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154 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1757
I am rather inclined to imagine, that pain and pleasure in their most simple and natural manner of affecting, are each of a positive nature, and by no means necessarily dependent on each other for their existence. The human mind is often, and I think it is for the most part, in a state of neither pain or pleasure, which I call a state of indifference. (Part I, Sect. II)And after this, which is a point I would be in fact inclined to agree with, Burke expands outwards from the individual towards the Society, during which he outlines this idea of Sympathy with others, followed by Imitation of others (his clear influence from Locke's view of human understanding is evident), and then the necessity of Ambition,
if men gave themselves up to imitation entirely, and each followed each other, and so on in an eternal circle, it is easy to say that there never could be any improvement amongst them. (Part I, Sect. XVII)(Though he draws here a claim that makes sense, and which makes a distinction between the collective and the individual role, he also just sort of claims kind of haphazardly that "God has planted in man a sense of ambition")
The person who grieves, suffers his passion to grow upon him; he indulges it, he loves it [...] That grief should be willingly endured, though far from a simply pleasing sensation, is not so difficult to be understood. It is the nature of grief to keep its object perpetually in its eye, to present it in its most pleasurable views, to repeat all the circumstances that attend it, even to the last minuteness; to go back to every particular enjoyment, to dwell upon each, and to find a thousand new perfections in all, that were not sufficiently understood before; in grief, the pleasure is still the uppermost. (Part I, Sect. V)This is an interesting observation: the contents of grief that it its essential character is in fact not one of pain, at least not as defined here, but rather of pleasure; we know that for Burke the privation of pleasure is not equal to pain, and grief arises when the object of pleasure is lost without chance of return - still, the primary contents is the pleasure aspect.
First, to be comparatively small. Secondly, to be smooth. Thirdly, to have a variety in the direction of parts; but fourthly, to have those parts not angular, but melted as it were into each other. Fifthly, to be of a delicate frame, without any remarkable appearance of strength. Sixthly, to have its colours clear and bright; but not very strong and glaring. Seventhly, or if it should have any glaring colour, to have it diversified with others. (Part III, Sect. XVIII)Burke claims that fitness is not the cause of beauty, or that the utility of one's components is not denoting beauty - he then gives the examples of pigs and pelicans and monkeys, which are efficient in their composition, but do not evoke that sense of beauty. Yet is this not such a distinctly arbitrary category, then? If we reduce beauty away from these methods of verification, then surely it is just purely determined by a 'feeling' - such a subjective nature being purely anecdotal, then. What excludes a pig or a monkey from being beautiful? Just a 'feeling'? As we know from the Introduction: On Taste, Burke wishes to arrive at some objective notion of such a category: yet he presupposes that these animals are not seen by the reader as beautiful, which only arises from a subjective viewpoint; yet he still wants to categorise them precisely outside the realm of beauty with these 'objective' principles, which he has arrived at by observing them in those things which he already presupposes to not be beautiful! Where do we start from? Are we trapped in a tautology?
A quality so essential to beauty, that I do not now recollect anything beautiful that is not smooth. (Part III, Sect. XIV)This is kind of an absurd supposition; what is smooth? Take, for example, a furry creature, like a cat, or even one that is prickly, like a hedgehog: is the fur, or the spikes, being not flatly smooth, denoting an object without beauty? Yet we generally do not regard cats or hedgehogs as not beautiful, and most in fact regard them as beautiful and pleasing. Should we then subsume those features under the idea of 'smoothness' because of its softness to touch, in the case of fur, or the slickness of a hedgehog's spikes? In this case, we are simply creating our own definition to define a property of objects: in essence, 'beautiful objects are smooth; what is smooth?; smooth is an property beautiful objects have; why is smooth such a property that its presence in objects denotes beauty?; because objects of beauty are smooth.' Once again, Burke's treatment of beauty can almost be viewed tautologically, it appears.
On closing this general view of beauty, it naturally occurs that, that we should compare it with the sublime; and in this comparison there appears a remarkable contrast. (Part III, Sect. XXVII)What luck! I am almost convinced that Burke is being deliberately dishonest here - it feels as though, with the aforementioned contentions, Burke sees the category of the sublime, and he wished to place the beautiful as this neat category in contrast with it; and so we see this arbitrariness masked as categorical dissection through enquiry.
There are two sorts of societies. The first is, the society of sex. The passion belonging to this is called love, and it contains a mixture of lust; its object is the beauty of women. (Part I, Sect. XVIII)This passage seems to betray a certain archaic nature of Burke's writing: women are immediately presumed to be the object of desire, and they are treated fundamentally as that object, for the consumption of the subject - they are presupposed, at least in this regard, as secondary to men, and no recognition is awarded to their individual subjectivity. In speaking on aesthetic questions, particularly ones so purely human, one would be remiss to discount the participation and understanding of a large percentage of our population.