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Nature of Necessity, The. Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy.
This is a reissue of a book which is an exploration and defence of the notion of modality 'de re', the idea that objects have both essential and accidental properties. It is one of the first full-length studies of the modalities to emerge from the debate
255 pages, ebook
First published January 1, 1974
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About the author
Alvin Plantinga
50 books361 followersHe is an American analytic philosopher, the John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the University of Notre Dame and the inaugural holder of the Jellema Chair in Philosophy at Calvin College.
Plantinga is widely known for his work in philosophy of religion, epistemology, metaphysics and Christian apologetics.
He has delivered the Gifford Lectures three times and was described by TIME magazine as "America's leading orthodox Protestant philosopher of God"
Plantinga is the current winner of the Templeton Prize.
Plantinga is widely known for his work in philosophy of religion, epistemology, metaphysics and Christian apologetics.
He has delivered the Gifford Lectures three times and was described by TIME magazine as "America's leading orthodox Protestant philosopher of God"
Plantinga is the current winner of the Templeton Prize.
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
March 31, 2015
Somebody described this book perfectly: "I felt like I was up against a Level 97 Boss and I was only Level 70."
Plantinga begins his survey of modal ontology with a discussion of de re and de dicto statements.
de dicto: predicates a modal property of another dictum or proposition (Plantinga 9).
de re: x has a certain property essentially.
The problem: “suppose we are given the object x and a property P. Is it possible to state general directions for picking out some proposition--call it the kernel proposition with respect to x and P--whose de dicto modal properties determine whether x has P essentially” (30)?
While such a question seems arcane, it does allow Plantinga to furnish the theist with a number of highly useful concepts and tools, like possible worlds. A possible world is the way things could have been, a possible state of affairs (44). But not every possible world is a possible state of affairs. “A state of affairs must be maximal or complete.”
From this Plantinga gives a fine, if not always lucid, presentation of essence and nature. An essence could also be a set of properties (76). An essence is a set of world-indexed properties (i.e., that is those which exist in every possible world; 77). Essential properties: the properties Socrates has in every world he exists. Essence: the instantiation of the above properties.
Plantinga uses these tools to deal with the atheologian’s problem of evil. First of all, what is freedom? Freedom: no causal laws and antecedent conditions determine whether I will or will not act.
The initial defense: a world containing creatures who are sometimes significantly free is more valuable, all things considered, than a world with no freedom (166). Therefore, creatures that are capable of moral good are also capable of moral evil.
The problem: if God is omnipotent, then how come he couldn’t create a world where all the creatures freely do what is good? Plantinga takes a brief detour and clarifies what we mean by creation. God does not create everything (e.g., he does not create his own properties, for example). Rather, God creates some things and God actualizes states of affairs (169).
Plantinga gives a rather dizzying survey of the Ontological Argument. While I have my doubts on its psychological efficacy in debates, the Ontological Argument, especially Plantinga’s retelling of it, serves a crucial role in defining what we mean by God and what it means for God to have properties.
This allows Plantinga to utilize the concept of Transworld Depravity: Every world that God actualizes, given person P’s freedom, P takes at least one wrong action (185). It is possibly true (not necessarily) that any world God actualizes has P doing wrongly.
Plantinga concludes his discussion with the Ontological Argument. The crux of the matter is this: a) is existence a predicate? b) is existence a great-making property?
Kant denies (a). I am not sufficient to judge whether he is right or not. In any case, (b) is more interesting. Can (b) be proven adequately to the unbeliever? Maybe, maybe not. However, for the believer for whom the existence of God is already a settled issue (whether rightly or wrongly) (b) certainly follows (and thus informs one’s systematic theology).
Further, given Plantinga’s possible worlds semantics, a maximally great being will exist in every possible world.
Conclusion
This is the hardest book I’ve ever read. The above is a fourth grade summary of what I think Plantinga said. The appendix on symbolic logic is like what math would look like if it were designed by Satan.
I found a lot of useful logical tools. I am not sure all of Plantinga’s arguments are fully developed. For example, I like the idea of transworld depravity. I am just not sure why the atheologian will not object in the following way: “Why could God not create a world in which transworld depravity doesn’t obtain? Must freedom then entail transworld depravity?” Indeed, this is problematic for the doctrine of creation.
I don’t think it is a full defeater, but it does give one pause. This book can benefit the advanced reader, but reader be warned--it is hard.
Plantinga begins his survey of modal ontology with a discussion of de re and de dicto statements.
de dicto: predicates a modal property of another dictum or proposition (Plantinga 9).
de re: x has a certain property essentially.
The problem: “suppose we are given the object x and a property P. Is it possible to state general directions for picking out some proposition--call it the kernel proposition with respect to x and P--whose de dicto modal properties determine whether x has P essentially” (30)?
While such a question seems arcane, it does allow Plantinga to furnish the theist with a number of highly useful concepts and tools, like possible worlds. A possible world is the way things could have been, a possible state of affairs (44). But not every possible world is a possible state of affairs. “A state of affairs must be maximal or complete.”
From this Plantinga gives a fine, if not always lucid, presentation of essence and nature. An essence could also be a set of properties (76). An essence is a set of world-indexed properties (i.e., that is those which exist in every possible world; 77). Essential properties: the properties Socrates has in every world he exists. Essence: the instantiation of the above properties.
Plantinga uses these tools to deal with the atheologian’s problem of evil. First of all, what is freedom? Freedom: no causal laws and antecedent conditions determine whether I will or will not act.
The initial defense: a world containing creatures who are sometimes significantly free is more valuable, all things considered, than a world with no freedom (166). Therefore, creatures that are capable of moral good are also capable of moral evil.
The problem: if God is omnipotent, then how come he couldn’t create a world where all the creatures freely do what is good? Plantinga takes a brief detour and clarifies what we mean by creation. God does not create everything (e.g., he does not create his own properties, for example). Rather, God creates some things and God actualizes states of affairs (169).
Plantinga gives a rather dizzying survey of the Ontological Argument. While I have my doubts on its psychological efficacy in debates, the Ontological Argument, especially Plantinga’s retelling of it, serves a crucial role in defining what we mean by God and what it means for God to have properties.
This allows Plantinga to utilize the concept of Transworld Depravity: Every world that God actualizes, given person P’s freedom, P takes at least one wrong action (185). It is possibly true (not necessarily) that any world God actualizes has P doing wrongly.
Plantinga concludes his discussion with the Ontological Argument. The crux of the matter is this: a) is existence a predicate? b) is existence a great-making property?
Kant denies (a). I am not sufficient to judge whether he is right or not. In any case, (b) is more interesting. Can (b) be proven adequately to the unbeliever? Maybe, maybe not. However, for the believer for whom the existence of God is already a settled issue (whether rightly or wrongly) (b) certainly follows (and thus informs one’s systematic theology).
Further, given Plantinga’s possible worlds semantics, a maximally great being will exist in every possible world.
Conclusion
This is the hardest book I’ve ever read. The above is a fourth grade summary of what I think Plantinga said. The appendix on symbolic logic is like what math would look like if it were designed by Satan.
I found a lot of useful logical tools. I am not sure all of Plantinga’s arguments are fully developed. For example, I like the idea of transworld depravity. I am just not sure why the atheologian will not object in the following way: “Why could God not create a world in which transworld depravity doesn’t obtain? Must freedom then entail transworld depravity?” Indeed, this is problematic for the doctrine of creation.
I don’t think it is a full defeater, but it does give one pause. This book can benefit the advanced reader, but reader be warned--it is hard.
January 20, 2015
In Nature of Necessity, Plantinga explains the use of possible worlds philosophy. Or at least he tries to. For much of the book I felt like I was up against a level 97 boss, and I'm only at level 70. This was one of his earlier works. He's become a better communicator later in life, but even as a young man his mind was awe-inspiring.
July 2, 2025
Modal metaphysics is probably one of my favorite areas of philosophy. As utterly dull as it probably is to most people (and I can’t honestly argue), I find it extremely rewarding.
Plantinga is my favorite philosopher, or least my favorite philosopher of religion, and this is the best book of his I’ve read so far. The first couple of chapters are spent identifying necessity (“broadly logical necessity,” as he calls it) and then explaining and arguing for the difference between modality de re and de dicto. Endorsement of the former commits one to a view called essentialism, which holds, basically, that objects have both essential and non essential properties, as well as that each object has an essence, something synonymous with self identity, and that is what makes them “them” across different worlds. Most of the book was spent laying out this view. Essentialism seems to me correct, and it gives a robust way to comprehend metaphysical modality beyond just the semantics, but I admit that I am too ignorant about the subject to say if it’s wholly successful. At least the doctrine that objects have essential and accidental properties is apparently uncontroversial now, and in arguing for that view I think Plantinga is obviously correct.
The last two chapters are spent on Plantinga’s Free Will Defense and Modal Ontological argument, respectively. The former is very widely regarded as having successfully rebutted all forms of the logical problem of evil; even famous atheists like J.L. Mackie agree. The latter is deeply controversial, but Plantinga’s goal was only to provide an avenue whereby theists could rationally hold belief in God, and I think in that he definitely succeeded. The argument is almost universally regarded as valid, and its only real premise—that, possibly, God exists—is such that every theist would assent to it, and even most atheists, I think, would accept that it isn’t immediately irrational to do so. Once this premise is granted, it follows deductively that God exists through a whole lot of extremely technical modal inferences, but these inferences themselves aren’t the controversial part of the argument.
It may be hard to tell what from this review what there is to actually like about the book, but I personally find this all immensely interesting. Modal metaphysics is beautiful and has helped to greatly clarify my thinking, and this is the most thorough and interesting exposure that I have had to it.
Plantinga is my favorite philosopher, or least my favorite philosopher of religion, and this is the best book of his I’ve read so far. The first couple of chapters are spent identifying necessity (“broadly logical necessity,” as he calls it) and then explaining and arguing for the difference between modality de re and de dicto. Endorsement of the former commits one to a view called essentialism, which holds, basically, that objects have both essential and non essential properties, as well as that each object has an essence, something synonymous with self identity, and that is what makes them “them” across different worlds. Most of the book was spent laying out this view. Essentialism seems to me correct, and it gives a robust way to comprehend metaphysical modality beyond just the semantics, but I admit that I am too ignorant about the subject to say if it’s wholly successful. At least the doctrine that objects have essential and accidental properties is apparently uncontroversial now, and in arguing for that view I think Plantinga is obviously correct.
The last two chapters are spent on Plantinga’s Free Will Defense and Modal Ontological argument, respectively. The former is very widely regarded as having successfully rebutted all forms of the logical problem of evil; even famous atheists like J.L. Mackie agree. The latter is deeply controversial, but Plantinga’s goal was only to provide an avenue whereby theists could rationally hold belief in God, and I think in that he definitely succeeded. The argument is almost universally regarded as valid, and its only real premise—that, possibly, God exists—is such that every theist would assent to it, and even most atheists, I think, would accept that it isn’t immediately irrational to do so. Once this premise is granted, it follows deductively that God exists through a whole lot of extremely technical modal inferences, but these inferences themselves aren’t the controversial part of the argument.
It may be hard to tell what from this review what there is to actually like about the book, but I personally find this all immensely interesting. Modal metaphysics is beautiful and has helped to greatly clarify my thinking, and this is the most thorough and interesting exposure that I have had to it.
November 15, 2020
Alvin Plantinga demonstrates his mastery of both formal and modal logic in this examination of the perennial question of God and the existence of evil. While the argument is complex, Plantinga's ability to communicate and lead the reader step by step allows this book to be accessible in its basic argument, even if the specifics require a deeper and more careful reading. The argument is carefully laid out step by step, with the symbolic logic explained and expanded in the text.
Traditionally, the problem of evil has been one of the most difficult problems to square with a belief in an infinite, good Deity. While the entire argument of the book is dedicated to showing that this problem is not a logical contradiction, the slow, deliberate and complicated form that this demonstration takes witnesses the difficulty of the problem. While the logic may be clear that there is no necessary contradiction between these two propositions, the problem is not one of logic alone. This problem is one that is deeper than intellect. While the argument is formal, the reader will find much that is familiar from other, less rigorous examinations of this problem, While the rhetoric is familiar, Plantinga's academic form does not reduce the final argument to a Gospel presentation. For the Christian, this may be a fault, but an objective examination of the problem without the precommitment to an evangelistic appeal strengthens the validity of the argument. While the argument may not prove to be fully satisfying, the clear demonstration that a reasonable case can be offered for the traditional theistic position is a positive.
Anthony Flew's falsification criteria is also challenged by Plantinga. The use of modal logic may make Flew's insight less sure, but the rhetorical persuasiveness remains. While the argument is center of this work, Plantinga offers a compelling example of a careful, rational examination of a difficult problem, He provides a model in action of how logic, and the more specialized modal logic, can be used to consider long-standing challenges to the faith. While Plantinga's attempt does not remove the problem, it is a comfort to see that there is an intellectually valid response to the more difficult of all problems in any theistic belief.
Traditionally, the problem of evil has been one of the most difficult problems to square with a belief in an infinite, good Deity. While the entire argument of the book is dedicated to showing that this problem is not a logical contradiction, the slow, deliberate and complicated form that this demonstration takes witnesses the difficulty of the problem. While the logic may be clear that there is no necessary contradiction between these two propositions, the problem is not one of logic alone. This problem is one that is deeper than intellect. While the argument is formal, the reader will find much that is familiar from other, less rigorous examinations of this problem, While the rhetoric is familiar, Plantinga's academic form does not reduce the final argument to a Gospel presentation. For the Christian, this may be a fault, but an objective examination of the problem without the precommitment to an evangelistic appeal strengthens the validity of the argument. While the argument may not prove to be fully satisfying, the clear demonstration that a reasonable case can be offered for the traditional theistic position is a positive.
Anthony Flew's falsification criteria is also challenged by Plantinga. The use of modal logic may make Flew's insight less sure, but the rhetorical persuasiveness remains. While the argument is center of this work, Plantinga offers a compelling example of a careful, rational examination of a difficult problem, He provides a model in action of how logic, and the more specialized modal logic, can be used to consider long-standing challenges to the faith. While Plantinga's attempt does not remove the problem, it is a comfort to see that there is an intellectually valid response to the more difficult of all problems in any theistic belief.
May 12, 2022
This book was incredible. However, I think what one reviewer said was spot on. I felt like a level 70 fighting a level 97 boss the whole way reading this. The logic was a beast in itself, and just reminds me how much more logic I need to study.
All in all, a masterpiece to say the least. Plantinga clearly is a master at his craft.
All in all, a masterpiece to say the least. Plantinga clearly is a master at his craft.
May 21, 2021
Fantastic work. I wish I understood more of it.
January 8, 2011
A classic in modal logic.
June 16, 2014
Completely changed the way I view the world and think about reality.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews