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From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe
Time and again, when studying the history of scientific and philosophical thought in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries-- they are, indeed, so closely interrelated and linked together that, separated, they become ununderstandable-- I have been forced to recognize, as many others have before me, that during this period human, or at least European, minds underwent a deep revolution which changed the very framework and patterns of our thinking and of which modern science and modern philosophy are, at the same time, the root and the fruit. This revolution or, as it has been called, this "crisis of European consciousness," has been described and explained in many different ways. Thus, whereas it is generally admitted that the development of the new cosmology, which replaced the geo- or even anthropocentric world of Greek and medieval astronomy by the heliocentric, and, later, by the centerless universe of modern astronomy, played a paramount role in this process, some historians, interested chiefly in the social implications of spiritual changes, have stressed the alleged conversion of the human mind from theoria to praxis, from the scientia contemplativa to the scientia activa et operativa, which transformed man from a spectator into an owner and master of nature; some others have stressed the replacement of the teleological and organismic pattern of thinking and explanation by the mechanical and causal pattern, leading, ultimately, to the "mechanisation of the world-view" so prominent in modern times, especially in the eighteenth century: still others have simply described the despair and confusion brought by the "new philosophy" into a world from which all coherence was gone and in which the skies no longer announced the glory of God.
183 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 1957
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1257 people want to read
About the author
Alexandre Koyré
72 books50 followersAleksandr Vladimirović Kojre, published as Alexandre Koyré was a philosopher and historian of science. He contributed to the development of the history of science in France and to its diffusion in the United States after the Second World War.
In the 1930's, Koyré began the research that made him one of the most eminent historians of twentieth century scientific thought, the first phase of which ended before the Second World War with the publication of the three volumes of Galilean Studies. Koiré became one of the protagonists of French historical epistemology, a new discipline that claimed to study the history of scientific thought as such and as a whole.
In the 1930's, Koyré began the research that made him one of the most eminent historians of twentieth century scientific thought, the first phase of which ended before the Second World War with the publication of the three volumes of Galilean Studies. Koiré became one of the protagonists of French historical epistemology, a new discipline that claimed to study the history of scientific thought as such and as a whole.
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January 20, 2018
It is generally admitted that the seventeenth century underwent, and accomplished, a very radical spiritual revolution of which modern science is at the same time the root and the fruit.
Alexandre Koyre
Koyre was born in Russia in 1892. In the period 1908–1911 he studied under Edmund Husserl and David Hilbert in Gottingen Germany. In 1912 he went to Paris, to study at the Collège de France and the Sorbonne under Henri Bergson and others. After fighting in the First World War he received a doctorate and began teaching in Paris at the École pratique des hautes études (EPHE). In 1932 the EPHE created a Department of History of Religious Thought in Modern Europe for him to chair.
During several periods in the 1930s and early 1940 Koyré taught in Fuad University (later Cairo University) where he was among the first to teach modern philosophy in Egyptian academia. His most important student in Cairo was Abdel Rahman Badawi (1917–2002) who is considered the first systematic modern Arab philosopher.
During World War II, Koyré lived in New York City, and taught at the New School for Social Research. After World War II, he held frequent posts as visiting professor in a number of institutions in the U.S., including Princeton, Harvard, Yale, the University of Chicago, and Johns Hopkins. Over the final decade of his life Koyre was general secretary and Vice President of the Institut International de Philosophie, a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and received honorary Medals from both the History of Science Society and the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. He died in Paris in 1964.
(Condensed and edited from Wikipedia)
the book
First thing… the quote above opens Koyre's Introduction. The footnote for the sentence lists four books exemplifying what he says: Science and the modern world, The metaphysical foundations of modern physical science, The making of the modern mind, and Great chain of Being.
Second thing … The style of the narrative is quite easy going. Perhaps because it grew out of a Noguchi Lecture Koyre gave at Johns Hopkins in 1953. That's the style I see, that of a lecturer moving about, commenting on something, adding an aside, and so on.
Third thing … The book consists of twelve sections. For all but the final one, Koyre lists below the title a cast of the most important thinkers discussed.
I. The Sky and the Heavens. (Nicholas of Cusa, Marcellus Paligenius) The latter is the Latin name for a sixteenth century Neapolitan humanist poet, who wrote "Zodiacus Vitae", a poem which addresses "the subject of human happiness in connection with scientific knowledge". (wiki)
II. The New Astronomy and the New Metaphysics. (Copernicus, Thomas Diggs, Giordano Bruno, William Gilbert) Digges was an English mathematician and astronomer; Gilbert an English physician and natural philosopher.
III. The New Astronomy against the New Metaphysics. (Kepler)
IV. Things Never Seen Before and Thoughts Never Thought: the Discovery of New Stars in the World Space and the Materialization of Space. (Galileo, Descartes)
V. Indefinite Extension or Infinite Space. (Descartes, Henry More) the latter a philosopher of the Cambridge Platonist school
VI. God and Space, Spirit and Matter. (Henry More)
VII. Absolute Space, Absolute Time and Their Relations to God. (Malebranche, Newton, Bentley) Malebranche was a French priest and Rationalist philosopher, Richard Bentley an English classical scholar and theologian)
VIII. The Divinization of Space. (Joseph Raphson) an English mathematician
IX. God and the World: Space, Matter, Ether and Spirit. (Newton)
X. Absolute Space and Absolute Time: God's Frame of Action (Berkeley, Newton)
XI. The Work-Day God and the God of the Sabbath. (Newton, Leibniz)
XII. Conclusion: The Divine Artifex and the Dieu Faineant. the latter phrase, "loafing god", to finally become in Laplace's System of the World, a god no longer needed for explanation
questions, answers, guesses
In this section I will address some mysteries about this book and my possession, reading, and review of it which you are not yet aware of.
I start by explaining how I came to review a book which until today was not amongst books on my Goodreads shelves. The reason this came about I can relate with certainty. Yesterday I was casting about for some book which I'd read but not reviewed. Of course there are many. I chanced upon a spreadsheet in which I'd listed several such books; and further chanced upon Koyre's book, mostly because it stood out in the list.
Why did it stand out? Because a column near the book's name held a number much larger than any other book's number. That column was indicated to be the the number of days since I'd read the book (and not yet reviewed it). This book's so-defined number was 16,359. (Today it's 16,360 – or was before I finished this review.) Almost 45 years. I'd entered the date that I read the book as April 1 1973.
I should add that my copy of the book, published in 1968, looks brand new, no indication that it had ever been opened, much less read. (It has been now, but I mean yesterday. Opened, that is. Even read, a bit.)
Did I read the book in 1973? Did I even have the book in 1973? Why did I enter this date?
The time (date) itself places my body in space. In 1973 my wife and I lived in Melbourne, Vic., Australia. She was on a post-doc; I was tagging along, and had found something to do by re-enrolling in under-grad school at the University of Melbourne, in the Department of the History and Philosophy of Science (HPS) – just because it sounded interesting.
Aha! So this book, certainly a book relating some of the history and philosophy of science, may well have been assigned reading? Or suggested reading maybe.
Then today, as I entered into this review the information about the book's chapters, I think I understood. The book had probably been recommended to me by my thesis advisor. See, the last year we were there (1974) I had begun work on a Master's thesis, concerning the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. When we left, I took the unfinished thesis with me, to be completed in the U.S. HAH! (I did try, but to no avail.) This correspondence appears to be discussed in depth in chapter XI of Koyre's book. Now when and where I procured the book isn't important, but I believe I've probably had it since before I gave up on the thesis, probably since at least 1976-77. That's my guess anyway, and my guess is as good as yours, so I'll take mine.
who might like the book?
Well, I might like the book. It's going on my smallest reading list (only a few dozen). Not because I want to finish that thesis (which could probably be found in my basement), but that for simply reminding me of those days I would appreciate it.
As for you. It still seems to be in print. If you are interested in interdisciplinary history books, this is great – combining as it does the history of European thought in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in areas of religion, philosophy, and science. What I like to call the history of ideas.
and that rating???
I've rated the (unread) book by duplicating the rating given it here on Goodreads by a friend of mine, AC. I trust his ratings on books such as this.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Previous review: Voyage in the Dark
Random review: The Stranger
Next review: A Boy's Will Robert Frost
Previous library review: Hope Dies Last Studs Terkel
Next library review: The Organization Man
Alexandre Koyre
Koyre was born in Russia in 1892. In the period 1908–1911 he studied under Edmund Husserl and David Hilbert in Gottingen Germany. In 1912 he went to Paris, to study at the Collège de France and the Sorbonne under Henri Bergson and others. After fighting in the First World War he received a doctorate and began teaching in Paris at the École pratique des hautes études (EPHE). In 1932 the EPHE created a Department of History of Religious Thought in Modern Europe for him to chair.
During several periods in the 1930s and early 1940 Koyré taught in Fuad University (later Cairo University) where he was among the first to teach modern philosophy in Egyptian academia. His most important student in Cairo was Abdel Rahman Badawi (1917–2002) who is considered the first systematic modern Arab philosopher.
During World War II, Koyré lived in New York City, and taught at the New School for Social Research. After World War II, he held frequent posts as visiting professor in a number of institutions in the U.S., including Princeton, Harvard, Yale, the University of Chicago, and Johns Hopkins. Over the final decade of his life Koyre was general secretary and Vice President of the Institut International de Philosophie, a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and received honorary Medals from both the History of Science Society and the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. He died in Paris in 1964.
(Condensed and edited from Wikipedia)
the book
First thing… the quote above opens Koyre's Introduction. The footnote for the sentence lists four books exemplifying what he says: Science and the modern world, The metaphysical foundations of modern physical science, The making of the modern mind, and Great chain of Being.
Second thing … The style of the narrative is quite easy going. Perhaps because it grew out of a Noguchi Lecture Koyre gave at Johns Hopkins in 1953. That's the style I see, that of a lecturer moving about, commenting on something, adding an aside, and so on.
Third thing … The book consists of twelve sections. For all but the final one, Koyre lists below the title a cast of the most important thinkers discussed.
I. The Sky and the Heavens. (Nicholas of Cusa, Marcellus Paligenius) The latter is the Latin name for a sixteenth century Neapolitan humanist poet, who wrote "Zodiacus Vitae", a poem which addresses "the subject of human happiness in connection with scientific knowledge". (wiki)
II. The New Astronomy and the New Metaphysics. (Copernicus, Thomas Diggs, Giordano Bruno, William Gilbert) Digges was an English mathematician and astronomer; Gilbert an English physician and natural philosopher.
III. The New Astronomy against the New Metaphysics. (Kepler)
IV. Things Never Seen Before and Thoughts Never Thought: the Discovery of New Stars in the World Space and the Materialization of Space. (Galileo, Descartes)
V. Indefinite Extension or Infinite Space. (Descartes, Henry More) the latter a philosopher of the Cambridge Platonist school
VI. God and Space, Spirit and Matter. (Henry More)
VII. Absolute Space, Absolute Time and Their Relations to God. (Malebranche, Newton, Bentley) Malebranche was a French priest and Rationalist philosopher, Richard Bentley an English classical scholar and theologian)
VIII. The Divinization of Space. (Joseph Raphson) an English mathematician
IX. God and the World: Space, Matter, Ether and Spirit. (Newton)
X. Absolute Space and Absolute Time: God's Frame of Action (Berkeley, Newton)
XI. The Work-Day God and the God of the Sabbath. (Newton, Leibniz)
XII. Conclusion: The Divine Artifex and the Dieu Faineant. the latter phrase, "loafing god", to finally become in Laplace's System of the World, a god no longer needed for explanation
questions, answers, guesses
In this section I will address some mysteries about this book and my possession, reading, and review of it which you are not yet aware of.
I start by explaining how I came to review a book which until today was not amongst books on my Goodreads shelves. The reason this came about I can relate with certainty. Yesterday I was casting about for some book which I'd read but not reviewed. Of course there are many. I chanced upon a spreadsheet in which I'd listed several such books; and further chanced upon Koyre's book, mostly because it stood out in the list.
Why did it stand out? Because a column near the book's name held a number much larger than any other book's number. That column was indicated to be the the number of days since I'd read the book (and not yet reviewed it). This book's so-defined number was 16,359. (Today it's 16,360 – or was before I finished this review.) Almost 45 years. I'd entered the date that I read the book as April 1 1973.
I should add that my copy of the book, published in 1968, looks brand new, no indication that it had ever been opened, much less read. (It has been now, but I mean yesterday. Opened, that is. Even read, a bit.)
Did I read the book in 1973? Did I even have the book in 1973? Why did I enter this date?
The time (date) itself places my body in space. In 1973 my wife and I lived in Melbourne, Vic., Australia. She was on a post-doc; I was tagging along, and had found something to do by re-enrolling in under-grad school at the University of Melbourne, in the Department of the History and Philosophy of Science (HPS) – just because it sounded interesting.
Aha! So this book, certainly a book relating some of the history and philosophy of science, may well have been assigned reading? Or suggested reading maybe.
Then today, as I entered into this review the information about the book's chapters, I think I understood. The book had probably been recommended to me by my thesis advisor. See, the last year we were there (1974) I had begun work on a Master's thesis, concerning the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. When we left, I took the unfinished thesis with me, to be completed in the U.S. HAH! (I did try, but to no avail.) This correspondence appears to be discussed in depth in chapter XI of Koyre's book. Now when and where I procured the book isn't important, but I believe I've probably had it since before I gave up on the thesis, probably since at least 1976-77. That's my guess anyway, and my guess is as good as yours, so I'll take mine.
who might like the book?
Well, I might like the book. It's going on my smallest reading list (only a few dozen). Not because I want to finish that thesis (which could probably be found in my basement), but that for simply reminding me of those days I would appreciate it.
As for you. It still seems to be in print. If you are interested in interdisciplinary history books, this is great – combining as it does the history of European thought in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in areas of religion, philosophy, and science. What I like to call the history of ideas.
and that rating???
I've rated the (unread) book by duplicating the rating given it here on Goodreads by a friend of mine, AC. I trust his ratings on books such as this.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Previous review: Voyage in the Dark
Random review: The Stranger
Next review: A Boy's Will Robert Frost
Previous library review: Hope Dies Last Studs Terkel
Next library review: The Organization Man
September 22, 2015
This is one of the best books I’ve ever read, period. Koyre’s classic is a serious piece of intellectual history, covering the various polemics of the early scientific revolution. Consequently, one can expect heavy quotation from some of history’s greatest minds (these include Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Newton and Leibniz among others) as well as subtle but always ingenious commentary from Koyre himself. As the title suggests, most of the discussion revolves around notions of space, particularly the radical shift from an Aristotelian closed world to the Newtonian picture of absolute, infinite space. But make no mistake for there are many, many riches to be found here.
Firstly, the correspondence between Leibniz and Samuel Clarke is not a matter of purely historical interest given that Leibniz’s notions of space paved the way for Einstein’s conceptual revolution many centuries later. Moreover, the mechanical/ Cartesian concept of matter, while ridiculed as simplistic and inadequate by many contemporary commentators, still remains influential when trying to formulate metaphysical problems like the mind-body problem. Yet, very few people acknowledge the fact that Newton undermined any coherent concept of matter by postulating gravity. Chomsky’s neglected but powerful discussion on the inability to formulate a mind-body problem owes much to Koyre’s analysis of Newton’s demolition of the mechanistic/ materialistic physics of the Cartesians.
What shocked me the most, however, was the interconnectedness of theological, philosophical and scientific concepts. I was shocked to discover that much important conceptual scientific work has been done on the presumption of various metaphysical views. The notion of absolute space was initially suggested by the Cambridge neoplatonist Henry More, who wished to get rid of the mechanical identification of matter and space and establish God and minds as extended entities. For if they weren’t extended then they couldn’t be found anywhere. One might argue that More's reasoning was shoddy (it wasn’t) but notice that his notion of absolute space ended up being a cornerstone of Newtonian physics.
Firstly, the correspondence between Leibniz and Samuel Clarke is not a matter of purely historical interest given that Leibniz’s notions of space paved the way for Einstein’s conceptual revolution many centuries later. Moreover, the mechanical/ Cartesian concept of matter, while ridiculed as simplistic and inadequate by many contemporary commentators, still remains influential when trying to formulate metaphysical problems like the mind-body problem. Yet, very few people acknowledge the fact that Newton undermined any coherent concept of matter by postulating gravity. Chomsky’s neglected but powerful discussion on the inability to formulate a mind-body problem owes much to Koyre’s analysis of Newton’s demolition of the mechanistic/ materialistic physics of the Cartesians.
What shocked me the most, however, was the interconnectedness of theological, philosophical and scientific concepts. I was shocked to discover that much important conceptual scientific work has been done on the presumption of various metaphysical views. The notion of absolute space was initially suggested by the Cambridge neoplatonist Henry More, who wished to get rid of the mechanical identification of matter and space and establish God and minds as extended entities. For if they weren’t extended then they couldn’t be found anywhere. One might argue that More's reasoning was shoddy (it wasn’t) but notice that his notion of absolute space ended up being a cornerstone of Newtonian physics.
August 30, 2025
Un peu déçue… Je crois que je m’attendais plus à un compte rendu des conséquences des nouvelles découvertes astronomiques et scientifiques sur la façon de voir le monde et de se percevoir pour les gens de l’époque qu’à la description des querelles de philosophes-scientifiques (qui sont soit dit en passant très têtus). Peut-être que c’est aussi parce que le monde clos est quand même beaucoup plus simple à comprendre que l’univers infini et que j’étais de plus en plus perdue (mais au moins j’ai eu l’air intelligente en attendant mon train).
Mention spéciale pour la qualité de l’édition, c’était super agréable de tourner les pages
Et Koyré a l’air vachement sympa
Mention spéciale pour la qualité de l’édition, c’était super agréable de tourner les pages
Et Koyré a l’air vachement sympa
Read
June 2, 2024I feel like this book makes a point 👉, when you take a closer look at Mother Nature, you can observe that nothing was done or happen in the world by chance, as personal opinion.
August 11, 2016
Vous trouverez ici les témoignages les plus contemporains et activement engagés dans le passage du monde théologique à l'univers physique-mathématique. Engagé du XVIe au XVIIIe siècle, il est une puissante arcane de notre culture. Des précurseurs comme Nicolas de Cues et Giordano Bruno aux querelles entre mécanistes-plénistes (dont Leibniz) et mathématistes-vacuistes (dont Newton et Samuel Clarke), le lecteur suit les mutations nombreuses d'une pensée centrée, d'abord, sur l'opposition Élevé-Immortel-Immobile / Bas-Temporel-Corruptible ; opposition ou distinction hiérarchique typiquement religieuse dont j'ai commenté un autre exemple célèbre (cf.Homo Hierarchicus: Le Système Des Castes Et Ses Implications). Témoignage de la proximité de l'auteur avec les pensées d'époque, cette distinction est saisie par le passage de l'attribution à la substance qui est dite former le cadre de l'ontologie traditionnelle (que faut-il entendre vraiment par ces terme et comment reconnaître l'identité de la distinction avec l'attribution, je ne saurais le dire en l'état actuel).
Ce n'est pas le moindre talent de Koyré que de parvenir à restituer la pensée des générations successives de philosophes de la nature dans les fins détails, et tout aussi ardus soient-ils, de parvenir à lui-même suivre leurs développements et oppositions - compréhension et maîtrise l'habilitant à intervenir occasionnellement à la manière d'un arbitre-observateur entre eux (répartissant mérites et maladresses).
En effet, l'aisance de Koyré avec la matière nous montre la transition sous son jour riche et authentique, par opposition à la version simplette qui nous en reste naïvement :
(1) La sortie de cette distinction hiérarchique, par l'uniformisation de l'espace et du temps, et leur infinitisation, ne sont pas principalement ni originairement une découverte scientifique, mais la conséquence d'une réflexion sur la nature de la création divine et du divin (sa liberté).
Une création peut-elle être infinie ? Voyez Nicolas de Cues reculer devant la réponse affirmative à laquelle ses spéculations logiques le conduisaient pourtant, et lui préférer un univers (ou monde au sens de système solaire...) interminé , et réserver à Dieu la seule essence de l'infini. Voyez Giordano Bruno affirmer l'infinitisation d'un univers peuplé d'autant d'étoiles et de planète regorgeant de vies, comme seule création digne de Dieu (mais payant son éloge par le feu).
(2) L'irruption du souci scientifique, empirique et positif, dans le débat a eu pour effet une opposition à l'infinitisation de l'espace. Voyez en effet un contemporain du téléscope, Kepler, limiter la connaissance au strict observable, et poser en bons logiciens des apories sur le concept d'infini avec lesquelles la physique doit toujours, jusqu'à un certain point, composer.
(3) La révolution copernicienne (le passage du géo- au hélio-centrisme) s'accomplit à l'intérieur d'un univers interminé, au sens de Cues; elle reste onto-théologique, bien qu'ouvrant la voie au renversement de la distinction (en égalité ici-bas/au-delà).
(4) Newton met les mathématiques au service de la démonstration que la matière est, de tout l'univers, l'élément le plus négligeable ; de la démonstration que les forces d'attraction et gravitation sont non-susceptibles d'une explication mécanique ni matérialistes ; que l'univers est inconcevable autrement que comme issu d'un dessein ordonné, harmonieux et intelligent.
Autant de points (et j'en néglige) montrant la profondeur d'une révolution culturelle dont on pense, à tort, qu'elle est sortie armée, bottée et casquée d'un esprit individuel-naturel. Sur plus de trois siècles, révolution enracinée de toutes parts dans l'exaltation du divin dans son infini, d'une absorption contemplative, placée ironiquement sous l'interdit de prétendre voir et comprendre le tout du point de vue divin, révolution-renversement aboutissant à la synthèse curieuse des antagonistes (Leibniz / Newton) jadis rivalisant dans l'exaltation, mais se réconciliant de manière posthume dans un point d'orgue à l'éloignement-effacement du divin (auquel Putnam fait écho : univers indifférent, froid, formant le Point de vue de nulle part depuis lequel l'entièreté de nos croyances ordinaires et traditions sont dites non-avenues ; non-cognitives, dépourvues de significations, cf.Le Réalisme à visage humain).
Ce n'est pas le moindre talent de Koyré que de parvenir à restituer la pensée des générations successives de philosophes de la nature dans les fins détails, et tout aussi ardus soient-ils, de parvenir à lui-même suivre leurs développements et oppositions - compréhension et maîtrise l'habilitant à intervenir occasionnellement à la manière d'un arbitre-observateur entre eux (répartissant mérites et maladresses).
En effet, l'aisance de Koyré avec la matière nous montre la transition sous son jour riche et authentique, par opposition à la version simplette qui nous en reste naïvement :
(1) La sortie de cette distinction hiérarchique, par l'uniformisation de l'espace et du temps, et leur infinitisation, ne sont pas principalement ni originairement une découverte scientifique, mais la conséquence d'une réflexion sur la nature de la création divine et du divin (sa liberté).
Une création peut-elle être infinie ? Voyez Nicolas de Cues reculer devant la réponse affirmative à laquelle ses spéculations logiques le conduisaient pourtant, et lui préférer un univers (ou monde au sens de système solaire...) interminé , et réserver à Dieu la seule essence de l'infini. Voyez Giordano Bruno affirmer l'infinitisation d'un univers peuplé d'autant d'étoiles et de planète regorgeant de vies, comme seule création digne de Dieu (mais payant son éloge par le feu).
(2) L'irruption du souci scientifique, empirique et positif, dans le débat a eu pour effet une opposition à l'infinitisation de l'espace. Voyez en effet un contemporain du téléscope, Kepler, limiter la connaissance au strict observable, et poser en bons logiciens des apories sur le concept d'infini avec lesquelles la physique doit toujours, jusqu'à un certain point, composer.
(3) La révolution copernicienne (le passage du géo- au hélio-centrisme) s'accomplit à l'intérieur d'un univers interminé, au sens de Cues; elle reste onto-théologique, bien qu'ouvrant la voie au renversement de la distinction (en égalité ici-bas/au-delà).
(4) Newton met les mathématiques au service de la démonstration que la matière est, de tout l'univers, l'élément le plus négligeable ; de la démonstration que les forces d'attraction et gravitation sont non-susceptibles d'une explication mécanique ni matérialistes ; que l'univers est inconcevable autrement que comme issu d'un dessein ordonné, harmonieux et intelligent.
Autant de points (et j'en néglige) montrant la profondeur d'une révolution culturelle dont on pense, à tort, qu'elle est sortie armée, bottée et casquée d'un esprit individuel-naturel. Sur plus de trois siècles, révolution enracinée de toutes parts dans l'exaltation du divin dans son infini, d'une absorption contemplative, placée ironiquement sous l'interdit de prétendre voir et comprendre le tout du point de vue divin, révolution-renversement aboutissant à la synthèse curieuse des antagonistes (Leibniz / Newton) jadis rivalisant dans l'exaltation, mais se réconciliant de manière posthume dans un point d'orgue à l'éloignement-effacement du divin (auquel Putnam fait écho : univers indifférent, froid, formant le Point de vue de nulle part depuis lequel l'entièreté de nos croyances ordinaires et traditions sont dites non-avenues ; non-cognitives, dépourvues de significations, cf.Le Réalisme à visage humain).
August 30, 2013
Como historiador de la ideas Koyré parte de una tesis y deja que los autores hablen (pero sólo los autores, el contexto no tiene rol en este proyecto). Incluso en este libro hablan más Nicolás de Cusa, G. Bruno, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Newton, Leibniz que el propio autor. El libro es un recorrido paso a paso de la concepción del mundo y del espacio en el que personajes que no coincidieron en tiempo y lugar ahora ven la oportunidad de hacerlo y de debatir entre ellos. De esta manera se observa que la ciencia astronómica puede ser contada como una historia, en este caso una bastante coherente y completa del desarrollo de las ideas.
September 17, 2018
'The infinite Universe of the New Cosmology, infinite in Duration as well as in Extension, in which eternal matter in accordance with eternal and necessary laws moves endlessly and aimlessly in eternal space, inherited all the ontological attributes of the Divinity. Yet only those - all the others the departed God took away with Him. '
April 1, 2022
POV: jsi středověký muž a nemůžeš si vybrat, jestli fušovat víc do filosofie nebo do matematiky
March 2, 2021
To judge from its premise, a work with a title like Alexandre Koyré’s From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe promises to be exciting indeed. For, as the author tells us in the preface, ‘During this period [the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries] human, or at least European, minds underwent a deep revolution which changed the very framework and patterns of our thinking and of which modern science and modern philosophy are, at the same time, the root and the fruit’ (p. v).
What does Koyré propose to cover?
I have endeavored...to define the structural patterns of the old and the new world-views and to determine the changes brought forth by the revolution of the seventeenth century. They seemed to me to be reducible to two fundamental and closely connected actions that I characterised as the destruction of the cosmos and the geometrization of space, that is, the substitution for the conception of the world as a finite and well-ordered whole, in which the spatial structure embodied a hierarchy of perfection and value, that of an indefinite or even infinite universe no longer united by natural subordination, but unified only by the identity of its ultimate and basic components and laws; and the replacement of the Aristotelian conception of space – a differentiated set of innerworldly places – by that of Euclidean geometry – an essentially infinite and homogeneous extension – from now on considered as identical with the real space of the world. (p. vi)
And, continuing in the introduction,
This, in turn, implies the discarding by scientific thought of all considerations based upon value-concepts, such as perfection, harmony, meaning and aim, and finally the utter devalorization of being, the divorce of the world of value and the world of facts. (p. 4)
The plan of the work is simple. Since, as Koyré remarks in the preface, despite the magnitude of the change, it was accomplished in the short interval of a century and a half, from Copernicus’ De revolutionibus (1543) to Newton’s Principia (1687), all he has to do is to alight upon a number of way-stations along the progression of thought and to expound the mental outlook of the key figures associated with them. The first of these is Nicholas of Cusa. Focused largely upon his teachings on the physical cosmos, Koyré’s treatment of Nicholas of Cusa altogether neglects the roots of his thought in Neoplatonism and medieval German mysticism. There are some problems even with the circumscribed objective of this chapter. For instance, Koyré claims that Nicholas of Cusa denies the very possibility of a mathematical treatment of nature (p. 19). Is he right? Perhaps so, if one is conditioned to picture mathematics in terms of a Newtonian-Leibnizian paradigm. But Cusa, who indeed aside from his theological writings did publish extensively on mathematics, is actuated by a mathematical ideal closer in spirit to the projective geometry of Poncelet in the nineteenth century – so it’s not the case that he is unmathematical, just that his kind of mathematics does not lend itself to a quantitative mastery of the phenomena such as we have come to expect. In the last sentence of this section, Koyré asserts, but does not show, that the spirit of the Renaissance breathes in Cusa’s work (p. 23).
Already in this first chapter, one can note several severe limitations in Koyré style. In general, there is too much exposition and too little critical analysis. Koyré’s readings tend to be very literal on the whole and confined to the surface level; there is no methodological commentary to speak of (even though as everyone knows it’s decisive, especially in the humanities). Nevertheless his extensive quotations from primary sources do give a sense of the debate. Koyré seems to have acted upon a decision to develop his argument from scratch and not to respond to anyone else’s views in the field of the history of science. On the sole occasion when he does so, he appears to be too dependent on Lovejoy as foil (p. 39). And worse: on pp. 54-55, Koyré makes the candid admission that he doesn’t know whether Giordano Bruno influenced anyone: a scholar is supposed to check things like this!
With such an unpromising start, one cannot entertain very high hopes for the rest of the work. Chapter two on Copernicus and others illustrates again the limits of Koyré’s method. An occasional observation does seem just enough – for instance, that Copernicus’ world though immense is not infinite (p. 33), but for the most part Koyré doesn’t go very deep in his analysis. He misses altogether what Mario Biagioli stresses as the main issue affecting the reception of Copernicus’ heliocentric system in the eyes of contemporaries: that of physics versus astronomy. Copernicus, an astronomer, simply does not have anything like an adequate physics that could displace Aristotle’s, and knows it; nor would any be forthcoming until a century later, after Galileo.
The same goes again for chapter three on Kepler. Koyré cites Kepler’s original texts but without much context. Nor are his judgments all that convincing. Kepler remains an Aristotelian (p. 87)? Re. being and motion: what about Kepler’s idea of solar force and his anticipation of inertia?
Perhaps the most arresting chapter in Koyré’s exposition is chapter six on Henry More’s strange spatialization of God (or any spirit) – reminiscent of Newton! One must rejoin, however, that medieval discussions on the place of angels were far more sophisticated than More’s – though to substantiate a claim such as this would take us too far afield and we shall merely refer to the secondary literature, of which Koyré, needless to say, is entirely incognizant [for recent scholarship, cf. Frederick A. Bakker, Delphine Bellis and Carla Rita Palmerino, eds., Space, Imagination and the Cosmos from Anitquity to the Early Modern Period (2018), which postdates Koyré of course]. The last chapter before the conclusion is devoted to the Leibniz-Clarke controversy (pp. 235-272). Here, Koyré merely recapitulates their arguments and adds almost nothing in the way of critical commentary.
Not that his summary pronouncements on the nature of the changes in mankind’s stance towards the world wrought by the seventeenth-century scientific revolution are necessarily wrong, but as to their textual justification, Koyré comes across as being markedly less insightful than, say, Vincent Cronin in his The View from Planet Earth (as we have just reviewed), even if the objective were only to document and not to analyze why. The latter author draws upon a far broader palette, has a finer grasp of historical sweep and includes many more cultural references and quotations from contemporary literary sources in building up a multifaceted portrait that goes a long way towards enabling the reader to appreciate what the changes in intellectual climate meant to those who either promoted or experienced them as they were occurring. As for sympathetic and insightful analysis of the profound causes behind the great transition from medieval to modern, see Hans Blumenberg (Genesis of the Copernican World), who has the scholarly training to engage what were the real philosophical and theological motivations in the minds of the principal actors and an historian’s imagination to go beyond mere recapitulation of the source material in order to arrive at a credible characterization of the underlying process of thought. In other words, Blumenberg actually does what Koyré grandly announces he is setting out to accomplish, but fails ever to realize at all adequately in practice (accordingly, we must promise a review of Blumenberg’s substantial monograph to be forthcoming before too long).
Reading Koyré can be a good exercise as a test of one’s own knowledge, especially concerning lesser figures such as Henry More whom one may not have encountered at length before. For all the prominence in the discipline of history of science he once enjoyed, Koyré would appear never really to have mastered metaphysics or theology, at the level one would ordinarily expect, or even to have arrived at a workmanlike competence, all of which limits him to superficial commentary and precludes the ability to engage in close analysis of his sources or to stitch together a synthetic view of his own. For this reason, Koyré can manage little more than a chronological exposition embellished with occasional none-too-incisive obiter dicta. It will of course ever be a source of satisfaction to scan another man’s portrayal of familiar material in order to see what response in oneself it may elicit, but it remains, in the end, dissatisfying to spar with a conversation partner one suspects of not being one’s equal.
What does Koyré propose to cover?
I have endeavored...to define the structural patterns of the old and the new world-views and to determine the changes brought forth by the revolution of the seventeenth century. They seemed to me to be reducible to two fundamental and closely connected actions that I characterised as the destruction of the cosmos and the geometrization of space, that is, the substitution for the conception of the world as a finite and well-ordered whole, in which the spatial structure embodied a hierarchy of perfection and value, that of an indefinite or even infinite universe no longer united by natural subordination, but unified only by the identity of its ultimate and basic components and laws; and the replacement of the Aristotelian conception of space – a differentiated set of innerworldly places – by that of Euclidean geometry – an essentially infinite and homogeneous extension – from now on considered as identical with the real space of the world. (p. vi)
And, continuing in the introduction,
This, in turn, implies the discarding by scientific thought of all considerations based upon value-concepts, such as perfection, harmony, meaning and aim, and finally the utter devalorization of being, the divorce of the world of value and the world of facts. (p. 4)
The plan of the work is simple. Since, as Koyré remarks in the preface, despite the magnitude of the change, it was accomplished in the short interval of a century and a half, from Copernicus’ De revolutionibus (1543) to Newton’s Principia (1687), all he has to do is to alight upon a number of way-stations along the progression of thought and to expound the mental outlook of the key figures associated with them. The first of these is Nicholas of Cusa. Focused largely upon his teachings on the physical cosmos, Koyré’s treatment of Nicholas of Cusa altogether neglects the roots of his thought in Neoplatonism and medieval German mysticism. There are some problems even with the circumscribed objective of this chapter. For instance, Koyré claims that Nicholas of Cusa denies the very possibility of a mathematical treatment of nature (p. 19). Is he right? Perhaps so, if one is conditioned to picture mathematics in terms of a Newtonian-Leibnizian paradigm. But Cusa, who indeed aside from his theological writings did publish extensively on mathematics, is actuated by a mathematical ideal closer in spirit to the projective geometry of Poncelet in the nineteenth century – so it’s not the case that he is unmathematical, just that his kind of mathematics does not lend itself to a quantitative mastery of the phenomena such as we have come to expect. In the last sentence of this section, Koyré asserts, but does not show, that the spirit of the Renaissance breathes in Cusa’s work (p. 23).
Already in this first chapter, one can note several severe limitations in Koyré style. In general, there is too much exposition and too little critical analysis. Koyré’s readings tend to be very literal on the whole and confined to the surface level; there is no methodological commentary to speak of (even though as everyone knows it’s decisive, especially in the humanities). Nevertheless his extensive quotations from primary sources do give a sense of the debate. Koyré seems to have acted upon a decision to develop his argument from scratch and not to respond to anyone else’s views in the field of the history of science. On the sole occasion when he does so, he appears to be too dependent on Lovejoy as foil (p. 39). And worse: on pp. 54-55, Koyré makes the candid admission that he doesn’t know whether Giordano Bruno influenced anyone: a scholar is supposed to check things like this!
With such an unpromising start, one cannot entertain very high hopes for the rest of the work. Chapter two on Copernicus and others illustrates again the limits of Koyré’s method. An occasional observation does seem just enough – for instance, that Copernicus’ world though immense is not infinite (p. 33), but for the most part Koyré doesn’t go very deep in his analysis. He misses altogether what Mario Biagioli stresses as the main issue affecting the reception of Copernicus’ heliocentric system in the eyes of contemporaries: that of physics versus astronomy. Copernicus, an astronomer, simply does not have anything like an adequate physics that could displace Aristotle’s, and knows it; nor would any be forthcoming until a century later, after Galileo.
The same goes again for chapter three on Kepler. Koyré cites Kepler’s original texts but without much context. Nor are his judgments all that convincing. Kepler remains an Aristotelian (p. 87)? Re. being and motion: what about Kepler’s idea of solar force and his anticipation of inertia?
Perhaps the most arresting chapter in Koyré’s exposition is chapter six on Henry More’s strange spatialization of God (or any spirit) – reminiscent of Newton! One must rejoin, however, that medieval discussions on the place of angels were far more sophisticated than More’s – though to substantiate a claim such as this would take us too far afield and we shall merely refer to the secondary literature, of which Koyré, needless to say, is entirely incognizant [for recent scholarship, cf. Frederick A. Bakker, Delphine Bellis and Carla Rita Palmerino, eds., Space, Imagination and the Cosmos from Anitquity to the Early Modern Period (2018), which postdates Koyré of course]. The last chapter before the conclusion is devoted to the Leibniz-Clarke controversy (pp. 235-272). Here, Koyré merely recapitulates their arguments and adds almost nothing in the way of critical commentary.
Not that his summary pronouncements on the nature of the changes in mankind’s stance towards the world wrought by the seventeenth-century scientific revolution are necessarily wrong, but as to their textual justification, Koyré comes across as being markedly less insightful than, say, Vincent Cronin in his The View from Planet Earth (as we have just reviewed), even if the objective were only to document and not to analyze why. The latter author draws upon a far broader palette, has a finer grasp of historical sweep and includes many more cultural references and quotations from contemporary literary sources in building up a multifaceted portrait that goes a long way towards enabling the reader to appreciate what the changes in intellectual climate meant to those who either promoted or experienced them as they were occurring. As for sympathetic and insightful analysis of the profound causes behind the great transition from medieval to modern, see Hans Blumenberg (Genesis of the Copernican World), who has the scholarly training to engage what were the real philosophical and theological motivations in the minds of the principal actors and an historian’s imagination to go beyond mere recapitulation of the source material in order to arrive at a credible characterization of the underlying process of thought. In other words, Blumenberg actually does what Koyré grandly announces he is setting out to accomplish, but fails ever to realize at all adequately in practice (accordingly, we must promise a review of Blumenberg’s substantial monograph to be forthcoming before too long).
Reading Koyré can be a good exercise as a test of one’s own knowledge, especially concerning lesser figures such as Henry More whom one may not have encountered at length before. For all the prominence in the discipline of history of science he once enjoyed, Koyré would appear never really to have mastered metaphysics or theology, at the level one would ordinarily expect, or even to have arrived at a workmanlike competence, all of which limits him to superficial commentary and precludes the ability to engage in close analysis of his sources or to stitch together a synthetic view of his own. For this reason, Koyré can manage little more than a chronological exposition embellished with occasional none-too-incisive obiter dicta. It will of course ever be a source of satisfaction to scan another man’s portrayal of familiar material in order to see what response in oneself it may elicit, but it remains, in the end, dissatisfying to spar with a conversation partner one suspects of not being one’s equal.
February 17, 2021
O autor analisa as discussões entre pensadores do século XVI e XVII. O fio condutor é o resgate da ideia de universo infinito em contraste com a ideia, então vigente, de uma esfera de estrelas fixas. A ideia revolucionária de infinitude do universo era efeito, então, de uma redescoberta dos atomistas gregos, que estavam esquecidos pela interpretação medieval da herança aristotélica. Destaco quatro aspectos: 1. A matemática, competindo com a metafísica mecanicista do Deus relojoeiro, permite que se pense agora em um Deus artífice de muitos mundos possíveis. 2. Descartes aceita que a extensão do mundo é indefinida, mas a infinitude é exclusividade divina. No entanto, ao identificar extensão e matéria dos corpos, não conseguiu conceber um espaço vazio. 3. A invenção do telescópio por Galileu. Para Koyré, o primeiro instrumento científico, pois permitiu transcender o limite dos sentidos. 4. A famosa expressão newtoniana, Hypotheses non fingo traduzida como “não imagino hipóteses”. Hipótese era na época entendida como o que não era deduzido de fenômenos. Para Newton, hipóteses, quer mecânicas, quer de qualidades ocultas, não tinham lugar na filosofia experimental pois não poderiam conduzir a experiências, nem seriam corroboradas ou desmentidas por experiências. A existência da gravidade não é uma hipótese, mas um fato patente, na medida em que é uma declaração sobre o comportamento dos corpos ou sobre a existência de forças centrípetas, em consequência das quais os corpos, ao invés de se moverem em linha reta (como seria esperado pelo princípio da inércia), desviam-se e movem-se em curvas.
March 2, 2025
Infinit, finit, matèria o esperit: si Déu és infinit, per què no ho hauria de ser l’univers? Però la perfecció és finita, diuen, una esfera. Però tal cosa seria limitar els poders de Déu, i és més intuitiu no posar-n’hi límits que imposar-n’hi. Però espera, si l’univers és infinit, no té centre? No, no. Però no voldràs dir que és igual d’infinit que Déu, no? No, per suposat: Déu és com la base eterna, omnipresent i omnipotent, i les seves lleis són la nostra manera d’apropar-nos-hi… la matèria és voluntat de Déu, és creació de Déu però no Déu. Segur? Déu és a per tot, dirà Newton, i l’identificarà amb un gran artífex que manté en funcionament les òrbites planetàries: Leibniz, dirà que tal cosa és una estupidesa, que si hi ha Déu, en tot cas, haurà automatitzat el procés. Per Déu! Bogeria.
May 4, 2023
Essential. I will say more about it later.
July 5, 2024
Beau voyage
November 5, 2018
I enjoyed this academic study, based on a series of lectures, of the shift from a Christian-Aristotelian finite universe toward an infinite universe, particularly because the thinkers get to express their thoughts in their own words through many long quotes. The lack of any real separation between theology, philosophy and natural philosophy for almost 1,000 years meant that views about the physical world involved evaluating their theological implications - theology was still dominant and the ultimate determiner of reality, as science is today. This was particularly noticeable in the sections on Newton and Leibniz where Newton’s views were extremely theologically driven. The author seemed to have a theological opinion himself that colored his evaluations, though I couldn’t articulate what exactly it was, maybe Catholicism? But I recommend this thought-provoking book.
May 25, 2018
I'd recommend to all egotists as the passages about the destabilisation of a fixed point at the centre of spheres (read: heavenly bodies, celestial orbs) was a real blow to my confidence. Turns out God is the only 'absolute' entity. Who knew?
April 12, 2008
First time I read it in highschool it went soo over my head, but I read it again last year and I think it's very interesting
March 24, 2025
The content of this book is related to the development of our pictures of the universe, as the author relates its scientific evolution over the course of history extending from as far back as Lucretius and Nicolas of Cusa to Galileo and Descartes and, as it appears to my eyes, is a series of visions and revisions. The author's contention is that our approach to understanding the limits of the world are naturally in terms of its extension in space qua our scientific knowledge and, it may said, that it directly correlates with our pre-scientific ability to locate God within the system for schematizing our place in the divine order. It appears that, up until the latter half of the 19th century, the frontiers of space and the Heavens that represented them were seen as the equivalent of the mind of God itself. The 20th century scientific revelations of special relativity (Einstein) and of quantum mechanics (Heisenberg) served as a further reminder that God in the universe was, indeed, equivalent to a circle whose diameter was infinite and whose center was nowhere; not only did relativity theory reduce our picture of the universe by ruling out any and all notion of absolutes, but it gave a kinder, gentler performative reading as preparation for the rule to be made here: it is not that God is NO WHERE, it is that God is NOW HERE. Lol. Koyre shows in this somewhat dated book that the desire to establish the ontological status of space itself is a project that, over the course of time, has perplexed humankind endlessly and may be the fulcrum for our overall scientific investigations into the nature of reality itself. Three stars.
April 26, 2021
No sé qué hubiera pensado de este libro si lo hubiera leído en otras circunstancias. Posiblemente me hubiera hartado en el tercer capítulo y no habría tenido la oportunidad de rumiar las maravillas que llegan más adelante, solo si se ha aguzado la mirada lo suficiente.
No sé si pueda defender las virtudes de la escritura de Koyré para la divulgación de la historia de la ciencia, porque me tomó casi un semestre del curso de Historia de la Ciencia y varias sesiones de discusión con mis compañeros de exposición para entender, casi como una revelación o como un rayo, la maestría del autor para desarrollar una intención que habita las páginas del libro - y sin siquiera estar escondida pasa desapercibida - : la ciencia del siglo XVII es impensable sin considerar la metafísica, la filosofía y la idea de Dios.
Las citas que utiliza Koyré son preciosas. Parecen innecesarias y posiblemente hoy se hubiera escrito de forma diferente; sin embargo, gracias a la conversación con mis compañeros lectores y al tiempo que nos ha tomado considerar esta lectura, cobran también sentido.
Debo, sin duda, volver a leerlo. No lo entendí sino hasta las últimas páginas, pero una vez llegó el rayo me dejó despierta y atenta.
No sé si pueda defender las virtudes de la escritura de Koyré para la divulgación de la historia de la ciencia, porque me tomó casi un semestre del curso de Historia de la Ciencia y varias sesiones de discusión con mis compañeros de exposición para entender, casi como una revelación o como un rayo, la maestría del autor para desarrollar una intención que habita las páginas del libro - y sin siquiera estar escondida pasa desapercibida - : la ciencia del siglo XVII es impensable sin considerar la metafísica, la filosofía y la idea de Dios.
Las citas que utiliza Koyré son preciosas. Parecen innecesarias y posiblemente hoy se hubiera escrito de forma diferente; sin embargo, gracias a la conversación con mis compañeros lectores y al tiempo que nos ha tomado considerar esta lectura, cobran también sentido.
Debo, sin duda, volver a leerlo. No lo entendí sino hasta las últimas páginas, pero una vez llegó el rayo me dejó despierta y atenta.
October 28, 2022
Il saggio che dà titolo al libro sta nella seconda parte, mentre la prima, più lunga, è occupata da un saggio temporalmente successivo dedicato al perché il "macchinismo" non si sia sviluppato in antichità, basato sulla rilettura di un saggio di P.M. Schuhl (che a sua volta si era ispirato al saggio di Koyre sul pressapoco), posto in appendice a questo libro. Volume dalla struttura un po' confusa, come si evince. Ma a ogni modo interessante per leggere come la cultura si sia sempre imposta alla tecnica in antichità, fino a che la tecnica non ha avuto una sua cultura scientifica con Bacone e Cartesio (e allora le cose sono cambiate). Bello l'esempio della tecnica fino a un certo momento del "pressapoco" degli orologi, contenuto appunto nel saggio sul "pressapoco".
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February 21, 2025Brilliant content and argument, and very thorough, but the writing style made it physically painful to read. I'm used to academic texts, but it felt like he was just pulling sentences from historical sources and expecting the reader to make the argument themselves for most of the text.
That said, "The infinite Universe of the New Cosmology, infinite in Duration as well as in Extension, in which eternal matter in accordance with eternal and necessary laws moves endlessly and aimlessly in eternal space, inherited all the ontological attributes of Divinity. Yet only those—all the others the departed God took away with Him." is a banger closing sentence, so...
That said, "The infinite Universe of the New Cosmology, infinite in Duration as well as in Extension, in which eternal matter in accordance with eternal and necessary laws moves endlessly and aimlessly in eternal space, inherited all the ontological attributes of Divinity. Yet only those—all the others the departed God took away with Him." is a banger closing sentence, so...
July 20, 2025
I really wanted to understand how the question of a finite universe, approached through mathematics and considered for its implications on the laws of physics, affected the development of knowledge more broadly during this era. This book delivers an answer, but it’s way more about Christian dogma than I expected. I’ve learned what a monumental waste of time and energy has been spent trying to reconcile the observable laws of physics with preconceived, dogmatically held beliefs about an omnipotent god. Fascinating but also incredibly frustrating.
March 24, 2019
The most important thing I took away from Koyre is that the scientific revolution in cosmology was when we went from the idea that the universe is a finite place, like a planet or an acre of land, to an infinite place defined by the rules of nature. It is a deep and serious book that sparks the kind of thinking that can keep you up at night (in a good way). For example, I wonder if there are places where the laws of physics are violated and, if so, what it would be like to live in those places.
September 12, 2024
At a few moments this book was a lot. It’s a great info dump. GREAT not just in quality but quantity as well. A bit hard to follow at times who was saying what and whether or not the author fully believed some of these thinkers arguments were sound. But, regardless it always summarized nicely as the chapters closed and I find it is likely the purpose was meant to be indeterminant and confusing at times because, God only knows, they didn’t, and we still don’t.
January 25, 2018
Att den stundtals är vääldigt tråkig gör liksom inget för den innehåller liksom allt. En fantastisk historisk redogörelse för hur man har tänkt på världen och universum och den minimala plats som människan upptar i allt det stora. Läsningen gjorde mig fylld av sorg och kärlek, och beundran (och storhetsvansinne).
February 14, 2024
The first three chapters are interesting, but when it gets to Descartes, I was getting completely overwhelmed by the metaphysics. They must be people with too much time and not enough computers to program if they had time writing so much nonsense about the true nature of space and time.
October 16, 2018
ترجمه بدفهم و سنگینی داشت.
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April 12, 2020 من العالم المغلق إلى الكون اللامتناهي
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
December 24, 2022
You really feel the desperation of the Scientist trying too believe. It's not a normal/historical/scient book. Religion and philosophy are important issues of the plot. I loved it
April 10, 2024
Magisterial.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 37 reviews