Căderea. Colapsul Uniunii Sovietice

by Vladislav M. Zubok, Gabriel Tudor (Translator)

Un studiu important despre prăbușirea Uniunii Sovietice și despre reformele eronate ale lui Gorbaciov care au condus la declinul ei

În 1945, Uniunea Sovietică ținea sub control jumătate din Europa și era membră fondatoare a Națiunilor Unite. Până în 1991 a ajuns să dețină o armată de patru milioane de oameni, dotată cu cinci mii de focoase nucleare, și era al doilea producător de petrol din lume. Dar, la scurt timp, URSS a alunecat într-o criză economică și a fost sfâșiată de separatismul naționalist. Colapsul Uniunii Sovietice a fost una dintre schimbările de mare impact ale secolului XX.

La treizeci de ani de la acele evenimente, Vladislav Zubok readuce în atenție ultimii ani ai URSS, respingând ideea că destrămarea ordinii sovietice era inevitabilă. Autorul arată cum reformele politice eronate ale lui Gorbaciov, care aveau drept scop modernizarea și democratizarea Uniunii Sovietice, au privat guvernul de resurse și au întărit separatismul. Volumul pune într-o lumină nouă populismul democratic rus, lupta țărilor baltice pentru independență, criza financiară sovietică și fragilitatea puterii statului autoritar.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Russia, Politics, Russian History, Audiobook, Soviet Union

656 pages, Paperback

First published November 30, 2021

About the author

Vladislav M. Zubok (see also: Владислав Зубок) is Professor of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is the author of A Failed Empire, Zhivago’s Children, and The Idea of Russia.

Reviews

[Hadrian · Rating 4 out of 5]

My father thinks Gorbachev is an idiot.
-Deng Xiaoping's youngest son, Deng Zhifang

There is no shortage of books on the fall of the Soviet Union. I am not in any sense a 'Russianist', but I can name several books off the top of my head - Stephen Kotkin's Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000, David Remnick's Lenin's Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire, and William Taubman's biography, Gorbachev: His Life and Times, or earlier prophecies of Soviet collapse such as George Kennan's Long Telegram. Not to mention the memoirs of those centrally or peripherally involved, such as Ambassador Matlock's Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union.

By the mid 1980s Zubok finds that the Soviet Union was in a bad shape but stable. Military expenditures were high, but the military manufacturing complex was one of the crown jewels of the Soviet economy and was relatively advanced. The Chernobyl nuclear accident blew a hole in the state budget, but not as much as what Gorbachev's anti-alcohol campaigns - recall that reduced alcohol consumption meant a reduced intake for state budget.

Zubok's account says that the causes of death were internal- multiple organ failure after over-exertion. Zubok argues that western foreign policy did not destroy the Soviet Union, but it was instead a series of decisions and events at the highest levels of the government - not just the increased military spending or the Chernobyl disaster or the oil price shock, but instead the decentralization and loss of control of the Soviet economy from Gorbachev's misguided - indeed "ruinous" reforms. This led to their lack of fiscal contribution from peripheral areas towards the central government and the hollowing out of its capabilities.

This was aggravated by the political reforms. The weakening of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the entrenched bureaucracy instead gave ammunition to ethnic and nationalist separatists and regional centers of power. The CPSU and the nomenklatura was the levers of power, and they were seen broken apart. Further concessions only emboldened nationalists, and instead propelled Yeltsin further into power. Former party members became strident anti-communists would instead gleefully loot the state on a grand scale after the passing of the ill-designed "Law on Socialist Enterprises". Zubok asserts that while the separatist movements of say Ukraine or the Baltic states were important, that was not central to the collapse; and the basis of their power was instead taking advantage of the internal struggle as well as relying on outside diaspora.

The United States, at least in Zubok's telling, was confused and incredulous at recent events. Policy became more pragmatic; first in trying to keep Gorbachev around because he was agreement in foreign policy and in mutual nuclear disarmament, and then trying to keep him alive, then trying to shield itself from the explosion.

In short, it was a "perfect storm" with a "hapless captain". Gorbachev desired huge changes, but he was rapidly unable to maintain control; and he essentially escaped to foreign policy and playing the statesmen after bouts of domestic weakness.

Gorbachev was not the only captain of the sinking ship; but Zubok finds that his campaigns of reforms were misguided - the top policymakers didn't know what they were doing, and they didn't want to turn back, perhaps in fear of heading back to what was there before. And Zubok finds being Gorbachev as being a kind of Leninist - not because he's decisive, not because he formed a vanguard party which dominated political affairs, but that Gorbachev saw the appeal of a figure who changed history so dramatically - and even mimed his speech after Lenin at some points! He says that Gorbachev feted Western leaders and developing cordial relationships, but the Western leaders soon realized how rotten the Soviet Union state was and how tenuous his position was. But in the later years of his reign, he became hesitant, timid, and unable to see his reforms through, and was thrashed by the brutally ambitious Yeltsin.

Zubok's argument is provocative and thorough, and makes a broad use of interviews - including with Gorbachev and many members of Yeltsin's staff. He does not give in to stereotypes about an unchanging Russia that is caught in an "oriental despotism". He sees the fall of the Soviet Union and the hopes of so many reformers as opportunities lost. I point out Zubok's conclusion:

History has never been a morality play about the inevitable victory of freedom and democracy. Instead, the world remains what it always was: an arena of struggle between idealism and power, good governance and corruption, the surge of freedom and the need to curb it in times of crisis and emergency.

[Paul Bryant · Rating 2 out of 5]

It was silly of me to try this book but it’s a subject that fascinates me, which is why I already read three books on the exact same thing*. And Collapse by Vladislav Zubok was one too many. I was dazzled by the triumph of the recent Watergate: A New History by Garrett Graff – that was yet another large tome on one of my favourite subjects and it was really great. So I thought, okay, yes, a new big book on the bizarre almost bloodless disappearance of the mighty Soviet Union. Let’s read it.

Zubok tells the story in a strongly Gorbcentric way, we are hovering over Gorby’s shoulder almost daily from 1988 to 1991 – to steal a little from My Fair Lady, his joys, his woes, his highs, his lows are second nature to me now, like breathing out and breathing in. We learn that Gorb was a kind of very well-dressed bull in a Communist china shop. Or, he was that earnest and sweet backpacker who turns round on a crowded bus to show someone his map and knocks two old ladies onto the floor with his massive rucksack. He had “a beautiful vision of a more open Soviet Union gradually integrated into a ‘Common European Home’”. In the middle of political chaos “he still believed he would make history and not be regarded as someone who had merely bobbed on the surface of a revolutionary deluge”. He was the one true Communist who destroyed communism.

The problem with Zubok is that like Gorby himself he seems not to be able to see the wood for the trees, he drowns the non specialist reader in the complexities of the Soviet political system which was complicated to begin with, before Gorby started monkeying around and made it all beyond complicated. Eventually I had to conclude this is a book for students and professors who need the hyperdetail. I don’t need the hyperdetail. And plus, sorry Vladislav, but your style tends towards the dry. I mean, how can such a dramatic story sound mostly a bit dull?

Ah well… goodbye Gorby.

Hello Putin.

*(Armageddon Averted by Stephen Kotkin; Revolution 1989 by Victor Sebestyen; Down with Big Brother by Michael Dobbs – all recommended.).

[Cool_guy · Rating 4 out of 5]

In many ways I feel that my understanding of the collapse of the Soviet Union is just as fuzzy as it was before I read Collapse. That's not really Zubok's fault. A high level political history of the disintegration of the USSR is bound to be borderline incoherent because the main actors had no idea what they were doing. In fact, its a testament to his rigor as a historian that he doesn't try to cram events into a cohesive, albeit flawed, narrative.

Take Gorbachev, for instance. I used to think he was naive but fundamentally good hearted (not that that matters at this level). Now it's clear to me he was an arrogant oaf. Animated by what he thought was the spirit of Lenin, Gorby chased misty visions of European social democracy (in the midst of its decline, one should add), while unleashing the forces that tore his country apart. I'd never thought I'd find Yeltsin, the sentimental drunk, a more interesting figure, but I did.

Finally, it's a miracle it took 30 years for a war in Ukraine to kick off.

[Jon-Erik · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very well researched book. The central premise, despite some hedging, is that Gorbachev's messianic visions and poor execution caused the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was avoidable, and if the reforms had gone along the lines planned by Andropov, things would have been better.

To some extent this is a refutation of the straw-man that Reagan won the Cold War with his military buildup, except there is plenty of information in this book itself to bolster that notion. In the conclusion, the author argues contra this notion that the Soviet leadership knew for years it needed to reform. Well, OK. Then why in particular was it during that particular moment that it became urgent? Zubok almost seems to hold Gorbachev in contempt because he was unwilling to use force as Kruschev did in 1956 and Brezhnev did in 1986.

In fact, for all of the criticism of Gorbachev, it's former Canadian Prime Minister Mulrooney's words that stuck with me

“In 1985, he said, then Vice-President Bush had attended Chernenko’s funeral in Moscow. What would Bush have done then if, meeting him after the funeral, Gorbachev had said: I will free Eastern Europe, I will dismantle the Warsaw Pact, a united Germany will join NATO, a UN force will start a war against Iraq, the USSR will sign the CFE and START agreements, there will be elections and democracy, I will develop personal ties with America, and economic ties with the West will grow.”

And all of those things happened and there was no war with the west. 30 years on, it's easy to see the tensions in Ukraine and the actions of Putin abroad as avoidable if only this situation had been handled better. But how? No one can know how history would have turned out and avoided World War 3 seems like a pretty big win to me.

Indeed, it seems to me that the real bad actors here were Yeltsin and his cadre of opportunistic vultures snapping up the remains of the Soviet state with no real idea what they were doing. Gorbachev actually accomplished a lot.

But to the point about Reagan, or at least the US, until the very end, the inability to reduce spending on the military-industrial complex was perhaps the fatal flaw in Gorbachev's plans. He saw that sector as the only world class industry and wanted to hang on to it, but it hampered other pieces he had in play. So whether or not it was inevitable that the USSR collapse and whether or not it was Reagan's military buildup that was the final necessary cause, it certainly was an important factor.

This book gives us a luxuriously detailed event-by-event account of the collapse from inside the halls of power, without much at all in the way of a sense of how things went for normal Soviet citizens. There are a few hints, but not a lot of detail.

Despite those criticisms, I thought this book was excellent and I learned a lot. In particular,
I had never realized just how bad the economic situation in the Soviet Union really was in the late 80s and always assumed that the problems really began with the collapse of Soviet Union. It seems that some of Gorbachev's attempted reforms had begun the cycle of plutocracy, but perhaps not irrevocably. Recently, many have seen the Chernobyl disaster as sparking things off thanks to the popular TV series, but that seems very overstated as well. We've heard Afghanistan was the straw that broke the camel's back too. Neither of these alone seem sufficient given the evidence in Zubok's book.

I also feel like I understand the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine much better. And it seems that Russia's claims are stronger than many of us in the west seem to realize and that Ukraine's separation from Russia was indeed largely driven by nationalism and a cynical attempt by former communists to hold on to power and wealth. This isn't an apology for an invasion, but it does seem that for countries bent on reversing the communist era, the transfer of land to the Ukranian SSR by Khrushchev was never intended to serve the purpose it has.

I don't know if the world would be a better place now if the USSR had a softer landing into the globalized world in a way more parallel to Eastern Europe. But I do know that it was a system that deserved to collapse. I also still bristle when I hear how much credit the USSR deserves for the defeat of Nazi Germany, as if they hadn't been largely responsible for the war's outbreak in the first place by agreeing to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in a cynical land grab.

People also act as if it's a simple footnote that the nuclear arms race and the broader Cold War is over, and as if we could have survived that way indefinitely, with no other nuclear near misses like the Cuban Missile Crisis or the Able Archer 83 panic. Quite possibly, human civilization was saved by this, and we have Gorbachev to thank for that in large part too, along with Reagan and Bush 41, no matter how much we may have disagreed with their domestic policies--Zubok with Gorbachev's and American liberals with the latter two.

[Anthony · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Trial of Gorbachev.

In this book Vladislav M. Zubok delivers a captivating and damning account of Mikhail Gorbachev and the last days of the Soviet Union. This is a fascinating insight into the drama, tension and what ifs of the fourth revolution Russia went through in the twentieth century. Zubok makes clear from the start that he disagrees with William Tubman’s phrase of the last Soviet general secretary and shows how he believes Gorbachev, who acting with good intentions, blundered and misunderstood the complex situation facing the USSR in the 1980s. For Zubok, Gorbachev’s reforms and hailing of nation destroyer Lenin unleashed a series of events which dissected the country and left Gorbachev in the political wilderness pleading with successor Boris Yeltsin for political immunity. By the time Gorbachev took over, the economic situation of the USSR was dyer. Years of socialism had stagnated the economy, however Perestroika, his reforms failed. Mainly because they were stuck between capitalism and communism and ended up ‘pulling the rug from under the already collapsing table’. For example, Gorbachev allowed directors of businesses to have greater control over production methods, hiring of staff and buying of products, however the state still controlled the means of production and the focus was still on quantity rather than profits. Limited autonomy with no focus on profit and inflexible prices meant that growth was hugely limited.

I felt this book pivoted towards a dual biography of Yeltsin verses Gorbachev, how the first broke free from political mediocrity to create a new condensed Russia; and the latter fell from the apex of international prestige to be blamed in his home country for all of its problems. Both are highly different personalities. Perhaps the biggest difference is that Gorbachev clung onto the idea of Leninist ideology which could not be defended. Yeltsin threw all of this away when he visited the USA and saw the readily available variety of affordable goods in supermarkets for all citizens. Furthermore the focus stays clearly aligned to Gorbachev and Yeltsin and the involvement of others such as Ronald Reagan or Pope John Paul II are minimal. This is an internal affair and goes a long way to help the reader understand present day Russia and even Vladimir Putin.

I must point out that this is not all Gorbachev and Yeltsin. President George Bush is shown to have been a supporter of Gorbachev, who was looked to for support by the Soviet leader. However, when the crunch came, Bush accepted Yeltsin’s new Russian Federation. Some argue that it was in the USA’s interest for the Soviet Union to collapse, which one can see why they would think this. Yeltsin portrayed a Russia which would succeed the old superpower’s prestige, however as Zubok points out it did not take the west long to realise this was not the case and new Russia was poor. These problems persist today in Putin’s Russia, where GDP is only 12 percent larger than the Netherlands and Belgium combined. Politically strong, economically weak. Other key players were US Secretary of State James Baker who told Gorbachev to get rid of the three Baltic Republics, a terrible idea from Gorbachev’s perspective; and Gorbachev’s loyal advisor Georgii Shakhnazarov who rightly believed Russia should cut ties with with central Asian Islamic republics as they would have to prop them up financially.

Perhaps the key to the collapse was the breakaway of the other socialist republics, specifically Ukraine. As one may know this is a divisive topic today. The argument is that Ukrainians were told they were the ‘bread basket of Europe’ and had gold and oil reserves galore. An independent Ukraine would be wealthy and also not abused by Russia. In voting they chose to go it alone, even with 68% in high Russian areas such as Luhansk Oblast in the east and 57% cherished historical Russian city of Sevastopol voting for independence. Nikita Khrushchev had realigned the Crimean region to the Ukrainian society in the late 1950s, at a time when separation was unthinkable, so the impact was supposed to be minimal. The dream of a wealthy Ukraine did not come to fruition with many Russian commentators claiming they were misled. What is clear this separation was the nail in the coffin.

Zubok’s book is highly readable and entertaining and I throughly enjoyed it. An expat living in the USA he is now an outsider looking in on the situation in his country. With writing this book he has documented how over 70 years of hurt fizzled out through further Russian failures. However, he turns this on its head and look optimistically at future. Things changed so quickly in the early 1990s for Russia, nothing is permanent in that old country and things will change again before long. An opportunity was missed for Russia to become free and democratic, however the journey is not over. Perhaps Russia was not ready, but one day it will be.

[David · Rating 5 out of 5]

The only thing worse than living in a society dominated by an undemocratic ruling clique, is living in one where the clique refuses to rule. This is the main message of Zubok's Collapse. No single other factor was nearly as decisive in precipitating the end of the USSR: treason by selfish elites worsened the dysfunction, but they could only act in the cracks opened up and left undefended by the State; a programme of liberalization rent apart a previously cohesive party-state, but Russia's unique catastrophe cannot be explained by a transformation that other societies went through much less painfully; entire peoples were crushed in the vice of nationalist recriminations, but the crowbar wielded by nationalist politicians wasn't ethnic but institutional: if Moscow isn't capable of preserving order in the periphery, better for the periphery to have its own despots better attuned to local elites.

Whichever way you look, violence was unintionally enabled by state paralysis. Zubok leaves the reader little room but to blame everything on Gorbachev: even drunk charlatans like Yeltsin showed more determination to see plans through. But what made Gorbachev so weak, was that he was an almost autistically idealistic communist, with every decision being either undergirded by intellectual imprimatur, or inconceivable. But Lenin used ideology more as a justification of profane realpolitik, not as a road map: in fawning over his idol, the idealist Gorbachev doomed the Leninist institutionalist project. The blindspots of Soviet marxism accumulated and exploded catastrophically in the person of the first non-cynical, non-ruthless true believer the USSR ever had at its helm.

The budget strained under a combination of moribund industries, an impossible-to-discipline workforce and massive financial support of foreign allies. The leadership was old, its legitimacy anchored more in the impenetrable intricacies of the Soviet machine than popularity or socialist fealty. Gorbachev believed Soviet society could be revived by promoting an NEP economically, democracy politically and freedom in the ideological sphere — but the moment these pieties were turned into policy, hollowing out the organisations, value chains and chain of command, the unintended consequences of his actions dumbfounded the reformer, having him cling to weary slogans and nonintervention.

Zubok closes the story by downplaying its relevance, but I disagree. It's crucial in explaining 1) why Russians today feel so betrayed by history, having made a bad situation infinitely worse by mismanaging a necessary transition, provoking a hostility to transition and openness in general; 2) underlining how the unwillingness of a central authority to bring down the hammer (ranging from the indesicive EU to Belgian somnambulance) can lead to local preference of a tyranny that gets things done; 3) challenging the eurocentric lense that tends to explain developments in the periphery by referring to European plans. If anything, the US should have intervened more to cushion the USSR's fall; Zubok conjectures that, were Bush to have remained in power, he might have covinced his party to devote billions to economic stabilization of the imploding state.

[Sharof Hamroh · Rating 3 out of 5]

Evil Empire that was built on horror and millions of deaths of its own citizens finally was abolished. Shout out to Gorbachev. To the man who we - former colonies of cruel Moscow regime - owe our freedom. Even though Gorby never intended to ruin that state.

About the book itself.

Zubok sometimes blindly follows official Soviet data and documents, which was notorious for disinformation. It made my teeth gnash.

For example,

According to the best available estimates, Soviet defense spending did not exceed 15 percent of GDP.

Only true if we rely on official data. Profound Russian Economist Konstantin Sonin spoke about a figure of about 30-40% of GDP per year. However Prof. Zubok is right to suppose that excessive military spendings was not the reason of the Grand Collapse (let's call the abolishment of Soviet state like this).

There is another passage I'd like to rant about. Zubok briefly introduced so-called "The Cotton Case". KBG chief Yuri Andropov ordered investigation of Uzbekistan under plausible pretence of monitoring if there was a corruption going.

In the book it goes something like this:

Under Andropov, he was sent by the central prosecutor’s office to Uzbekistan to investigate the “cotton case” - a scam that resulted in republican officials receiving 4 billion rubles from the central budget for cotton, which existed only in false reports. Gdlyan's investigations became one of the biggest sensations of the glasnost period, making him a celebrity, a people's fighter against the Soviet "mafia". People approved of Gdlyan's harsh methods; his team arrested hundreds of Uzbek officials, kept them for months under continuous interrogation, and put pressure on their closest relatives. Gdlyan’s partner in the investigation of the “cotton case,” Nikolai Ivanov, was elected as a deputy to the congress from Leningrad

I don't get why Prof. Zubok is pushing official Soviet propaganda? How likely is it that a HISTORIAN does not know subtle details about the case? Why doesn’t he say that similar fraud schemes with fake invoices had taken place throughout the USSR for decades, but Uzbekistan paid a great price, because Andropov planned to imprison Uzbek SSR' head of state Sharaf Rashidov, in the cotton case? Rashidov, who had close relations with Brezhnev, tried to convince the Leonid Brezhnev to abandon Andropov’s idea to seize Afghanistan. That's why Andropov wanted Rashidov behinds the bars.

There is the one about Crimea of course:

Shakhnazarov objected that the new union is more in line with Russian interests, since in this way Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan will remain in the zone of Russia’s geopolitical influence. Otherwise, “while Russia is coming to its senses, the republics will disperse into different compartments, be drawn into other unions, blocs, and, of course, no one will want to return them by force.” Shakhnakhzarov was convinced that the countries of Eastern Europe had already begun to move closer to NATO and Ukraine could do the same: “If this happens, then instead of a bridge [to Europe] and neutral states, we will get an entire military bloc on our borders.” What about Crimea? Will this peninsula, an integral part of Russian national identity, become foreign territory?

How come Crimea, a peninsula where Crimean Tatars and other Turkics had lived for ages before being expelled by Joseph Stalin during the World War II, became "a part of Russian national identity"??

Once again, but WHY ZUBOK DIDN'T object that imperialistic narrative?

There are much more, but I have no intention to continue because despite all of those flaws, I liked it. The book is coherent and I recommend to read it among other historical accounts on the Grand Collapse.

3 out of 5.

[michal k-c · Rating 4 out of 5]

extremely thorough and rigorous, the kind of work that once made me want to be a historian (before other works convinced me to pursue theory, I'm apparently very impressionable). Wish Zubok would've let himself off the leash a little bit more, but that's more a pitfall of the discipline and a marker of "good work" than it is a detriment.

the book is also extremely topical, with much of the back half being concerned with the issue of Ukrainian separatism and nationalism. but, despite what Yeltsin lead many to believe, Ukraine's sovereignty wasn't what split up the Union (though it was its final undoing). Gorbachev's delusional perestroika, tragic economic mismanagement, and his monumental ego were ultimately what did it. It's not worth doing "what if" history too much, but it's pretty hard not to imagine what the world might look like had the Sino-Soviet split not happened, had Andropov lived just a little bit longer to implement more conservative reforms, or had Gorbachev not sold the Union in exchange for a Pizza Hut commercial.

[Cheenu · Rating 5 out of 5]

It's literally a detailed play-by-play account of last years of Gorbachev's tenure.

The amount of detail surprised me but maybe I should have expected it.

After all, it is a 440 page book primarily focused on a two year period (90-91) of sheer mayhem and disarray.

Gorbachev is one of those historical figures where you are not really sure what to make of them.

I was hoping this book would steer me to some sort of definite perspective on Gorbachev but it is a testament to how well written this book is that it doesn't.

Was he a true peacenik that brought about a more peaceful world with disarmaments and refusing to violently suppress independence movements of Eastern Europe and the Baltics?

(This short documentary covers just how crucial Gorbachev was towards the liberalization of Hungary & the fall of the Berlin Wall for example - https://youtu.be/9NSKIu_JZX0?si=D7T4s...)

Or was he completely naive in his vision of an open society that would come together to implement his political and economic reforms?

Either way, it is a fantastic book that is the outcome of decades of meticulous research.

To add some personal commentary, I could not help drawing a parallel between the simmering resentment against an inefficient and often corrupt nomenklatura (bureaucracy) and what we are seeing in the Western world today.

The prevalent narrative of the fall of the Soviet Union is one of a grassroots democratic movement overthrowing a communist dictatorship.

However, in my opinion, the book convincingly evinces that most of the people were apathetic towards the structure and existence of the union and just wanted improvements in their living situation (no more bread lines).

Democracy and independence were just populist buzzwords that, by the chance of circumstances, stood in opposition to the nomenklatura which were co-opted by the opportunistic Yeltsin and others.

You have Yeltsin arguing for a breakaway Russia from USSR on the specious argument that they subsidize the rest of the USSR and similarly you have Trump arguing for the withdrawal of US from NAFTA on the similarly specious argument that it comes at the cost of American jobs.

Likewise, one can draw comparison between Boris Johnson and Brexit as well as Leonid Kravchuk and Ukrainian full independence - both of whom rode the populist positions of blaming everything on faraway bureaucrats in Brussels or Moscow.

As another popular quote says, "History may not repeat, but it certainly does rhyme"

Western world leaders should definitely view Gorbachev's vacillations and attempts to find a middle political ground as a cautionary tale.

As, in times of economic stagnation, the masses seem to prefer those who talk the language of major economic reforms with complete disregard for the accompanying ideology or even the logical soundness of aforesaid reforms.

Maybe the focus should be on proclamation and implementation of counterpart radical reforms rather than ideological pronouncements.

Okay, I'll now forsake my self anointed armchair political expert designation and return to regular book reviewing.

Wrapping up the review, I recommend reading this if you have any passing interest in contemporary Russian history.

[Mark James · Rating 5 out of 5]

I vividly remember the flag of the USSR coming down at midnight on Christmas Eve in Moscow, in 1991, and the tricolor flag of Russia rising in its place.

It was like the USSR had disappeared in the blink of an eye. I had forgotten how prolonged its collapse really was. My memory was jostled; I remember debates about what might take the place of the USSR long before December 1991. The Cold War was officially declared to be over some time in 1989 or 1990.

Mikhail Gorbachev, the last leader of the Soviet Union, was very much depicted as a hero in the West. He had singlehandedly ended the Cold War, let East Germany unite with West Germany, and allowed Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries to embrace democracy. The troubles and backlash he faced in the USSR was hinted at by the August 1991 coup attempt, but this book lays out the impossible headwinds that Gorbachev faced as he sought wide ranging reforms. What I didn't know was the many flaws of Gorbachev himself, and how he often undermined his own progress.

The breakup of the USSR was much more complex and long-coming than many realize. And the current conflicts in Ukraine, from Crimea to the Donbass to the Russian invasion in 2022, directly arise from unresolved and heavily debated issues of borders and sovereignty in 1991 as the USSR broke apart. Same for the South Ossetia and Abkhazia conflicts in Georgia, and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

I feel more informed after reading this book.

[Santi Ruiz · Rating 5 out of 5]

Zubok dedicates the book “to all reformers,” and it’s worth reading in that vein, as a cautionary tale about the difficulty of steering reforms one you set them into motion. His big thesis is that the collapse of the USSR wasn’t inevitable — that had Gorbachev made better decisions, he could have liberalized while keeping the union together. This was my first deep dive on the topic, so I can’t fully judge the argument, but he makes a compelling case, in particular that the staging of liberalizing reforms matters, and that you can blow an otherwise workable scheme by not sequencing properly. Gorbachev loosens restrictions on how state-run enterprises can invest their profits, as well as on capital flows to the West. The result is the selling off of productive assets (looting) before there’s a free internal market or a stable currency to support productive liberalization.

Other notes:
- Multiple plausible economic liberalization plans were put forward (the Petrakov program, Yavlinsky’s “400 Days of Confidence”), but no politician has the stomach for them.
- Additionally, no one in Gorbachev’s generation had any stomach for the use of force — not Gorbachev, not Yeltsin, not the neo-Stalinist coup leaders in the fall of 1991 — even when force would have been in their political interests.
- Gorbachev is a fascinating character: far more beloved in the West than in his home country, a brilliant procedural politician but without the stamina or dedication to see reforms through, a Leninist who wants to bring down state communism. Zubok paints him ultimately as a fool, unable to come to grips with the process he sets in motion.
- The tax on alcohol procured 1/3rd of Soviet GDP (??). Which seems impossible (I should find a cite), but the amount of drinking in this book is remarkable. Yeltsin is incoherently drunk by midday, regularly.
- The US has excellent insight into what’s going on in the USSR, comparatively — HW Bush talks to Gorbachev and Yeltsin regularly, Baker talks to his counterparts, etc. Lots of Western news media in Moscow by ‘91. Yet the collapse is still a surprise to the West right up until it actually happens, and well after it’s understood to be a fait accompli by everyone except Gorbachev. It’s just hard to make predictions (see the latest Statecraft on this).
- Great, canny episode with former President Nixon: he flies to Moscow to meet with both Gorbachev and Yeltsin, but they’re busy. So he has a loud conversation in his hotel lobby about a future meeting with Yeltsin. The KGB overhears, reports it back to Gorbachev, who rushes to meet with Nixon. Nixon’s people then call Yeltsin’s people back and let them know about he'll be meeting with Gorbachev, and Yeltsin’s people rush to schedule their own meeting.
- Even the democratic Russian reformers are desperate to keep Crimea and Ukraine in the national divorce (Solzhenitsyn is the most well-known example of this).

All in all, an excellent read, albeit a tiny bit stiff at times. Five stars. Zubok has a new book out on the history of the Cold War (and an episode with @TheStalwart about it) that I will be checking out next.

Tweeted here: https://x.com/rsanti97/status/1954628...

[Rick Wilson · Rating 4 out of 5]

I don’t fear bad men. Their madness isolates them, marks them as targets for resistance, even removal. I fear the ones who are unshakably convinced they’re doing the right thing. Between Stalin and Gorbachev, the Soviet century gave us two of the most dangerous examples: men who reshaped history with unwavering moral certainty and, in the process, left wreckage in their wake.

Collapse is about the chaos that marked the end of the Soviet Union and the rise of something far messier: the modern Russian Federation. It’s dense, well-researched, and refreshingly uninterested in easy heroes or tidy narratives. If anything, it leans a bit too hard on Gorbachev, as if he alone stood at the controls of a dying empire, but the real strength of the book lies in how it resists mono-causal explanations. The fall wasn’t inevitable. It was accidental, improvisational, and, at times, absurd.

This isn’t a book of clean arcs or moral clarity. It’s a reminder that history is messy, contingent, and full of people who all thought they were doing the right thing.

[stl̓laqsšn̓ · Rating 4 out of 5]

The one thing that holds it back from a five star rating is that the author never gives me any specific examples of how the collapse affects everyday people in the ussr. At the end he gives us some statistics, the most eye popping being that the life expectancy of men in post soviet Russia decline by… 11 YEARS! But presumably, soviet people also kept journals and those should’ve been referenced. Orlando Figes references several different diaries in A People’s Tragedy, which is describing the Bolshevik revolution, in an era before widespread literacy.

[Henry · Rating 4 out of 5]

very good very thorough and often very very sad. the core thesis that the breakup was not inevitable is interesting and deserves wider consideration. i think he can be a touch hard on gorby and a touch light on yelstin - both men fucked up almost constantly. as did the states.

we are living through the consequences of those messes now.

[Tanzil Chowdhury · Rating 4 out of 5]

gorby: let's reform the soviet union!!

*baltic revolutions* aw dang it
*failed economic reform program* aw dang it
*union treaty defied* aw dang it
*august 1991 coup* aw dang it
*soviet union collapses* aw dang it

[Aaron Watling · Rating 5 out of 5]

(WIP)

Absolutely mindboggling in it’s scope and depth, with a near day by day account, Zubok has carried out a gargantuan task and it has paid off in dividends.

This book feels like watching car crashes over and over again in slow motion. Gorbachev could never quite do the right thing. Seemingly this was never due to a lack of power or resources, but by continually making the wrong decision. Mikhail Sergeyevich was adamant in letting his personal approach to politics play out, and fail, repeatedly. Twas hubris that killed the Union.

Over the course of reading Collapse, I’ve begun to think about what perhaps could’ve happened had Andropov, the conservative reformer, lived another 5 years. And then in turn, why a party leader with such politics was so old. We could’ve been looking at a different world map today.

I won’t shut up about this book and once you’ve read it nor will you.

[Tanner Nelson · Rating 4 out of 5]

"Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet Union" is excellent. Just like Russia between 1919 and 1991, it centers around a single idea. Unlike the Soviet Union, however, it works. Mr. Vladislav Zubok bookends this history with an idea that is both a plea and a challenge: do not assume the history of Russia is prewritten. The Soviet Union was not destined to fall; Putin was not destined to reign.

I have wanted to read a modern history of the fall of the Soviet Union for years. To my chagrin, most histories long ago went out of print. I was overjoyed to find "Collapse" in audio format this summer because not only was it available, but it was new and written by a Russian! With almost 30 years between its writing and the USSR's disintegration, "Collapse" offers a very fair-handed account of the power struggles and grand ideas that deposited the Soviet Union in an ignominious grave.

When I started this book, Gorbachev was still alive. He passed away due to old age about halfway through my read. I found that Mr. Zubok was kinder to Gorbachev than I originally anticipated. The former Soviet chairman's actions are tinged with a strange patronizing empathy. It is especially noticeable once Boris Yeltsin enters the picture; the most common adjectives used to describe Mr. Yeltsin have got to be--understandably--"boorish," "brute," and "vanya" (something like "village idiot").

The beginning of "Collapse" struggles a bit. It's slow, to be honest. But after Chornobyl, things begin to escalate beyond Gorbachev's control and Russia almost careens headlong into independence. The later chapters were fascinating to me. It was interesting to watch Gorbachev and Bush's relationship mature. Toward the end, Mr. Zubok compares Bush to an air traffic controller guiding Gorbachev's descending authoritarian aircraft onto the runway of liberalism. It's an apt comparison.

"Collapse" probably isn't for everyone. It is filled with minutia and detail that only political scientists, economists, and historians (either armchair or legitimate) will find engaging. Fortunately for me, the boot fits. Perhaps there is a larger audience given the prescient timing of the book's publication. One of the most fascinating insights toward the end of the book was about Ukraine's importance to Russia. "Collapse" was published before Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February, but it sheds important light on the war and why Putin and his cadre of oligarchs seem hellbent on dragging Ukraine back into the fold. If that is interesting to you, you probably ought to give "Collapse" a read.

[Grant Erickson · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very great read that really digs in to the final year of the Soviet Union, and how, up until the metaphorical beast (i.e. dissolution) was at the gate, it was not inevitable that the country was at an end, no matter what Western scholarship insisted over the past 30 years. The USSR was not destined for "the dust heap of history", but merely a victim of sloppy reforms and dramatically released tensions.

It really lays into Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, blasting him for hedging his bets too often, and ignoring realities on the street, such as nationalistic tendencies within the Baltics, the Caucasus, and Ukraine. While the author doesn't assign complete blame onto Gorbachev for the fall of the Union, it is unsparing in its assessment of his legacy. Reform was necessary, but the way Gorbachev went about it was both overly timid and radical. Gorbachev wasn't fully responsible for the fall, but without his involvement, the fall might not have even happened.

I highly recommend this book if you're into Soviet/Russian history.

[Roger A · Rating 4 out of 5]

One of the best books I have read on the subject

The collapse of the USSR and the current dynamics of Russia is central to my research agenda, so I read a lot of books on the subject. This is one of the best, with a very perceptive and nuanced treatment.
It reminds us that individual leaders can be central when fork in the road type decisions are made. Gorbachev was not up to the job, while Deng was. The latter knew when to consolidate rather than rushing further, and that such large social reconfigurations require a strong state, not a weakened one.
Putin reestablished stability but he cannot undo the damage of the 1990s, so Russia is now the junior partner to China.

[Maya Hartman · Rating 5 out of 5]

“History has never been a morality play about the inevitable victory of freedom and democracy. Instead, the world remains what it always was: an arena of struggle between idealism and power, good governance and corruption, the surge of freedom and the need to curb it in times of crisis and emergency.”

[Michael · Rating 5 out of 5]

Pretty immaculately laid out history of the fall of the Soviet Union; coming to it from not knowing it a ton about the fall, found it compelling to read through and didn’t present at least too skewed or slanted a viewpoint in one direction or another (although I suspect the USA is painted a tad too innocently in the way they influenced things here).

The man at the heart is Mikhail Gorbachev, who this book gently lays out as a man who really wants to be smart but is actually quite dumb. The project of resurrecting the Soviet economy, of keeping the disparate collection of states together, of opening the Union up and not maintaining the iron fist of the past, was certainly not one that was easy, but at every turn Gorbachev seems to take the step most likely to accelerate the Union’s (and his own) downfall. From banning liquor sales and in so doing tanking the nation’s tax base, to giving the states power that encourages separatist movements and that they use to make operating the Union basically impossible, to making concessions to the West on foreign policy without extracting anything but a set of empty promises, his every move is one in the wrong direction. Reading Lenin will only get you so far if the reader is a dummy, it turns out. The “comedy” of this book is often in Gorbachev’s arrogance, his disbelief that he could be wrong or bamboozled in any way; I don’t have the book anymore (shoutout San Diego Public Library), but perhaps my favorite moment is when Gorbachev gives a quote along the lines of “Gorbachev’s final act has not yet arrived” right before he is unseated permanently and banished to the dust bin of history.

If there’s a perfect foil to Gorbachev, it is Boris Yeltsin, the alcoholic nationalist (who just really wants American love) with no real plans other than unseating the Union and a Russian state all of its own. He is able to grandstand his way to the top because of the weakness of conviction of the existing state, both in ideas (the constant waffling economy, the unclear vision for a federalist or confederacy of states) and in willingness to wield power (the coup that unseats Gorbachev originally allowing him to grand stand in the capital and earn popular support shows the fear to wield force in any way that permeated the state at the time due to the horrors of Stalinism and the 60s).

He hints at an interesting alternate history of the 1990s/21st century; one where Russia takes over China’s place as a manufacturer of consumer goods for the West- this is, of course, where the two countries diverge, Russia going with the Chilean/University of Chicago method of “shocking” the economy by jumping straight to the free market, China doing an easing that protected both its citizens and the production of the country. When the USA went looking, Russia was too much in disarray, its economy in shambles, unable to produce even if asked; meanwhile, China was ready, and in doing so became a world superpower. If the Union had stayed together, it’s hard to say what would have happened; but this book at least points to what led to its collapse, and what current conflicts stemmed from this moment (crazy to see every single origin of the Russian-Ukrainian war coming from agreements made at the collapse, mostly because Yeltsin was just in a hurry to seize power and take over the Union), as well as what disasters were averted in the process (nukes running amok). The USSR’s eagerness to join wit the West is another fascinating divergence in history, one that can only lead to speculation and alternate histories, one of countless ones this book lays out.

[Jerome Kuseh · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is a narrative history of the final years of the Soviet Union and the role that Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms played in the collapse of the union. Upon becoming General Secretary of the Communist Party in 1985, Gorbachev sought to bring radical reforms to save the Soviet economy which was reeling from low global oil prices. His two key reforms were glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring). Glasnost meant allowing press freedom and the freeing of dissidents and critics from detention. He believed this would drive popular suppport for perestroika which involved the democratisation of the communist party and providing limited market freedoms to state-owned entreprises (SOEs).

Gorbachev was an ardent reader of Lenin and saw himself as a reformer who could create a new system out of the old. However, his reforms had the opposite impact. He imposed restrictions on alcohol production and sales which resulted in a significant drop off in tax receipts. Perestroika led to nationalist candidates winning elections and glasnost amplified nationalist sentiment. Meanwhile the partial liberalization of SOEs allowed for private profiteering without the production of the consumer goods that Soviet citizens sorely needed. Adding to these complications was the Chernobyl disaster which drained the national budget.

Vladislav Zubok's main argument is that the fatalistic belief that authoritarian communism was destined to fall to liberal democracy is flawed, and that until the very end, the USSR possessed institutions that could have steered the Union through its various crises. Thus despite all the self-inflicted injuries Gorbachev had wrought, a decisive leader would have been able to save the union.

This leads us to examine Gorbachev's political views and leadership style. He had a disdain for the use of violence and so he largely watched on as Armenia and Azerbaijan struggled violently over Nagorno-Karabakh. He believed in bringing the USSR to the US-led "civilised world" through reforming the empire into a modern socialist democracy. He was skeptical of Deng Xiaoping's economic liberalization without the reform of the CCP. In fact, when the Tiananmen Square revolt and violent suppression happened Gorbachev was on a state visit to China. He considered that tragedy as a justification of his decision to reform both party and economy. His desire for Western approval and financial support led him to be much more decisive in taking foreign policy decisions such as ceding East Germany and allowing it into Nato, reducing Soviet armaments, and backing the US against Iraq (a Soviet ally) in the Gulf War.

Through George Bush Sr's eyes we can see the skepticism of the West in the reforms that Gorbachev was implementing. Bush's senior advisors kept expecting a backlash from the KGB and Soviet army. And despite his personal friendship with Gorbachev, he opposed large-scale financial support to the USSR believing that the large nuclear empire could never be contained within the Western liberal orbit. Instead driven by internal US politics, he supported the independence of the Baltic republics and eventually Ukraine.

Boris Yeltsin is another prominent character in Zubok's history. The future Russian president pounced on the reforms to ride a wave of Russian nationalism to the dissolution of the union. Despite a referendum in 1991 showing that 78% of voters wanted the preservation of the union, people were disappointed by the fecklessness of Gorbachev's centre and backed Yeltsin and other separatists who promised a thriving, liberal democratic, capitalist future free of the shackles of the union.

Although he never explicitly says it, one can surmise that Zubok considers the collapse of the Soviet Union as a disaster. Living conditions fell precipitiously after the collapse and nationalism was sparked across the nations of the former union leading to conflicts such as the Russian-Chechen wars, Russian-Georgian war, Armenia-Azarbaijan war, and most tragically, the Russian-Ukraine War.

Defenders of Gorbachev would take issue with Zubok's analysis and make the case that the collapse of the union was inevitable. They would also argue that Gorbachev ended the cold war and prevented a nuclear apocalypse. It is undeniable however that Gorbachev destroyed the very institutions that would have allowed him to implement the reforms he sorely sought to implement. By empowering nationalist leaders within the USSR's nations and watering down the Communist Party's control over the country, he was left as a hopeless bystander as Yeltsin (Russia), Kravchuk (Ukraine), and Shushkevich (Belarus) dissolved the Union with the Belovezha Accords. A good example of just how powerless Gorbachev had made himself by late 1991 was that the nuclear controls had been transferred to Yeltsin weeks before Gorbachev officially handed them over.

This book is an important history from an important writer - someone who clearly has an attachment to the old union and yet could understand its flaws. Someone who saw the promise of freedom and democracy crumble into more authoritarianism, economic collapse, and violent nationalism. I am sure people more educated on this subject would have better critiques but for me this is a 5-star book.

[Olan McEvoy · Rating 5 out of 5]

Vladislav Zubok's Collapse is a magisterial work of history on the final years of the Soviet Union, from Gorbachev's assumption of the role of General Secretary in 1985 until the union's dissolution in December 1991. Despite being over 400 pages long and quite dense at points, I was hooked from the first pages, particularly after Zubok's more personal introduction which frames the rest of the book.

Zubok actually first set out to write about Gorbachev's Perestroika in 1990 on a fellowship in the United States, not knowing that the country which he left would not exist by the time he returned. 30 years later, he managed to provide a remarkable synthesis of the archival material to bring the story of what actually happened to life.

There's a lot that could be said about this book, but I think there are a couple of main points which Zubok makes which will be most interesting to readers:

1. The common story in the West about how the USSR collapsed is quite mistaken or naive, often clouded by the general admiration for Gorbachev and a misunderstanding of how the Soviet system worked. It focuses too much on ideology and not enough on the mechanics of the system. Particularly, it overstates the inevitability of the eventual collapse and pays little attention to critical junctures and missed opportunities.

2. Gorbachev's reform program was hampered by his lack of understanding of the Soviet economy and his desire to put political reform ahead of economic reform, meaning that he lacked the authority to make hard decisions about the transition to the market. Perestroika and glasnost revolutionised the Soviet system, but did not provide the adjustments needed to make it work.

3. Rather than being the victim of the collapse, Russian politicians were in fact the driving power behind the breakup of the union, in spite of Yeltsin's maneuvering between the 'centre' and the republics. Their ambition to build a 'Great Russia' from the ashes preludes a lot of what is happening today.

4. Separatism in many regions of the union, particularly Ukraine and Kazakhstan, was mostly a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet system, rather than its cause (the Baltics are another story, however). These movements often found support among Russian democrats and nationalists, rather than opposition.

5. The Bush administration and U.S. government were key in holding Soviet institutions and Gorbachev in place until 1991, rather than being the architect of the downfall. Their recognition of separatism and independence usually came after it had become a foregone conclusion, in spite of domestic pressure to support the breakup of the union.

These are just some points which I found most interesting, although you could make several different lists about the themes of the book. This is a brilliant work on the politics of reform and change in general, and is also illuminative in light of the narrative put forward by Vladimir Putin about how the collapse of the Soviet Union was a 'betrayal' and a 'geopolitical disaster'. In understanding what actually happened, a key source of 21st century Russian nationalism and expansionism becomes clearer and Putin's story becomes even more ludicrous (no surprises there).

I'd highly recommend this to anybody interested in the history of the 20th century, the Cold War and the politics of the post-soviet space.

[Frank · Rating 4 out of 5]

I've been curious about Russia since my early teens, and current events gives impetus to take a close look at modern developments. There are many excellent books about Russia by American and European historians, but I thought it was time to get a Russian perspective (albeit, by someone presently at the LSE).

VZs Collapse focusses on a narrow snippet of Russian/Soviet history: the few years leading up to the moment when the USSR went out of existence. The story filled in some gaps, confirming some suspicions, moderated some generally accepted notions of what happened, and contained some surprises.

The first surprise was the amount of detail publicly available. I'd seen this before with S Kotkin. Events are recorded meticulously. Often, multiple accounts are provided, showing the different interpretations each participant gave to them.

Another surprise was the extent to which practically all the Soviet participants eagerly threw themselves into the hands of the Americans.

It's an odd relationship between the Americans and the Soviets. Each goes to great lengths to threaten the other with the most horrible fate. But as soon as the Soviets/Russians get themselves into some difficulty - which happens at intervals of about 50 years - they come running to the Americans for help. And what do the Americans do? They drop everything to respond. A strange rivalry. Americans and Russians stood side by side through great crises. But there are hardly any instances of Americans or Russians directly causing each other fatalities.

The US president, George Bush, was an essential off stage actor throughout the unwinding of the USSR. The participants turned to him for financial support, intellectual guidance (how to set up a capitalist economy and banking system, how to govern a democracy) and - most of all - for moral support. Gorbatschow would turn to Bush for encouragement when he ran into a setback. Yeltsin would call for advice on how to overcome resistance to his programmes. Whenever any Soviet leader experienced a success, he would rush to call President Bush. At times, the president comes across as the father of a group of squabbling children competing to win his approval. All while the USA and USSR were threatening each other with instant annihilation.

I have always admired Bush (pere) and this account strengthened that conviction. The president did a terrific job of guiding without interfering. The situation presented opportunities, but also a great many dangers, to the USA, to the USSR states and to the world. There were enormous numbers of nuclear weapons, the control of which came into question. The breakup of the USSR raised perplexing questions about borders, and the distribution of assets and liabilities. Strongly nationalistic tendencies emerged with populist leaders agitating for settling scores. Minority populations in newly formed nations suddenly fell under threat.

Some of the new leaders showed an astonishing level of naivety about basic economics and foreign policy. President Bush, from the sidelines, raised the right issues to the right people at the right moment, almost always steering matters in a safe direction. The seeds of today's conflict between Ukraine and Russia are clearly visible and would have been much worse and ignited much sooner, without Bush's guidance.

The US president was often surprised by the extent of his influence. There were moments where he prepared to cautiously approach a Soviet leader with a request, only to be pre-empted by that leader anticipating his intention, spontaneously offering a larger concession.

Different views were held by Bush's advisors, with Secretary of Defence Cheney consistently argued that for crippling the USSR - advice which the president didn't follow. It was interesting to see how much Bush's decision were made on the basis of the personal affection he felt for individual leaders.

In the context of the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, Jeffery Sachs makes the point that Gorbachow was given assurances that NATO would not move one inch to the east. This assurance was given as a condition for USSR agreeing to German reunification. As we know, NATO has expanded many times eastward and the threat of inclusion of Ukraine is often cited as the percipitant cause of the war.

In my opinion, Sachs is right about the cause of the war. The claim that Putin is intent is to reestablish the Soviet Union overlooks a lot of evidence. VZ throws an interesting light on the matter. First by reiterating assurance to Gorbatschow about NATO enlargement, but also adding that on two occasions Gorbatschow suggested (once directly, once through Foreign Minister Pankin) that central European countries should be able to decide for themselves whichever alliance structure they wish to belong to. Gorbatschow expressed this view spontaneously, that is to say, not in response to any prompting or pressure from third parties.

VZ also indirectly addressed Sachs' complaint that western nations failed to provide anything like the same level of financial support new nations of the USSR that were offered to Poland and other CEE countries. VZ pointed out that the Russian request lacked a coherent implementation plan. Similarly, an early Russian interest for inclusion into NATO was met with skepticism, largely because Russia was regarded as too large and too complex to be accommodated.

______________________

After some reflection I realise that I made this book sound as if it was about George Bush. That is mistaken. Bush is a supporting character in this story, just as he was in real life. VZ's real protagonist is Mikhail Gorbachov. But who was he? First, let me say who he was not. MG was not a politician, and certainly not a politician of the Soviet imprimatur. MG was an intellectual, more interested in ideas than he was in leading. As General Secretary, MG was outfitted with unlimited power, but it was deeply against his conviction to use it. Most of all, he hated the idea of using violence in pursuit of political ends.

MG tended to dither, especially at moments when rapid action was needed. Deep down, the man I am describing was a university professor.

MG could be very stubborn. He persisted with his intention to turn the USSR into a democratic socialist country long after it was clear that this wasn't ever going to happen. MG could also be cagey and resourceful. He had enormous resilience and self confidence, and this allowed him to bounce back from defeat after defeat, but without ever getting close to achieving his end.

[Leif · Rating 4 out of 5]

Lurking on my "to read" pile forever has been Collapse: beyond the personality driven stories of the end of the USSR, what about the economic and administrative reasons that contributed to the great shattering? Zubok delivers, and merges them together with the great host of Soviet politicians whose competitions for personal and political power brought all to such a shuddering halt.

It's long and does get a bit tedious at times, but overall this was a fantastic read, especially for the economic policy woven into the main argument.

[Peyton · Rating 4 out of 5]

"It was the weakness of the Kremlin leadership, however, not the strength of the 'Russian opposition,' that remained the principal factor in the systemic crisis that pulled the country apart. In March 1991, about 20 percent of people in the core republics of the Union thought that it would be better to live in separate republics rather than in a common state. This minority became the majority by August, most apparently in Ukraine, but also in the Russian Federation. Overwhelmingly, this was not the result of a sudden national awakening. Rather, it was a choice in favor of law and order, a distancing from the grotesque ineptness of the central authorities and the vacuum of central power. As one young scholar put it, after August 1991, 'hierarchical breakdown was not a consequence of some broader ‘collapse’ of the Soviet system but rather constituted the systemic collapse itself.'"

Okay but fr why did gorbachev do (or not do) all that?? Was he stupid???

[cunningrocks · Rating 4 out of 5]

An incredibly detailed, blow by blow political history from the perspective of the politburo.

Imo it needs more political economy, it doesn't really explain a) the crises initially faced by Gorby/Andropov and b) how the reforms resulted in the development of the Russian oligarchy, but perhaps these are beyond the scope of project. In general more details on the economic reforms and their impact on everyday life are needed.

Excellent read if you're looking for an elite-centered analytic of the fall of the USSR. Leaves you feeling pissed off.

[Spencer Wright · Rating 4 out of 5]

I really enjoyed this book. The author is a Russian, and it felt much more nuanced and open minded than a lot of the gung-ho American books on this topic that I've read.

[Markus · Rating 4 out of 5]

Thanks mr Zubok I hate Gorbatschow now

[Jonathon McKenney · Rating 4 out of 5]

The fourth star may be a Stockholm syndrome but a slog slog at times. Incredibly detailed. I loved the coup chapters, and the back half of the book really accelerated. Zubok did not love Gorbachev (and really seemed to hate Raisa) but his does a nice job of showing how the man bungled most opportunities. The tragedy was acknowledged only at the end.