Constructing Cassandra: Reframing Intelligence Failure at the CIA, 1947–2001

by Milo Jones, Philippe Silberzahn

When it was created in 1947, the CIA had a clear remit to prevent strategic surprises. On key occasions, it has failed spectacularly. How is this possible? Although there has been no shortage of studies exploring how intelligence failures can happen, none of them have been able to provide a unified understanding of the phenomenon. Constructing Cassandra analyzes four key strategic surprises experienced by the  the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Iranian revolution of 1978, the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The book traces the ultimate origin of these seemingly diverse surprises to the enduring collective identity and culture of the Agency itself.

389 pages, Kindle Edition

First published August 21, 2013

Reviews

[Michal · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very interesting and useful book for practitioners of strategic warning, but provides valuable lessons and ideas for any organization or team which works in the forecasting domain, trying to anticipate future events. We can all learn from CIA mistakes described in the book because the authors did a great work of diagnosing the cultural and organizational causes of these warning failures.