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T. S. Eliot once called Jacques Maritain "the most conspicuous figure and probably the most powerful force in contemporary philosophy." His wife and devoted intellectual companion, Raissa Maritain, was of Jewish descent but joined the Catholic church with him in 1906. Maritain studied under Henri Bergson but was dissatisfied with his teacher's philosophy, eventually finding certainty in the system of St. Thomas Aquinas. He lectured widely in Europe and in North and South America, and lived and taught in New York during World War II. Appointed French ambassador to the Vatican in 1945, he resigned in 1948 to teach philosophy at Princeton University, where he remained until his retirement in 1953. He was prominent in the Catholic intellectual resurgence, with a keen perception of modern French literature. Although Maritain regarded metaphysics as central to civilization and metaphysically his position was Thomism, he took full measure of the intellectual currents of his time and articulated a resilient and vital Thomism, applying the principles of scholasticism to contemporary issues. In 1963, Maritain was honored by the French literary world with the national Grand Prize for letters. He learned of the award at his retreat in a small monastery near Toulouse where he had been living in ascetic retirement for some years. In 1967, the publication of "The Peasant of the Garonne" disturbed the French Roman Catholic world. In it, Maritain attacked the "neo-modernism" that he had seen developing in the church in recent decades, especially since the Second Vatican Council. According to Jaroslav Pelikan, writing in the Saturday Review of Literature, "He laments that in avant-garde Roman Catholic theology today he can 'read nothing about the redeeming sacrifice or the merits of the Passion.' In his interpretation, the whole of the Christian tradition has identified redemption with the sacrifice of the cross. But now, all of that is being discarded, along with the idea of hell, the doctrine of creation out of nothing, the infancy narratives of the Gospels, and belief in the immortality of the human soul." Maritain's wife, Raissa, also distinguished herself as a philosophical author and poet. The project of publishing Oeuvres Completes of Jacques and Raissa Maritain has been in progress since 1982, with seven volumes now in print.
AN EXCELLENT INTRODUCTION BY A MODERN “THOMIST” PHILOSOPHER
Jacques Maritain (1882-1973) was a French philosopher who converted to Catholicism in 1906; he was known as a prominent "neo-Thomist."
He begins this 1948 book: “Thomism is not a museum piece. No doubt… it must be studied historically… But Thomism … harmonizes… in a synthesis which transcends all its components. It is relevant to every epoch. It answers modern problems, both theoretical and practical… We therefore look to Thomism at the present day to save: in the speculative order, intellectual values; in the practical order, so far as they can be saved by philosophy, human values. In short, we are concerned not with an archaeological but with a living Thomism… We must defend the traditional wisdom and the continuity of the Philosophia Perennis against the prejudices of modern individualism… we are shocked if we are told of a knowledge which applies today the same fundamental concepts, the same principles, as in the days of Sankara, Aristotle, or St. Thomas… I have often answered this objection by pointing out… that truth cannot be subjected to a chronological test.” (Pg. 9-11)
He cautions, however, that “I dislike the term ‘Neo-scholasticism’ or ‘Neo-Thomism.’ It involves the risk of pulling us down from the higher plane of wisdom to the lower plane of the problematic sciences and thereby leading us logically to demand for Thomism also a progress by substitution in which the ‘Neo’ would devour the Thomism.” (Pg. 20)
Later, he explains, “The Thomist philosopher is dubbed ‘scholastic,’ a name derived from his most painful affliction. Scholastic pedantry is his peculiar foe. He must constantly triumph over his domestic adversary, the professor. The Thomist philosophy, therefore, is, in the sense explained, an EXISTENTIAL philosophy… it is applicable to the speculative philosophy of Saint Thomas, Thomism in the very order of speculation, particularly metaphysical speculation.” (Pg. 30)
He states, "The Supreme ‘Mystery’ is the supernatural Mystery which is the object of faith and theology. It is concerned with the Godhead Itself, the interior life of God, to which our intellect cannot rise by its unaided natural powers. But philosophy and science also are concerned with mystery, another mystery, the mystery of nature and the mystery of being. A philosophy unaware of mystery would not be a philosophy.” (Pg. 13)
He explains, “The object of metaphysics… is, according to the Thomists, being as such… It is being disengaged and isolated from the sensible quiddity, being viewed as such and set apart in its pure intellectual values.” (Pg. 26) He adds, “Metaphysics, however, does not verify its conclusions in sense data, nor, like mathematics, in the imagination. Nevertheless, it too refers to the corruptible existence which can be attained by sensation.” (Pg. 29)
He clarifies, “the term dialectic as employed by modern philosophers… now designates a procedure which passes from opposites to opposites to engender reality, starting from the most primitive notion… [Logicians] sought a LOGICAL explanation of things… The genuine philosopher, however, seeks an ONTOLOGICAL (metalogical) explanation of things and is not content with a merely logical explanation.” (Pg. 46)
He states, “the intuition of the principle of identity, every being is what it is, being is being, can possess such value for the metaphysician… The philosopher…sees in it the first fundamental law of reality itself, a law which astounds him because it proclaims … the primal mystery of being, its combination of subsistence and abundance, a law which is exemplified by objects in an infinite number of different modes, and applied with an infinite variety.” (Pg. 60)
He points out, “Thomism… merits the appellation of an existential philosophy, and this already in the speculative order, in what concerns the speculative portion of philosophy. But though Thomist metaphysics is an existential metaphysics, it is so by being and remaining metaphysics, a wisdom whose procedure is intellectual and in strict accordance with the demands of the intellect and its distinctive intuitiveness.” (Pg. 64)
He observes, “the principle of identity… has its supreme exemplification in God Himself, in the first Principle of being, who is Truth and Love, and in the Trinity of Persons which is known only by revelation, and escapes the grasp of the philosopher’s reason abandoned to its own powers.” (Pg. 96)
He notes, “To this potentiality in all creatures… corresponds the dominating indifference of the will. The will is specified by good as such… This the principle of sufficient reason plays no more magnificent part than its part in making possible the freedom of the will.” (Pg. 101)
He argues, “Spinoza’s God, a Deity very imperfectly immanent, is thought and extension, as we might conceive a subsistent Geometry. No more than the latter is He or can He be love. Nor can He be Himself the object and end of His love. Though we ought to love Him with an intellectual love, as we might love such a Geometry, both are equally incapable of returning our love or loving us first. Moreover, Spinoza’s God causes things without ordaining them to any end.” (Pg. 122-123)
He argues, “It is equally clear that chance cannot possibly be the origin of things. For it presupposes an encounter of causal series, and further that each of these series exists only because the causes it contains are determined to a particular end. Chance, that is to say, necessarily implies preordination. To hold that the universe can be explained by a primordial chance is self-contradictory.” (Pg. 138)
This is excellent explanation of modern Thomist metaphysics and philosophy, and will be virtually “must reading” for anyone studying the subject.
This is a clear introduction to some of the core ideas of Neo-Thomist metaphysics, especially the focus upon ‘being.’
Basically, when people sense an object like a cat, they extract the essence of the cat from their experience and that becomes the concept used to talk about cat(s) (ie catness). In addition, Neo-Thomists also believe that the being-ness (the esse) of the cat also presents itself to the experiencer. This means that there is a twofold aspect to experiencing. People experience both the essence and the esse of the object.
This distinction is important because it explains the difference between talking about imaginary objects like a dragon, where people have the essence of dragon in their mind; and talking about a cat which they have actually experienced (ie essence + esse).
This is all relatively uncontroversial to Neo-Thomists. However, the author adds his own insights to better explain what Thomism is saying, and this makes this an interesting book which stands out from others of the same genre.
To explain the experience of ‘esse’ the author turns to the language of ‘intuition’ and adds a quasi mystical element to it. Lecture 3 tells us that to be able to ‘see’ esse when experiencing objects then people need ‘intellectual purification’ and ‘a certain level of intellectual spirituality.’ The ability to grasp that there is an essence AND an esse is ‘a gift bestowed upon the intellect by an intuition.’
Explaining the grasping of esse as an intuition is questionable as a historically accurate reading of Aquinas; but it is nevertheless helpful to some extent, as it clarifies that there is something different going on in the mind. But it also leaves a series of questions about the nature and scope of the intuition (and the assumed intuitionism of which it is an element). And most critically of all, it raises the question about how we can be so confident that that intuition even exists.
The author makes the point that Kant’s idealism is due to the fact that Kant simply didn’t have the right kind of intuition to know that objects exist in reality (ie intuiting their esse as well as their essence). What locks Kant into idealism is that all he has are essences and so he struggles to get back to reality.
But what is to prevent the Kantian from replying and saying that it is not so much the case that Kantians lack an intuition, as it is the case that Thomists are just (falsely) imagining one? Other Neo-Thomists did in fact attempt to respond to that objection, but the author of this book doesn’t really engage with it. That’s a disappointing lacuna in an otherwise informative book.
Overall, this has deservedly remained in print, as it is a helpful way for readers to understand the core ideas of Neo-Thomist metaphysics. But it is not a simple read. There is a fair amount of Latin interspersed in the text and there are some long Latin footnotes. The ideas also represent a very different style of philosophy which means that readers may have to be willing to read and re-read passages in order to grasp what exactly they are saying.