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How to Make Our Ideas Clear
"How to Make Our Ideas Clear" is the cornerstone for the philosophical school now known as pragmatism, and began the formalization of the scientific method. It is justly regarded as one of the most important philosophical papers ever written.
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First published January 1, 1878
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About the author
Charles Sanders Peirce
201 books188 followersCharles Sanders Peirce (/ˈpɜrs/, like "purse", September 10, 1839 – April 19, 1914) was an American philosopher, logician, mathematician, and scientist, sometimes known as "the father of pragmatism". He was educated as a chemist and employed as a scientist for 30 years. Today he is appreciated largely for his contributions to logic, mathematics, philosophy, scientific methodology, and semiotics, and for his founding of pragmatism.
In 1934, the philosopher Paul Weiss called Peirce "the most original and versatile of American philosophers and America's greatest logician". Webster's Biographical Dictionary said in 1943 that Peirce was "now regarded as the most original thinker and greatest logician of his time."
An innovator in mathematics, statistics, philosophy, research methodology, and various sciences, Peirce considered himself, first and foremost, a logician. He made major contributions to logic, but logic for him encompassed much of that which is now called epistemology and philosophy of science. He saw logic as the formal branch of semiotics, of which he is a founder. As early as 1886 he saw that logical operations could be carried out by electrical switching circuits; the same idea was used decades later to produce digital computers.
Bertrand Russell (1959) wrote, "Beyond doubt [...] he was one of the most original minds of the later nineteenth century, and certainly the greatest American thinker ever." Alfred North Whitehead, while reading some of Peirce's unpublished manuscripts soon after arriving at Harvard in 1924, was struck by how Peirce had anticipated his own "process" thinking. Karl Popper viewed Peirce as "one of the greatest philosophers of all times". Yet Peirce's achievements were not immediately recognized. His imposing contemporaries William James and Josiah Royce admired him, and Cassius Jackson Keyser at Columbia and C. K. Ogden wrote about Peirce with respect, but to no immediate effect.
The first scholar to give Peirce his considered professional attention was Royce's student Morris Raphael Cohen, the editor of an anthology of Peirce's writings titled Chance, Love, and Logic (1923) and the author of the first bibliography of Peirce's scattered writings. John Dewey studied under Peirce at Johns Hopkins and, from 1916 onwards, Dewey's writings repeatedly mention Peirce with deference. His 1938 Logic: The Theory of Inquiry is much influenced by Peirce. The publication of the first six volumes of the Collected Papers (1931–35), the most important event to date in Peirce studies and one that Cohen made possible by raising the needed funds, did not prompt an outpouring of secondary studies. The editors of those volumes, Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, did not become Peirce specialists. Early landmarks of the secondary literature include the monographs by Buchler (1939), Feibleman (1946), and Goudge (1950), the 1941 Ph.D. thesis by Arthur W. Burks (who went on to edit volumes 7 and 8), and the studies edited by Wiener and Young (1952). The Charles S. Peirce Society was founded in 1946. Its Transactions, an academic quarterly specializing in Peirce, pragmatism, and American philosophy, has appeared since 1965.
Peirce has gained a significant international following, marked by university research centers devoted to Peirce studies and pragmatism in Brazil (CeneP/CIEP), Finland (HPRC, including Commens), Germany (Wirth's group, Hoffman's and Otte's group, and Deuser's and Härle's group), France (L'I.R.S.C.E.), Spain (GEP), and Italy (CSP). His writings have been translated into several languages, including German, French, Finnish, Spanish, and Swedish. Since 1950, there have been French, Italian, Spanish, British, and Brazilian Peirceans of note.
In 1934, the philosopher Paul Weiss called Peirce "the most original and versatile of American philosophers and America's greatest logician". Webster's Biographical Dictionary said in 1943 that Peirce was "now regarded as the most original thinker and greatest logician of his time."
An innovator in mathematics, statistics, philosophy, research methodology, and various sciences, Peirce considered himself, first and foremost, a logician. He made major contributions to logic, but logic for him encompassed much of that which is now called epistemology and philosophy of science. He saw logic as the formal branch of semiotics, of which he is a founder. As early as 1886 he saw that logical operations could be carried out by electrical switching circuits; the same idea was used decades later to produce digital computers.
Bertrand Russell (1959) wrote, "Beyond doubt [...] he was one of the most original minds of the later nineteenth century, and certainly the greatest American thinker ever." Alfred North Whitehead, while reading some of Peirce's unpublished manuscripts soon after arriving at Harvard in 1924, was struck by how Peirce had anticipated his own "process" thinking. Karl Popper viewed Peirce as "one of the greatest philosophers of all times". Yet Peirce's achievements were not immediately recognized. His imposing contemporaries William James and Josiah Royce admired him, and Cassius Jackson Keyser at Columbia and C. K. Ogden wrote about Peirce with respect, but to no immediate effect.
The first scholar to give Peirce his considered professional attention was Royce's student Morris Raphael Cohen, the editor of an anthology of Peirce's writings titled Chance, Love, and Logic (1923) and the author of the first bibliography of Peirce's scattered writings. John Dewey studied under Peirce at Johns Hopkins and, from 1916 onwards, Dewey's writings repeatedly mention Peirce with deference. His 1938 Logic: The Theory of Inquiry is much influenced by Peirce. The publication of the first six volumes of the Collected Papers (1931–35), the most important event to date in Peirce studies and one that Cohen made possible by raising the needed funds, did not prompt an outpouring of secondary studies. The editors of those volumes, Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, did not become Peirce specialists. Early landmarks of the secondary literature include the monographs by Buchler (1939), Feibleman (1946), and Goudge (1950), the 1941 Ph.D. thesis by Arthur W. Burks (who went on to edit volumes 7 and 8), and the studies edited by Wiener and Young (1952). The Charles S. Peirce Society was founded in 1946. Its Transactions, an academic quarterly specializing in Peirce, pragmatism, and American philosophy, has appeared since 1965.
Peirce has gained a significant international following, marked by university research centers devoted to Peirce studies and pragmatism in Brazil (CeneP/CIEP), Finland (HPRC, including Commens), Germany (Wirth's group, Hoffman's and Otte's group, and Deuser's and Härle's group), France (L'I.R.S.C.E.), Spain (GEP), and Italy (CSP). His writings have been translated into several languages, including German, French, Finnish, Spanish, and Swedish. Since 1950, there have been French, Italian, Spanish, British, and Brazilian Peirceans of note.
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
October 18, 2016
Simplu: susţinând o logică abstractă, descrisă după un model ideatic şi imposibil de pus în practică spontan...
February 26, 2017
Peirce places emphasis on logic, which is a sensible thing as it can teach us how to make our ideas clear and be masters of our own meaning.
His first step is to criticize the notions of 'clear' and 'distinct', saying "since it is clearness that they were defining, I wish the logicians had made their definition a little more plain". I had this same objection reading Descartes, it seems Descartes just throws the terms out there without using discretion.
Descartes was one of the first thinkers to try and replace authority for the measure of truth. He, through skeptical methods, concluded that self-consciousness decided truths based on agree-ability with reason. This makes the mistake of allowing ideas that seem to be 'clear' but are actually not to be accepted. To counter this, the ideas must be 'distinct' which is to mean tested by dialectical examination.
Perice's pragmatism comes out when he states that Leibnitz missed "the most essential point of the Cartesian philosophy, which is, that to accept propositions which seem perfectly evident to us is a thing which, whether it be logical or illogical, we cannot help doing."
Belief, he states, has three properties. It is something we are aware of, it appeases doubt, and it establishes rules of action (or habits). Peirce then arrives at the notion that we conceive an object based on our conception of the effects that it has. You can't be in disagreement with someone else if you both agree in regard "to all their sensible effects".
Peirce attempts to dissect numerous philosophical debates by analyzing what we mean by certain words, and how many arguments arise over a confusion of terminology and are often just questions of the propriety of language. "There is some vague notion afloat that a question may mean something which the mind cannot conceive; and when some hair-splitting philosophers have been confronted with the absurdity of such a view, they have invented an empty distinction between positive and negative conceptions, in the attempt to give their non-idea a form not obviously nonsensical."
His first step is to criticize the notions of 'clear' and 'distinct', saying "since it is clearness that they were defining, I wish the logicians had made their definition a little more plain". I had this same objection reading Descartes, it seems Descartes just throws the terms out there without using discretion.
Descartes was one of the first thinkers to try and replace authority for the measure of truth. He, through skeptical methods, concluded that self-consciousness decided truths based on agree-ability with reason. This makes the mistake of allowing ideas that seem to be 'clear' but are actually not to be accepted. To counter this, the ideas must be 'distinct' which is to mean tested by dialectical examination.
Perice's pragmatism comes out when he states that Leibnitz missed "the most essential point of the Cartesian philosophy, which is, that to accept propositions which seem perfectly evident to us is a thing which, whether it be logical or illogical, we cannot help doing."
Belief, he states, has three properties. It is something we are aware of, it appeases doubt, and it establishes rules of action (or habits). Peirce then arrives at the notion that we conceive an object based on our conception of the effects that it has. You can't be in disagreement with someone else if you both agree in regard "to all their sensible effects".
Peirce attempts to dissect numerous philosophical debates by analyzing what we mean by certain words, and how many arguments arise over a confusion of terminology and are often just questions of the propriety of language. "There is some vague notion afloat that a question may mean something which the mind cannot conceive; and when some hair-splitting philosophers have been confronted with the absurdity of such a view, they have invented an empty distinction between positive and negative conceptions, in the attempt to give their non-idea a form not obviously nonsensical."
November 13, 2023
Peirce making the case for clear language as prerequisite for clear ideas.
November 14, 2022
I don’t see the hype in the paper that many philosophers do.
For example, in the description above of the work, it literally credits CS Peirce for developing the scientific method, when nothing of the sort happened in this paper. The scientific method was already quite established by the time that CS Peirce was writing.
When it comes to his views regarding pragmatism (or pragmaticism), that really only starts to become interesting (or, more likely, less interesting, but moreso pleasant to accept as a belief), depending on how into the thick of things with regards to some rabbit-hole meta-physical philosophical discussions someone has gotten. At least, that’s my interpretation.
For me, certain philosophers, even when I disagree with their point of view, I can see what the hype is about. Here, I found it totally underwhelming, despite the hype around CS Peirce in philosophy.
Maybe I’m missing something? Idk. If someone gets the hype or has another interpretation of this work, I’d be interested. Feel free to drop a comment and explain it and maybe it’ll help a lightbulb go off somewhere.
For example, in the description above of the work, it literally credits CS Peirce for developing the scientific method, when nothing of the sort happened in this paper. The scientific method was already quite established by the time that CS Peirce was writing.
When it comes to his views regarding pragmatism (or pragmaticism), that really only starts to become interesting (or, more likely, less interesting, but moreso pleasant to accept as a belief), depending on how into the thick of things with regards to some rabbit-hole meta-physical philosophical discussions someone has gotten. At least, that’s my interpretation.
For me, certain philosophers, even when I disagree with their point of view, I can see what the hype is about. Here, I found it totally underwhelming, despite the hype around CS Peirce in philosophy.
Maybe I’m missing something? Idk. If someone gets the hype or has another interpretation of this work, I’d be interested. Feel free to drop a comment and explain it and maybe it’ll help a lightbulb go off somewhere.
February 13, 2022
An important essay in understanding the origins of American Pragmatism. The aim is to pursue a notion of truth and an understanding of reality that remains connected to action and experience. It is possible for people to hold contrary notions of truth as long as each facilitates the fixing of belief and the completion of action. Until a circumstance arises where the difference between perceptions of truth matter, because they are contrary to a reality that exists independent of our belief in it, both perceptions are true. "Only practical distinctions have meaning"
June 2, 2022
Title suggestion: “Pragmatism manifest”. A lot of emphasis on logic and science as means to achieve truth, which he correlates with clear thoughts. Wittgenstein would definitely approve of it. Suggestion to read before: “Socrate’s Apology” and “Beyond Good and Evil”. The geometrical part was actually fun and help me to realize how Newton’s law are actually a quantification of the idea of causality and extension.
June 5, 2022
Non avendo l'adeguata preparazione la lettura è risultata molto complicata, dando l'impressione di essere un insegnamento esoterico. Peccato perché penso che l'autore sviluppa un pensiero fondamentale per costruire un modo di pensare migliore, non in prenda alla suggestione o la sensazione.
Non posso non notare l'ironia di come il titolo del libro cozza con l'esperienza che un lettore non adeguatamente preparato ha della lettura.
Non posso non notare l'ironia di come il titolo del libro cozza con l'esperienza che un lettore non adeguatamente preparato ha della lettura.
March 16, 2021
Confusing and complex, yet somewhat interesting when I was able to understand what he was talking about.
June 30, 2024
Più d'un uomo ha amorevolmente coltivato come hobby qualche vaga ombra di una idea troppo priva di significato per essere veramente falsa; ciò nonostante egli l'ha appassionatamente amata, ne ha fatto la sua compagna di giorno e di notte, le ha dato la sua forza e la sua vita, abbandonando ogni altra occupazione per essa, e in breve ha vissuto di essa e con essa finché è diventata carne della sua carne e sangue del suo sangue; e poi un bel mattino si è svegliato per trovarla scomparsa, svanita come la bella Melusina della favola, e con essa l'essenza stessa della sua vita. Ho conosciuto io stesso un uomo simile. [da pagina 8]
Ci potremmo tenere perfettamente al sicuro da tutti questi sofismi se riflettessimo sul fatto che l'intera funzione del pensiero è di produrre azioni, abitudini e che qualunque cosa connessa con un pensiero ma non pertinente al suo scopo è un'aggiunta a esso ma non parte di esso. ... Per sviluppare il significato di una cosa non dobbiamo far altro, dunque, che determinare quali abitudini essa produce, giacché quello che una cosa significa è semplicemente l'abitudine da essa implicata. ... Così dobbiamo scendere al tangibile e al pratico., per trovare la radice di ogni vera distinzione di pensiero per sottile che sia; e non vi è distinzione di significato, per fine che sia, che possa consistere in altro che in una possibile differenza pratica. [da pagina 16]
Ci potremmo tenere perfettamente al sicuro da tutti questi sofismi se riflettessimo sul fatto che l'intera funzione del pensiero è di produrre azioni, abitudini e che qualunque cosa connessa con un pensiero ma non pertinente al suo scopo è un'aggiunta a esso ma non parte di esso. ... Per sviluppare il significato di una cosa non dobbiamo far altro, dunque, che determinare quali abitudini essa produce, giacché quello che una cosa significa è semplicemente l'abitudine da essa implicata. ... Così dobbiamo scendere al tangibile e al pratico., per trovare la radice di ogni vera distinzione di pensiero per sottile che sia; e non vi è distinzione di significato, per fine che sia, che possa consistere in altro che in una possibile differenza pratica. [da pagina 16]
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews