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Warrant #2
Warrant and Proper Function
In this companion volume to Warrant: The Current Debate, Alvin Plantinga develops an original approach to the question of epistemic warrant; that is what turns true belief into knowledge. He argues that what is crucial to warrant is the proper functioning of one's cognitive faculties in the right kind of cognitive environment. Although this book is in some sense a sequel to its companion volume, the arguments do not presuppose those of the first book and it stands alone as a stimulating contribution to epistemology.
256 pages, ebook
First published December 1, 1992
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About the author
Alvin Plantinga
50 books361 followersHe is an American analytic philosopher, the John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the University of Notre Dame and the inaugural holder of the Jellema Chair in Philosophy at Calvin College.
Plantinga is widely known for his work in philosophy of religion, epistemology, metaphysics and Christian apologetics.
He has delivered the Gifford Lectures three times and was described by TIME magazine as "America's leading orthodox Protestant philosopher of God"
Plantinga is the current winner of the Templeton Prize.
Plantinga is widely known for his work in philosophy of religion, epistemology, metaphysics and Christian apologetics.
He has delivered the Gifford Lectures three times and was described by TIME magazine as "America's leading orthodox Protestant philosopher of God"
Plantinga is the current winner of the Templeton Prize.
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
January 9, 2015
Plantinga begins by examining the Gettier-type problems that internalist accounts of knowledge face. Having shown these difficulties, Plantinga is now able to set the stage for his externalist approach to warrant. This he does by explaining our design function: Any well formed human being who is in an epistemically congenial environment and whose intellectual faculties are in good working order will typically take for granted at least three things: that she has existed for some time, that she has had many thoughts and feelings, and that she is not a thought or feeling (Plantinga 50).
He then examines three apparent weak points of externalism and show not only are they strong points, only a fool would challenge them: memory, other persons, and testimony. In the nature of the case we do not have basic beliefs about these three entities in the sense that evidentialism and classic foundationalism require (especially memory and testimony; solipsism has a host of problems beyond this). Throughout this defense we see the vindication of Thomas Reid.
The book is quite difficult and technical, though. The sections on probability will lose all but the most formidable philosophers. While reading these chapters one is reminded of Eowyn’s comments to Merry before the battle: “Courage, Merry; it will soon be over.”
He then gives a (mostly) wonderfully lucid discussion of coherentism, classic foundationalism, and Reidian foundationalism. Coherentism sees truth as a source of warrant in the existing relations of one’s beliefs: does a belief “cohere” and “mesh” in a larger noetic structure? Plantinga suggests this is inadequate because coherentism only tells us of the doxastic relationships between beliefs. Warrant, by contrast, needs far more, experience among other things (179). Classical foundationalism is wrong because it is self-referentially incoherent. It is not the case that the foundationalist claim (a belief is properly basic because it is either self-evident to me or immediately present to my senses) meets its own criteria: it is not self-evidently true nor is it available to the senses (182). This leaves us with Plantinga’s position: Reidian foundationalism. If a belief is formed in proper circumstances according to its proper cognitive design, it has warrant.
Conclusion:
The book began well and ended well. The middle sections were good, too, but likely only of interest to the most doughty of analytic philosophers. While I agree with Plantinga’s thesis, there are some shortcomings (but these can be excused because they have been treated in later works). The section on Reidian foundationalism, for example, while fundamentally sound, seemed to lack, forgive the pun, coherence in articulation. I kept seeing what RF was not in relation to classical foundationalism, but very little on what it was. The final chapters on naturalism are interesting, but have since been further refined in Plantinga’s later works.
He then examines three apparent weak points of externalism and show not only are they strong points, only a fool would challenge them: memory, other persons, and testimony. In the nature of the case we do not have basic beliefs about these three entities in the sense that evidentialism and classic foundationalism require (especially memory and testimony; solipsism has a host of problems beyond this). Throughout this defense we see the vindication of Thomas Reid.
The book is quite difficult and technical, though. The sections on probability will lose all but the most formidable philosophers. While reading these chapters one is reminded of Eowyn’s comments to Merry before the battle: “Courage, Merry; it will soon be over.”
He then gives a (mostly) wonderfully lucid discussion of coherentism, classic foundationalism, and Reidian foundationalism. Coherentism sees truth as a source of warrant in the existing relations of one’s beliefs: does a belief “cohere” and “mesh” in a larger noetic structure? Plantinga suggests this is inadequate because coherentism only tells us of the doxastic relationships between beliefs. Warrant, by contrast, needs far more, experience among other things (179). Classical foundationalism is wrong because it is self-referentially incoherent. It is not the case that the foundationalist claim (a belief is properly basic because it is either self-evident to me or immediately present to my senses) meets its own criteria: it is not self-evidently true nor is it available to the senses (182). This leaves us with Plantinga’s position: Reidian foundationalism. If a belief is formed in proper circumstances according to its proper cognitive design, it has warrant.
Conclusion:
The book began well and ended well. The middle sections were good, too, but likely only of interest to the most doughty of analytic philosophers. While I agree with Plantinga’s thesis, there are some shortcomings (but these can be excused because they have been treated in later works). The section on Reidian foundationalism, for example, while fundamentally sound, seemed to lack, forgive the pun, coherence in articulation. I kept seeing what RF was not in relation to classical foundationalism, but very little on what it was. The final chapters on naturalism are interesting, but have since been further refined in Plantinga’s later works.
May 8, 2020
Plantinga makes enormous assumptions about the nature of truth, the reliability of our senses, memory, the nature of logic and mathematics, he ignores historical developments, and his reasoning from analogy is comically flawed.
This is painful to read.
There are moments where he realizes how shaky the ground he is building upon is. But instead of realizing it means he should abandon the project (vis-a-vis reductio ad absurdum) he pushes on.
He has convinced me that any philosophical attempt to explain knowledge needs to incorporate the findings of psychology. Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, Descartes, etc did not have recourse to such a discipline. Plantinga has no such excuse, except to hide in an academic silo.
I do not think he establishes that warrant exists.
This is rubbish. From start to finish.
This is painful to read.
There are moments where he realizes how shaky the ground he is building upon is. But instead of realizing it means he should abandon the project (vis-a-vis reductio ad absurdum) he pushes on.
He has convinced me that any philosophical attempt to explain knowledge needs to incorporate the findings of psychology. Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, Descartes, etc did not have recourse to such a discipline. Plantinga has no such excuse, except to hide in an academic silo.
I do not think he establishes that warrant exists.
This is rubbish. From start to finish.
Currently reading
January 27, 2013I am now almost a 3rd of the way through Warrant and Proper Function, and I think my main problem is the structure of the information. It almost seems as if he is reflecting on a random piles of construction material laying on the ground. For the trained builder, who knows the whole, (the sequence and ordering of the parts in a completed building) then, reading details about various random piles, does not cause him to get lost. But alas, I love philosophy, but I am no trained philosopher. So to really be able to fully grasp and communicate to others what I am reading about, I would need Plantinga to structure the information in a foundation to roof sort of way, so I could see where each piece belongs. With John Locke writing for example, he may not necessarily be easy to follow to begin with, but eventually its clear how each point builds upon the former in a logical manner, making it much easier to recall and share with others. I know I have no right to complain though, this book by Plantinga is written for professionals, not for laymen.
I do realize that there is a logical structure of the book as a whole, each section is meant to lead to the next section, but yeah, once in a section I get lost in the details.
I do realize that there is a logical structure of the book as a whole, each section is meant to lead to the next section, but yeah, once in a section I get lost in the details.
March 2, 2010
The first few chapters of this book are organized like an introduction to epistemology textbook. They are simply written, with many examples, and cover epistemological topics involving perception, memory, the apriori and testimony. The key point or insight in these early chapters is the development of warrant. For Plantinga, knowledge is not justified true belief; rather, it is warranted true belief. Warrant involves the proper function of one's cognitive mechanisms, mechanisms that are aimed at truth, an environment for which an organims was designed to operate in, and a certain level of certainty had by the organism.
The later chapters of this book are devoted to Plantinga's (now famous) defeater argument--aka the evolotionary argument against naturalism. These chapters are the best, most insightful, and most original.
The later chapters of this book are devoted to Plantinga's (now famous) defeater argument--aka the evolotionary argument against naturalism. These chapters are the best, most insightful, and most original.
January 20, 2008
Excellent follow up to the first book in the trilogy. (See all three of my reviews.) Plantinga develops the approach he ended off hinting at in WCD. After furthering his original approach to the question of warrant, he applies it to various epistemological desiderata. He ends off hinting at his devastating argument against the conjunction of naturalism and evolution - which is developed later in WCB and Naturalism Defeated, ed. James Beilby.
September 3, 2013
fascinating read. dont know if i agree with him :/
June 16, 2014
Very difficult analytic philosophy, but good!
July 22, 2009
Classic text on warrant, but not for the layman.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews