The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth

by Gar Alperovitz

Shipped from UK, please allow 10 to 21 business days for arrival. Good, A good, clean and sound copy in blue cloth boards with a good dust jacket.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Japan, Politics, War, World War II, Military Fiction

847 pages, Hardcover

First published July 30, 1995

Reviews

[Marie Tankersley]

I just read selected chapters out of this for a paper and it was helpful and very detailed

[Dave · Rating 3 out of 5]

In the early 1960s, Gar Alperovitz wrote his dissertation that challenged the accepted story surrounding the events of the summer of 1945 and the dropping of two atomic bombs on Japan. It was obviously very controversial. This book, published in 1995 on the 50th anniversary of the bombings, builds on that argument with much new material that was declassified over the intervening years.

The standard story is that the bombs forced Japan's surrender before an invasion of the home islands by American troops would be necessary. It was claimed that invasion would have cost as many as a million American lives, and an equal number on the Japanese side. Alperovitz points out, however, that the actual numbers from a military estimate of the time started out at 46,000 casualties. That's casualties, not lives. Based on percentages in the Pacific war, that would translate to roughly 7,000 to 10,000 deaths. Alperovitz shows how politicians gradually inflated that number over the years to solidify the case for dropping the bombs.

There is much evidence in declassified arguments that points toward a Japanese nation ready to surrender before the bombs were dropped. The threat of the Soviet Union entering the war that summer is thoroughly examines, as is the question of clarifying the term "unconditional surrender." U.S. officials were willing to consider allowing Japan to keep its emperor, and that would likely have been a concession that made surrender more likely. But despite urging from the majority of his advisors, Truman followed the advice of Secretary of State James Byrnes and chose not to communicate this to the Japanese.

This is a huge book, and I can't possibly summarize all of the arguments here. They are very convincing, but not totally so. Certainly mistakes were made on the part of Truman and his team, but Alperovitz's proof that the Japanese were ready to surrender is thin - basically relying on one or two intercepted cables.

My image of Harry Truman is definitely shaken by this account, but I'm not totally won over.

[Tariq Mahmood · Rating 4 out of 5]

Reading this book has provided me with a new definition of superpower. A superpower is considered a superpower only when it is successful in spreading its version of narrative, at same time rejecting all other conjectures as arbitrary.

This fantastic and extremely detailed book on the real reasons for dropping of atomic bombs on Japan will leave no doubt that the main reason was to establish USA as the new Superpower in the world. The popular narrative does not include the Soviet threat to enter the war in Asia at all. Gar painstakingly elaborates his analysis of the deciding months leading to the decision to drop the bomb. The American insistence on unconditional surrender of Japan, the shift in American behaviour after the successful test in New Mexico, the strange decision not to give Japanese any advanced warning, the complete rejection of all of Japan's efforts to seek defeat, and in the end accepting conditional surrender which was not an option before dropping of the two atomic bombs. There was also complete absence of any diplomacy from the Western powers and little attempts to consider diplomatic solutions with Japan.

I was also amazed at the dehumanisation of the Japanese race in America which was responsible in making such a horrific decision possible. Strands of the same dehumanisation tendency can still be felt in the current War on terror where terrorist are kept incognito without any access to law on Guantanamo by Americans. There is also considerable campaign by certain sections of mainstream media to demonise all Muslims which makes the illegal American drone attacks and target killings much more easy to justify sell to the world at large.


The book makes heavy reading but I am afraid the author had little choice in the matter. He is working against nearly 60 years of 'popular' narrative after all. What other choice did he have?

[Doug Dillon · Rating 5 out of 5]

A true scholarly and valuable book with infinite details setting the record straight about why the U.S. dropped atomic bombs on Japan. But you really must want to study this topic in-depth to deal with all 668 pages of text out of 847 pages in total. 178 pages are documentation, index, etc.

[Matthew Lynch · Rating 4 out of 5]

Highly informative and detailed, and realty two books in one (the path toward the bomb, and the post-war narrative). A few random notes:
- unanimous military opinion that Japan would surrender imminently
- Japan needed clarity on terms of surrender that the US didn't supply (they wanted to retain the emperor)
- concern that an island invasion would unite dissenting Japanese against the Americans
- for those planning on the bomb, initial plan was for a demonstration on a military target first
- concerns to limit American casualties were overcome by prolongation of decision to clarify the terms of surrender. US had broken Japanese codes and were listening in on all discussion within Japan, where it was clear that the terms of surrender needed clarity.
- McCoy urged Truman to drop term unconditional, and that the US could get all it wanted without it. The Japanese feared enslavement, extermination, etc. Said they could be allowed rights to govern as they choose, economic viability, etc
- us public urging clarity on war aims, wanting a quick resolution, yet hardliners continued with no compromise terms.
- wanted bomb to demonstrate supremacy to Russians
- Byrnes, Truman's sec, consistently opposed attempts to modify the surrender formula
- decision to use the bomb stemmed from a desire to end the war, by any means possible, before Russia entered the war
- sec of war Stimson's diaries provide ample evidence to this effect. Considered widely to exert greatest influence on the president, but this is demonstrably false.
- sec of state Byrnes major influence on president, and stood virtually alone in advising pres to drop assurances about emperor etc
- reason historians miss Byrnes influence is that they later had a major falling out
- Byrnes saw the bomb as a major diplomacy tool, and that it would allow 'the United states to impose its own terms once its power was demonstrated' (214).
- allies had intercepted Japanese Comms that only hinderence to end of war were terms of surrender
- Churchill also noted the tremendous cost of forcing unconditional surrender
- US wanted bomb to keep Russia from entering war, and thereby pressing claims on China
- concerns about Soviet dominance in Europe were demonstrably on the rise in late 44 early 45, and the bomb was seen as a way to 'keep them in check'
- immediately after demonstrating the bomb publicly, 'u. S. Diplomacy did actively and urgently begin to press aggressively for major changes in the Balkans'
- Truman, under Byrnes urging, issued a warning to Japan that lacked any assurances about the emperor and was thus only a public relations tactic and really seen by the two of them as a Prelude to the use of the bomb.
- military leaders did not have any direct involvement in the decision-making process leading to the use of the bomb.
- Margaret Truman biography of Harry Truman record a meeting the day before Potsdam where all military leaders except one were in agreement on the use of the bomb. However there is no evidence that this meeting ever occurred and historians have repeatedly written to Margaret Truman without any replies regarding the evidence that this meeting happened.
- Japan had expressed willingness to seek peace on the basis of the Atlantic Charter which guaranteed people the right to choose the form of government under which they would live and to retain all territory.
- US actively sought to delay a Russian declaration of war, an act that would have undoubtedly hastened a surrender and saved lives
- after Hiroshima Japan and sent urgent messages asking for clarification on the Russian position.
- after Nagasaki the Japanese sent an offer to accept the Potsdam Proclamation with one sole exception, that the emperor be protected. Truman was immediately favorable to the offer but Byrnes was not.
- in the end the emperor's position was maintained. Unbelievable.
- Stimson's estimate that the bomb likely saved over a million lives, a figure still widely quoted, lacks any serious basis, though widely repeated by Truman and others. Highest estimates for a full-scale invasion was between 40-46k, official est was 31,000.
- most military leaders believed the war would end long before an invasion would be necessary.
- almost every major WW2 leader, including Eisenhower, is on record saying that the bomb was unnecessary
- also in the post war revision is the idea that Hiroshima was an important military base. It was of minor industrial/military importance, and wasn't even on Allied "to bomb" lists. This is part of the post war myth.
- even for those that believes that Hiroshima was justified, there's some agreement that Nagasaki was too soon. It was a crime
- Truman declared that Tokyo had rejected the July 26th Potsdam terms of surrender (unconditional), but intercepts reveal that the US knows that Japan was studying them and seeking clarification, particularly on the issue of the emperor. Truman wrote in his memoirs that Hiroshima and Nagasaki weere wiped out because they rejected the terms. He knew otherwise. Also, Truman said that he ordered the bombs AFTER the Potsdam declaration, when in fact, the order to use the bombs had already been given (I suppose it could've been rescinded?).
- Hirohito remained emperor until 1989!
- Despite the fact that Truman and Churchill had agreed on the condition to keep the emperor, Byrnes suggested its removal before Potsdam, almost guaranteeing that the bombs would be dropped.
- the Japanese surrender only came after implicit assurances on keeping the emperor were given, but the post war myth implies that it was unconditional.
- in the end, actual targeting didn't focus on industrial centers.
- the Russian invasion of Manchuria likely did more to hasten the end of the war than the bombs, according to some historians.
- even those who favor the bomb have to ask whether (1) it should've been used in civilian areas, (2) without warning, (3) twice in quick succession, and ultimately, (4) whether there was no other option.

[Tom · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting revisionist take upon the start of the Cold War.

[Joe Bellew · Rating 4 out of 5]

Think you know why we dropped the nukes? Think again. Our received wisdom doesn’t jive with reality. Thoroughly researched and probably a bi5 overlong at about 900 pages—-I’m glad I read the digital version, as it doesn’t show the number of pages or how far you’ve progressed. Still questions linger for me: why the second bomb; why did certain American decision makers think having the bomb could be used to strong arm the Soviets (unless we were actually willing to use it on them); and how culpable was Hirohito?

[Liam Evans · Rating 2 out of 5]

What a SLOG. I get what Alperovitz is trying to say, but someone needs to take what he wrote and make it readable in a way that doesn't make your eyes gloss over.

He just keeps going over and over the same ground. Yes, you lay the fault of the dropping of the atomic bomb on the feet of Secretary of State Byrnes. Yes, you explain why the military didn't see it as entirely necessary. Yes, you explain how they started justifying it post-war. But did you have to make it so TURGID?

[Bygone · Rating 4 out of 5]

A depressing glance into the more honest reasons we dropped the bomb in Hiroshima, including intimidation and leverage over Russia (pushed heavily by Byrnes), research into how it would affect civilians vs. a military target, and ending the war before Russian interference. Might prove to be good material for a story of some sort?

[JerryDeanHalleck · Rating 3 out of 5]

Dry but invaluable for all the information (800 pages) regarding the dropping of the Hiroshima bomb. People have complained about too much detail, but to me, that is whats so great about it. You can dip in and out, and if want to know what Stimson or MacArthur said about the decision, its all there.

[Alexander Manilov · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good information, but perhaps too much detail. A bit academic.

[Meredith Frazier · Rating 3 out of 5]

Insightful, but lengthy. I agree with Alperovitz that there were other options, but given these options, the bomb, although a tragedy, was necessary.

[Road Worrier · Rating 5 out of 5]

Long book, but essential reading for anyone hailing from the United States.

[Dallas · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book contains all the sources, save those lost or deliberately destroyed, on the choice to drop the atomic weapons on Japan at the end of World War Two. I am enjoying the work very much. It is divided into two parts: the historical evidence of the choice to drop the bomb and the creation of the official tale of inevitability: the popular story that it was either the choice to drop the bombs or the certain slaughter of millions of American troops on the beaches of Japan. Both sections are chilling. The text is full of thorough documentation and filled with astounding footnotes that document the search for documents and records that have gone missing or have been destroyed.
One of the most fascinating elements in the first third of the book is the various messages from the Japanese government that were sent to the US government in the waning months of the war. Many of these messages were only acknowledged and officially declassified and released by the US government in the 1990's, and they are proof that the Japanese leadership were seeking clarification of the US demands of unconditional surrender. It was clear months before the Trinity Test that the United States could have shortened the war by assuring the Japanese government of the security of the Emperor. The reasons the American government chose not to do so are various and shocking, and they included pressure from the military leadership of the Manhattan Project that wished to use their monstrous creation, diplomats who wished to use the bomb as a trump card in the first poker rounds of the Cold War with the Soviets, and the reprehensible doctrine of total war.
The first third of the book reveals many important facts. Operation Olympic and Operation Coronet, the planned invasions of Japan by ground troops, were only plans and were not being talked of as serious possibilities by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, or the military leadership. No one seems to have expected to invade Japan, and this was not a foregone conclusion. The evidence on this point is clear and important. Another point is that the demand for unconditional surrender was controversial. Many American media outlets, including Time and Life magazines and religious periodicals such as The Christian Century questioned the policy, pointed out that it would certainly prolong the war and cause needless death, and clear terms for peace ought to be offered to Japan. This argument has been so utterly lost and forgotten in so many contemporary discussions of the choice to drop the atomic weapons, it is quite refreshing to see them reintroduced to the subject once again.
Once Truman and his advisors made the choice not to negotiate terms or even to communicate with the Japanese government, the military leadership objected to the use of the Bomb. This is another vital bit of evidence about the choice to use the weapons that ought to be better known in contemporary discussion. Eisenhower, Leahy, Nimitz, MacArthur, and even Curtis LeMay were all very clear to the government that the atomic weapons were not a military necessity. Leahy objected to the use of the Bomb in the strongest terms, prophesying that sins of such wickedness did not go unpunished, and insisting that wars must not be fought against women and children. Curtis LeMay, the heir of Sherman, even went as far as to deny the Bomb had anything to do with the surrender of Japan, arguing publicly that it was impossible for the Japanese to continue the struggle in any case, and that his devastating firebomb strategy had already defeated Japan.
In conclusion, although I have yet to dive into part two, this history seems indispensable to me. I highly recommend it.

[Derek · Rating 4 out of 5]

Pretty decisive conclusions based on exhaustive documentary research. Perhaps not for the casual reader, who will find the methodology somewhat burdensome. He sometimes misses the forests for the trees (his little swipe in the afterword at "Marxist momentum theory" is a strawman, I think), but overall it's a book anyone interested in the topic should pick up, either for a full read or for reference.

[M. W. · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is such a fun read!.....well, not really. It's pretty depressing. I've been reading and rereading this book since the late 90's......and I still can't decide about the decision to use the atomic bomb. Anyone that can say that it was "right" or "wrong" with certainty, doesn't know the full story and all of its strange details. If you read this book...you'll read it more than once.

[Peter Sprunger · Rating 2 out of 5]

This topic is near and dear to my heart... but this book was even too much for me. This is probably the definitive work on the subject because of the amount of research that went into it. However, that research is presented in its entirety by moving from excerpt to excerpt. This makes for a very boring read.

[Jonnie Enloe · Rating 4 out of 5]

You only thought you knew the truth until you read this book. It is not schocking. But it is eyeopening. The blatant racism of high office in the US. It is a slow read and you have to want to know about this event before you read it. It is well worth the time. But be prepared to study. I used six books as reference during my reading which caused the unusual length to expand.

[Chris · Rating 3 out of 5]

Very detailed look into Washington at the time of the decision to drop the atomic bomb. Very surprised to learn about waiting for the Soviet invasion of Marchuria and the US (Truman/Stimson/Byrnes) to drop the bomb before that declaration. Also interesting to see Japan wanting to keep their emperor, as a diety.

[CALVIN REAMES · Rating 5 out of 5]

For a boomer born in 1947 who thought that his existence depending on the use of the Atomic Bombs used in WWII, this book was a revelation to me. Hard work and great persistence on the author's part has created a book worth reading. And even though I might agree with them, the author's underlying political views show through the analysis. Still in all, a great piece of research and analysis.

[Andrew · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very rigorous scholarship uncovers a wealth of evidence and information that has long since sunk down the American memory hole. Challenges most mainstream historical assumptions that the A-bomb was a necessary evil...a must read.

[Andy · Rating 4 out of 5]

An interesting view that proposes the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan was not a military decision but a foreign policy decision.

[Andrew Taylor · Rating 5 out of 5]

Essential reading for anyone with strong views on the topic. Guaranteed to change your perspective on many things.

[Steve]

I've read parts of this book before, but plan to read it again (and in full) in light of the Obama Administration's stated policies regarding the use of nuclear weapons.

[Emily · Rating 3 out of 5]

As a reference book, this is top notch. Check out the Shimoda case it references, a whole 'nother layer of controversy added to bombing of Hiroshima, just there!

[Sarah · Rating 4 out of 5]

Incredibly thorough and eye opening. Also very long and dense. Glad I read it but doubt I ever will again.