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Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact
Originally published in German in 1935, this monograph anticipated solutions to problems of scientific progress, the truth of scientific fact and the role of error in science now associated with the work of Thomas Kuhn and others. Arguing that every scientific concept and theory—including his own—is culturally conditioned, Fleck was appreciably ahead of his time. And as Kuhn observes in his foreword, "Though much has occurred since its publication, it remains a brilliant and largely unexploited resource."
"To many scientists just as to many historians and philosophers of science facts are things that simply are the they are discovered through properly passive observation of natural reality. To such views Fleck replies that facts are invented, not discovered. Moreover, the appearance of scientific facts as discovered things is itself a social construction, a made thing. A work of transparent brilliance, one of the most significant contributions toward a thoroughly sociological account of scientific knowledge."—Steven Shapin, Science
"To many scientists just as to many historians and philosophers of science facts are things that simply are the they are discovered through properly passive observation of natural reality. To such views Fleck replies that facts are invented, not discovered. Moreover, the appearance of scientific facts as discovered things is itself a social construction, a made thing. A work of transparent brilliance, one of the most significant contributions toward a thoroughly sociological account of scientific knowledge."—Steven Shapin, Science
222 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1935
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About the author
Ludwik Fleck
4 books3 followersLudwik Fleck (11 July 1896 – 5 June 1961) was a Polish and Israeli physician and biologist who did important work in epidemic typhus in Lwów, Poland, with Rudolf Weigl and in the 1930s developed the concept of the "Denkkollektiv" ("thought collective"). The concept of the "thought collective" is important in the philosophy of science and in logology (the "science of science"), helping to explain how scientific ideas change over time, much as in Thomas Kuhn's later notion of the "paradigm shift" and in Michel Foucault's concept of the "episteme".
Thought collectives:
Fleck wrote that the development of truth in scientific research was an unattainable ideal as different researchers were locked into thought collectives (or thought-styles). A "truth" was a relative value, expressed in the language or symbolism of the thought collective in which it belonged, and subject to the social and temporal structure of this collective. To state therefore that a specific truth is true or false is impossible. It is true in its own collective, but incomprehensible or unverifiable in most others. He felt that the development of scientific insights was not unidirectional and does not consist of just accumulating new pieces of information, but also in overthrowing the old ones. This overthrowing of old insights is difficult because a collective attains over time a specific way of investigating, bringing with it a blindness to alternative ways of observing and conceptualization. Change was especially possible when members of two thought collectives met and cooperated in observing, formulating hypothesis and ideas. He strongly advocated comparative epistemology. This approach anticipated later developments in social constructionism, and especially the development of critical science and technology studies.
Thought collectives:
Fleck wrote that the development of truth in scientific research was an unattainable ideal as different researchers were locked into thought collectives (or thought-styles). A "truth" was a relative value, expressed in the language or symbolism of the thought collective in which it belonged, and subject to the social and temporal structure of this collective. To state therefore that a specific truth is true or false is impossible. It is true in its own collective, but incomprehensible or unverifiable in most others. He felt that the development of scientific insights was not unidirectional and does not consist of just accumulating new pieces of information, but also in overthrowing the old ones. This overthrowing of old insights is difficult because a collective attains over time a specific way of investigating, bringing with it a blindness to alternative ways of observing and conceptualization. Change was especially possible when members of two thought collectives met and cooperated in observing, formulating hypothesis and ideas. He strongly advocated comparative epistemology. This approach anticipated later developments in social constructionism, and especially the development of critical science and technology studies.
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September 10, 2012
No matter what you do in life, you will never be as awesome as Ludwik Fleck. A Jewish Polish doctor most active in the interwar years, Fleck published 120 medical articles in 6 languages, wrote a proto-STS tract, invented a typhus vaccine while imprisoned in the ghetto by the Nazis, survived Auschwitz, testified against Mengele and co at the Nuremburg trials, and finally fled Soviet occupied Europe to Israel in 1957. They were a different breed then.
Fleck traces syphilis from the 16th century to the 20th century, from a moral scourge to one of many genital ulcerating diseases, to a bacteria, to the contemporary Wasserman antibody test. But syphilis merely serves as the primary example for a much grander project in what Fleck terms comparative epistemology, as he explains how scientific knowledge work. Fleck develops a detailed theory around 'thought collectives' and 'thought styles', the collective work that determines what it regarded as scientifically valid, the circulation of knowledge, and the definition of relevant problems and details.
It's a clear precursor to Kuhn and Foucault, in terms of genealogical approaches to understanding previous scientific theories as true in their time, not as false ideas to discarded in the Whiggish march to absolute truth. Fleck, however, does not share Kuhn's belief in incommensurability, choosing instead a more continuous view of scientific history. The approach to communities of individuals, techniques, tools, tactic knowledge, and norms, prefigures Bruno Latour's lab ethnography and the social constructivist turn.
However, this is a strange, strange book, the scholarly equivalent of a coelacanth. It's not much formally cited (I don't think I've ever seen it in a contemporary paper). Later authors took the form of Fleck's ideas, while discarding his terminology. The medical details that Fleck uses to support his claims are often hard to follow. While the assertions sparkle ("A fact is that which resists arbitrary thinking"), they're embedded in a glutinous mass of anti-Vienna school sociology. I can't really say that anybody should read this book, but if they'll do, they'll be a better person.
Fleck traces syphilis from the 16th century to the 20th century, from a moral scourge to one of many genital ulcerating diseases, to a bacteria, to the contemporary Wasserman antibody test. But syphilis merely serves as the primary example for a much grander project in what Fleck terms comparative epistemology, as he explains how scientific knowledge work. Fleck develops a detailed theory around 'thought collectives' and 'thought styles', the collective work that determines what it regarded as scientifically valid, the circulation of knowledge, and the definition of relevant problems and details.
It's a clear precursor to Kuhn and Foucault, in terms of genealogical approaches to understanding previous scientific theories as true in their time, not as false ideas to discarded in the Whiggish march to absolute truth. Fleck, however, does not share Kuhn's belief in incommensurability, choosing instead a more continuous view of scientific history. The approach to communities of individuals, techniques, tools, tactic knowledge, and norms, prefigures Bruno Latour's lab ethnography and the social constructivist turn.
However, this is a strange, strange book, the scholarly equivalent of a coelacanth. It's not much formally cited (I don't think I've ever seen it in a contemporary paper). Later authors took the form of Fleck's ideas, while discarding his terminology. The medical details that Fleck uses to support his claims are often hard to follow. While the assertions sparkle ("A fact is that which resists arbitrary thinking"), they're embedded in a glutinous mass of anti-Vienna school sociology. I can't really say that anybody should read this book, but if they'll do, they'll be a better person.
December 19, 2015
First round of reading Fleck's Genesis. The commentary done by Kuhn was helpful to situate the review on Fleck's Genesis on that time. Fleck's Genesis is recommended to be read for those who are interested to understand the social roots of the scientific fact (a matter of fact, this term 'fact' is also needed to be clarified further) and the relationship between individual scientist, scientific community and the scientific thought. Besides syphilis, Fleck also did mentioned about history of chemistry and physics here and there, but he mainly focuses on the history and philosophy of medicine, in particular, which is quite obvious to me, clinical practice of medicine.
Fleck is different from Kuhn in term of viewing the function of revolutions in science. Rather than Kuhn that talks about anomaly that can produce a revolution in science, Fleck, in my view, seems to discuss more on the genesis and development of a particular 'normal science' (to use Kuhn's term).
As Fleck himself mentioned how his underlying concept might be fragmentary in the nature of his presentation, I still find that this loophole is the opportunity to develop his concept to be more coherent or at least, more developed.
Fleck is different from Kuhn in term of viewing the function of revolutions in science. Rather than Kuhn that talks about anomaly that can produce a revolution in science, Fleck, in my view, seems to discuss more on the genesis and development of a particular 'normal science' (to use Kuhn's term).
As Fleck himself mentioned how his underlying concept might be fragmentary in the nature of his presentation, I still find that this loophole is the opportunity to develop his concept to be more coherent or at least, more developed.
May 16, 2013
This is a remarkable book. On the surface, it is an account of how the scientific diagnosis of syphilis (at least in the early 20th Century) developed out of several pre-scientific ideas such as the religious-moral theory of carnal scourge; the quasi-medical theory of humors, etc. But syphilis is just a case study; what Fleck is actually aiming at is a sociological theory of knowledge that casts doubt on our commonsense understanding of what “facts” are. In doing so, Fleck also issues a radical and provocative challenge to epistemological theories of what constitutes the “truth”.
Fleck argues against the view that there are timeless facts residing in an objective reality out there, either waiting to be discovered or already shown to exist. On the contrary, facts are the outcome of historical processes where a multitude of chaotic, competing thoughts gradually stabilize into self-evident forms. This process is complex – Fleck likens it to a network of rivers intersecting each other and changing course over time (p.78). But as the rivers proceed closer and closer to the sea, their paths become less and less variable. Likewise, what might start off as a mess of thoughts will repeatedly hit against some firm foundation and grow more constrained until they finally become a settled body of knowledge.
What is this “firm ground” (p.95) that thoughts bump against? This is the prior store of facts that are, at any moment, taken-for-granted. Facts beget facts. The mechanism of how this occurs is one of Fleck’s prescient contributions to the history and sociology of knowledge (the original German was published in 1935). He posits a cognitive mechanism whereby the prior store of facts serves as an organizing framework that shapes the “direct perception” of thoughts. Fleck called this cognitive structure the “thought style”. A thought style would form the basis of interpretation, and dictate which are the relevant problems that deserve further investigation. (In this regard, Fleck’s theory is similar to the pragmatist theory of inquiry developed at around the same time. This is not a coincidence; Fleck mentions Wilhelm Jerusalem, who was in close contact with William James and disseminated much of American pragmatist thought to Germany.)
The diagnosis of syphilis, for example, was only possible because of how a particular thought style directed the researchers to ask certain questions over others. In several rather too cursory passages, Fleck describes how the pioneer of the first useful diagnostic test for the disease, August von Wassermann, had been directed in his investigations by a popular theory of “syphilitic blood”. Guided by this prevailing thought style, Wassermann conducted experiments looking for specific syphilitic antigens (antibody-producing agents) in infected blood. Fleck points out that Wassermann was barking up the wrong tree as “antigen detection...is difficult, and...yields only very irregular results”. Nevertheless, Wassermann’s experiments were the required first step towards the detection of antibodies (as opposed to antigens) whose reaction indicated the probable presence of syphilis. Thus, it did not matter that the prior “facts” postulating the existence of syphilitic antigens were wrong by the standards of contemporary knowledge. On the contrary, this “wrong” interpretation led to a certain set of problems that, in the end, improved our knowledge of syphilis. Provocatively, Fleck argues that the truth of a fact should be judged by the terms of the particular thought style that it belongs to (p.100). This would imply that it is meaningless to judge the explanation of syphilis as divine punishment by the standards of today’s scientific knowledge. In Fleck’s radical epistemology, “myth differs from science...only in style.” (p.95)
The origin of facts in thought styles, and the epistemological autonomy of each thought style relative to another, raise some questions that have their echo in Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific “paradigms” (Kuhn acknowledged Fleck’s book as an important source of his ideas). How do thought styles evolve over time? Are thought styles incommensurate with each other, such that facts in one style have no relevance for facts in another? Would this not be a profoundly relativist perspective that prohibits judgment, especially for ethical and moral evaluation?
Fleck can be ambiguous and contradictory on these questions. But we can glean how they might be answered by bearing in mind that Fleck is not offering a subjectivist alternative to objective facts. He does not say that facts are just stable thoughts in our heads. Facts have a materiality that is fundamentally social — competing thoughts are stabilized by a “community of persons mutually exchanging ideas” (p.39). Wasserman was not experimenting alone; he was engaged in a dialogue with his scientific peers and with the public. Of course, which ideas gain currency depends on the prevalent thought style, but these thought styles are, in turn, altered by the addition of knowledge.
The social structure of a thought community (Fleck calls it a thought “collective”) plays a large role in the evolution of a thought style. Each collective is structured, in Fleck’s theory, as a small knowledge-producing elite surrounded by a larger public. The circulation of knowledge in this structure is both centrifugal and centripetal — the elite are directed in their pursuit of knowledge by the general thought-style that is legitimized by the masses, while the new facts that they produce have to be simplified and reduced into self-evident foundations for popular consumption. But this forms a closed loop that begs the question of how new thought styles evolve in the first place. Crucially, Fleck also discusses the possibility of communication between thought collectives. Words which have a particular meaning relative to a specific thought style are communicated across collectives. As this happens, ideas “undergo a certain change in their meaning as they circulate intercollectively” (p.109). As meanings change, old ideas become reinterpreted in new ways and influence the prior store of knowledge in a thought collective. For Fleck, this change in thought style is the “most important epistemological significance of the intercollective communication of thoughts” (p.110).
From a sociological perspective, the central importance of communication and meaning-change within and across thought collectives in Fleck’s theory of knowledge can usefully complement Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus and fields. A common criticism of Bourdieu’s habitus is that these “structuring structures” of thought are often portrayed as static and set in time. Incorporating a theory of communication might result in a more dynamic theory of habitus and fields evolving over time.
But Fleck leaves many unanswered questions together with many tantalizing leads. Is it possible to adjudicate between thought styles? Given the possibility of communication between collectives, this seems likely. However, Fleck also states that “the greater the difference [distance] between two thought styles, the more inhibited will be the communication of ideas” (p.109). Collectives that are too near only appear to differ in their interpretation of facts; collectives that are too far apart are incomprehensible to each other. Evaluation – and this includes moral and ethical judgment as well - therefore seems to require some kind of middle distance between thought collectives.
As usual, this notion of distance raises a question: what determines the boundary of a thought style? Fleck provides no clear answer. He does note, however, that often people occupy more than one thought collective at any given moment. These individuals act as potential “vehicles” for intercollective communication. This prefigures Ronald Burt’s social-network theory of entrepreneurs as “network bridges”. Yet Fleck adds an intriguing observation that has been overlooked by network and organizational theorists. He says that “a person participates more often in several very divergent thought collectives than in several closely related ones” (p.110). This is partly to reduce conflict: an individual apparently has a harder time tackling an idea that has two closely related meanings, than he would have if there were two different, but not incomparable, perspectives. This seems to suggest that the boundary of a thought style is independent of the people that comprise its collective. A person might belong to two different thought collectives, but the distance between the styles carried by these collectives depends on something else. Belonging alone does not imply nearness. This provides a useful lead for contemporary organizational network theorists to pursue. Organizational networks are usually conceptualized in terms of positional structure (e.g. hierarchical links; inter-company board linkages; inter-division links), but not in terms of distances. How would you operationalize the distance in thought style between a manager and subordinate; between engineering divisions in a manufacturing company; between Google and Apple? What would happen if we incorporate this distance, as Fleck conceived it, into the hypothesis of creative entrepreneurs as network bridges?
I encountered this kind of hypothesis-generation at almost every page of Fleck’s brilliant book. Today, almost 80 years after its original publication, the "Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact" continues to provoke and tantalize readers with its rich fount of ideas.
Fleck argues against the view that there are timeless facts residing in an objective reality out there, either waiting to be discovered or already shown to exist. On the contrary, facts are the outcome of historical processes where a multitude of chaotic, competing thoughts gradually stabilize into self-evident forms. This process is complex – Fleck likens it to a network of rivers intersecting each other and changing course over time (p.78). But as the rivers proceed closer and closer to the sea, their paths become less and less variable. Likewise, what might start off as a mess of thoughts will repeatedly hit against some firm foundation and grow more constrained until they finally become a settled body of knowledge.
What is this “firm ground” (p.95) that thoughts bump against? This is the prior store of facts that are, at any moment, taken-for-granted. Facts beget facts. The mechanism of how this occurs is one of Fleck’s prescient contributions to the history and sociology of knowledge (the original German was published in 1935). He posits a cognitive mechanism whereby the prior store of facts serves as an organizing framework that shapes the “direct perception” of thoughts. Fleck called this cognitive structure the “thought style”. A thought style would form the basis of interpretation, and dictate which are the relevant problems that deserve further investigation. (In this regard, Fleck’s theory is similar to the pragmatist theory of inquiry developed at around the same time. This is not a coincidence; Fleck mentions Wilhelm Jerusalem, who was in close contact with William James and disseminated much of American pragmatist thought to Germany.)
The diagnosis of syphilis, for example, was only possible because of how a particular thought style directed the researchers to ask certain questions over others. In several rather too cursory passages, Fleck describes how the pioneer of the first useful diagnostic test for the disease, August von Wassermann, had been directed in his investigations by a popular theory of “syphilitic blood”. Guided by this prevailing thought style, Wassermann conducted experiments looking for specific syphilitic antigens (antibody-producing agents) in infected blood. Fleck points out that Wassermann was barking up the wrong tree as “antigen detection...is difficult, and...yields only very irregular results”. Nevertheless, Wassermann’s experiments were the required first step towards the detection of antibodies (as opposed to antigens) whose reaction indicated the probable presence of syphilis. Thus, it did not matter that the prior “facts” postulating the existence of syphilitic antigens were wrong by the standards of contemporary knowledge. On the contrary, this “wrong” interpretation led to a certain set of problems that, in the end, improved our knowledge of syphilis. Provocatively, Fleck argues that the truth of a fact should be judged by the terms of the particular thought style that it belongs to (p.100). This would imply that it is meaningless to judge the explanation of syphilis as divine punishment by the standards of today’s scientific knowledge. In Fleck’s radical epistemology, “myth differs from science...only in style.” (p.95)
The origin of facts in thought styles, and the epistemological autonomy of each thought style relative to another, raise some questions that have their echo in Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific “paradigms” (Kuhn acknowledged Fleck’s book as an important source of his ideas). How do thought styles evolve over time? Are thought styles incommensurate with each other, such that facts in one style have no relevance for facts in another? Would this not be a profoundly relativist perspective that prohibits judgment, especially for ethical and moral evaluation?
Fleck can be ambiguous and contradictory on these questions. But we can glean how they might be answered by bearing in mind that Fleck is not offering a subjectivist alternative to objective facts. He does not say that facts are just stable thoughts in our heads. Facts have a materiality that is fundamentally social — competing thoughts are stabilized by a “community of persons mutually exchanging ideas” (p.39). Wasserman was not experimenting alone; he was engaged in a dialogue with his scientific peers and with the public. Of course, which ideas gain currency depends on the prevalent thought style, but these thought styles are, in turn, altered by the addition of knowledge.
The social structure of a thought community (Fleck calls it a thought “collective”) plays a large role in the evolution of a thought style. Each collective is structured, in Fleck’s theory, as a small knowledge-producing elite surrounded by a larger public. The circulation of knowledge in this structure is both centrifugal and centripetal — the elite are directed in their pursuit of knowledge by the general thought-style that is legitimized by the masses, while the new facts that they produce have to be simplified and reduced into self-evident foundations for popular consumption. But this forms a closed loop that begs the question of how new thought styles evolve in the first place. Crucially, Fleck also discusses the possibility of communication between thought collectives. Words which have a particular meaning relative to a specific thought style are communicated across collectives. As this happens, ideas “undergo a certain change in their meaning as they circulate intercollectively” (p.109). As meanings change, old ideas become reinterpreted in new ways and influence the prior store of knowledge in a thought collective. For Fleck, this change in thought style is the “most important epistemological significance of the intercollective communication of thoughts” (p.110).
From a sociological perspective, the central importance of communication and meaning-change within and across thought collectives in Fleck’s theory of knowledge can usefully complement Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus and fields. A common criticism of Bourdieu’s habitus is that these “structuring structures” of thought are often portrayed as static and set in time. Incorporating a theory of communication might result in a more dynamic theory of habitus and fields evolving over time.
But Fleck leaves many unanswered questions together with many tantalizing leads. Is it possible to adjudicate between thought styles? Given the possibility of communication between collectives, this seems likely. However, Fleck also states that “the greater the difference [distance] between two thought styles, the more inhibited will be the communication of ideas” (p.109). Collectives that are too near only appear to differ in their interpretation of facts; collectives that are too far apart are incomprehensible to each other. Evaluation – and this includes moral and ethical judgment as well - therefore seems to require some kind of middle distance between thought collectives.
As usual, this notion of distance raises a question: what determines the boundary of a thought style? Fleck provides no clear answer. He does note, however, that often people occupy more than one thought collective at any given moment. These individuals act as potential “vehicles” for intercollective communication. This prefigures Ronald Burt’s social-network theory of entrepreneurs as “network bridges”. Yet Fleck adds an intriguing observation that has been overlooked by network and organizational theorists. He says that “a person participates more often in several very divergent thought collectives than in several closely related ones” (p.110). This is partly to reduce conflict: an individual apparently has a harder time tackling an idea that has two closely related meanings, than he would have if there were two different, but not incomparable, perspectives. This seems to suggest that the boundary of a thought style is independent of the people that comprise its collective. A person might belong to two different thought collectives, but the distance between the styles carried by these collectives depends on something else. Belonging alone does not imply nearness. This provides a useful lead for contemporary organizational network theorists to pursue. Organizational networks are usually conceptualized in terms of positional structure (e.g. hierarchical links; inter-company board linkages; inter-division links), but not in terms of distances. How would you operationalize the distance in thought style between a manager and subordinate; between engineering divisions in a manufacturing company; between Google and Apple? What would happen if we incorporate this distance, as Fleck conceived it, into the hypothesis of creative entrepreneurs as network bridges?
I encountered this kind of hypothesis-generation at almost every page of Fleck’s brilliant book. Today, almost 80 years after its original publication, the "Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact" continues to provoke and tantalize readers with its rich fount of ideas.
July 5, 2021
My mind wasn't blown away by this book, only because it had been pre-blown by Foucault in, I'm guessing, early 2020. Fleck is an obvious precursor though. Since I (over-) used a Foucauldian approach in my last master's thesis, quick note about the difference between the two:
Foucault glosses over, ignores, or even rejects [fait abstraction de] the notion of individuals. He takes a truly bleak bird's eye view (as well as a meticulous dissection) of grand social schemes and analyses institutions and 'discourses of truth' in terms of power dynamics, while managing to ignore any and all people involved. To read Foucault is to read about power struggles and waves of shock in 'society' as a zone of clashing forces, but never about human society as such. There are no individuals of any psychological depth; only discourses that legitimate this or that form of power whose end is to segregate the dominant from the subjugated, and to monitor and control the latter. There is no unmovable truth; power weaves truth. Fleck is much less morose: he too rejects the notions of truth and error, and postulates a kind of knowledge that is socially determined and context-bound (also introduces the sort of paradigm shift that will appear later in Kuhn). But his approach allows much more room for the human element. Fleck talks about people as subjective and pretty much irrational beings, and zooms in on the subliminal [I first wrote infraliminaire which translates to subthreshold] as well as overarching variables (one might say, a non-exhaustive set of micro- and macro- psycho-socio-cognitive biases) that come into play in the development of thought, knowledge, and science through history.
Syphilis (or rather, the development of syphilology) is used as a case study to illustrate the necessarily contextualized, shifting, and ephemeral nature of collective thought systems, as opposed to the prevailing idea of science as objective, absolute, and invariably 'going upwards' ("even specialized knowledge does not simply increase but also basically changes"). Something I didn't know when I started reading this book (didn't know the author at all): Fleck is a microbiologist and physician, so you can expect some tedious passages on antibodies, serums, and monkeys. As someone who's actively avoided any classes related to microbiology or virology during three years of pre-med (although I used to love immunology, but even immuno passages from the turn of the 20th century sound more like an alchemy treatise), I thought some parts of this book were a pain indeed. I'm looking at you, Chapter 3. Readers be warned; anyway, I'm going to leave this rudimentary review at that and move on to something else. I do want to quote the excellent last sentence of this page's top review (Michael's): "I can't really say that anybody should read this book, but if they'll do, they'll be a better person." He nails it. Nothing to add.
Foucault glosses over, ignores, or even rejects [fait abstraction de] the notion of individuals. He takes a truly bleak bird's eye view (as well as a meticulous dissection) of grand social schemes and analyses institutions and 'discourses of truth' in terms of power dynamics, while managing to ignore any and all people involved. To read Foucault is to read about power struggles and waves of shock in 'society' as a zone of clashing forces, but never about human society as such. There are no individuals of any psychological depth; only discourses that legitimate this or that form of power whose end is to segregate the dominant from the subjugated, and to monitor and control the latter. There is no unmovable truth; power weaves truth. Fleck is much less morose: he too rejects the notions of truth and error, and postulates a kind of knowledge that is socially determined and context-bound (also introduces the sort of paradigm shift that will appear later in Kuhn). But his approach allows much more room for the human element. Fleck talks about people as subjective and pretty much irrational beings, and zooms in on the subliminal [I first wrote infraliminaire which translates to subthreshold] as well as overarching variables (one might say, a non-exhaustive set of micro- and macro- psycho-socio-cognitive biases) that come into play in the development of thought, knowledge, and science through history.
Syphilis (or rather, the development of syphilology) is used as a case study to illustrate the necessarily contextualized, shifting, and ephemeral nature of collective thought systems, as opposed to the prevailing idea of science as objective, absolute, and invariably 'going upwards' ("even specialized knowledge does not simply increase but also basically changes"). Something I didn't know when I started reading this book (didn't know the author at all): Fleck is a microbiologist and physician, so you can expect some tedious passages on antibodies, serums, and monkeys. As someone who's actively avoided any classes related to microbiology or virology during three years of pre-med (although I used to love immunology, but even immuno passages from the turn of the 20th century sound more like an alchemy treatise), I thought some parts of this book were a pain indeed. I'm looking at you, Chapter 3. Readers be warned; anyway, I'm going to leave this rudimentary review at that and move on to something else. I do want to quote the excellent last sentence of this page's top review (Michael's): "I can't really say that anybody should read this book, but if they'll do, they'll be a better person." He nails it. Nothing to add.
The important role of the collective effort in any scientific work is clearly shown by the history of syphilology as described in chapter 1. Every theme in the sequence of ideas originates from notions belonging to the collective. Disease as a punishment for fornication is the collective notion of a society that is religious. Disease caused by the influence of the stars is a view characteristic of the astrological fraternity. Speculations of medical practitioners about therapy with metals spawned the mercury idea. The blood idea was derived by medical theoreticians from the vox populi, 'Blood is a humor with distinctive virtues.' The idea of the causative agent can be traced through the modern etiological stage as far back as the collective notion of a disease demon.
Observation and experiment are subject to a very popular myth. The knower is seen as a kind of conqueror, like Julius Caesar winning his battles according to the formula "I came, I saw, I conquered." A person wants to know something, so he makes his observation or experiment and then he knows. Even research workers who have won many a scientific battle may believe this naïve story when looking at their own work in retrospect. At most they will admit that the first observation may have been a little imprecise, whereas the second and third were "adjusted to
the facts." But the situation is not so simple; it does not obtain until tradition, education, and familiarity have produced a readiness for stylized (that is, directed and restricted) perception and action; until an answer becomes largely pre-formed in the question, and a decision is confined merely to "yes" or "no," or perhaps to a numerical determination; until methods and apparatus automatically carry out the greatest part of our mental work for us.
October 4, 2020
So brutal to try to get through this one for class.
Reads like this:
"One particular circumstance above all others, namely the astrological constellation, if not father to this thought at least sired one of its constituents."
And this:
"The factuality of the relation between syphilis and the Wassermann reaction consists in just this kind of solution to the problem of minimizing thought caprice, under given conditions, while maximizing thought constraint. The fact thus represents a stylized signal of resistance in thinking. Because the thought style is carried by the thought collective, this "fact" can be designated in brief as the signal of resistance by the thought collective."
Reads like this:
"One particular circumstance above all others, namely the astrological constellation, if not father to this thought at least sired one of its constituents."
And this:
"The factuality of the relation between syphilis and the Wassermann reaction consists in just this kind of solution to the problem of minimizing thought caprice, under given conditions, while maximizing thought constraint. The fact thus represents a stylized signal of resistance in thinking. Because the thought style is carried by the thought collective, this "fact" can be designated in brief as the signal of resistance by the thought collective."
September 11, 2008
Where Kuhn got his big ideas. Fleck was also an endlessly fascinating man. I don't think that there has been a better analysis of the history of the germ theory of disease. And he chose syphilis as his main topic to boot. Just great.
July 4, 2021
A proto-Kuhnian account of the socially constructed character of scientific knowledge (Wissen) from 1935, that introduces a number of fundamental concepts such as the notion that epistemologies are always the product of "thought collectives" than generate shared assumptions about the world that create "a harmony of illusions" among members of the collective. There is no scientific knowledge outside these collectives. Such thought collectives all have specified rules of behavior and particular psychological forms. "As an entity it is even more stable and consistent than the so-called individual, who always consists of contradictory drives." Individuals in fact always belong to multiple thought collectives at once - as a member of a nation, a political party, a professional guild, a family, etc. A firm foundation for epistemology can therefore only be established through the investigation of these "thought communities" (Denkgemeinschaften).
Ideas develop through the circulation and rearticulation within such communities: "Whose thought is it that circulates?" Fleck asks. "It is one that obviously belongs not to the individual but to the collective. Whether an individual construes it as truth or error, understands it correctly or not, a set of findings meanders throughout the community, becoming polished, transformed, reinforced, or attenuated, while influencing other findings, concept formations, opinions, and habits of thought. After making several rounds within the community, a finding often returns considerably changed to its originator, who recognizes it himself in a different light. He either does not recognize it as his own or believes - and this happens quite often - to have originally seen it in its original form." (42-43) This insight about the development of ideas through communal circulation becomes the basis for a different framing of how epistemology becomes ideology through their totemic reincantion by the community: "Words which formerly were simple terms become slogans; sentences which once were simple statements become calls to battle. This completely alters their socio-cognitive value. They no longer influence the mind through their logical meaning - indeed, they often act against it - but rather they acquire a magical power and external a mental influence simply by being used... New themes such as propaganda, imitation, authority, rivalry, solidarity, enmity, and friendship begin to appear - themes which could not have been produced by the isolated thought of any one individual." Which insight leads Fleck to his summary conclusion: "Every epistemological theory is trivial that does not take this sociological dependence of all cognition into account in a fundamental and detailed manner. But those who consider social dependence a necessary evil and an unfortunate human inadequacy which ought to be overcome fail to realize that without social conditioning no cognition is even possible. Indeed, the very word 'cognition' acquires meaning only in connection with a thought collective." (43) This thought collective theory enables a uniform investigation of primitive, archaic, naive, and even psychotic types of thinking. Facts and even reason itself are not immutable but have a history.
Ideas develop through the circulation and rearticulation within such communities: "Whose thought is it that circulates?" Fleck asks. "It is one that obviously belongs not to the individual but to the collective. Whether an individual construes it as truth or error, understands it correctly or not, a set of findings meanders throughout the community, becoming polished, transformed, reinforced, or attenuated, while influencing other findings, concept formations, opinions, and habits of thought. After making several rounds within the community, a finding often returns considerably changed to its originator, who recognizes it himself in a different light. He either does not recognize it as his own or believes - and this happens quite often - to have originally seen it in its original form." (42-43) This insight about the development of ideas through communal circulation becomes the basis for a different framing of how epistemology becomes ideology through their totemic reincantion by the community: "Words which formerly were simple terms become slogans; sentences which once were simple statements become calls to battle. This completely alters their socio-cognitive value. They no longer influence the mind through their logical meaning - indeed, they often act against it - but rather they acquire a magical power and external a mental influence simply by being used... New themes such as propaganda, imitation, authority, rivalry, solidarity, enmity, and friendship begin to appear - themes which could not have been produced by the isolated thought of any one individual." Which insight leads Fleck to his summary conclusion: "Every epistemological theory is trivial that does not take this sociological dependence of all cognition into account in a fundamental and detailed manner. But those who consider social dependence a necessary evil and an unfortunate human inadequacy which ought to be overcome fail to realize that without social conditioning no cognition is even possible. Indeed, the very word 'cognition' acquires meaning only in connection with a thought collective." (43) This thought collective theory enables a uniform investigation of primitive, archaic, naive, and even psychotic types of thinking. Facts and even reason itself are not immutable but have a history.
September 24, 2020
Perhaps the first book to insist on the fundamentally social nature of scientific fact formation and cognition (certainly the first I'm aware of), and holds up beautifully. Fleck gives a more nuanced version of the social construction of facts than Kuhn does, by not insisting on the drama of scientific revolutions and instead exploring how "normal science" gradually creates its own incommensurability. Analyzing the Wassermann test at a time when its mechanism was still unknown makes the book itself now a case study of its own themes.
September 9, 2012
So, Fleck's book is incredibly important to Science Studies and general humanistic study focussed on the sciences. The book was assigned reading for my introduction to science studies graduate seminar at New York University; bear that in mind as I rattle off my complaints [and there are many] and keep it in context. This is a book that was hugely influential for Thomas Kuhn, perhaps one of the most prominent academics of the 20th century. That said, the book is hugely problematic.
Methodologically, Fleck works from an understanding of the history of a single case and extrapolates extensively out into his analysis. The book focuses in large part on the history of the concept of syphilis and its progress through proto-epidemiologies and the eventual understanding of the disease. Here's the thing: There are a lot of notes that he makes that don't translate all that well across a larger number of cases, and those counter-examples are not appropriately represented. Fleck doesn't spend a good deal of time imagining counter-arguments and presenting his argument against the best possible opposition. As a result, the reader inevitably spends a good deal of time considering the weaknesses of Fleck's arguments and waiting for answers that never come.
It is interesting in the data that Fleck chooses to focus on. Representation of the disease is very important to Fleck, as is the understanding of the etiology of the disease. These are things that later thinkers also begin to take seriously, with varying levels of success. In innovating this particular approach, perhaps, Fleck deserves a congratulations, but he does the analysis here in ways which are fairly rudimentary.
One of the most frustrating points is Fleck's failure to recognize the epistemology and philosophy of science that was available to him and would have constituted the most immediate and strongest rebuttle to the views that he presented in the book. While Fleck is noted as a philosopher of science by many, the epistemological notes that he presents are easy to beat back with the most basic early 20th century philosophy of science; both the empiricists and the German Kantians he should have been well read in can beat him back fairly easily resting only on preexisting work.
Fleck's influence on Kuhn comes in large part from the methodology that acknowledges the importance of the thought processes of the larger group of scientists; this is the one thing that is likely revolutionary about Fleck's work. This alone is an important observation, reminding us that science is not a sterile process and that the points-of-view of those involved matter a great deal; that is one of the great ideas of Science Studies, as a movement, but I still admit that it struggles to redeem the text as a whole for me, even with that in mind as a marker of historical importance.
Methodologically, Fleck works from an understanding of the history of a single case and extrapolates extensively out into his analysis. The book focuses in large part on the history of the concept of syphilis and its progress through proto-epidemiologies and the eventual understanding of the disease. Here's the thing: There are a lot of notes that he makes that don't translate all that well across a larger number of cases, and those counter-examples are not appropriately represented. Fleck doesn't spend a good deal of time imagining counter-arguments and presenting his argument against the best possible opposition. As a result, the reader inevitably spends a good deal of time considering the weaknesses of Fleck's arguments and waiting for answers that never come.
It is interesting in the data that Fleck chooses to focus on. Representation of the disease is very important to Fleck, as is the understanding of the etiology of the disease. These are things that later thinkers also begin to take seriously, with varying levels of success. In innovating this particular approach, perhaps, Fleck deserves a congratulations, but he does the analysis here in ways which are fairly rudimentary.
One of the most frustrating points is Fleck's failure to recognize the epistemology and philosophy of science that was available to him and would have constituted the most immediate and strongest rebuttle to the views that he presented in the book. While Fleck is noted as a philosopher of science by many, the epistemological notes that he presents are easy to beat back with the most basic early 20th century philosophy of science; both the empiricists and the German Kantians he should have been well read in can beat him back fairly easily resting only on preexisting work.
Fleck's influence on Kuhn comes in large part from the methodology that acknowledges the importance of the thought processes of the larger group of scientists; this is the one thing that is likely revolutionary about Fleck's work. This alone is an important observation, reminding us that science is not a sterile process and that the points-of-view of those involved matter a great deal; that is one of the great ideas of Science Studies, as a movement, but I still admit that it struggles to redeem the text as a whole for me, even with that in mind as a marker of historical importance.
February 18, 2019
Intelligently written and very accessible, Fleck's epistemological theories hold true today just as much as they did in 1935.
Fleck uses the case of Syphilis as a canvas to explicate one of his core arguments; that knowledge is not a result of sudden discovery and transforms into self-evident truth, but rather, that knowledge evolves from previous ideas and is regarded as such solely within certain, competing communities.
For this, Fleck coined the term “Thought collective “ (ger. Denkkollektiv) as a “community of persons mutually exchanging ideas (..) and the carrier for the historical development of any field of thought (..) and the given stock of knowledge” (page number).
According to Fleck, knowledge must always be observed in relation to the thought collective that recognizes it.
Each collective has its own legitimacy and “proto-ideas” it derives knowledge from. In the same way, one collective used astrology as the root of syphilis while another linked it to the wrath of God. Members of these collectives derive their “thought style” (ger. Denkstil) from observation, which the collective itself attributes value to - including possible errors.
Fleck brilliantly uses the course of Syphilis - from “bad, befouled blood” to bacterial infection - to underlie his epistemology, that there will never be a complete error or complete truth. Rather, it is an evolving quest, intricately intertwined with the history of ideas, psychology and society at large, sometimes abandoning old paradigms and creating new ones.
Fleck admits, nevertheless, that these thought styles can become very rigid and resistant against contradictions and new, alien notions. Once a “structurally closed system of opinions consisting of many details and relations”, i.e. a thought style, is formed, it becomes difficult to penetrate. As ideas pass from one generation to another, they are firmly established. Who dares to question that the earth is round? That matter is built of atoms? - the thought collective permeated the so-called common sense and questioning the latter is regarded delusional.
Fleck even goes further by stating that “what actually thinks within a person is not the individual himself but his social community“. Cognition belongs to the thought collective, not the individual since knowledge itself is the “paramount of social creation”. This viewpoint raises questions about the individual role in a scientific world shaped by different collectives.
Fleck uses the case of Syphilis as a canvas to explicate one of his core arguments; that knowledge is not a result of sudden discovery and transforms into self-evident truth, but rather, that knowledge evolves from previous ideas and is regarded as such solely within certain, competing communities.
For this, Fleck coined the term “Thought collective “ (ger. Denkkollektiv) as a “community of persons mutually exchanging ideas (..) and the carrier for the historical development of any field of thought (..) and the given stock of knowledge” (page number).
According to Fleck, knowledge must always be observed in relation to the thought collective that recognizes it.
Each collective has its own legitimacy and “proto-ideas” it derives knowledge from. In the same way, one collective used astrology as the root of syphilis while another linked it to the wrath of God. Members of these collectives derive their “thought style” (ger. Denkstil) from observation, which the collective itself attributes value to - including possible errors.
Fleck brilliantly uses the course of Syphilis - from “bad, befouled blood” to bacterial infection - to underlie his epistemology, that there will never be a complete error or complete truth. Rather, it is an evolving quest, intricately intertwined with the history of ideas, psychology and society at large, sometimes abandoning old paradigms and creating new ones.
Fleck admits, nevertheless, that these thought styles can become very rigid and resistant against contradictions and new, alien notions. Once a “structurally closed system of opinions consisting of many details and relations”, i.e. a thought style, is formed, it becomes difficult to penetrate. As ideas pass from one generation to another, they are firmly established. Who dares to question that the earth is round? That matter is built of atoms? - the thought collective permeated the so-called common sense and questioning the latter is regarded delusional.
Fleck even goes further by stating that “what actually thinks within a person is not the individual himself but his social community“. Cognition belongs to the thought collective, not the individual since knowledge itself is the “paramount of social creation”. This viewpoint raises questions about the individual role in a scientific world shaped by different collectives.
January 5, 2015
My professor is appalled more people have not read this book. Fleck is one of the first people to present scientific facts as socially constructed, so he deserves a lot of recognition, and definitely more than he gets now. That is true. However, it is also true that the scientific fact Fleck uses as a case study is the existence of syphilis. This book contains about a hundred pages of detailed description of one of history's grossest diseases. This was a mistake, from a marketing standpoint, in my opinion. It's still a great book and I recommend it to anyone interested in science studies - especially because a lot of later writers (notably Thomas Kuhn) lifted ideas straight from Fleck's work while barely Fleck at all. But given that there are all kinds of philosophy of science books out there now, I'm less surprised than my professor is that most people choose one without any syphilis in it.
November 29, 2024
Wenn Fleck heute weithin bekannt ist, dann verdanken wir das ohne Zweifel Thomas S. Kuhn. Kuhn erwähnte ihn lobend 1962 im Vorwort zu Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen. Kuhn bezog sich später noch zwei weitere Male explizit auf Fleck. Er ging ausführlich auf die Umstände seiner Entdeckung Flecks ein und auf das, was Fleck ihm vermittelt hat, und zwar im Vorwort zur amerikanischen Ausgabe von Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache im Jahr 1979, deren Veröffentlichung er initiierte: Kuhn sagte, es sei ein Projekt, über das er seit seiner Begegnung mit Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache mit mehreren Freunden und Bekannten gesprochen habe. Mit der Übersetzung ging es nicht nur darum, Fleck, ein englischsprachiges Publikum zu verschaffen, sondern, ihm überhaupt ein Publikum zu verschaffen.
Das Buch Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache befasst sich mit der Entstehung und Entwicklung wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse. Fleck argumentiert, dass wissenschaftliche Tatsachen nicht statisch sind, sondern sich im Laufe der Zeit durch den Einfluss von Denkstilen und Denkkollektiven entwickeln. Er verwendet die Wassermann-Reaktion als Fallbeispiel, um zu zeigen, wie sich eine Erkenntnis durch die Zusammenarbeit und den Austausch innerhalb einer Forschergemeinschaft weiterentwickelt.
In Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache argumentiert Fleck, dass dass jeder Denkstil an ein Denkkollektiv gebunden ist. Dabei handelt es sich um eine Gemeinschaft von Individuen, die einen gemeinsamen Wissensbestand und eine gemeinsame Denkweise teilen.
Jeder Denkstil beinhaltet eine spezifische Art des Sehens und Interpretierens der Welt. Dies zeigt sich besonders deutlich in anatomischen Abbildungen. Sowohl in älteren als auch in modernen Abbildungen werden nicht einfach "naturgetreue" Darstellungen wiedergegeben, sondern Sinnbilder , die den jeweiligen Denkstil widerspiegeln.
Jeder Denkstil zeichnet sich durch eine bestimmte Beharrungstendenz aus. Das bedeutet, dass einmal etablierte Gedankensysteme dazu neigen, sich auch gegenüber widersprüchlichen Fakten oder neuen Erkenntnissen zu behaupten.
Jeder Denkstil ist historisch gewachsen und befindet sich in ständigem Wandel. Neue Denkstile entstehen häufig aus dem Spannungsfeld zwischen etablierten Denkweisen und neuen Erkenntnissen.
Der moderne wissenschaftliche Denkstil ist geprägt von einem starken Streben nach Objektivität, Klarheit und Präzision. Ältere Denkstile hingegen waren oft durch mythische, mystische oder religiöse Elemente beeinflusst.
Der moderne wissenschaftliche Denkstil unterscheidet sich vor allem durch seinen Fokus auf Objektivität, Spezialisierung und den offenen Austausch von Ideen von früheren Ansätzen. Dennoch gibt es auch Gemeinsamkeiten, die auf die grundlegenden Mechanismen von Denkstilen hinweisen: Jeder Denkstil beeinflusst die Art und Weise, wie wir die Welt wahrnehmen und interpretieren, und ist stets in einen historischen und sozialen Kontext eingebettet.
Die folgenden Punkte verdeutlichen, warum Fleck das Konzept des Denkkollektivs als zentral für die Wissenschaft betrachtet:
1 Soziale Prägung des Denkstils: Der Denkstil eines Denkkollektivs – die spezifische Art und Weise des Wahrnehmens, Denkens und Handelns – wird durch soziale Interaktion und Tradition geformt. Die Mitglieder eines Denkkollektivs teilen gemeinsame Annahmen, Methoden und Fragestellungen. Fleck betont, dass die Zugehörigkeit zu einem Denkkollektiv den „Denkzwang“ des Individuums prägt und festlegt, „was nicht anders gedacht werden kann“.
2 Kollektive Natur wissenschaftlicher Tatsachen: Wissenschaftliche Tatsachen entstehen und entwickeln sich nicht isoliert, sondern innerhalb von Denkkollektiven. Sie sind nicht rein „objektiv“, sondern werden durch den jeweiligen Denkstil des Kollektivs geprägt. Laut Fleck müssen Tatsachen im Denken des Kollektivs als Widerstand gegen willkürliches, gestaltloses Betrachten erlebt werden. Erst durch den Denkverkehr innerhalb des Kollektivs werden sie zu „unmittelbar erfahrbaren Gestalten“.
3 Interkollektiver Austausch und Fortschritt: Der Austausch zwischen verschiedenen Denkkollektiven – der interkollektive Denkverkehr – ist für Fleck entscheidend für den Fortschritt wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse. Der Kontakt mit anderen Denkstilen eröffnet neue Perspektiven und Fragestellungen, die wiederum Denkstiländerungen und neues Wissen ermöglichen.
4 Einfluss sozialer Kontexte: Wissenschaftliche Denkkollektive sind in größere soziale Kontexte eingebettet, wobei soziale Bedürfnisse und Interessen die Forschungsrichtungen und Schwerpunkte beeinflussen. Fleck illustriert dies anhand der Syphilisforschung, die aufgrund der moralischen Aufladung des Themas eine besondere Dynamik entwickelte.
5 Kollektiver Charakter wissenschaftlicher Entdeckungen: Anhand der Entwicklung der Wassermann-Reaktion zeigt Fleck, wie die Entdeckung und Etablierung wissenschaftlicher Tatsachen ein komplexes soziales Geschehen ist, an dem zahlreiche Akteure innerhalb eines Denkkollektivs beteiligt sind. Eine Leistung, die häufig einem einzelnen Wissenschaftler zugeschrieben wird, ist für Fleck das Ergebnis kollektiver Anstrengungen.
Zusammenfassend betont Fleck die zentrale Rolle des Denkkollektivs, da er Wissenschaft als dynamischen, sozialen Prozess begreift, geprägt von gemeinsamen Denkweisen, kollektiver Wissensproduktion und dem Austausch zwischen verschiedenen Kollektiven. Das Denkkollektiv bildet den Rahmen, in dem wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse entstehen, sich entwickeln und weitergegeben werden.
Die späte Rezeption von Ludwik Flecks Werk Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache lässt sich auf mehrere Faktoren zurückführen:
1 Ungünstige historische Umstände: Flecks Buch erschien 1935 in Deutschland, als der Nationalsozialismus zunehmend Einfluss gewann. Als polnischer Jude wurde Fleck im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland abgelehnt, und der Ausbruch des Zweiten Weltkriegs verhinderte eine weitere Verbreitung seines Werks. Zudem erschwerten Flecks Verfolgung und Deportation in Ghettos und Konzentrationslager seine wissenschaftliche Arbeit erheblich.
2 Emigration der deutschsprachigen Wissenschaftstheorie: Die Emigration von Schlüsselfiguren der Wissenschaftstheorie wie Carnap, Popper, Hempel und Reichenbach führte zur Zerstreuung dieses intellektuellen Zentrums. Flecks Ideen wurden nicht Teil des Diskurses im Exil und blieben daher im englischsprachigen Raum zunächst unbekannt.
3 Flecks isolierte Position: Als Mediziner und Bakteriologe war Fleck kein etablierter Wissenschaftstheoretiker und veröffentlichte hauptsächlich in medizinischen Fachzeitschriften. Seine Außenseiterrolle erschwerte die Wahrnehmung seiner Ideen durch die philosophische Fachwelt.
4 Geringe Beachtung in Polen: Auch in Polen fand Flecks Werk zunächst kaum Beachtung. Die einflussreiche „Lwow-Warszawa“-Schule (eine vom Wiener Kreis stark beeinflußte neopositivistische Strömung), zeigte kein Interesse an seinen Ideen. Erst durch die englischsprachige Rezeption ab 1979 begann auch in Polen eine ernsthafte Auseinandersetzung mit Flecks Werk.
5 Die „Wiederentdeckung“ durch Thomas S. Kuhn: Thomas S. Kuhn, der 1962 mit The Structure of Scientific Revolutions die Wissenschaftstheorie revolutionierte, stieß eher zufällig auf Flecks Buch. Er erkannte die Parallelen zu seinen eigenen Ideen und würdigte Flecks Einfluss, was entscheidend zur Bekanntheit von Flecks Werk beitrug.
Erst nach Flecks Tod begann die wissenschaftstheoretische Community – angestoßen durch Kuhn – sich intensiv mit seinen Ideen auseinanderzusetzen. Die schwierigen historischen Bedingungen, Flecks Außenseiterstatus und die fehlende Rezeption in Polen trugen dazu bei, dass sein Werk lange unbeachtet blieb.
Das Buch Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache befasst sich mit der Entstehung und Entwicklung wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse. Fleck argumentiert, dass wissenschaftliche Tatsachen nicht statisch sind, sondern sich im Laufe der Zeit durch den Einfluss von Denkstilen und Denkkollektiven entwickeln. Er verwendet die Wassermann-Reaktion als Fallbeispiel, um zu zeigen, wie sich eine Erkenntnis durch die Zusammenarbeit und den Austausch innerhalb einer Forschergemeinschaft weiterentwickelt.
In Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache argumentiert Fleck, dass dass jeder Denkstil an ein Denkkollektiv gebunden ist. Dabei handelt es sich um eine Gemeinschaft von Individuen, die einen gemeinsamen Wissensbestand und eine gemeinsame Denkweise teilen.
Jeder Denkstil beinhaltet eine spezifische Art des Sehens und Interpretierens der Welt. Dies zeigt sich besonders deutlich in anatomischen Abbildungen. Sowohl in älteren als auch in modernen Abbildungen werden nicht einfach "naturgetreue" Darstellungen wiedergegeben, sondern Sinnbilder , die den jeweiligen Denkstil widerspiegeln.
Jeder Denkstil zeichnet sich durch eine bestimmte Beharrungstendenz aus. Das bedeutet, dass einmal etablierte Gedankensysteme dazu neigen, sich auch gegenüber widersprüchlichen Fakten oder neuen Erkenntnissen zu behaupten.
Jeder Denkstil ist historisch gewachsen und befindet sich in ständigem Wandel. Neue Denkstile entstehen häufig aus dem Spannungsfeld zwischen etablierten Denkweisen und neuen Erkenntnissen.
Der moderne wissenschaftliche Denkstil ist geprägt von einem starken Streben nach Objektivität, Klarheit und Präzision. Ältere Denkstile hingegen waren oft durch mythische, mystische oder religiöse Elemente beeinflusst.
Der moderne wissenschaftliche Denkstil unterscheidet sich vor allem durch seinen Fokus auf Objektivität, Spezialisierung und den offenen Austausch von Ideen von früheren Ansätzen. Dennoch gibt es auch Gemeinsamkeiten, die auf die grundlegenden Mechanismen von Denkstilen hinweisen: Jeder Denkstil beeinflusst die Art und Weise, wie wir die Welt wahrnehmen und interpretieren, und ist stets in einen historischen und sozialen Kontext eingebettet.
Die folgenden Punkte verdeutlichen, warum Fleck das Konzept des Denkkollektivs als zentral für die Wissenschaft betrachtet:
1 Soziale Prägung des Denkstils: Der Denkstil eines Denkkollektivs – die spezifische Art und Weise des Wahrnehmens, Denkens und Handelns – wird durch soziale Interaktion und Tradition geformt. Die Mitglieder eines Denkkollektivs teilen gemeinsame Annahmen, Methoden und Fragestellungen. Fleck betont, dass die Zugehörigkeit zu einem Denkkollektiv den „Denkzwang“ des Individuums prägt und festlegt, „was nicht anders gedacht werden kann“.
2 Kollektive Natur wissenschaftlicher Tatsachen: Wissenschaftliche Tatsachen entstehen und entwickeln sich nicht isoliert, sondern innerhalb von Denkkollektiven. Sie sind nicht rein „objektiv“, sondern werden durch den jeweiligen Denkstil des Kollektivs geprägt. Laut Fleck müssen Tatsachen im Denken des Kollektivs als Widerstand gegen willkürliches, gestaltloses Betrachten erlebt werden. Erst durch den Denkverkehr innerhalb des Kollektivs werden sie zu „unmittelbar erfahrbaren Gestalten“.
3 Interkollektiver Austausch und Fortschritt: Der Austausch zwischen verschiedenen Denkkollektiven – der interkollektive Denkverkehr – ist für Fleck entscheidend für den Fortschritt wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse. Der Kontakt mit anderen Denkstilen eröffnet neue Perspektiven und Fragestellungen, die wiederum Denkstiländerungen und neues Wissen ermöglichen.
4 Einfluss sozialer Kontexte: Wissenschaftliche Denkkollektive sind in größere soziale Kontexte eingebettet, wobei soziale Bedürfnisse und Interessen die Forschungsrichtungen und Schwerpunkte beeinflussen. Fleck illustriert dies anhand der Syphilisforschung, die aufgrund der moralischen Aufladung des Themas eine besondere Dynamik entwickelte.
5 Kollektiver Charakter wissenschaftlicher Entdeckungen: Anhand der Entwicklung der Wassermann-Reaktion zeigt Fleck, wie die Entdeckung und Etablierung wissenschaftlicher Tatsachen ein komplexes soziales Geschehen ist, an dem zahlreiche Akteure innerhalb eines Denkkollektivs beteiligt sind. Eine Leistung, die häufig einem einzelnen Wissenschaftler zugeschrieben wird, ist für Fleck das Ergebnis kollektiver Anstrengungen.
Zusammenfassend betont Fleck die zentrale Rolle des Denkkollektivs, da er Wissenschaft als dynamischen, sozialen Prozess begreift, geprägt von gemeinsamen Denkweisen, kollektiver Wissensproduktion und dem Austausch zwischen verschiedenen Kollektiven. Das Denkkollektiv bildet den Rahmen, in dem wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse entstehen, sich entwickeln und weitergegeben werden.
Die späte Rezeption von Ludwik Flecks Werk Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache lässt sich auf mehrere Faktoren zurückführen:
1 Ungünstige historische Umstände: Flecks Buch erschien 1935 in Deutschland, als der Nationalsozialismus zunehmend Einfluss gewann. Als polnischer Jude wurde Fleck im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland abgelehnt, und der Ausbruch des Zweiten Weltkriegs verhinderte eine weitere Verbreitung seines Werks. Zudem erschwerten Flecks Verfolgung und Deportation in Ghettos und Konzentrationslager seine wissenschaftliche Arbeit erheblich.
2 Emigration der deutschsprachigen Wissenschaftstheorie: Die Emigration von Schlüsselfiguren der Wissenschaftstheorie wie Carnap, Popper, Hempel und Reichenbach führte zur Zerstreuung dieses intellektuellen Zentrums. Flecks Ideen wurden nicht Teil des Diskurses im Exil und blieben daher im englischsprachigen Raum zunächst unbekannt.
3 Flecks isolierte Position: Als Mediziner und Bakteriologe war Fleck kein etablierter Wissenschaftstheoretiker und veröffentlichte hauptsächlich in medizinischen Fachzeitschriften. Seine Außenseiterrolle erschwerte die Wahrnehmung seiner Ideen durch die philosophische Fachwelt.
4 Geringe Beachtung in Polen: Auch in Polen fand Flecks Werk zunächst kaum Beachtung. Die einflussreiche „Lwow-Warszawa“-Schule (eine vom Wiener Kreis stark beeinflußte neopositivistische Strömung), zeigte kein Interesse an seinen Ideen. Erst durch die englischsprachige Rezeption ab 1979 begann auch in Polen eine ernsthafte Auseinandersetzung mit Flecks Werk.
5 Die „Wiederentdeckung“ durch Thomas S. Kuhn: Thomas S. Kuhn, der 1962 mit The Structure of Scientific Revolutions die Wissenschaftstheorie revolutionierte, stieß eher zufällig auf Flecks Buch. Er erkannte die Parallelen zu seinen eigenen Ideen und würdigte Flecks Einfluss, was entscheidend zur Bekanntheit von Flecks Werk beitrug.
Erst nach Flecks Tod begann die wissenschaftstheoretische Community – angestoßen durch Kuhn – sich intensiv mit seinen Ideen auseinanderzusetzen. Die schwierigen historischen Bedingungen, Flecks Außenseiterstatus und die fehlende Rezeption in Polen trugen dazu bei, dass sein Werk lange unbeachtet blieb.
September 5, 2018
By reflecting on the historical background of syphilis, Fleck develops a theory of thought collectives that determine which statements deserve to be canonized as fact. His text is a mentally rigorous exercise at the intersection of science and epistemology and requires a fine attention to detail. At times, I found the text somewhat repetitive; however, Fleck is ultimately successful in building support for a theory that may describe the progression of medicine, science, and general knowledge.
May 15, 2015
The groundbreaking work on the epistemology of science and how scientific knowledge is socially constructed, Fleck's book is deeper and more philosophical than Th. Kuhn's later Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In these positivist days, when any doubt of the current scientific orthodoxy is ridiculed and censured, Fleck gives a much-needed dose of perspective.
August 1, 2020
Originally published in 1935, this is a spectacular book that anticipates a staggering range of key ideas in the more recent (and independently emergent) traditions of the sociology of scientific knowledge and sociologically-informed history of science.
September 10, 2015
Although his writing style was hard for me to handle, the points of the book are very important and thought provoking.
June 5, 2018
Contains the germ of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions decades before but meanders in minutiae and loses the thread.
Read
April 10, 2022It’s a tough book to get through, even in English. Fortunately, it’s very short, and Fleck is relatively clear in his ordering of chapters and sub-chapters. In essence, the book has two identities. The first is that of a history of medicine book, which looks at the origins of syphilis as a disease of the blood and the medical diagnostics developed to identify it. The second is that of a sociology of science book, which uses the history of syphilis as a case study to explore how facts are created within communities of likeminded thinkers. Fleck calls these communities thought collectives, and their like-mindedness thought styles. In describing the need to study the history of syphilis in order to understand it as a concept, he also argues for the need to study the history of cognition if one is to study the history of science (21). His conclusion: cognition is a social process, and facts are not objectively given but collectively created. In this sense his ideas anticipate those of later 20th-century philosophers and sociologists of science; ideas which are still highly relevant today, as we continue to debate the place of scientific knowledge in society.
April 10, 2022
The most influential book in the field of science studies that you will never see cited by anyone in the field of science studies
December 30, 2022
'Whose thought is it that continues to circulate?'
#DeZinVanHetBoek #TheEssenceOfTheBook
#DeZinVanHetBoek #TheEssenceOfTheBook
March 6, 2023
Ludwik Fleck je bil zdravnik, ki je delal v mikrobiološkem laboratoriju; pri praksi je vedno pogosteje odkrival, da je potek znanstvenega odkritja vse prej kot ravna linija od problema do rešitve. V bistvu kaže, da je dejanje odkritja močno pogojeno s skupnostjo in časom, v katerem se dogaja. Na primeru razvoja razumevanja sifilisa in poti, ki je vodila do identifikacije te bolezni z Wassermanovo reakcijo, pokaže, da je ta pot v resnici tudi veliko nerodnejša in polna kulturnih, političnih, časovnih, prostorskih vplivov.
Za Flecka je vsako mišljenje že pogojeno z družbeno-zgodovinskim kontekstom, v katerem se odvija. Ta kontekst se kaže v mišljenjskih kolektivih: To so mreže posameznikov, ki medsebojno vplivajo nase. Med njih šteje tako neko področje znanosti, kot skupina ljudi na likovnem krožku, ali pa celo družina. V teh mrežah se ustvari določen slog mišljenja, ki vsakemu posamezniku ne določa le prepričanj, ampak tudi način gledanja sveta, mišljenja, celo čustvovanja. Ta slog mišljenja postane v kolektivu pogoj za to, da bo posameznikovo izrekanje sprejeto za legitimno in smiselno. posameznik pa pripada več mišljenjskim kolektivom hkrati, zato se stalno spreminjamo; naenkrat vedno tudi - vsaj kanček - vplivamo na kolektiv, ki vpliva nazaj na nas, nato pa te spremembe prenesemo v druge kolektive. Takšen proces medsebojnega vplivanja na mišljenje deluje mnogo bolj organsko, in je bolj nepredvidljivo, kot bi si radi mislili.
Ključno je tudi to, da se informacije prenašajo različno na različnih stopnjah kolektiva: tako bo npr. specialist na nekem področju v znanstvenem članku svoje odkritje opisal z veliko mero previdnosti (zelo verjetno je; ne bi bilo napak trditi, da...), medtem ko se bo že v zbornikih o istem odkritju pisalo z večjo gotovostjo, v poljudnoznanstvenih besedilih pa bo to predstavljeno kot gotova danost, zasidrana v resničnost. Ko Fleck opozaraj na vse to, ne želi napotiti na mišljenje o popolni relativnosti vseh dejstev; prej želi pokazati, da je resnica nekaj bolj fluidnega in konkretnega, ne pa neka višja danost.
Za Flecka je vsako mišljenje že pogojeno z družbeno-zgodovinskim kontekstom, v katerem se odvija. Ta kontekst se kaže v mišljenjskih kolektivih: To so mreže posameznikov, ki medsebojno vplivajo nase. Med njih šteje tako neko področje znanosti, kot skupina ljudi na likovnem krožku, ali pa celo družina. V teh mrežah se ustvari določen slog mišljenja, ki vsakemu posamezniku ne določa le prepričanj, ampak tudi način gledanja sveta, mišljenja, celo čustvovanja. Ta slog mišljenja postane v kolektivu pogoj za to, da bo posameznikovo izrekanje sprejeto za legitimno in smiselno. posameznik pa pripada več mišljenjskim kolektivom hkrati, zato se stalno spreminjamo; naenkrat vedno tudi - vsaj kanček - vplivamo na kolektiv, ki vpliva nazaj na nas, nato pa te spremembe prenesemo v druge kolektive. Takšen proces medsebojnega vplivanja na mišljenje deluje mnogo bolj organsko, in je bolj nepredvidljivo, kot bi si radi mislili.
Ključno je tudi to, da se informacije prenašajo različno na različnih stopnjah kolektiva: tako bo npr. specialist na nekem področju v znanstvenem članku svoje odkritje opisal z veliko mero previdnosti (zelo verjetno je; ne bi bilo napak trditi, da...), medtem ko se bo že v zbornikih o istem odkritju pisalo z večjo gotovostjo, v poljudnoznanstvenih besedilih pa bo to predstavljeno kot gotova danost, zasidrana v resničnost. Ko Fleck opozaraj na vse to, ne želi napotiti na mišljenje o popolni relativnosti vseh dejstev; prej želi pokazati, da je resnica nekaj bolj fluidnega in konkretnega, ne pa neka višja danost.
April 6, 2024
Fundamental book for the criticism of the scientific method, the beginnings of the sociology of science. Excellent book.
Read
July 30, 2025An interesting book. I confess to having not finished the entire thing, but I did learn way more about venereal disease than I ever expected to.
September 4, 2014
O Kurwa, Poland can into awesome philosophy of science!
Everything about this book is fascinating. Published in German by a Polish physician/biologist, in what's now Ukraine, this book could've shaken the very foundations of science in 1935... except it didn't. As a matter of fact, Ludwik had to fight for his life (and those of other Jews) during WWII after being pushed into Lviv's ghetto. And then, no one really cared about the book for quite a while. Then Thomas Kuhn, an American philosopher, independently developed some of the themes found in this book, and nothing happened again. Until, that is, the early 80's when the book gradually became more popular. Why?
Fleck himself could've seen it coming. He realised that discussions happen in thought collectives (he went way beyond science when he developed this concept), and these thought collectives may well "filter" facts - depending on what they consider relevant. When he penned this tome, no thought collective really cared about what he had to say. Then, 50 years later, a thought collective (that of philosophers of science) took interest in what he had to say. Thought collectives are fickle like that.
In order to illustrate his point, Fleck analysed the history of syphilis, making it the world's best book about syphilis ever published. Mainly because it's just a case study, and it could've been about anything else, really (Feyerabend talked about the Galileo Affair, coming to not altogether different conclusions). Truth is, its history developed haphazardly, and there was hardly a crucial experiment that sorted everything out. That's, Fleck would've said, a myth from popular science and vademecum science (that is, the science consumed by educated amateurs and presented by textbooks). Journal science, produced by scientists on the go, is hardly so neat.
All in all, this book will never be a best-seller. He's no science-worshipper (like Popper), no revolutionary (like Kuhn), and no Feyerabend (like firebrand). It doesn't mean this book is bad though. He was so enthralled in his own activities that he was probably too honest and careful for his own good. And, thanks to this, the book is amazing.
Everything about this book is fascinating. Published in German by a Polish physician/biologist, in what's now Ukraine, this book could've shaken the very foundations of science in 1935... except it didn't. As a matter of fact, Ludwik had to fight for his life (and those of other Jews) during WWII after being pushed into Lviv's ghetto. And then, no one really cared about the book for quite a while. Then Thomas Kuhn, an American philosopher, independently developed some of the themes found in this book, and nothing happened again. Until, that is, the early 80's when the book gradually became more popular. Why?
Fleck himself could've seen it coming. He realised that discussions happen in thought collectives (he went way beyond science when he developed this concept), and these thought collectives may well "filter" facts - depending on what they consider relevant. When he penned this tome, no thought collective really cared about what he had to say. Then, 50 years later, a thought collective (that of philosophers of science) took interest in what he had to say. Thought collectives are fickle like that.
In order to illustrate his point, Fleck analysed the history of syphilis, making it the world's best book about syphilis ever published. Mainly because it's just a case study, and it could've been about anything else, really (Feyerabend talked about the Galileo Affair, coming to not altogether different conclusions). Truth is, its history developed haphazardly, and there was hardly a crucial experiment that sorted everything out. That's, Fleck would've said, a myth from popular science and vademecum science (that is, the science consumed by educated amateurs and presented by textbooks). Journal science, produced by scientists on the go, is hardly so neat.
All in all, this book will never be a best-seller. He's no science-worshipper (like Popper), no revolutionary (like Kuhn), and no Feyerabend (like firebrand). It doesn't mean this book is bad though. He was so enthralled in his own activities that he was probably too honest and careful for his own good. And, thanks to this, the book is amazing.
July 31, 2016
Das Buch, das Thomas Kuhn den Weg geebnet hat. Ludwik Fleck, ein Mediziner mit offenen Augen, beschreibt übersichtlich, verständlich und äusserst plausibel, was Wissen seiner Ansicht nach ist. Tatsächlich macht er Skeptizismus produktiv, eine Tat, die mich persönlich davor bewahrt hat, den Verstand zu verlieren. Ein Jammer, dass diesem brillanten Kopf nicht schon zu Lebzeiten die verdiente Anerkennung zukam. Obwohl er das wohl mit seiner eigenen Theorie begründen würde...
January 6, 2025
In a similar vein as *The Copernican Revolution*, *Genesis and Development* concerns one particular scientific discovery and what that can tell us about science more generally. In this case, the book is about the discovery of syphilus and its cause. Much of Fleck's theories have informed Kuhn, which is how I learned of this. To hear people talk of this book and it's theories, you wouldn't think it just uses the one case of syphilus but that it is.
May 28, 2008
Where it all comes from.
November 28, 2009
An excellent introduction to the social construction of scientific knowledge. Fleck was perhaps the first person to lay out the argument that science is socially constructed. An STS classic.
August 31, 2013
Ground-breaking insight into the thought collectives that drive science.
February 19, 2016
It's a seminal work, but a slog to read.
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