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290 pages, Paperback
First published December 1, 1956
How does such a network of language, culture, and behaviour come about historically? Which was first: the language patterns or the cultural norms? In main they have grown up together, constantly influencing each other. But in this partnership the nature of the language is the factor that limts free plasticity and rigidifies channels of development in the more autocratic way. This is so because a language is a system, not just an assemblage of norms. Large systematic outlines can change to something new only very slowly, while many other cultural innovations are made with comparative quickness. Language thus represents the mass mind; it is affected by inventions and innovations, but affected little and slowly, whereas to inventors and innovators it legislates with the decree immediate. p.165
We are inclined to think of language simply as a technique of expression, and not to realize that language first of all is a classification and arrangement of the stream of sensory experience which results in a certain word-order, a certain segment of the world that is easily expressible by the type of symbolic means that language employs. In other words, language does in a cruder but also in a broader and more versatile way the same thing that science does. [...] We have just seen how the Hopi language maps out a certain terrain of what might be termed primitive physics. We have observed how, with very thorough consistency and not a little true scientific precision, all sorts of vibratile phenomena in nature are classified by being referred to various elementary types of deformation process [...] could be made with great appropriateness to a multiplicity of phenomena belonging entirely to the modern scientific and technical world - movements of machinery and mechanism, wave processes and vibrations, electrical and chemical phenomena - things that the Hopi have never known or imagined, and for which we ourselves lack definite names. p. 64
A covert linguistic class may not deal with any grand dichotomy of objects, it may have a very subtle meaning, and it may have no overt mark other than certain distinctive "reactances" with certain overtly marked forms. It is then what I call a CRYPTOTYPE. It is a submerged, subtle, and elusive meaning, corresponding to no actual word, yet shown by linguistic analysis to be functionally important in the grammar. For example, the English particple UP meaning "completely, to a finish," as in "break it up, cover it up, eat it up, twist it up, open it up" can be applied to any verb of one or two syllables initially accented, EXCEPTING verbs belonging to four special cryptotypes. One is the cryptotype of dispersion without a boundary; hence one does not say "spread it up, waste it us, spend it up, scatter it up, drain it up, or filter it up." Another is the cryptotype of oscillation without agitation of parts; we don't say "rock up a cradle, wave up a flag, wiggle up a finger, nod up one's head" etc. The third is the cryptotype of nondurative impact whihc also includes psychological reaction: "kill, fight, etc., hence wje don't say "whack it up, tap it up, slam it up, wrestle him up, hate him up." The fourth is the verbs of directed motion, move lift pull push put, etc., with which UP has the directional sense, "upward" or derived senses, even though the sense may be contradicted by the verb and hence produce an effect of absurdity, as in "drip it up." p.80
By more or less distinct terms we ascribe a semificticious isolation to parts of experience. English terms, like "sky, hill, swamp," persuade us to regard some elusive aspect of nature's endless variety as a distinct THING, almost like a table or chair. Thus English and similar tongues lead us to think of the universe as a collection of rather distinct objects and events corresponding to word. Indeed this is the implicit picutre of classical physics and astronomy - that the universe is essentially a collection of detached objects of different sizes. The examples used by older logicians in dealing with this point are usually unfortunately chosen. They tend to pick out tables and chairs usually unfortunately chosen. They tend to pick out tables and chairs and apples on tables as test objects to demonstrate the object-like nature of reality and its one-to-one correspondence with logic. Man's artifacts and the agricultural products he severs from living plants have a unique degree of isolation; we may expect that [all] languages will have fairly isolated terms for them. The real question is: What do different languages do, not with these artificially isolated objects but with the flowing face of nature in its motion, color and changing form: with clouds, beaches, and yonder flight of birds? For, as goes our segmentation of the face of nature, so goes our physics of the cosmos. p.240-1