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The Return of History and the End of Dreams
Hopes for a new peaceful international order after the end of the Cold War have been dashed by sobering Great powers are once again competing for honor and influence. Nation-states remain as strong as ever, as do the old, explosive forces of ambitious nationalism. The world remains “unipolar,” but international competition among the United States, Russia, China, Europe, Japan, India, and Iran raise new threats of regional conflict. Communism is dead, but a new contest between western liberalism and the great eastern autocracies of Russia and China has reinjected ideology into geopolitics. Finally, radical Islamists are waging a violent struggle against the modern secular cultures and powers that, in their view, have dominated, penetrated, and polluted their Islamic world. The grand expectation that after the Cold War the world would enter an era of international geopolitical convergence has proven wrong.
For the past few years, the liberal world has been internally divided and distracted by issues both profound and petty. Now, in The Return of History and the End of Dreams , Robert Kagan masterfully poses the most important questions facing the liberal democratic countries, challenging them to choose whether they want to shape history or let others shape it for them.
For the past few years, the liberal world has been internally divided and distracted by issues both profound and petty. Now, in The Return of History and the End of Dreams , Robert Kagan masterfully poses the most important questions facing the liberal democratic countries, challenging them to choose whether they want to shape history or let others shape it for them.
128 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2008
28 people are currently reading
726 people want to read
About the author
Robert Kagan
26 books237 followersRobert Kagan is an American historian and foreign policy commentator. Robert Kagan is the son of Yale classical historian and author, Donald Kagan. He is married to Victoria Nuland, the former U.S. ambassador to NATO, and has two children. He is the brother of political commentator Frederick Kagan.
Kagan is a columnist for the Washington Post and is syndicated by the New York Times Syndicate. He is a contributing editor at both The New Republic and the Weekly Standard, and has also written for the New York Times, Foreign Affairs, the Wall Street Journal, Commentary, World Affairs, and Policy Review.
Kagan is a columnist for the Washington Post and is syndicated by the New York Times Syndicate. He is a contributing editor at both The New Republic and the Weekly Standard, and has also written for the New York Times, Foreign Affairs, the Wall Street Journal, Commentary, World Affairs, and Policy Review.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 96 reviews
April 22, 2009
This interesting, clearly written and terse book explores the direction the major geopolitical powers have taken since the end of the Cold War. Those powers are the US, the EU, China, Russia, Japan, India, and Iran. The geopolitical analysis of these powers comes from a more or less Realist perspective, which is to say, the powers are viewed as individuals pursuing their respective selfish interests.
At the end of the Cold War, the liberal democracies of the West made the naive assumption that the collapse of the Soviet Union would lead to the ideological triumph of liberal democracy worldwide. This was to be the so called "End of History", a period of unprecedented peace and prosperity marking the triumph of liberal democracy over communism. This assumption understimated the nationalist desire within Russia and China over past disgraces, and after a period of fractured democratic experimentation in Russia during the 90's, Putin brought the country back to autocratic rule. China has benefited from opening up economically but never released its political stranglehold.
The resulting geopolitical picture is one of the democratic powers of the EU, US, Japan and India allied against the autocratic powers of Russia, China, and Iran. The anti-modernist sentiment of radical Islamists, Kagan contends, is opposed by all of the above mentioned powers, all of whom embrace modernity. Even within Islamic countries, Kagan says, there isn't nearly enough support for radical Islam to gain a serious foothold.
I wasn't quite sure how to rate this work, since I haven't read a whole lot on international relations, and thus have little to no basis to evaluate the accuracy of much of what is claimed therein. It was, however, an interesting and well written book and has piqued my interest in the subject of geopolitics.
At the end of the Cold War, the liberal democracies of the West made the naive assumption that the collapse of the Soviet Union would lead to the ideological triumph of liberal democracy worldwide. This was to be the so called "End of History", a period of unprecedented peace and prosperity marking the triumph of liberal democracy over communism. This assumption understimated the nationalist desire within Russia and China over past disgraces, and after a period of fractured democratic experimentation in Russia during the 90's, Putin brought the country back to autocratic rule. China has benefited from opening up economically but never released its political stranglehold.
The resulting geopolitical picture is one of the democratic powers of the EU, US, Japan and India allied against the autocratic powers of Russia, China, and Iran. The anti-modernist sentiment of radical Islamists, Kagan contends, is opposed by all of the above mentioned powers, all of whom embrace modernity. Even within Islamic countries, Kagan says, there isn't nearly enough support for radical Islam to gain a serious foothold.
I wasn't quite sure how to rate this work, since I haven't read a whole lot on international relations, and thus have little to no basis to evaluate the accuracy of much of what is claimed therein. It was, however, an interesting and well written book and has piqued my interest in the subject of geopolitics.
March 1, 2018
Old school and laced with American arrogance but still sexy and pleasurable read.
September 22, 2010
There are a great many books on current geopolitics available at this time to the general reader. This is one of the more interesting. Kagan differs from others that I've read. He believes the drift of nations is generally toward liberalism. But in the post-Cold War world the powerful nations are more able to express their individual cultural traditions, religions, and nationalism. Because these nations no longer stand in the hulking shadow of Soviet-American conflict, this has allowed a new era of great power competition to emerge which resembles the rivalries prior to the world wars. The return to history Kagan refers to is this return to great power competition. Presumably the end of dreams is the failure of great power cooperation for peace and security. Maybe the most important word in the book is autocracy. It's those nations who have deep centralization of governmental power (near dictatorships) while practicing capitalism and economic health who've replaced the Cold War communists as the primary rivals of the liberal democracies. It's along the borders of those countries that the fault lines of potential conflict lie. Russia and China are the most important, of course, but the world is full of autocratic nations with whom the liberal governments deal with varying degrees of success or frustration, like Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Eventually, he thinks, this divide between autocracy and democracy will erupt in armed conflict. Kagan, like every other geopolitical pundit, also addresses the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. But he sees it as the last holdout against a tide of modernity and liberalism which will inevitably overwhelm an Islamic world already generally receptive to western ideas and culture. Fundamentalism will fall by the wayside in the rush toward modernism. Another--to me surprising--idea Kagan puts forth is that the general distrust of the American global hegemon was caused not by conservatives who tend to be more isolationist-minded but by liberals who were more aggressive about projecting the liberal democratic agenda worldwide. This is an interesting book. It's tiny but its ideas are big.
January 1, 2013
I'm always depressed to read a book that is all about pointing out the blindingly obvious state of the world, and then it gets called "enlightening". All Mr. Kagan did was summarize what anyone with a basic knowledge of international relations and world history should have been able to figure out from glancing at the news on a semi-regular basis. Aside from this, there is a shocking lack of supporting evidence every time he makes a claim about why a nation-state or ethnic group acts the way it does. Apparently he believes he is an expert on why Arabs and Russians and Chinese think the way they do, so backing up his statements about their history isn't required.
I think he was a bit off in his analysis of why Russia acts the way it does. He makes passing mention to the "democracy" of the 1990s in Russia, but he seems to be conveniently forgetting that the "democracy" he's referring to was a system run by robber-barons who had no qualms with taking all of the country's wealth for themselves.
Finally, Brazil only got a passing mention. That's inexcusable since, even at the time of this being written, it was proving to be an emerging power in the region. But, hey, it's Latin America! It hasn't existed since the U.S. stopped fiddling with the governments in the 1980s, right? Please.
I think he was a bit off in his analysis of why Russia acts the way it does. He makes passing mention to the "democracy" of the 1990s in Russia, but he seems to be conveniently forgetting that the "democracy" he's referring to was a system run by robber-barons who had no qualms with taking all of the country's wealth for themselves.
Finally, Brazil only got a passing mention. That's inexcusable since, even at the time of this being written, it was proving to be an emerging power in the region. But, hey, it's Latin America! It hasn't existed since the U.S. stopped fiddling with the governments in the 1980s, right? Please.
January 4, 2021
Boy it must be nice to pump out long essays and publish them as books. Kagan's Of Paradise and Power was a fascinating exploration of European and American divergence on foreign policy/security thinking. This book was more of just a survey of the geopolitical landscape circa 2008 with a defense of the U.S. led international order. He avoided Iraq (studiously?) and basically argued that the post Cold War hopes of liberal, human rights, and capitalist victory around the world have been banished and that more traditional great power politics have returned. Not particularly insightful or problematic.
February 27, 2011
To understand this book and its context in International Relations theory, you need to be aware of the famous essay (later, book) by Francis Fukuyama http://www.sais-jhu.edu/faculty/fukuyama
entitled "The End of History and the Last Man", written after the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the Soviet Union. Fukuyama argued that, essentially, western liberal democracies and free-market ideologies were triumphant, and that the great ideological struggles in history were at an end.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_End_...
This has proven to not be the case (as Fukuyama himself has since admitted). Kagan's book is a bold (if totally expected) rejoinder to Fukuyama. Since I love academic feuds, I could not resist this book.
(See also Richard Posner versus Stanley Fish versus Ronald Dworkin, the movie "Arguing the World" http://www.pbs.org/arguing/ or more generally the Letters to the Editor of any edition of the New York Review of Books. The Posner v Dworkin v Fish debates were like a intellectual version of a Godzilla movie, and really awakened my slumbering mind as an undergrad English major at MSU. Reading their debates on law and literature was as transformative an experience as reading the essays of Francis Bacon.)
Back to this book, Kagan writes "The great fallacy of our era has been the belief that a liberal international order rests on the triumph of ideas and on the natural unfolding of human progress. It is an immensely attractive notion, deeply rooted in the Enlightenment worldview of which all of us in the liberal world are a product. Our political scientists posit theories of modernization, with sequential stages of political and economic development that lead upward towards liberalism. Our political philosophers imagine a grand historical dialectic, in which the battle of worldviews over the centuries produces, in the end, the correct liberal democratic answer." (p.102)
He responds that "progress" is not inevitable, but contingent on historical events which could have gone either way - battles, social movements, treaties, economic practices, the work of institutions. While all of this is true, Kagan also subscribes to the IR school of "realism" (note, that is just a label chosen by the theorists themselves, it's like calling your political party the "majority" party, and is not indicative of whether their arguments have a strong fidelity to actual reality).
This concise book is pragmatic and a enjoyable response to Fukuyama, nuanced and complex (unlike much political commentary in America these days). It was also refreshing for me to return to the realm of international relations after spending time reading public international law texts (which suffers from insularity and granularity - never dealing with global geopolitics, economics, or any system of thought outside PIL itself). In that sense, the book was a good summary of at least one view, "Realist", of current geopolitics.
However, Kagan, suffering from the cognitive blinders which ideology imparts, writes to persuade using false dichotomies, straw men, and provocative assumptions - all of which amount to, essentially, scaremongering for too much of the book. He also completely neglects to see the effect of soft power (cultural influence, technological influences and innovation, and the benefits and flexibilities of open societies over closed, autocratic ones).
Additionally, any IR theory suffers from being what my friend, an economist Ph.D candidate, calls derisively "Big Think" - in that IR deals with opaque vagaries, little case-by-case explanations using its methodology, and has absolutely no predictive power.
There were a few points of convergence between Kagan and I:
"yet history has not been kind to the theory that strong trade ties prevent conflict between nations. The United States and China are no more dependent on each other's economies today than were Great Britain and Germany's before World War I."
This would be a very provocative statement around the editorial desk of the Economist or Financial Times, and I would LOVE to hear any liberal development economist or macro-economist try to respond to this. They would sputter some vague answer... "To the extend that the data suggests that.... economics has more rigorous methodology... economics has both predictive and explanatory power.... trade ties disincentivize nations from pursing war..."
I remain totally uncertain about this, however, and admit that global events are usually a lot more complex than any one discipline has the power to explain fully. International Relations theory, Economics, International Law, Critical Theory, etc., - these can only contain one facet, always incomplete, of actual reality. The place a lens over reality, highlight some features which conform to their disciple, and diminish the facts which do not fit their discipline, much less their theory.
In this sense, Kagan's book (while worth the $3 I paid for it from the used remainder books pile at Books-A-Million, here in DC), is essentially a intelligent exercise in sophistry, rhetoric masked as science, and easily seen as the thoughts of an individual trapped in his own cognitive framework.
entitled "The End of History and the Last Man", written after the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the Soviet Union. Fukuyama argued that, essentially, western liberal democracies and free-market ideologies were triumphant, and that the great ideological struggles in history were at an end.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_End_...
This has proven to not be the case (as Fukuyama himself has since admitted). Kagan's book is a bold (if totally expected) rejoinder to Fukuyama. Since I love academic feuds, I could not resist this book.
(See also Richard Posner versus Stanley Fish versus Ronald Dworkin, the movie "Arguing the World" http://www.pbs.org/arguing/ or more generally the Letters to the Editor of any edition of the New York Review of Books. The Posner v Dworkin v Fish debates were like a intellectual version of a Godzilla movie, and really awakened my slumbering mind as an undergrad English major at MSU. Reading their debates on law and literature was as transformative an experience as reading the essays of Francis Bacon.)
Back to this book, Kagan writes "The great fallacy of our era has been the belief that a liberal international order rests on the triumph of ideas and on the natural unfolding of human progress. It is an immensely attractive notion, deeply rooted in the Enlightenment worldview of which all of us in the liberal world are a product. Our political scientists posit theories of modernization, with sequential stages of political and economic development that lead upward towards liberalism. Our political philosophers imagine a grand historical dialectic, in which the battle of worldviews over the centuries produces, in the end, the correct liberal democratic answer." (p.102)
He responds that "progress" is not inevitable, but contingent on historical events which could have gone either way - battles, social movements, treaties, economic practices, the work of institutions. While all of this is true, Kagan also subscribes to the IR school of "realism" (note, that is just a label chosen by the theorists themselves, it's like calling your political party the "majority" party, and is not indicative of whether their arguments have a strong fidelity to actual reality).
This concise book is pragmatic and a enjoyable response to Fukuyama, nuanced and complex (unlike much political commentary in America these days). It was also refreshing for me to return to the realm of international relations after spending time reading public international law texts (which suffers from insularity and granularity - never dealing with global geopolitics, economics, or any system of thought outside PIL itself). In that sense, the book was a good summary of at least one view, "Realist", of current geopolitics.
However, Kagan, suffering from the cognitive blinders which ideology imparts, writes to persuade using false dichotomies, straw men, and provocative assumptions - all of which amount to, essentially, scaremongering for too much of the book. He also completely neglects to see the effect of soft power (cultural influence, technological influences and innovation, and the benefits and flexibilities of open societies over closed, autocratic ones).
Additionally, any IR theory suffers from being what my friend, an economist Ph.D candidate, calls derisively "Big Think" - in that IR deals with opaque vagaries, little case-by-case explanations using its methodology, and has absolutely no predictive power.
There were a few points of convergence between Kagan and I:
"yet history has not been kind to the theory that strong trade ties prevent conflict between nations. The United States and China are no more dependent on each other's economies today than were Great Britain and Germany's before World War I."
This would be a very provocative statement around the editorial desk of the Economist or Financial Times, and I would LOVE to hear any liberal development economist or macro-economist try to respond to this. They would sputter some vague answer... "To the extend that the data suggests that.... economics has more rigorous methodology... economics has both predictive and explanatory power.... trade ties disincentivize nations from pursing war..."
I remain totally uncertain about this, however, and admit that global events are usually a lot more complex than any one discipline has the power to explain fully. International Relations theory, Economics, International Law, Critical Theory, etc., - these can only contain one facet, always incomplete, of actual reality. The place a lens over reality, highlight some features which conform to their disciple, and diminish the facts which do not fit their discipline, much less their theory.
In this sense, Kagan's book (while worth the $3 I paid for it from the used remainder books pile at Books-A-Million, here in DC), is essentially a intelligent exercise in sophistry, rhetoric masked as science, and easily seen as the thoughts of an individual trapped in his own cognitive framework.
June 18, 2024
Would have been a good read in 2008
July 14, 2025
Concise and brilliant - enhances historical understanding.
February 18, 2011
Compared to Of Paradise and Power, this one takes a more global view, although the American slant is obvious (and South-America, Canada, and most of Africa are barely mentioned). The author Robert Kagan still sees the world as a kettle that might boil over, and his answer is military power, the fear it causes as a threat and the results it brings if used against others. He seems to be amazingly unable to understand that not everyone wants to live the same kind of lives, that there are several sets of value systems and that that's okay.
"It is logical, too, that a world of liberal democratic states would gradually produce an international order that reflected those liberal and democratic qualities. This has been the Enlightenment dream since the eighteenth century, when Kant imagined a "Perpetual Peace" consisting of liberal republics and built upon the natural desire of all peoples for peace and material comfort." Pp.103
First of all, not everyone desires peace, nor material comfort. Are these people wrong? Are they not allowed to disagree? Who decides that? Secondly, how is diplomacy or any kind of (equal) discourse supposed to be possible, when (at least) one party considers their point of view inevitably evolved and others as something less developed?
"Of the many bad options in dealing with this immensely dangerous problem (radical Islamism), the best may be to hasten the process – more modernization, more globalization, faster. This would require greater efforts to support and expand capitalism and the free market in Arab countries, as many have already recommended, as well as efforts to increase public access to the world through television and the Internet." Pp. 101
So, to hell with other cultures, they are inferior to the American anyway? And these "solutions" would benefit American businesses, no-one else really. The reality of this passage would be Targets and Wallmarts all over the Middle East instead of locally owned small businesses, and without any kind of workers rights (they don't have those in America so why elsewhere?) By television here, Kagan means American television, not Mexican telenovelas, Bollywood-movies or Al Jazeera news.
"Finally, the democratic world should continue to promote political liberalization; support human rights, including the empowerment of women; and use it's influence to support a free press and repeated elections that will, if nothing else, continually shift power from the few to the many." Pp. 101-102
Yes, it's a beautiful idea. The problem is who gets to define the acceptable levels of these ideals.
This book was published in 2008 and oh, what a difference a few years make. Seriously. Human rights? As I write this thousands of Americans are protesting anti-union bills in Wisconsin; in Missouri, State Senator Jane Cunningham want's to put children under 14 to work, during school weeks without work permits (or union protection obviously); sick people are denied health care because of money all over United States. Empowering women? Still no Equal Pay Act; move to restrict abortion rights at the expense of woman's life... sounds good. Free press? Wikileaks, anyone? Also consolidation of media to fewer owners means fewer news make it to the broadcast, when everyone has the same stories. Free elections? Well, Citizens United took care of that one.
All in all, if the system of the USA is the best we can come up with, we're in trouble. Maybe it would not be a bad idea to benchmark other systems once in a while.
"It is logical, too, that a world of liberal democratic states would gradually produce an international order that reflected those liberal and democratic qualities. This has been the Enlightenment dream since the eighteenth century, when Kant imagined a "Perpetual Peace" consisting of liberal republics and built upon the natural desire of all peoples for peace and material comfort." Pp.103
First of all, not everyone desires peace, nor material comfort. Are these people wrong? Are they not allowed to disagree? Who decides that? Secondly, how is diplomacy or any kind of (equal) discourse supposed to be possible, when (at least) one party considers their point of view inevitably evolved and others as something less developed?
"Of the many bad options in dealing with this immensely dangerous problem (radical Islamism), the best may be to hasten the process – more modernization, more globalization, faster. This would require greater efforts to support and expand capitalism and the free market in Arab countries, as many have already recommended, as well as efforts to increase public access to the world through television and the Internet." Pp. 101
So, to hell with other cultures, they are inferior to the American anyway? And these "solutions" would benefit American businesses, no-one else really. The reality of this passage would be Targets and Wallmarts all over the Middle East instead of locally owned small businesses, and without any kind of workers rights (they don't have those in America so why elsewhere?) By television here, Kagan means American television, not Mexican telenovelas, Bollywood-movies or Al Jazeera news.
"Finally, the democratic world should continue to promote political liberalization; support human rights, including the empowerment of women; and use it's influence to support a free press and repeated elections that will, if nothing else, continually shift power from the few to the many." Pp. 101-102
Yes, it's a beautiful idea. The problem is who gets to define the acceptable levels of these ideals.
This book was published in 2008 and oh, what a difference a few years make. Seriously. Human rights? As I write this thousands of Americans are protesting anti-union bills in Wisconsin; in Missouri, State Senator Jane Cunningham want's to put children under 14 to work, during school weeks without work permits (or union protection obviously); sick people are denied health care because of money all over United States. Empowering women? Still no Equal Pay Act; move to restrict abortion rights at the expense of woman's life... sounds good. Free press? Wikileaks, anyone? Also consolidation of media to fewer owners means fewer news make it to the broadcast, when everyone has the same stories. Free elections? Well, Citizens United took care of that one.
All in all, if the system of the USA is the best we can come up with, we're in trouble. Maybe it would not be a bad idea to benchmark other systems once in a while.
March 19, 2015
A quick and informative read that deepened my understanding of international politics. A great primer, but one that should be read with healthy skepticism since (A) the author served in Reagan's State Department, (B) the author makes important judgments about the motives and world views of foreign nations, but from a Western vantage point, and (C) it was published in 2008 (pre-financial collapse) and is somewhat outdated given today's rapidly changing global landscape.
Some reviewers classified the book as "neoconservative," but I disagree. Kagan clearly supports America's role as a global military super-power and is quick to proclaim that the rest of the democratic world does as well, despite the moral misgivings it might stir in them. Nonetheless, where he succeeds and sets himself apart from most conservative analysts is in the way he frames his arguments. Rather than labeling autocracies like China, Russia, and Iran as inherently evil or inferior (as many American writers and politicians do), he presents their government systems as structural and ideological alternatives to liberal democracy. This doesn't mean that they are equally effective or ethical, but it does help the reader understand the logic and rationale that each side uses to justify its methods and power.
In sum, I highly recommend this book to anyone who wants a better understanding of how the Western world--and especially America--conceptualizes global politics and international relations.
Some reviewers classified the book as "neoconservative," but I disagree. Kagan clearly supports America's role as a global military super-power and is quick to proclaim that the rest of the democratic world does as well, despite the moral misgivings it might stir in them. Nonetheless, where he succeeds and sets himself apart from most conservative analysts is in the way he frames his arguments. Rather than labeling autocracies like China, Russia, and Iran as inherently evil or inferior (as many American writers and politicians do), he presents their government systems as structural and ideological alternatives to liberal democracy. This doesn't mean that they are equally effective or ethical, but it does help the reader understand the logic and rationale that each side uses to justify its methods and power.
In sum, I highly recommend this book to anyone who wants a better understanding of how the Western world--and especially America--conceptualizes global politics and international relations.
November 29, 2013
Let me start with I do not agree with this authors opinon on foreign policy. I do not think that the author is naive or stupid. He is clearly a smart man and knows how to write. This book/essay is well written. I side with a non-interventionlist foreign policy. I do not think that we should get involved in civil wars or regime changes. I disagree with the author when he gives a mere three sentences to free trade and says that it will not work because governments act like humans and free trade does not work with humans(wag of my finger). Needless to say it was a hard read for someone who does not agree. It took me almost 3 months to trudge through his mere 105 pages.
I will say this though and this will explain my 3 stars. The author was informative. I still hold my views of foreign policy, but I feel that I am more informed of the neo-cons views of why we have to be in continual war and their fears of us bringing our troops home. I understand the complexity of the middle east and our geo-polictal relations with China and Russia. So the author has my respect for writing clearly his opinion and supporting it with facts (Tip of my hat).
I will say this though and this will explain my 3 stars. The author was informative. I still hold my views of foreign policy, but I feel that I am more informed of the neo-cons views of why we have to be in continual war and their fears of us bringing our troops home. I understand the complexity of the middle east and our geo-polictal relations with China and Russia. So the author has my respect for writing clearly his opinion and supporting it with facts (Tip of my hat).
July 25, 2009
The Return of History, and the End of Dreams is a short (105 pages), troubling book on the state of the world, its great powers, and what the future could hold. Kagan is one of the neocons, and seems quite at home w/ the Big Picture, which sees a world roughly aligned between the democracies (the United States, Europe, Japan, India (the new player), and the autocracies (Russia, China, Iran, and a grab bag of rogue states). Kagan sees the world entering a dangerous era that resembles the 19th Century Great Game, rather than some sort 21st “end of history” phase where lions will lay down with sheep to talk about all the values that they share. Kagan isn’t necessarily saying war is imminent, but clear thinking – and seeing, is required. Good stuff.
September 6, 2016
I did not particularly agree with Kagan's neoconservative opinions which some may engage with. A few things he touched upon I found myself gawking at - in particular, one thing that made an especially bad impression on me was his statement on how Muslims would appear to be more empathetic to extremism which I found to be absolutely shocking and preposterous to suggest, especially in this day in age, where tense political atmospheres would only be further fuelled by careless conclusions - especially by established historians like Kagan.
June 16, 2008
This is a serious piece. Its short length [105 pages text, 116 with footnote] can disguise the long essay/short book's serious approach to a number of foreign policy issues. Kagan was [is?] a neo-conservative, but this piece has the merit of a sometime neo-con looking back at the past years, and looking ahead with more practical suggestions and, it must be said, more optimism than many gurus of foreign affairs tea leaves do.
January 3, 2017
Rather neoconservative in its perspective but still has some useful insights.
March 9, 2022
Kagan’s “Return of History” is a little old, but his theorization on the geopolitical balance between liberal democracies and autocracies proved prescient, with Russian action in Ukraine, which lends to my belief in the value of the rest of his content.
The book settles on the sentiment that liberal international institutions like the EU and UN have distracted the countries involved from the constancy of hard power and geopolitical balance in the world. Kagan evidences this by pointing to the success of autocracies under this system, and how these autocracies have relied upon old school military power while also lending credence to the development of their international economic capacity to legitimize themselves in this 21st century sphere of international relations. And the strategy has proven effective, with China and Russia making economic gains all the while holding no elected legitimacy. Kagan concludes that democracies still hold the balance in their hands, but could just as quick squander it if they continue to count their laurels and miss the writing on the wall; in terms of practical application, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and China’s ambivalent response is just that.
I appreciated Kagan’s insistence that the autocracies of Russia and China, along with others around the globe, may have less than legitimate claims to power by democratic standards, but they are still structured on the principle of empowerment for their own countries, no matter how corrupted their vision may be. I thought the quintessential example of this was Putin’s actions in Ukraine. Even though I believe Putin did not expect such significant domestic pushback and an almost unbelievably uniform response from the western world, his actions in Ukraine are consistent with hard power, national security geopolitics; while the expansion of NATO is not a direct threat to the sovereignty of Russian statehood, it’s certainly antithetical to the country and its former iterations foreign policy approach for the past, I don’t know, 700 years. Putin’s actions are not irrational or heedlessly based, they are founded on a (pretty delusional) notion of Russia’s security interests in Eastern Europe; they are not power grabs from Putin to support the kleptocratic sentiments of his rule, because he is personally suffering a great deal of economic blowback during these invasions. Instead, the actions align with Kagan’s insistence- autocracies adhere to the will of their countries, that will may just informed from the past more so than the current sentiments of its citizens.
And this lends itself even further to the notion that autocracies appreciate hard power in geopolitics the most, because in Russia’s case, it’s really all it has; with western Europe’s and the US’s predictably decreasing dependence on global oil and gas, and Russia’s already peripheral status in international institutions, hard power is what the country can appreciate most as a means to exact its plans.
I thought Kagan’s book was well informed and enlightening for citizens of democracies that see the world stirring in tumult around them. International liberal institutions are ideas only as strong their participants, and autocratic powers take notice when participation wanes.
The book settles on the sentiment that liberal international institutions like the EU and UN have distracted the countries involved from the constancy of hard power and geopolitical balance in the world. Kagan evidences this by pointing to the success of autocracies under this system, and how these autocracies have relied upon old school military power while also lending credence to the development of their international economic capacity to legitimize themselves in this 21st century sphere of international relations. And the strategy has proven effective, with China and Russia making economic gains all the while holding no elected legitimacy. Kagan concludes that democracies still hold the balance in their hands, but could just as quick squander it if they continue to count their laurels and miss the writing on the wall; in terms of practical application, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and China’s ambivalent response is just that.
I appreciated Kagan’s insistence that the autocracies of Russia and China, along with others around the globe, may have less than legitimate claims to power by democratic standards, but they are still structured on the principle of empowerment for their own countries, no matter how corrupted their vision may be. I thought the quintessential example of this was Putin’s actions in Ukraine. Even though I believe Putin did not expect such significant domestic pushback and an almost unbelievably uniform response from the western world, his actions in Ukraine are consistent with hard power, national security geopolitics; while the expansion of NATO is not a direct threat to the sovereignty of Russian statehood, it’s certainly antithetical to the country and its former iterations foreign policy approach for the past, I don’t know, 700 years. Putin’s actions are not irrational or heedlessly based, they are founded on a (pretty delusional) notion of Russia’s security interests in Eastern Europe; they are not power grabs from Putin to support the kleptocratic sentiments of his rule, because he is personally suffering a great deal of economic blowback during these invasions. Instead, the actions align with Kagan’s insistence- autocracies adhere to the will of their countries, that will may just informed from the past more so than the current sentiments of its citizens.
And this lends itself even further to the notion that autocracies appreciate hard power in geopolitics the most, because in Russia’s case, it’s really all it has; with western Europe’s and the US’s predictably decreasing dependence on global oil and gas, and Russia’s already peripheral status in international institutions, hard power is what the country can appreciate most as a means to exact its plans.
I thought Kagan’s book was well informed and enlightening for citizens of democracies that see the world stirring in tumult around them. International liberal institutions are ideas only as strong their participants, and autocratic powers take notice when participation wanes.
February 3, 2025
The book “The End of History and the Return of Dreams” by American journalist and author, Robert Kagan, can broadly be separated into two parts. In the first section, Kagan examines the geopolitical circumstances of several regional hegemons before he analyses current threats to the Western-dominated neoliberal order in the latter part. Although Kagan omits several key regions and conflicts dominating the current political landscape, his book works well as a clear and comprehensible introductory guide to 21st-century geopolitics.
While the first chapter of Kagan’s book, “Hope and Dreams”, nicely situates the book in its appropriate historical context and explains the origins of the post-Cold War optimism, the second chapter, “The Return of Great Power Nationalism”, establishes the main thesis of the book: History did not end after the Cold War, in fact, great power nationalism has returned with a vengeance and with it, great power conflict. Without overwhelming the reader with too much new information, Kagan provides just enough information on history and political philosophy in these introductory chapters to prepare the audience for the rest of the book. Beyond this, Kagan also draws heavily on quotes and impressions from contemporary political actors and scholars of international relations to support his account. In this way, the reader is gently introduced to basic concepts from the field of international relations. These expert opinions give Kagan’s claims credibility and make the content more digestible and interesting for amateurs of geopolitics.
Following his introduction, Kagan sets up the audience for the discussions in the latter part of the book by outlining the geopolitical circumstances of Russia, China, Japan, India, Iran, and the United States. Kagan uses this part of his book to provide a very concise outline of what he considers to be the major players in the arena of contemporary politics. Because these summaries are very brief and do not require any background knowledge, this book is accessible to a broad audience beyond politically minded reader. However, this brevity and superficialness of content comes at the price of both breadth and depth. For readers already familiar with the basics of geopolitics, this book has not yielded any new ideas or arguments thus far but has rather seemed like a refresher course in Geopolitics 101.
Moving on from these regional focuses, Kagan dedicates the second part of his book to expound on threats facing the current international order. By far the most interesting chapter in this book is the chapter titled “The Axis of Democracy and Association of Autocrats” in which Kagan explores the European roots of autocracy and the ideology and interests of dominant autocratic regimes. Leaning heavily on Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations”, Kagan argues that the next fault line for great power conflict will be along states’ form of government. While much of this book works as an introductory text to geopolitics, in this chapter, Kagan makes a fresh and interesting contribution to debates within international relations and contemporary politics circles. Not only does he raise compelling questions about the future of the neoliberal world order, but his ideas also have practical implications for democratic policymakers on how to tackle the spread of autocracy. Moreover, this chapter also stands out for its non-partisan description of the virtues of autocracies. Instead of claiming all autocratic leaders are corrupt and power-hungry, Kagan impartially argues that “(by) providing order, by producing economic success, by holding their nations together and leading them to a position of international influence, respectability, and power (…)” (Kagan 2008, 60), autocrats are serving their country just as democratic leaders want to. By providing a multi-faceted description of autocracies that highlights both their advantages and disadvantages, Kagan becomes more convincing in his argument.
However, it is also in the second part of the book that underlying problems with it become glaringly obvious. Although Kagan’s efforts at objectivity are reflected in his analysis of autocracies and his warranted criticisms of the United States, by including only a limited selection of regions and threats to concentrate on, Kagan’s Western bias reveals itself. The dangers Kagan chooses to expand on, are exclusively threats to the Western-dominated neoliberal world order. By not considering salient disputes between regions beyond Europe and the United States, readers are given the impression that only threats that affect the West qualify as important conflicts in the international arena. In this light, his choice of regions in the first section also reveals itself as problematic. The selected regions are scrutinized only through their relationship to and significance for the West. Very telling here is that two whole continents, Africa and South America, garner not a single chapter in the whole book. Without these vital inclusions, Kagan’s book cannot be considered a reflection of the realities of geopolitics, but only as a small, Western-centric outtake.
The penultimate chapter, “Towards a Concert of Democracies”, functions as closure to the foregoing chapters on global threats. Although it includes sentiments for more unity among democratic states and a condemnation of democratic expansion, its short length of only five pages is indicative of Kagan’s lack of answers to the problems outlined in previous chapters. Beyond a containment strategy reminiscent of the Cold War, Kagan does not have any practical or innovative solutions to offer. This lack of substance is appropriate for a novice audience for whom these conclusionary platitudes are something to ponder in the future, but they are not original or concrete enough for an expert audience, despite what the book’s reviews claim.
Finally, in his conclusion, Kagan returns to the main thrust of his argument: rebutting Fukuyama’s “The End of History?”. While Kagan’s book does not offer a lot in terms of policymaking advice for the looming threats he details, his main intention is to alert people and politicians to not be complacent and rest on their laurels, while waiting for liberal democracies to inevitably dominate the world stage. His book acts as a warning that great power competition never disappeared but has simply taken on a different shape and he urges democracies to stay vigilant if they want to win the battle over autocracy, just as they won the battle over communism. In this regard, the book is very consistent in its messaging and convincing in its supporting arguments.
Because “The End of History and the Return of Dreams” follows a very clear structure and does not assume any previous knowledge on the part of the reader, it is accessible to a very broad readership. For an audience not very familiar with international relations and current geopolitics, this book breaks down complex issues and concepts into easily digestible language and offers a concise overview of mainstream geopolitics. However, readers should remain aware that the book prioritizes a Western perspective and does not offer a comprehensive or inclusive overview of the current world order. For audiences already well-versed in geopolitics and international relations, the only truly interesting contribution Kagan makes to current political debates is his discussion of the “Association of Autocracies”. Beyond this, much of the book reads like a realist’s introduction to applied international relations and does not delve beyond the surface level.
While the first chapter of Kagan’s book, “Hope and Dreams”, nicely situates the book in its appropriate historical context and explains the origins of the post-Cold War optimism, the second chapter, “The Return of Great Power Nationalism”, establishes the main thesis of the book: History did not end after the Cold War, in fact, great power nationalism has returned with a vengeance and with it, great power conflict. Without overwhelming the reader with too much new information, Kagan provides just enough information on history and political philosophy in these introductory chapters to prepare the audience for the rest of the book. Beyond this, Kagan also draws heavily on quotes and impressions from contemporary political actors and scholars of international relations to support his account. In this way, the reader is gently introduced to basic concepts from the field of international relations. These expert opinions give Kagan’s claims credibility and make the content more digestible and interesting for amateurs of geopolitics.
Following his introduction, Kagan sets up the audience for the discussions in the latter part of the book by outlining the geopolitical circumstances of Russia, China, Japan, India, Iran, and the United States. Kagan uses this part of his book to provide a very concise outline of what he considers to be the major players in the arena of contemporary politics. Because these summaries are very brief and do not require any background knowledge, this book is accessible to a broad audience beyond politically minded reader. However, this brevity and superficialness of content comes at the price of both breadth and depth. For readers already familiar with the basics of geopolitics, this book has not yielded any new ideas or arguments thus far but has rather seemed like a refresher course in Geopolitics 101.
Moving on from these regional focuses, Kagan dedicates the second part of his book to expound on threats facing the current international order. By far the most interesting chapter in this book is the chapter titled “The Axis of Democracy and Association of Autocrats” in which Kagan explores the European roots of autocracy and the ideology and interests of dominant autocratic regimes. Leaning heavily on Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations”, Kagan argues that the next fault line for great power conflict will be along states’ form of government. While much of this book works as an introductory text to geopolitics, in this chapter, Kagan makes a fresh and interesting contribution to debates within international relations and contemporary politics circles. Not only does he raise compelling questions about the future of the neoliberal world order, but his ideas also have practical implications for democratic policymakers on how to tackle the spread of autocracy. Moreover, this chapter also stands out for its non-partisan description of the virtues of autocracies. Instead of claiming all autocratic leaders are corrupt and power-hungry, Kagan impartially argues that “(by) providing order, by producing economic success, by holding their nations together and leading them to a position of international influence, respectability, and power (…)” (Kagan 2008, 60), autocrats are serving their country just as democratic leaders want to. By providing a multi-faceted description of autocracies that highlights both their advantages and disadvantages, Kagan becomes more convincing in his argument.
However, it is also in the second part of the book that underlying problems with it become glaringly obvious. Although Kagan’s efforts at objectivity are reflected in his analysis of autocracies and his warranted criticisms of the United States, by including only a limited selection of regions and threats to concentrate on, Kagan’s Western bias reveals itself. The dangers Kagan chooses to expand on, are exclusively threats to the Western-dominated neoliberal world order. By not considering salient disputes between regions beyond Europe and the United States, readers are given the impression that only threats that affect the West qualify as important conflicts in the international arena. In this light, his choice of regions in the first section also reveals itself as problematic. The selected regions are scrutinized only through their relationship to and significance for the West. Very telling here is that two whole continents, Africa and South America, garner not a single chapter in the whole book. Without these vital inclusions, Kagan’s book cannot be considered a reflection of the realities of geopolitics, but only as a small, Western-centric outtake.
The penultimate chapter, “Towards a Concert of Democracies”, functions as closure to the foregoing chapters on global threats. Although it includes sentiments for more unity among democratic states and a condemnation of democratic expansion, its short length of only five pages is indicative of Kagan’s lack of answers to the problems outlined in previous chapters. Beyond a containment strategy reminiscent of the Cold War, Kagan does not have any practical or innovative solutions to offer. This lack of substance is appropriate for a novice audience for whom these conclusionary platitudes are something to ponder in the future, but they are not original or concrete enough for an expert audience, despite what the book’s reviews claim.
Finally, in his conclusion, Kagan returns to the main thrust of his argument: rebutting Fukuyama’s “The End of History?”. While Kagan’s book does not offer a lot in terms of policymaking advice for the looming threats he details, his main intention is to alert people and politicians to not be complacent and rest on their laurels, while waiting for liberal democracies to inevitably dominate the world stage. His book acts as a warning that great power competition never disappeared but has simply taken on a different shape and he urges democracies to stay vigilant if they want to win the battle over autocracy, just as they won the battle over communism. In this regard, the book is very consistent in its messaging and convincing in its supporting arguments.
Because “The End of History and the Return of Dreams” follows a very clear structure and does not assume any previous knowledge on the part of the reader, it is accessible to a very broad readership. For an audience not very familiar with international relations and current geopolitics, this book breaks down complex issues and concepts into easily digestible language and offers a concise overview of mainstream geopolitics. However, readers should remain aware that the book prioritizes a Western perspective and does not offer a comprehensive or inclusive overview of the current world order. For audiences already well-versed in geopolitics and international relations, the only truly interesting contribution Kagan makes to current political debates is his discussion of the “Association of Autocracies”. Beyond this, much of the book reads like a realist’s introduction to applied international relations and does not delve beyond the surface level.
July 23, 2019
The Return of History and the End of Dreams by Robert Kagan is a rejection of Fukuyama's End of History. Here, Kagan adopts a softer tone than he does in The Jungle Grows Back. He argues his case fairly persuasively. This tiny book is a polemic that states things that are a obvious and beyond dispute so as to undermine his ideological rival, while not getting too much into depth about what should replace it. Rather, he seems pretty clear that more US is better, that the world is not pulling away from America as much as people feared, that the rivals to American power are motivated by historical grievance, national pride, and state logic, and the idea that victory for democracy is inevitable because of someone's illusion. This illusion is not readily labelled at Fukuyama, at least not in any overt fashion, but even passive familiarity of his work lets you know that this is meant to be a bullet to kill off Fukuyama's dream and to wake up the American political establishment.
While fine, I already read the Jungle Grows Back and of Paradise and Power, so I feel like I've read this already. The World America Made feels like a book I have already read as well, and I will get to it eventually.
While perhaps prescient at its publication, if there are any who still disagree with the overall observation of the book in the current day and age, then they have simply refused to pay attention.
I did appreciate the call out to Thumos though, this seems to be a clear nod to Fukuyama's own admission of potential fault with his theory. So at this point, while Kagan is saying Fukuyama is wrong, he's doing it in a way that is meant to be an offshoot of Fukuyama's own consideration. He'll abandon that in The Jungle Grows Back.
86/100
While fine, I already read the Jungle Grows Back and of Paradise and Power, so I feel like I've read this already. The World America Made feels like a book I have already read as well, and I will get to it eventually.
While perhaps prescient at its publication, if there are any who still disagree with the overall observation of the book in the current day and age, then they have simply refused to pay attention.
I did appreciate the call out to Thumos though, this seems to be a clear nod to Fukuyama's own admission of potential fault with his theory. So at this point, while Kagan is saying Fukuyama is wrong, he's doing it in a way that is meant to be an offshoot of Fukuyama's own consideration. He'll abandon that in The Jungle Grows Back.
86/100
September 3, 2021
Well articulated and presented. Small book that has an impact. Over arching theme of this book is that the end of the Cold War gave a false impression that the persuasiveness of the democratic ideal was inevitable and this should inform ongoing encounters with the broader world is not true. Rather, interests as informed by governing structure, economics, and geography still predominate and drive power politics and competition among the worlds lone superpower and the few great powers.
Author views China, Russia, and (somewhat) Iran as forming the greatest threats to the liberal international order. For Russia and China, autocratic governing structures and commitment to pragmatic decisions related to their economy and certain measure of cultural freedom help make their model attractive and resourceful for securing influence. In other words, while they may not seem outright destabilization of the current liberal order, they won’t seek to preserve it as they expand their spheres of influence. Russia and China indifference to Iranian nuclear capability is of note.
Recent policy decisions seem to indicate US policy makers share this view. Support of Ukraine; “pivot” to Asia; strengthening of alliance with India; military exercises with Australia and Japan. Recent decisions concerning Afghanistan, notwithstanding, there has been a common thread guiding US policy.
Author views China, Russia, and (somewhat) Iran as forming the greatest threats to the liberal international order. For Russia and China, autocratic governing structures and commitment to pragmatic decisions related to their economy and certain measure of cultural freedom help make their model attractive and resourceful for securing influence. In other words, while they may not seem outright destabilization of the current liberal order, they won’t seek to preserve it as they expand their spheres of influence. Russia and China indifference to Iranian nuclear capability is of note.
Recent policy decisions seem to indicate US policy makers share this view. Support of Ukraine; “pivot” to Asia; strengthening of alliance with India; military exercises with Australia and Japan. Recent decisions concerning Afghanistan, notwithstanding, there has been a common thread guiding US policy.
November 19, 2017
Kagan, Robert, The Return of History and The End of Dreams (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008). Vintage Kagan: beknopt, stijlvol geschreven, prikkelend beargumenteerd, en met gedegen kennis van het verleden. Ook vintage neocon: Kagan gaat op de bres voor het liberalisme van de Verlichting met behulp van een "realistische" kijk op de wereld. Hij neemt afstand van de idealistische multilateralistische visie die na het einde van de Koude Oorlog postvatte. "We have entered the age of divergence," waarin de natiestaat domineert. Kagan onderstreept de groeiende wedijver tussen grootmachten als bepalend voor de ontwikkeling van de internationale betrekkingen. Deze wedijver krijgt in toenemende mate ideologische trekken als gevolg van de tegenstelling tussen democratien (geleid door de VS) en autocratien (vooral China en Rusland). Kagan roept in dat verband op tot meer samenwerking tussen de democratien ("global concert or league of democracies"). Als buitenlandspolitieke visie blijft het onuitgewerkt en ook onvolledig (bijv vrijwel geen aandacht voor fragiele staten), maar als discussiestuk is het moeilijk te overtreffen. Cijfer: 9.
March 12, 2022
Quando se pensava que a Democracia se ia espalhar e vingar em todo o mundo, o que acontece é que autocracias existem e se mantêm, com a força da China e da Rússia na frente. Confronto entre a Democracia e a Autocracia, com uma análise de como as Autocracias se sentem humilhadas e menorizadas por um Ocidente que se sente moralmente superior (e que nem sempre dá o exemplo).
É um livro pró-Democracia mas com uma tentativa de visão do outro lado e de como as Autocracias vão sobrevivendo e crescendo.
PS - E escrito em 2008 fala como a Ucrânia será sempre um problema para a Rússia.
É um livro pró-Democracia mas com uma tentativa de visão do outro lado e de como as Autocracias vão sobrevivendo e crescendo.
PS - E escrito em 2008 fala como a Ucrânia será sempre um problema para a Rússia.
February 4, 2019
I listened to the unabridged audio version of this. It wasn’t a recent edition, and dated back to the Bush years I believe. That said, it was a great book for bringing one up to speed on the current global geopolitical struggles between the liberal democratic west and the autocracies of the world.
Much of what he wrote is valid today. I’d like to read a newer edition, if one exists, to see how he revises his work.
Much of what he wrote is valid today. I’d like to read a newer edition, if one exists, to see how he revises his work.
February 16, 2019
Written in the style of an extended Foreign Affairs essay, this extended contemplation of the international order circa 2008 has all that characteristics of that journal - the elegant writing, the dispassionate assessment, the learning, and the feeling that the whole academic study of international relations is little more than a parlour game with very limited capacity to understand the past and none to predict the future.
October 10, 2021
Apesar de originalmente escrito em 2008, a leitura de Robert Kagan do panorama internacional mantém-se actual em 2021.
De leitura fácil para o leitor médio, revela que a luta entre autocracias e democracias liberais não terminou em 1989, com a queda do bloco soviético.
Este confronto mantém-se e irá prolongar-se pelas próximas décadas. Uma leitura fundamental para quem gosta de relações internacionais e Direito Internacional.
De leitura fácil para o leitor médio, revela que a luta entre autocracias e democracias liberais não terminou em 1989, com a queda do bloco soviético.
Este confronto mantém-se e irá prolongar-se pelas próximas décadas. Uma leitura fundamental para quem gosta de relações internacionais e Direito Internacional.
January 18, 2022
An easy, short, straight forward and factual read. The book came out in 2008 and should be updated with another edition since quite a bit's happened on the US/World stage since then. An update would especially be interesting considering the on-going health crisis. Recommended for history/political enthusiasts.
December 9, 2023
More of an essay than a book. Starts and ends as an indictment of Francis Fukiyama's 'The end of history' but doesn't add much to the conversation. A decent breakdown of the state of the world in 2010, though no great insights. I'd skip this one, nothing here of value you can't get from an Atlantic article.
May 17, 2025
thought i had 2 articles to read for my class TURNS OUT IT WAS 2 BOOKS. extreme meep
good overview of hegemonic states and their context but lowk basic stuff nothing new. also major lmao moment when a book written in 2008 predicts 80% of whats happening rn it felt like reading a self-fulfilling prophecy so that was also fun
good overview of hegemonic states and their context but lowk basic stuff nothing new. also major lmao moment when a book written in 2008 predicts 80% of whats happening rn it felt like reading a self-fulfilling prophecy so that was also fun
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May 29, 2021A short but worthwhile primer on neoconservative and neoliberal thought ca 2008. Kagan is well-intentioned and among the more sincere neoconservaties; but the presumptions he makes and the assumptions about the liberal order are good evidence for how we got where we are in 2021.
December 25, 2021
Clear and concise writing. Not sure such an argument could’ve been written from anything but an American perspective. I don’t think I agree with every point he explains but it’s an interesting analysis of world order as of 2008.
March 8, 2023
Kind of funny to read a geopolitics book from 15 years ago since so much has happened. Generally the book holds up fairly well, especially since his main prediction was: "the CCP and Putin might get up to trouble in the future" which has turned out to be true
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