambicija; rasuđivanje; vođstvo; smjelost; agilnost; infrastruktura; strategija; teror, i Božije Proviđenje. Zar nije ono Napoleon kazao da vojnici ne trebaju da budu samo dobri ratnici, nego i srećni?
U „Pet faza rata“, Straus kaže da su tri generala vojevali isti vid borbe i da su se od tada principi ratovanja, i pored današnje tehnologije, izmijenili taman koliko i ljudska priroda. Prema Strausu, rat se ne sastoji od tri simplifikovana stadijuma, kao što se obično vjeruje (napad; borba; pobjeda/poraz), nego iz pet: napad; otpor; sukob; zatvaranje mreže i znanje/svijest o tome kada treba prestati.
Drugim riječima, rat se ne može razumjeti, a da se prethodno ne dozvoli djelovanje obligatorne nepredvidljivosti i njegova istinski politička priroda.
Velike vojskovođe su to dobro znale. Oni nisu samo igrali na pobjedu. Naprotiv, oni su anticipirali neuspjeh, samo što im je otprilike bilo jasno kako da se povrate iz njega. Uspjeh na bojnom polju bi stavili u kontekst cjelokupne situacije. Znali su da ste i dalje mogli dobiti najveću bitku, ali izgubiti čitav rat. Takođe su razumjeli da vojna pobjeda nije bila isto što i politički uspjeh. Rat je jednostavno nepredvidljiv. Zato su brojni drevni generali prizivali Fortunu da im pritekne u pomoć, i to ne bez
razloga. Komandanti su strpljivo pripremali planove, s tim da nijedan planer nije znao šta se krije iza narednog obruča brda, niti je metereolog bio u stanju da predvidi kakvo će vrijeme da ih dočeka u presudnom času.
Tako su Persijanci poslali mornaricu na Aleksandrovu bazu u Grčkoj (za vrijeme dok je Makedonac bio na persijskom tlu), a Rimljani su napali Hanibalovo uporište u Španiji (dok je ovaj rovario po Italiji). Obojica su bili nesmotreni u odgovorima na te napade, međutim Aleksandar je imao više sreće; Hanibal je, s druge strane, pretrpio težak poraz.
Pompej (prvobitni Cezarov saveznik, a sada na drugoj strani u građanskom ratu) je isto tako iz Španije mogao napasti Cezarovu bazu u Italiji, ali ga je Cezar prestigao prvi napadnuvši Španiju.
Kad je sukob u pitanju, njihove najodlučnije bitke, Gaugamela (Aleksandar), Kana (Hanibal) i Farsalska ravnica (Cezar), bile su polja smrti što su pokazala „isuviše vještine kako ne bi impresionirale, i suviše krvi kako ne bi zaprepastile“. Takođe su pokazale herojsku upornost kojoj njihovi protivnici nipošto nisu bili u mogućnosti direktno da se suprotstave.
Kao majstori konvencionalnog ratovanja, Aleksandar, Hanibal i Cezar nude lekcije i o nekonvencionalnom ratovanju; uzmimo u obzir Aleksandrovo osposobljavanje armije da se bori s neumornim avganistanskim nomadskim gerilcima po njihovim vrletima (više o ovome u pop-romanu Stivena Presfilda, Pohod na Avganistan; Laguna, 2009), Hanibalove taktičke lukavosti u italijanskim brdima, ili Cezarove ulične borbi u Aleksandriji – kao i oratorske inicijative koje bi i najveće skeptike nagnale da se late oružja za svog vođu.
Pritom imajte na umu da je svaka od ove tri ličnosti (Cezar ponajmanje) vojevala u prvim borbenim redovima, a skoro nikada u pozadini. Razumnom čovjeku malo fali pa da povjeruje da se za takve osobe svojevremeno i vrijedilo boriti. Ipak, kao u kakvom grčkom epu, Aleksandrovi vojnici su u potpunosti svojevoljno za njega doslovno obišli pola planete, sve dok nisu uvidjeli da to što rade više nema smisla.
Isto tako, veliki vojskovođa je katkada bio prinuđen i da ih „privoli“ na juriš. Jedanput se, skoro goloruk, Aleksandar uzverao merdevinama uz visoku utvrdu nekog neimenovanog bramanskog grada (u zimu 325/6. godine prije Hrista), tim činom – uzgred pretrpjevši i teške povrede – nagnavši Grke da, zbog posramljenosti, jurnu na neprijatelja ne bi li zaštitili vođu, jer, i pored svih netrpeljivosti među njima, Aleksandra bezmalo nijedan vojnik nije htio da vidi ubijenog.
Posljednji stadijum uspješnosti predstavlja znanje ili svijest o tome kada treba prestati. Ovdje je svaki čovjek ponaosob pao na ispitu.
Poslije Kane, volšebni Hanibal je je pokazao tvrdoglavost na mjestima gdje je trebao da iskaže fleksibilnost; drugim riječima, njegov pokušaj da se okuša u diplomatiji okončao se neslavno. Kako god bilo, Hanibal je jedini od trojice vojskovođa čiji se iznureni vojnici nikada nisu digli na pobunu. Prije njega, Aleksandar je rastegnuo svoje carstvo sve dok se njime više nije moglo upravljati. (Uzgred budi rečeno, dok je Makedonac vodio vojnu protiv Persijanaca, Spartanci su konstantno pozivali na koaliciju sa Persijancima i na građanski rat u ionako nestabilnoj grčkoj državi.)
Od ove trojice je za Strausa nepobitno najveći vojskovođa Cezar i kao jedan od razloga za ovakvu odluku glasi: zato jer je sazreo kao čovjek. Za razliku od Hanibala i Aleksandra, koji su postali vojskovođe pošto su navršili dvadesetu, Cezar nije postao vrhovni komandant prije nego što je zašao u četrdesetu. To se zbilo u Galiji; imao je pedeset godina kad je prešao mostić preko Rubikona i započeo građanski rat. Bolje je reći da je naposljetku ipak platio glavom zbog iluzija o sopstvenoj grandioznosti, no Cezar se, ako pitate Strausa, od prve dvojice najbolje pokazao kao državnik i general; a prije nego što je postao general, svakako je bio uspješan političar.
Dabome da ima plauzibilnosti u Strausovim zaključcima, ali kao što i sâm vispreno navodi, istorija rata je istorija grešaka, i to je ono čemu najbolje svjedoči ova knjiga. U suprotnom, mjeriti veličinu ova tri uistinu veličanstvena vojnika dođe kao mučna kontemplacija o korisnijoj hranljivosti limonćela, fortunele ili nešpule.
U trenutku kad Cezara nazove zrelim, za njegovo osvajanje Galije i pobjedu u građanskom ratu (za četiri godine), Straus kaže da se to strelovito dogodilo zato jer je Cezar, najedanput, postao „starac koji žuri“. A dok je Aleksandar žurio, pretpostavićemo da je to sigurno izgledalo ishitreno, jer je ovaj bio pretjerano mlad?
I ne zaboravimo da, i pored toga što su Hanibal i Aleksandar bili veoma pismeni ljudi, jedini je Cezar pisao knjige – „izuzetne knjige“.
Takođe veliki udio u Strausovoj proizvoljnoj odluci ima i fakat što Cezar nije bio sin nekog vladara, kao druga dvojica.
Dabome, na svaki Cezarov talenat Straus prirodno potpisuje i njegovu manjkavost; na kraju je neminovno da prizna da su čovjeka dokusurili puka frustracija i arogancija, što opet ne bi trebalo da bude dio karaktera perfektno zrelog čovjeka.
Sklona reinterpretacijama, kao i svaka slična studija, ovaj naslov je izvrstan samo zato jer ga je napisao korektan istoričar koji barata latinskim i grčkim kao maternjim jezikom, i očito se zabavlja dok nam drži čas vojne istorije (stare činjenice tumačeći kroz moderne uvide i sl.), nekako misleći da i od drevnih genijalnih tirana, kao što su bila pomenuta trojica, današnji još krvožedniji političari mogu da nauče nešto korisno, s čime se ne ni u kom slučaju ne bih saglasio.
(2013)
January 6, 2018
From a purist's perspective on history... no!
An interesting premise as a comparison. The intro to the book commits the sins of applying psuedo modern/christian morals to a pre christian world and its cultures.
It also applies a "war is inherently evil" undertone, blatantly stated early in the book. That in itself is a gross misunderstanding of not only the fundamental nature of the ancient world, but a realisiltic understanding on the foundations and mechanics of what keeps modern civilization lumbering forward.
Like any "... it be evil I tells ye" viewpoint, a number of misunderstandings exist in the text.
This book attempts to normalize the nature of three monumental individuals in history. God like in status... to then try and dissect how you too can try and understand and apply those qualities in your day to day life, or business dealings.
Reality check, no matter how toxic your workplace, it ain't the cut throat and regressive environment of the Roman senate during Caesar's life. This book at times completely misunderstands Caesar's political motives as well, mistaking the whim for mischief and self destructive defiance (ie his personally defined standards for stoicism) for ego and miscalculation.
No matter how bold you think you are, adapting to Alexander's guerilla warfare mindset and exterminating Afghan villages due to his addiction to a never ending life of "conquest" that went well beyond even ancient standards does not translate into sane choices within a modern society. He did do those things, and that is a genuine part of his nature that you cannot neatly ignore.
And as for Hannibal, the research is still based on Roman and post-ancient-but-pro-Roman sources, and thus lacks an appreciation on how dramatically different Carthaginian customs and attitudes were (and are now being discovered/considered) in contrast to the genocidal and earth scorching militant state of Rome. Bare in mind that the modern western world is also predominantly influenced by the rituals and customs of ancient Rome. That gives Carthage an added element of the exotic and alien. A major civilization that was thriving in a way that the Romans thought inherently at odds with themselves and deserving of total annihilation. That would indicate they would have thrived in ways that our modern world is also at odds with, and could not co-exist along side of.
Hannibal is the only Carthaginian anyone has ever properly known about. That says a lot about what little we truly know about the sole representative of a city, a civilization ... of an entire race of humans that were "erased" from existence.
If you know your ancients, this book will offer nothing but frustration. Another reader's digest attempt to skim over some of the most enduring "public" personalities to have walked this earth.
An interesting premise as a comparison. The intro to the book commits the sins of applying psuedo modern/christian morals to a pre christian world and its cultures.
It also applies a "war is inherently evil" undertone, blatantly stated early in the book. That in itself is a gross misunderstanding of not only the fundamental nature of the ancient world, but a realisiltic understanding on the foundations and mechanics of what keeps modern civilization lumbering forward.
Like any "... it be evil I tells ye" viewpoint, a number of misunderstandings exist in the text.
This book attempts to normalize the nature of three monumental individuals in history. God like in status... to then try and dissect how you too can try and understand and apply those qualities in your day to day life, or business dealings.
Reality check, no matter how toxic your workplace, it ain't the cut throat and regressive environment of the Roman senate during Caesar's life. This book at times completely misunderstands Caesar's political motives as well, mistaking the whim for mischief and self destructive defiance (ie his personally defined standards for stoicism) for ego and miscalculation.
No matter how bold you think you are, adapting to Alexander's guerilla warfare mindset and exterminating Afghan villages due to his addiction to a never ending life of "conquest" that went well beyond even ancient standards does not translate into sane choices within a modern society. He did do those things, and that is a genuine part of his nature that you cannot neatly ignore.
And as for Hannibal, the research is still based on Roman and post-ancient-but-pro-Roman sources, and thus lacks an appreciation on how dramatically different Carthaginian customs and attitudes were (and are now being discovered/considered) in contrast to the genocidal and earth scorching militant state of Rome. Bare in mind that the modern western world is also predominantly influenced by the rituals and customs of ancient Rome. That gives Carthage an added element of the exotic and alien. A major civilization that was thriving in a way that the Romans thought inherently at odds with themselves and deserving of total annihilation. That would indicate they would have thrived in ways that our modern world is also at odds with, and could not co-exist along side of.
Hannibal is the only Carthaginian anyone has ever properly known about. That says a lot about what little we truly know about the sole representative of a city, a civilization ... of an entire race of humans that were "erased" from existence.
If you know your ancients, this book will offer nothing but frustration. Another reader's digest attempt to skim over some of the most enduring "public" personalities to have walked this earth.
July 17, 2018
Das Buch - so dachte ich - wäre eine spannende, wenn auch vielleicht etwas hinkende historische Vergleichsangelegenheit. Am Ende muss ich sagen, dass ich sogar ein wenig enttäuscht bin. Betrachten wir uns den Titel, würden wir denken, dass wir vielleicht etwas über den Genius des Anführers erfahren. Allerdings liefert Strauss weder eine griffige Definition dessen, noch wendet er die wenigen Punkte, die er dafür aufstellt, wirklich an. Wir lernen, dass ein Feldherr seine Angriffsfenster erkennen muss, nach dem ersten Schlag mit aufkommenden Widerstand fertig werden muss, dann den Hauptkonflikt strategisch und taktisch führen muss, dann seine Operation/Kampagne abschließen muss und schlussendlich erkennen muss, wann er genug haben muss.
Zu Beginn rückt er zudem noch zehn Schlüsselqualifikationen in den Fokus, die ein erfolgreicher Feldherr mitbringen muss/sollte:
1.Ambition
2.Urteilskraft
3.Führungsqualität
4.Mut (oder gar Tollkühnheit)
5.Agilität (hier in Form von Anpassungsfähigkeit)
6.Infrastruktur
7.Strategie
8.Terror (er sieht die Fähigkeit dazu sogar aufgrund von Alexander dem Großen und Caesar als sehr zentral an)
9.Branding (Selbst-Propaganda)
10.Vorsehung (bei ihm göttlich geprägt, weil Divine Providence) - oder für mich trivialer: Glück
Darüber hinaus werden sie aber nicht wirklich zu einem Analysewerkzeug, auch wenn sie hier und da festgestellt werden. Jetzt eilt Strauss - faktenreich - durch die bekanntesten Feldzüge Alexanders, Hannibals und Caesars, um nach den fünf oben genannten Phasen zu prüfen, ob die drei wirklich große Feldherren und Führungspersönlichkeit sind.
Wir lernen einiges über die Feldzüge der drei, allerdings wirkt das Schema, so lose es ist, draufgepresst. Relativ schnell fällt auf, dass Hannibal da gar nicht so sehr reinpasst, wie Herr Strauss sich das vielleicht in der Konzeption gedacht haben mag und so wird sein Anteil kleiner und kleiner.
Darüber hinaus findet allerdings auch keine Analyse statt, und darin liegt die zentrale Schwäche dieses Werkes. Jetzt eilt Strauss auf etwa 250 Seiten Kerntext also durch deren politisch-martialisches Leben, zeichnet die groben Leitlinien und Entwicklungen nach, ohne natürlich in die Tiefe gehen zu können im historischen Rahmen, allerdings auch ohne die Führungsqualität zu analysieren. Stattdessen erhalten wir permanent Zuschreibungen, wie genial, wie toll, wie einfallsreich oder anpassungsfähig sie waren. Aber wir bekommen keine wirkliche Erklärung, warum ihr Handeln genau das ist.
Ebenso unklar ist, wie weit Strauss den Führungsgenius oder das Charisma fasst. Zwar verweist er am Ende immer wieder auf den Feldherren, doch andere Bereiche gliedert er ein, um sie dann wieder auszugliedern (Das Staatsmännische oder allgemein die Propagandafähigkeit einer Person abseits des Schlachtfeldes), wenn sie ihm nicht mehr passen.
Oder anders gesagt: bevor ich dieses Werk gelesen habe, wusste ich durch die Schulbildung geprägt, dass Alexander, Caesar und Hannibal zu den großen Feldherren und Kriegstreibern der Antike gehören. Nach Lektüre habe ich andere Adjektive für ihre Größe, aber immer noch keine Gründe. Nur weitere Zuschreibungen. Das war doch sehr enttäuschend.
Der Stil des Buches ist spröde. Strauss ist in seinen ewig wiederkehrenden Floskeln (...as the crow flies...) gefangen, seine Schlacht- und Taktikbeschreibungen sind sehr skizzenhaft und die Gesamtstrategien sind selten vollständig und dadurch nicht vollends nachzuvollziehen für den Laien. Wenn jemand Straussens Wissen hat, wird er viele Nuancen sicher verstehen und ähnliche Schlüsse möglicherweise treffen können. Wer nicht dieselbe Ausgangslage hat, tappt im Dunkeln oder in der blutigen Mutmaßung. Wir müssen uns auf Straussens Zuschreibungen verlassen, die...mitunter problematisch scheinen.
Sein Schlusskapitel beantwortet dann auch für ihn die Frage, wen er von den dreien als das größte Genius hält: am Ende entscheidet er sich für Caesar. Warum? Das kann ich nach dreimaliger Lektüre der zwei Seiten noch nicht so recht beantworten. Aus Gründen, würde ich vermuten. Am ehesten dadurch, dass Caesar für ihn doch am ehesten an einen Staatsmann rankommt, also doch die Sphäre des Feldherren verlässt. Gleichzeitig gibt er Alexander die Krone der besten Propaganda und größten Ambition, während Hannibal für ihn Epitom der verschwendeten Kampfeskraft, des Siegens ohne Nachhall ist. Straussens Weg dahin ist allerdings wenig nachvollziehbar, da er im politischen Leben Hannibals durchaus konstatieren muss, dass Hannibal nach seiner Feldherrenzeit noch ein äußerst erfolgreicher Politiker war, doch das tut er wenig überzeugend damit ab, dass er Hannibal durchaus vorwirft, dass dieser mit der späten Nachkriegsblüte Karthagos erst den Untergang eingeleitet hätte, weil Rom Karthago sonst ignoriert hätte. Er wendet also Hannibals Erfolg gegen diesen, was er im Gegenzug dazu bei Alexander, dessen Reich ja sofort in den Diadochenkriegen unterging, gar nicht so recht tun will. Und die Auflösungserscheinungen zeigte Alexanders Reich ja bekanntlich auch schon zu Lebzeiten.
Am Ende stellt er also für sich fest, dass Hannibal nach Caesar der größte Diener Roms war, und alles in einem Duktus, der einen fast glauben lässt, er habe sich im Laufe des Buches mit Hannibal entzweit.
Ob die drei letztlich wirklich den Begriff Genius tragen dürfen, ist ebenso unklar wie seine Definition. Zwar sucht er auch nach Fehlern und Macken, aber so wirklich aussagekräftig verrechnen will er dies nicht.
Wie dem auch sei: letztlich ist die Idee des Buches wunderbar, allerdings beantwortet es die eigene Prämisse für mich nur unzureichend (ich stelle natürlich zur Debatte, dass ich das Werk und seinen Inhalt nicht ausreichend verstehe). Es scheitert an seinem Anspruch. Es ist zu trocken, um populärwissenschaftlich tauglich zu sein, aber zu wenig wissenschaftlich, um die Diskussion um dieses Thema entweder voranzubringen oder gar zu prägen. Mit Glück reibt sich jemand an der Meinung von Strauss und legt ein umfassenderes, analytischeres Werk nach. Das wäre wünschenswert.
Letztlich darf man aber durchaus loben, dass Barry S. Strauss einen doch recht geordneten, wenn auch stark verkürzten und zurechtgeschnittenen Ritt durch die Feldherrengeschichte der drei Protagonisten betreibt und viele nützliche Fakten präsentiert, die durchaus zum Einstieg in das Thema genützt werden können. Die Bibliographie sieht sehr solide aus.
Wer sich allerdings mit dem Protagonisten beschäftigt hat, und sich mit den jeweiligen Zeiten auskennt, kann sicher auf die Lektüre dieses Werkes verzichten. Wer einen lockeren, wenn auch problematisches und streitbaren Einstieg in den Vergleich wegen möchte, darf sich gerne an das Werk trauen und sich seine eigene Meinung bilden.
Zu Beginn rückt er zudem noch zehn Schlüsselqualifikationen in den Fokus, die ein erfolgreicher Feldherr mitbringen muss/sollte:
1.Ambition
2.Urteilskraft
3.Führungsqualität
4.Mut (oder gar Tollkühnheit)
5.Agilität (hier in Form von Anpassungsfähigkeit)
6.Infrastruktur
7.Strategie
8.Terror (er sieht die Fähigkeit dazu sogar aufgrund von Alexander dem Großen und Caesar als sehr zentral an)
9.Branding (Selbst-Propaganda)
10.Vorsehung (bei ihm göttlich geprägt, weil Divine Providence) - oder für mich trivialer: Glück
Darüber hinaus werden sie aber nicht wirklich zu einem Analysewerkzeug, auch wenn sie hier und da festgestellt werden. Jetzt eilt Strauss - faktenreich - durch die bekanntesten Feldzüge Alexanders, Hannibals und Caesars, um nach den fünf oben genannten Phasen zu prüfen, ob die drei wirklich große Feldherren und Führungspersönlichkeit sind.
Wir lernen einiges über die Feldzüge der drei, allerdings wirkt das Schema, so lose es ist, draufgepresst. Relativ schnell fällt auf, dass Hannibal da gar nicht so sehr reinpasst, wie Herr Strauss sich das vielleicht in der Konzeption gedacht haben mag und so wird sein Anteil kleiner und kleiner.
Darüber hinaus findet allerdings auch keine Analyse statt, und darin liegt die zentrale Schwäche dieses Werkes. Jetzt eilt Strauss auf etwa 250 Seiten Kerntext also durch deren politisch-martialisches Leben, zeichnet die groben Leitlinien und Entwicklungen nach, ohne natürlich in die Tiefe gehen zu können im historischen Rahmen, allerdings auch ohne die Führungsqualität zu analysieren. Stattdessen erhalten wir permanent Zuschreibungen, wie genial, wie toll, wie einfallsreich oder anpassungsfähig sie waren. Aber wir bekommen keine wirkliche Erklärung, warum ihr Handeln genau das ist.
Ebenso unklar ist, wie weit Strauss den Führungsgenius oder das Charisma fasst. Zwar verweist er am Ende immer wieder auf den Feldherren, doch andere Bereiche gliedert er ein, um sie dann wieder auszugliedern (Das Staatsmännische oder allgemein die Propagandafähigkeit einer Person abseits des Schlachtfeldes), wenn sie ihm nicht mehr passen.
Oder anders gesagt: bevor ich dieses Werk gelesen habe, wusste ich durch die Schulbildung geprägt, dass Alexander, Caesar und Hannibal zu den großen Feldherren und Kriegstreibern der Antike gehören. Nach Lektüre habe ich andere Adjektive für ihre Größe, aber immer noch keine Gründe. Nur weitere Zuschreibungen. Das war doch sehr enttäuschend.
Der Stil des Buches ist spröde. Strauss ist in seinen ewig wiederkehrenden Floskeln (...as the crow flies...) gefangen, seine Schlacht- und Taktikbeschreibungen sind sehr skizzenhaft und die Gesamtstrategien sind selten vollständig und dadurch nicht vollends nachzuvollziehen für den Laien. Wenn jemand Straussens Wissen hat, wird er viele Nuancen sicher verstehen und ähnliche Schlüsse möglicherweise treffen können. Wer nicht dieselbe Ausgangslage hat, tappt im Dunkeln oder in der blutigen Mutmaßung. Wir müssen uns auf Straussens Zuschreibungen verlassen, die...mitunter problematisch scheinen.
Sein Schlusskapitel beantwortet dann auch für ihn die Frage, wen er von den dreien als das größte Genius hält: am Ende entscheidet er sich für Caesar. Warum? Das kann ich nach dreimaliger Lektüre der zwei Seiten noch nicht so recht beantworten. Aus Gründen, würde ich vermuten. Am ehesten dadurch, dass Caesar für ihn doch am ehesten an einen Staatsmann rankommt, also doch die Sphäre des Feldherren verlässt. Gleichzeitig gibt er Alexander die Krone der besten Propaganda und größten Ambition, während Hannibal für ihn Epitom der verschwendeten Kampfeskraft, des Siegens ohne Nachhall ist. Straussens Weg dahin ist allerdings wenig nachvollziehbar, da er im politischen Leben Hannibals durchaus konstatieren muss, dass Hannibal nach seiner Feldherrenzeit noch ein äußerst erfolgreicher Politiker war, doch das tut er wenig überzeugend damit ab, dass er Hannibal durchaus vorwirft, dass dieser mit der späten Nachkriegsblüte Karthagos erst den Untergang eingeleitet hätte, weil Rom Karthago sonst ignoriert hätte. Er wendet also Hannibals Erfolg gegen diesen, was er im Gegenzug dazu bei Alexander, dessen Reich ja sofort in den Diadochenkriegen unterging, gar nicht so recht tun will. Und die Auflösungserscheinungen zeigte Alexanders Reich ja bekanntlich auch schon zu Lebzeiten.
Am Ende stellt er also für sich fest, dass Hannibal nach Caesar der größte Diener Roms war, und alles in einem Duktus, der einen fast glauben lässt, er habe sich im Laufe des Buches mit Hannibal entzweit.
Ob die drei letztlich wirklich den Begriff Genius tragen dürfen, ist ebenso unklar wie seine Definition. Zwar sucht er auch nach Fehlern und Macken, aber so wirklich aussagekräftig verrechnen will er dies nicht.
Wie dem auch sei: letztlich ist die Idee des Buches wunderbar, allerdings beantwortet es die eigene Prämisse für mich nur unzureichend (ich stelle natürlich zur Debatte, dass ich das Werk und seinen Inhalt nicht ausreichend verstehe). Es scheitert an seinem Anspruch. Es ist zu trocken, um populärwissenschaftlich tauglich zu sein, aber zu wenig wissenschaftlich, um die Diskussion um dieses Thema entweder voranzubringen oder gar zu prägen. Mit Glück reibt sich jemand an der Meinung von Strauss und legt ein umfassenderes, analytischeres Werk nach. Das wäre wünschenswert.
Letztlich darf man aber durchaus loben, dass Barry S. Strauss einen doch recht geordneten, wenn auch stark verkürzten und zurechtgeschnittenen Ritt durch die Feldherrengeschichte der drei Protagonisten betreibt und viele nützliche Fakten präsentiert, die durchaus zum Einstieg in das Thema genützt werden können. Die Bibliographie sieht sehr solide aus.
Wer sich allerdings mit dem Protagonisten beschäftigt hat, und sich mit den jeweiligen Zeiten auskennt, kann sicher auf die Lektüre dieses Werkes verzichten. Wer einen lockeren, wenn auch problematisches und streitbaren Einstieg in den Vergleich wegen möchte, darf sich gerne an das Werk trauen und sich seine eigene Meinung bilden.
May 9, 2023
Very enjoyable, especially the portions on Alexander the Great! 1 star deducted because, while I understand the reasoning behind telling the stories of the 3 generals side by side, I still found it organizationally confusing.
May 1, 2014
If the author had just stuck to history I would have given 4 stars. As it is, I toyed with 2 stars because it was such an awkward stretch to try apply lessons from these 3 leaders to modern business. It failed in that regard. At times it was a bit disjointed because it would tell a bit about one,then go to the next and the next and then pick up again with the first and you had to try and remember where you left off. This may have been because I listened to it on tape.
However, the history parts were very interesting. I knew of the three of course, but had never studied them in any detail so everything was new to me. I thought modern warfare was vicious and deadly but I was amazed at the numbers of people who would be killed in some of the battles. They rivaled Gettysburg. It was also interesting to see thay they were great soldiers but generally had a harder time when they needed to be statesmen. They all had problems in the end despite their brilliance.
However, the history parts were very interesting. I knew of the three of course, but had never studied them in any detail so everything was new to me. I thought modern warfare was vicious and deadly but I was amazed at the numbers of people who would be killed in some of the battles. They rivaled Gettysburg. It was also interesting to see thay they were great soldiers but generally had a harder time when they needed to be statesmen. They all had problems in the end despite their brilliance.
February 23, 2015
Overall, I found this book very well written with cogent arguments. I liked his treatment of the topic, and found his breakdown of the elements convincing. The analysis is well thought out, and presents a nicely balanced view that does not overstep the bounds of the available data.
This book is accessible to non-experts and writing is engaging and lively. There are points on which I would have liked a little more depth, but I understand why he kept to the level he did. I would heartily recommend it to anyone interested in leadership, whether from a historical or current perspective.
This book is accessible to non-experts and writing is engaging and lively. There are points on which I would have liked a little more depth, but I understand why he kept to the level he did. I would heartily recommend it to anyone interested in leadership, whether from a historical or current perspective.
October 8, 2016
Not dry in the slightest. From their beginnings through to their deaths and the political aftermath, Strauss brings these three to life in a way that drives history and the affect their actions took on history. Great example being Hannibal had a memorial built and dedicated to him on the alleged spot he died, by a Turkish general and politician in 1939, completed in 1981. Alexander and Caesar's final resting places are lost to sand and ruin. Worth the read if a student of history, or a passing one.
August 29, 2014
Really abominably written. It just constantly felt like a burden to pick the book up and read more. Finished it because I paid good money for it, but Strauss takes what is essentially a historical timeline of events and tries to present it as a drama, but it ends up feeling manufactured and forced. I initially thought that the book would have more of an emphasis on leadership, since it's in the dang title, but it really failed on that front too. Unfocused, poorly written, would not recommend to anyone. Abysmal.
February 25, 2019
An interesting discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of Caesar, Alexander, and Hannibal. I enjoyed the historical discussion as well as the details related to the most important battles that each general undertook. I'm not certain I agree with the book's thesis, and it does spend a lot of time criticizing the decisions of Hannibal while simultaneously lauding him as a top tier general, which was a bit confusing. It is a worthwhile book for the history, but I'm not sure it has too many lessons to teach.
August 14, 2012
Good analysis of the leaders during their war periods... would have loved to get more analysis about those leaders when they weren't really leading troops. It couldn't really be done with Alexander the Great, but perhaps could have been done with Hannibal and definitely could have happened with Julius Caesar. I liked how Strauss organized his book-- giving examples for all three, rather than treating each individual leader in separate 'sections' of the book.
August 1, 2012
Well researched and provacative insights into the minds and visions of three of histories great men. Strauss somehow pulls together the basic threads of what made Hannibal, Caesar and Alexander tick -- and what may tick in each of us who are in leadership positions of varying degrees. A very useful read for anyone climbing the corporate or government ladder (aren't we all?).
September 10, 2012
Excellent read about three of antiquity's most powerful leaders notably Alexander the Great, Hannibal, and Caesar. There are lessons to be learned from these men especially during one of the most important political seasons in many years.
July 5, 2015
Marvelous comparison of the 3 biggest military names in the Ancient World and set out as a thoroughly enjoyable and informative explanation of the activities and influences that each engaged in. A very good read for any who have a passion for classical history.
March 29, 2016
A great book examining the keys to success of three of the most successful military leaders of all time. The book is written in a compelling way, where Strauss transitions between Hannibal, Alexander, and Caesar as they progress through a similar pattern of success and failure.
January 20, 2019
Fun, engaging, and knowledgeable, Masters of Command is, at times, written like a motivational speech - and yet has good analysis of the military campaigns each general waged.
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