A Force So Swift: Mao, Truman, and the Birth of Modern China, 1949

by Kevin Peraino

A gripping narrative of the Truman Administration's response to the fall of Nationalist China and the triumph of Mao Zedong's Communist forces in 1949--an extraordinary political revolution that continues to shape East Asian politics to this day.

In the opening months of 1949, U.S. President Harry S. Truman found himself faced with a looming diplomatic catastrophe--"perhaps the greatest that this country has ever suffered," as the journalist Walter Lippmann put it. Throughout the spring and summer, Mao Zedong's Communist armies fanned out across mainland China, annihilating the rival troops of America's one-time ally Chiang Kai-shek and taking control of Beijing, Shanghai, and other major cities. As Truman and his aides--including his shrewd, ruthless secretary of state, Dean Acheson--scrambled to formulate a response, they were forced to contend not only with Mao, but also with unrelenting political enemies at home, in Congress and even within the administration. Over the course of this tumultuous year, Mao fashioned a new revolutionary government in Beijing, laying the foundation for the creation of modern China, while Chiang Kai-shek fled to the island sanctuary of Taiwan. These events transformed American foreign policy--leading, ultimately, to decades of friction with Communist China, a long-standing U.S. commitment to Taiwan, and the subsequent wars in Korea and Vietnam.

Drawing on Chinese and Russian sources, as well as recently declassified CIA documents, Kevin Peraino tells the story of this remarkable year through the eyes of the key players, including Mao Zedong, President Truman, Secretary of State Acheson, Minnesota congressman Walter Judd, and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, the influential first lady of the Republic of China. Truman and his administration struggled to navigate a disorienting new political landscape that was being reshaped daily by the emerging technology of television, the rising tensions of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, and growing fears of spying, infiltration, and Russia’s acquisition of the atomic bomb.

Today, the legacy of 1949 is more relevant than ever to the relationships between China, the United States, and the rest of the world, as Beijing asserts its claims in the South China Sea and tensions endure between Taiwan and the mainland. Yet at the heart of the book is a story for any season--a thoughtful and moving examination of the fierce determination of the human will.

Genres: History, China, Nonfiction, Politics, Asia, Audiobook, American History

384 pages, Hardcover

First published September 19, 2017

Reviews

[Matt · Rating 4 out of 5]

“Chiang [Kai-shek] and Mao [Zedong] had been battling each other, in one form or another, for more than two decades. At one time, they had considered themselves uneasy allies in a common struggle to modernize China. The enemy then had been the empire’s ancient past, its ossified rituals and corrupt bureaucracy. After the collapse of the Qing dynasty, they had both fought the republican government in Beijing and the warlords in the provinces. Over the years, however, the revolution had splintered. Chiang had taken command of the Nationalist wing, the Guomindang, ruthlessly purging his political enemies. Mao, after a series of his own bitter power struggles, had solidified his control of the Chinese Communists…Ultimately, however, the Second World War had left Chiang’s armies crippled and the Chinese economy in ruins. In its aftermath, Mao’s Communists began slowly retaking territory. American leaders, at first, had sought to reconcile the warring factions, dispatching various missions to the Middle Kingdom in an effort to broker peace. But when those efforts failed, U.S. statesmen grew gradually more disillusioned with Chiang. Increasingly, against a growing and emboldened Communist opposition, the Generalissimo was on his own…”
- Kevin Peraino, A Force So Swift: Mao, Truman, and the Birth of Modern China, 1949

When the story of the 21st Century is eventually written, it is likely that China will occupy center stage as the preeminent superpower. As America dominated the previous hundred-year span, the current one looks like it will belong to the Chinese. Since I won’t be around to read that story, I figured the best I could do was explore a bit as to how China put itself in such a position.

The trouble, of course, is that Chinese history is as big as Asia itself. It stretches back thousands of years, and contains enough material to fill many times that number of books. Deciding to narrow my scope a bit, I have started to read more about China in the era of the Second World War. This has the twin virtues of allowing me to stay on familiar ground, and to witness the birth of modern China, as fathered by two towering, antagonistic historical figures: Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong.

Last year, I began this project by reading Rana Mitter’s Forgotten Ally, about China’s desperate and bloody struggle against Japan. Even though I have a few more similar titles on my shelf – my reading ambition far outstripping my actual reading – I have moved forward a few years, to the events contained within Kevin Peraino’s A Force So Swift.

Covering just a single year – 1949 – Peraino nimbly narrates the fall and flight of Chiang, the ascendancy of Mao, and the struggle of President Harry Truman to formulate a response to a geopolitical earthquake that was far beyond the capability of any one man – even an American President – to control.

Though its subject matter is complex and a bit esoteric – this is, after all, about high-level diplomacy – A Force So Swift is written as a popular history. At less than three-hundred pages of text, it is relatively short, especially when considering how much material it contains. More than that, Peraino has decided to run his story through a handful of major characters, personalizing the events, and creating an engaging intimacy. These figures include Mao, Chiang, Madame Chiang Kai-Shek, President Truman, and – perhaps most fascinatingly – Secretary of State Dean Acheson.

I don’t want to necessarily say that A Force So Swift is superficial, since that implies a negative value. Nevertheless, Peraino definitely takes an eagle-eyed perspective, streamlining and simplifying things. There is very little background given to Mao and Chiang, so you have to bring your own knowledge with you. Beyond that, the action is tilted away from the happenings in China – with only the sketchiest accounts of Mao’s final military victories, and Chiang’s escape to Taiwan – and toward the political wrangling in the United States.

The heart of Peraino’s tale concerns President Truman and Secretary Acheson’s decision about whether to continue to support Chiang (and if so, how much), and the cost of this decision in the face of withering Republican attacks that Truman was “losing China” (as though America ever owned it in the first place). Here, the Republican opposition is symbolized by Congressman Walter Judd, who Peraino presents as a principled critic, rather than a political opportunist (and there were a few of those).

Eventually, President Truman withheld further aid to Chiang. At the time, this was seen as one of the most catastrophic foreign policy defeats in American history. Truman and Acheson were duly roasted over the coals. Yet, in the fullness of time, it is extremely hard, even if one squints, to see what more Truman could have done, or whether pouring more money into Chiang’s cause would have changed anything but the timing of his defeat. Mao had done a good job preserving himself during World War II, which meant that once Japan had left, he was going to be really, really hard – if not impossible – to beat, even if Chiang had been better supplied, and his forces less corrupt. I haven’t studied the issue enough to draw any hard conclusions, but on first glance, this looks a lot like the situation in Vietnam, where the Communist forces were simply more motivated than the Nationalist forces, and that no amount of American aid or military support was going to change that balance.

Unfortunately, the scolding that Truman and Acheson received forced them to pivot hard into anti-Communism and the Cold War. As Peraino writes, this led to a cascading series of choices that were to have far reaching consequences. These consequences went beyond the frosty American-Chinese relations that continue to this day.

For instance, in May 1950, after the Chinese People’s Liberation Army captured an island from Chiang’s Nationalists, Truman decided to provide money and military aid to Indochina, in the first tentative steps of the quagmire to come (it’s interesting that after his drubbing, Truman was willing to do in Vietnam what he had refused to do with Chiang).

Just as momentous, Secretary Acheson gave a speech regarding a defensive perimeter against the spread of Communism. This perimeter left out South Korea, which was promptly attacked by North Korea in June 1950, with China’s blessing (and later, with many of China’s troops). The Korean War, in turn, hardened Truman’s stance against China, and led him to support Chiang and Taiwan against the People’s Republic.

To be sure, in the realm of history, drawing straight lines between cause and effect is a fraught proposition. After all, many things are happening simultaneously all over the world. It is far too simple to give all credit to Mao or all blame to Truman, Acheson, and Chiang, since there are countless other factors at play. It is a very rare thing for a huge historical event to turn on a single person as – in Herman Wouk’s conception – “the massive door of a vault turns on a small jewel bearing.” By keeping a tight focus on just a few key players, Peraino reduces this sprawling event to its essentials, but in doing so, there is some distortion and flattening.

Yet, this type of history writing is also really dramatic. The pace here is propulsive, and I easily finished A Force So Swift in a couple days. By giving us human dimensions, Peraino also makes this topic memorable, a morality play acted out on the most tremendous of stages. Someday, hopefully, I will get to that massive biography of Dean Acheson that sitting on one of my bookshelves, threatening its collapse. Until then, I have a strong basis for further study, provided by this entertaining and easily-digestible look at one of the major inflection points in the arc of the world.

[Mikey B. · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an outstanding book on the time period under examination. We come to understand the complexities of the U.S. and a new, emerging China in 1949.

The profiles of the personalities participating with the pulls and pushes on them are well depicted by the author. We get close-up views of Madame Chiang Kai-shek (the wife of Nationalist Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek and prime manipulator number one), Harry Truman, and Dean Acheson. Madame Chiang Kai-shek espoused the nationalist cause endlessly, using primarily money that was abundantly handed over to her by the U.S. during the war years. She spent much of her time in New York City networking and brought several American politicians onboard who were whole-heartedly converted to “saving” China.

For some Americans, China was seen as pivotal; it had to be defended from the spreading tentacles of communism. Mao was edging close to the Stalinist Soviet Union seeking their aid, but in many ways Mao was leery of all foreigners. These foreigners had been exploiting and pilfering China for well over one hundred years. Mao misinterpreted the White Paper released by the Truman government reporting on the mass corruption and ineptitude of the Nationalist Chinese (Chiang Kai-shek) over the years. Mao saw it as a propaganda ploy for the U.S. to exert still more influence and control in China.

Page 132 Walter Judd, Republican Congressman, November 1949

Tragically it appears likely that the forces against us [Mao’s communists] are about to win. If so, it can only bring disaster for all people who believe in genuine freedom, and especially for those who believe there is a God and there are moral laws in the universe... a civilization can go down in destruction because the blind allowed themselves to be led by the blind.

This is extreme hubris, as if the United States would have had the ability to transform events in China – a large, impoverished country of hundreds of millions which the U.S. had little knowledge of. How many troops would have been needed to overcome the Chinese Communist army of two million soldiers? How much aid money would need to be given and for how long? There was a strong proselytizing wave of “America can save the world” by many at this time. Fortunately this was countered by a more pragmatic approach.

Page 223 Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, October 1949

We can greatly help those who are doing their utmost to succeed... we cannot direct or control; we cannot make a world, as God did, out of chaos.

[Nancy · Rating 5 out of 5]

In 1949 Mao's People Liberation Army was taking over mainland China while Madame Chaing Ka-shek endeavored to gain more funding for her husband's Nationalist army.

America considered China a minor power. Europe after WWII garnered most of American attention. President Truman was assailed with conflicting views on how to deal with China. There was the domino theory and its fear of Communist take-over of Southeast Asia. For all the help that Chaing Ka-shek had received, the Nationalists were losing the war. Was their cause a 'rate hole' not worth throwing more money into? Britain was considering recognizing Mao as the new head of China. Should America follow suit?

Kevin Peraino's narrative history A Force So Swift was fascinating to read. The complicated history of the time comes to life, especially the machinations of Truman's White House and the people who sought to influence his policy. Names I heard growing up were brought to life. After reading The Accidental President by A. J. Baimie about Truman's first four months in the presidency it was interesting to see how he handled issues in his second term.

"......Truman and his N.S.C. filtered into the Cabinet Room at the White House....From an oil painting at the front of the room, the face of Woodrow Wilson stared down, judging them. For his entire adult life, Truman had sought to emulate Wilson, to continue the twenty-eighth president's quest to develop a "collective conscience" and a "common will of mankind" that might replace the chaos of conflicting interests that had defined the first half of the twentieth century."

Instead of consolidating a way to universal peace, Truman signed the policy paper to halt support to "non-Communist elements in China." America would no longer support Chaing Ka-shek, now isolated on Taiwan. Money would instead go to covert operations. America was to give "particular attention" to the French and Vietnamese conflict in Indochina. Meanwhile, Mao was celebrating his victory and had turned his attention to Korea. The choices made in 1949 led to the Korean conflict and the Vietnam War and have implications that reverberate to this day.

I received a free book from the publisher through Blogging for Books in exchange for a fair and unbiased review.

[Bkwmlee · Rating 3 out of 5]

I struggled a bit with rating this book, mainly because this book turned out to be very different from what I expected. I’m quite selective when it comes to non-fiction books, since I know it generally takes more effort on my part to concentrate and focus on what I’m reading due to life’s many distractions. When I see a non-fiction book on a subject that piques my interest, I pick it up hoping that the information will be presented in a way that is engaging and insightful. I’m a bit of a history fanatic and love learning new things, so I tend to gravitate toward books that have a historical element to them. While this book definitely covered the history aspect well, the part that made it difficult for me to get into was its heavy focus on politics. I’ve always viewed politics as a complicated game with constantly-changing rules and a playbook so complex that only those players well-versed in its language have a decent shot at success. I’m not one of those players and never will be. I know enough about the basics to help me get through life, but that’s about it – most politics go way above my head and to be honest, I’m fine with that, as I have no interest whatsoever trying to understand it. It’s no surprise then that I try to stay away from books that are heavy on politics and this is why Kevin Peraino’s A Force So Swift: Mao, Truman, and the Birth of Modern China, 1949 didn’t really work for me.

The book recounts the one year timespan from when Harry Truman starts his second term as President of the U.S. in 1948 to the rise of infamous Communist dictator Mao Zedong and his establishment of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949. Historically, the author covered quite a bit of ground, starting from the end of the Second World War and its effect on the various countries that were involved (specifically the countries that formed the Axis and Allied Powers during the war), running through some of the major events that occurred during that time and the various players involved. There was also a bit of back history about China, the rise of Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek and the Soong family, Mao Zedong’s early years and his role during the war, the Japanese occupation of China and its aftermath, etc. – it also touched on some of the cultural differences between China and the U.S. and the basis for these differences from history….this first third or so of the book that dealt with history and culture I absolutely enjoyed. However, after that, the book started to focus more on the American side of things – more specifically, the intricacies of American politics and development of foreign policy during the Truman administration, details about the political players and strategists who shaped the U.S. policy toward China and the rest of the Pacific, the roles that Europe and also Russia played, etc. – this is where the book started losing me and after I dozed off a few times while reading, I decided to skim my way through the rest of it.

I ended up rating this book 3 stars because it was actually very well-written and well-researched, plus the history and culture parts were really good, it’s just that I didn’t care for the minutiae with the politics, which unfortunately was majority of the book. For someone like me who is not into politics, I found this book a bit too tedious and way too long (my version came in at a little under 300 pages, with nearly 100 pages of notes/references in the back). Overall, this is a good book that I’m sure those who are into politics will find fascinating and also will learn a lot from it (in fact, our current leader in the big white house (and his staff too) should probably read this book so he understands the history behind our relationship with China and why he can’t say the stuff that he has about China and Taiwan the past couple months and not expect to ruffle some feathers – as an added bonus, there’s some stuff about North Korea in here too!).

Received advance reader’s copy from Crown Publishing via Penguin First to Read program.

[Matt · Rating 5 out of 5]

​​Kevin Peraino delivers a stunning look into the birth of Communist China and the American reaction to a new power player on the block. There was little time to stop and think, as the Chinese government swiftly changed hands during the country’s civil war. As the Cold War emerged and President Harry Truman sought to stomp out communism across the world, the Chinese presence, led by Mao Zedong, helped solidify a new political thorn for Americans and one that would not simply be a passing fad. Well-researched and keenly told in a clear manner, Kevin Peraino keeps the reader hooked throughout this stellar tome.

While the world watched throughout the early months of 1949, US President Harry Truman worried. He received daily updates about the Chinese Civil War and progress being made by the communists, led by Mao Zedong. This catastrophe is explored in depth by Kevin Peraino in this book that seeks to explain the situation and how it would be accepted by one of the world’s superpowers. As Truman found himself concerned, he would not let it overtake him, though it would be a large impediment to keeping communism contained across the European continent.

Peraino not only looks at the rise of Mao, but also the deterioration of Chiang Kai-shek, the pro-American leader of China who fled to Taiwan. China would see a major shift in politics, ideology, and sentiment on the world scene, which would soon lead to drastic changes by Mao to reshape the country and pave the way towards economic stability. As Peraino argues, there was a need to rely on Stalin’a Russia for a time, though Mao refused to be a satellite government in Asia for the Soviet leader. China may have been in its ideological youth, there was no desire to become too dependent.

Exploring some key political figures and how they sought to understand or shape China, Peraino seeks to educate the reader at every turn. Key members of Truman’s cabinet, world leaders, and Cold War era players all helped to shape the view China had on the world scene and how it would be accepted at a time when counties sought to begin collaborative work, rather than isolationist behaviour. As Peraino further discusses, the rise of Chinese communism would pave the way for political and ideological shifts in Korea, as well as Vietnam, two countries that would soon have Americans tied up and bloodied. This would also create a significant geo-political situation with Taiwan at its centre, forcing the Americans to assert their definition of the ‘true China’, which would divide the world for decades. With the Taiwan situation on the doorstep, Peraino also seeks to draw connections to how America would explain their support of the small island and Chiang support while he remained in exile.

China and America, new allies and guarded foes, would forever look to these years in the late 1940s as an early ‘tire kicking’ to see just how intense the clash would be. Kevin Peraino does a stellar job trying to explain the difficulties of a US-China relationship and the foundations of these strains.

It is impossible to synthesise events with ease in a single book, but Kevin Peraino does well with what he has published. Seeking to jam decades of history and nuanced political views into a tome of digestible length, the author does well to provide key pathways to understanding without getting too bogged down in the details. Peraino does well to explain the lay of the land for the curious reader, while showing the various flavourings that cannot be ignored when understanding the situation and how these two countries came to respect one another, albeit remaining leery. Using countless documents from many sources, Peraino substantiates his views with documented proof, adding depth to the sentiments expressed. This helps create a well-rounded view for the curious reader and paves the way to better understanding the strains many governments had in trying to understand the Communist China that refused to disappear. A brilliant piece of writing that taught me so very much. I can only hope to learn more about the region, the subject matter, and seek to read more of Kevin Peraino’s wiritng. Well worth my time and surely perfect for the curious reader who wants to learn, while still keeping things someway accessible for the layperson.

Kudos, Mr. Peraino, for a brilliant primer to help the curious reader gather some intial interest on the subject matter.

Love/hate the review? An ever-growing collection of others appears at:
http://pecheyponderings.wordpress.com/

[Cynthia · Rating 4 out of 5]

Post World War Two feels like it should be familiar to most people however the sequence of political issues often isn’t. Peraino describe the events that lead to the China we know today or at least its roots. So many people were sick of conflict and the GI’s and their families wanted to get on with rebuilding their interrupted lives. Truman and his cabinet and the then current Congress didn’t have this luxury.

Peraino concentrates on China and Chang Kai-Shek’s nationalist party versus mao’s Communist platform. Obviously the US had a vested interest in aiding Chang. The Soviet Union backed the Communists. I’m impressed with clarity of how the facts are presented. There were lots of players but the author alternates each party’s concerns and the reasoning behind their actions.

Thank you to the publisher for providing an advance reader’s copy.

[Mal Warwick · Rating 5 out of 5]

Most history books paint the past in broad strokes, covering dozens or hundreds of years. Yet some of the most engaging works drill down into the events of a particular time or place. Kevin Peraino has brilliantly used that approach in A Force So Swift: Mao, Truman, and the Birth of Modern China, 1949. By focusing on the events of a single year, and concentrating on just ten key individual players in the drama, Peraino has brought back to life the complex circumstances surrounding one of the seminal events of the 20th Century. In Peraino's hands, the emergence of the People's Republic of China comes across as though it might have occurred yesterday.

And this is not dry history that can be forgotten. As Peraino notes, "Anxious Chinese officials see today's American policy as a sequel to the containment strategy hatched in 1949."

1949 was a fateful year in many ways. The year witnessed the growth of the Red Scare, the formation of NATO, the opening run of Death of a Salesman, the resignation and suicide of Defense Secretary James Forrestal, the formation of the Council of Europe, the trials of Alger Hiss, the publication of 1984, the first test of a nuclear bomb by the Soviet Union, and the formation of East and West Germany. Every one of these events figures in the background of Peraino's chronicle of the year.

I was barely conscious of the wider world in 1949. After all, I was just eight years old. But every one of the ten individuals Peraino follows through that fateful year conjures up memories for me. Admittedly, my reading of history has a lot to do with that. But all ten of the people profiled in A Force So Swift were active for years after 1949, and I became familiar with them as the years went by. Peraino's book helps me understand them better.

The cast of characters in A Force So Swift includes Mao Zedong, Harry Truman, Dean Acheson, Chiang Kai-Shek, Madame Chiang Kai-Shek, Josef Stalin, and Douglas MacArthur, every one of whom is familiar to anyone who reads history. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, Congressman Walter Judd (R-Minnesota), and British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin all played oversized roles in the events of 1949 but are less well known today. Johnson and Judd were central figures in the China Lobby that pressured Truman. Bevin engineered Britain's recognition of Red China in defiance of US wishes.

The central drama illuminated in A Force So Swift is the clash between Acheson and the China Lobby led by Madame Chiang Kai-Shek for President Truman's attention. The debate centered on whether the United States should continue to support the Nationalist forces led by Chiang Kai-Shek as they fell apart in the face of continuing Communist victories. Acheson was firmly opposed. Throughout the year, Truman leaned toward Acheson's position, but saying no became progressively more difficult as the year unfolded. ("To court Mao or to confront him? Truman did not really want to do either.") The public relations campaign whipped up by the China Lobby was ferocious, and political pressure from Congress and the Pentagon was daunting. ("The congressional leadership was unanimously opposed to formally halting shipments" of money and arms to Chiang.) Even before Mao declared the formation of the People's Republic on October 1, 1949, Acheson and Truman were convinced Red China was a fait accompli, and they hoped that by refraining from overt attacks on Mao's forces that a split would eventually emerge between China and the Soviet Union. Their opponents refused to accept reality. History shows Truman and Acheson were correct.

"Ultimately the legacy of 1949," Peraino writes, "in some cases, despite Acheson's best efforts, had included thirty years of nonrecognition of Communist China, a decades-long U.S. commitment to Taiwan, and the wars in Korea and Vietnam."

Kevin Peraino is an American journalist who has written for many leading publications. He is a visiting scholar at New York University. A Force So Swift is his second book.

[Micah Cummins · Rating 5 out of 5]

Review to come.

[Michelle T · Rating 4 out of 5]

I've always believed that to understand today's geopolitical dynamics, we must learn about their roots. Recent travels have broadened my horizon and piqued my interest in modern history, especially around US-China tensions.

Peraino does a fantastic job of recounting the downfall of the Nationalists, how the US played a role, and the gradual build of the CCP's power, well supported by the Soviet Union. He captures the essence of key figures in political history (Madame Chang, Chang Kai-Shek, Mao, Truman, Acheson, McCarthy, Johnson, Judd, Mao, Stalin and others) but largely from the US perspective.

While well written and well researched, this book requires a lot of concentration given how much ground it covers and how heavily it dives into US politics, especially in the second half. I struggled a bit with the latter. Key events / pivotal moments were also missing (e.g. Xi'an Incident, TW's martial law), but I still thought it was a great read. This genre is a little adventurous for me but I'm glad I was rewarded with greater knowledge and background of the intricate geopolitical tensions, foreign policies and polar perspectives, especially during the tense post WW2 era.

[Nancy · Rating 5 out of 5]

I knew absolutely nothing about..
Truman administration VS. Mao Zedong's People's Republic of China.
This book was enlightening!
I was very impressed with Dean Achenson
who he played a central role in defining American foreign policy.
Tip: read H.W. Brands The General and The President after you
read this book.
H.W.Brands' book starts....where Kevin
Peraino's finishes!
#MustRead for all non-fiction/history buffs!

[Lee · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent history of the interactions between domestic and international politics in 1949 as US-China relations fell apart.

[Charles · Rating 5 out of 5]

Could China have been “Saved”?

By 1949, the year captured in this fascinating story of Mao Zedong’s defeat of Chiang Kai-shek’s forces in China, the world was a very complicated place for President Truman and American policy makers. The Marshall Plan had been launched to jump-start European recovery and counter Communist influence. The Berlin airlift was a success, but the Soviet Union had exploded an atomic bomb, thereby ending America’s status as the world’s only atomic power. The spy trial of Alger Hiss began, and became the prelude to fears of a “Red Menace”. Soon Joseph McCarthy would launch a hunt for spies in the State Department, military, and Hollywood.

China was an especially vexing problem. George Kennan, the architect of a containment policy directed at Stalin’s Soviet Union, judged that Mao’s impending victory over Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists was the product of tremendous indigenous forces beyond the power of the U.S. to control. Policy makers such as Secretary of State Dean Acheson were frustrated by Chiang’s incompetence. The American electorate could not understand why the U.S., with all its power, couldn’t control Communist expansion — but at the same time voters were increasingly unwilling to foot the bill for overseas military and economic aid, particularly in Asia.

And, startling as it now seems to us in 2018, China was viewed as economically unimportant to the U.S., unlikely ever to be a “great power”.

Author Kevin Peraino provides an absorbing chronicle of the personalities involved in the decisions and events of 1949 to provide background to the question Americans ask, “Could China have been “saved”?

John Layton Stuart, a former China missionary and U.S. ambassador to China, wanted to engage with Mao. Louis Johnson, Truman’s Secretary of Defense, wanted to roll back Mao’s gains on the battlefield. Truman and Secretary of State Acheson didn’t want to come to grips with the hard question, hoping to wait to see how the dust settled before deciding how to proceed.

Congress wanted non-Communists to “win” but didn’t want to spend any money or make military commitments to achieve that aim.

Yet any bailout of the Nationalists was up to America because the U.S. alone had emerged from World War II stronger not weaker. Britain, America’s strong ally in Europe against Communism, had a different agenda in China. The British priority was retention of Hong Kong and the preservation of Britain’s significant assets on the mainland. British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin urged a hands-off, patient approach to Mao and didn’t see China as a threat to world order.

As with the American-backed South Vietnam regime in 1975, the collapse of Chiang’s Nationalist forces in 1949 was swift, as Mao’s forces captured Beijing, Shanghai, and other major cities despite the hundreds of millions of dollars of military equipment provided by the U.S. to prevent just such an eventuality.

Looking back on 1949 with the hindsight of the Vietnam experience, it is also difficult to believe that U.S. military assistance, short of the use of atomic weapons and the risk such use might bring, could have altered the outcome of Mao’s victory. If 500,000 American troops couldn’t subdue a small country such as South Vietnam, China’s size both in terms of population and area would have doomed U.S. troop intervention to prop up the Nationalist Chinese regime. It would have been a Vietnam ten times worse than Vietnam.

So, this book offers a compelling case that Chiang Kai-shek’s China could not have been “saved” by the U.S., The ideological attractiveness, at the time, of Mao’s message to the suffering Chinese people and the failure of the Nationalists to implement needed reform would have doomed outsider intervention. Coming decades would see continued Chinese suffering due to Mao’s mismanagement, including The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. But no one had the crystal ball in 1949 to predict such events.

And no one in 1949 could have foreseen China’s economic growth and strength by 2018.

Peraino handles with clarity a complicated political situation in both China and the United States in 1949 and provides a useful background to the issues of U.S.-Chinese relations today.

[Yakym Yermak · Rating 5 out of 5]

Як і прийнято у американських дослідників: Вони пишуть про Америку. Китай тут не головна дійова особа.

Книга не про Мао чи Чана, а про відносини і стратегії державних посадовців Сполучених Штатів Америки.

Цікаво? Так, безумовно. Гарно поданий текст, цікаві персонажі. Ти постійно хвилюєшся за китайських націоналістів і мадам Чан, злишся на американську «верхівку», спостерігаєш за відносинами між Мао і Сталіним, і особливо, що я люблю в текстах: під час прочитання у тебе з’являються думки: «А що якби вони зробили по-іншому?» «Що було б, якби … ?»

Окремо для Українців: Якщо ви думаєте читати книгу «У таборах», яка вийшла 2022 року у видавництві «Лабораторія», то спочатку рекомендую прочитати саме цю книгу, а вже потім повертатись до Таборів. Я зробив навпаки, і трохи жалкую, контексту не вистачало, а зараз все стало на свої місця.

[Albert · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book is an exploration of the change in American foreign policy in China during the birth of the People's Republic of China in 1949. It is an important, specific year in China's vast history, making sure that this book has its place amongst the modern Chinese history books. Although the figures covered changed the course of US-China relations, the author too often depicts strange one-dimensional characterizations of complex individuals. And given how the events of 1949 shaped US-China relations ever since, I think the author missed a great opportunity to conduct an in-depth study of these relations, and instead, embellished minute-by-minute details more often than focusing on the massive implications of the birth of Communist China.

Still, there are informative accounts of the different responses to the changing of the guard in China. There is President Harry Truman, who grows increasingly more discouraged by the failings of the Nationalist government in controlling China and squandering American aid along the way. There is Secretary of State Dean Acheson, whose evolving China policy goes from ignoring East Asia to its dominating his strategy sessions to embracing containment of Communist China. There is Communist leader Mao Zedong, who is emboldened into victory coinciding with Communist China's growing relationship with Stalin's Soviet Union. There is Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek, who falls by the wayside as China's leader, retreating further east until he reaches the island of Taiwan. There is his wife Madame Chiang, orchestrating Nationalist strategy and currying American support behind the scenes - while in New York.

I liked the use of New York Times headlines to go alongside the day-to-day coverage of the Truman administration behind the scenes and its response to the Chinese Communist Revolution. I also learned a lot about the China White Paper, the thought process behind and the impact of Truman administration's decision to release the document, to attempt to absolve itself of responsibility for "the loss of China" and distance itself from Chiang and the Nationalists. I also found Truman's jostling with Congressman Walter Judd on China policy and his all-out Nationalist support to be an interesting backstory.

I sometimes found the author used language condescending towards some decision makers (perhaps Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson) and sympathetic towards others (Acheson). I would have preferred the author present facts to let the reader determine the impact of events and their own opinion on individuals. I was also surprised that eventual Premier Zhou Enlai was barely mentioned.

Overall, this book was useful to examine the American response to the Chinese Communist Revolution in 1949, but could have been much more.

[Alan · Rating 4 out of 5]

A concise diplomatic history of 1949 of US involvement in China — the year in which “we lost China,” “blowing with the advance winds of the Cold War” making clear that the Vietnam War was the “bastard legacy” of 1949. A page turner. I concurrently re-read the last third of Tuchman’s classic “Stillwell and the American Experience in China — which helped put in perspective the losing hand that Truman and Acheson were dealt by FDR’s handling of China in 1944.

[Alan Tomkins · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was a very interesting, well written book that moved along at a fast clip. After reading it, I feel that though I understand why Truman and Acheson decided to write off Chiang and the Nationalists, their doing so opened the door to the Korean War. Kim Il Sung had been repeatedly asking Stalin for permission to invade South Korea, and Stalin for years had been saying no, don't antagonize the U.S. and risk war with the Americans. But after witnessing the Truman administration's complete passivity and lack of any response other than closed mouth appeasement to Mao's communist conquest of China in 1949, by the spring of 1950 Stalin told Kim go for it, the U.S. probably won't do anything. Perhaps there weren't any good options, but having some kind of a coherent China policy would have been helpful. There was none. The communists were patient, persistent, disciplined, and kept to a definite strategy. The U.S. under President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson were the opposite of that. And to say that Acheson's approach of patiently waiting for rifts to appear between the Chinese and the Soviets was vindicated decades later, as the author suggests more than once, because it eventually did happen and Nixon eventually was able to capitalize on this development...well, there are times for certain policies, and though such an approach was clearly suitable in the early 1970s, that doesn't mean it was suitable at the formation of the PRC. The communists were aggressive. They would hold back or back off if the west stood up to them. Truman and Acheson did not stand up to them, and more violent conflict with communist aggressors followed. That may not have been the intended message of this book, but after years of softening on such a perspective, I now believe it more firmly than ever after reading this. Anyway, I enjoyed it. Good book.

[Bryan Cebulski]

History books are always to some extent going to feel like an episode in the middle of a long series, and you just kind of have to hope the writer provides enough context for you to figure out the befores and afters. This wasn't too bad in that respect, but it did feel like it zoomed through a lot of material. I liked it and got a lot out of it--it's really interesting to see this often overlooked lead-up to the Korean War--but I wonder if something either more focused or comprehensive would have been easier to absorb.

I thought this was going to be a sort of back-and-forth narrative about Mao and Truman and how their respective administrations treated foreign policy with one another's countries but out of anyone for some reason Madame Chiang Kai-shek has been the primary human focus.

[Carlos Wang · Rating 4 out of 5]

1949是個關鍵的年份，例如，最近慶祝“建政”70週年的中華人民共和國就是在這個時間點成立。雖然，其實很多重大關鍵的命運早在更之前就已然決定了，特別是前一年三大會戰打完之後。在這過程中，美國對華政策仍然舉棋不定，各方勢力爭論不休，事態卻不等人，回過神時，大局已然底定。本書書名寓意即是指此一情況。畢竟，連毛澤東原本都自我估計應該要到五零年代中才能打敗蔣介石的呢。

本書作者凱文.裴萊諾(Kevin Peraino)是位資深新聞記者，他採取了類似《萬歷十五年》的方式，他放大了1949這個年份，帶領讀者去一一檢視，在這個風雲變幻的時間點，參與其中的幾位重大人物他們的背景、個性與立場動機，並以此探討其在歷史進程中的影響與結果。



做為一個媒體工作人，作者的基本敘事功力是沒問題，不過，他在描述幾位主人公如杜魯門、蔣宋美齡、周以德等時，雖然看的出其用心詳述，詳實，但卻缺乏像另外一位風格相似的女性作者塔奇曼那樣細膩，選擇刻劃人物的事蹟不夠讓人“印象深刻”，在水平上次了一等。



把焦點集中在一個年份，讀者可以看到作者詳細的敘述了美國政界針對中國政策的決定，是如何針鋒相對，激烈交鋒。每個人都出於自己的理由與動機，然後用國家利益去包裝，而結果卻只有歷史可以證明。不過這樣的缺點是卻欠缺大局觀，讀者自己最好對整個前因後果自行有所了解，才能更加明白作者的表述。





讀完本書，可以感覺到裴萊諾對杜魯門在中國政策上的瞻前顧後，甚至最後選擇“放生”的態度頗有微詞，認為之後的“韓戰”、“越戰”等，都是因此而起。雖然，他也坦承，在歷史關鍵點要做出明智的抉擇並不容易，有時候雖然未必抱持著惡意，卻也可能得出非己所願的結果。



不過批判杜魯門也未必公平。蔣政權在抗戰後期的腐敗衰弱是有目共睹，眾所皆知，即便小羅斯福生前，也沒剩下多少好感。我曾想過，如果這位美國史上任期最長的總統能夠當完四任，歷史能否有其他改變？他會給予蔣氏更多的支援，還是會跟杜魯門一樣呢？可惜不會有答案。





這本書其實如果能夠搭配同出版社的另外一本《意外的國度》看，會有更好的體驗。(貌似會有兩本合售的活動吧)

[Fraser Kinnear · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a fantastic, short history of the year the Chinese Communist party came to power in China. Periano tells the story through a tight cast of characters: Mao, Chiang Kai-shek, Madame Chiang Kai-shek, Truman, Dean Acheson, and Stalin. Each character's personality and philosophy drives the story like that of a great play.

The writer Joseph Campbell, for example, in 1949 published The Hero with a Thousand Faces, a book drawing on psychoanalytical techniques to argue that the myths of many different cultures shared similar elements - including a heroic central character on a quest to redeem his people. Although previous scholars had made sutdies of comparative mythology, Campbell's innovation, according to one reviewer, was to include Christianity as one of the narratives to be deconstructed. Campbell, like the psychoanalysts who inspred him, thus inverted the relationship between man and God: The latter became a projection of the former. Taken to its logical conclusion, Campbell's work cast human beings as active producers of their gods and myths, not just passive consumers. This ongoing cultural argument over the promise and limits of human agency provided the backdrop ot the China debate and helps explain a great deal. Few of the key players fit neatly into one of these categories; more often they toggled between the two or embodied both at once. Madame Chiang and Walter Judd considered themselves both devout Christians and firm believers in human volition, sharing the millenarian conviction that they could improve the world through their efforts. On the other hand, Acheson - not a particularly devout Christian - nevertheless was convinced that much of the world environment remained resistant to human control. Perhaps alone among the important participants, Mao unapologetically exalted the force of human will. "You are God," he had once written in the margin of one of his philosophy books. "Is there any God other than yourself?"

The larger story goes roughly as follows: Chiang and Mao both fought to bring about the collapse of the Ching dynasty, briefly as allies. They subsequently fought against each other for 20 years, with Chiang controling China as leader of the Nationalist Party. World War II subsequently cripples China's economy and Chiang's mandate of control over the populus and military, which allows for Mao to sweep to power in 1949. The United States (namely, Truman and his Secretary of State Dean Acheson) quickly lose faith in Chiang's ability to retain power, and mostly stand aside during Mao's rise, which they deem is inevitable. All the while, Madame Chiang is in the US, bravely lobbying for more support for her much weaker husband.

For the US, this seems like yet another unsolvable problem in global politics, much like we have seen in the middle east for the past decade. The Korean War and the Vietnam War were both largely catalyzed by Mao's rise. Probably not surprising, but we were also not interested at the time in any more foreign adventures. According to a Gallup poll in early 1949, 1/5 of Americans said they were indifferent about the events in China and 15% didn't know about it.

What to do? 20th century history is rife with examples of where foreign intervention is justified and unjustified, successful and disasterous. I think most important is to see and understand examples of both, as all circumstances are different, and require judgment.

Some disorganized notes:

Mao proves to be a very Nietzhean personality, there are loads of great quotes about his ambition:
- "[Mao] saw no paradox in the exercise of human will, only opportunity.'Some say that we must believe that the moral law comes from the command of god, for only then can it be carried out and not be despised.' Mao had scrawled in the margin of one of his texts, 'This is a slavish mentality - why should you obey god rather than obey yourself?'".
- Mao's inspiration, Lian: "In the world, there is only power. There is no other force. That the strong always rule the weak is in truth the first great universal rule of nature. Hence, if we wish to obtain liberty, there is no other road. We can only seek first to be strong."

Some great quotes on Acheson:
-"We can help only where we are wanted and only where the conditions of help are really sensible and possible"
- Happiness is "Happiness is the Exercise of Vital Powers, Along Lines of Excellence, in a Life Affording Them Scope" Public service provides an antidote to the flatness of life
-Acheson's believed "force and violence were unavoidable realities in the terrestrial sphere. America's enemies, men like Stalin and Mao, were shrewdly crafting their strategies based on a calculation of forces... The United States, if it intended to survive in this dangerous world, would need to do the same, but cautiously, prudently."

Some other fascinating stories are hinted at, and would make for great reading on their own:
- General MacArthur wanted to open a southern front of the Korean war from Taiwan into China. Truman fired MacArthur over this
- In 1950, American operatives tried to support resistance fighters in Tibet, but eventually Mao sent 9,000 troops to invate Tibet.

A nice stanza from a Chesterton poem:
I tell you naught for your comfort,
Yea, naught for your desire,
Save that the sky grows darker yet
And the sea rises higher.

[Logan Burton · Rating 4 out of 5]

A suprisingly good primer into the drama between the State Department, the Communists, and the Nationalists toward the end of the Chinese Civil War. Considering how many few (even educated) Americans know about the precipitous events of Mao and the Communists taking over the mainland, this book is a very engrossing account of the individual characters that dealt with the countless political dilemmas. Undoubtedly, were I teach a class on "China watching", I would make this required reading.

[Bon · Rating 4 out of 5]

I found this a quick but thorough look at a specific slice of history, and really informative on an area my schooling never covered much. A must-read for those interested in east Asian affairs and how we got where we are today. Actually, a lot of the standoffs in this, concerns regarding Hong Kong and Taiwan, made it an eerily timely read if you look at the news today. It was written really objectively, to my eyes, and sure made U.S. policymaking of the time look foolish.

[Bob · Rating 4 out of 5]

Summary: A study of how the Truman adminstration, under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, framed America's response to the rise of Mao as the Nationalist forces under Chiang Kai-shek fell to Communist forces in 1949.

The role of the People's Republic of China as a world power is an accepted reality in today's global landscape. Threats to Taiwan, seizure of coastal islands, influence throughout east and southeast Asia, and economic growth and trading relationships with the U.S. regularly are subjects of the evening news. What is often less understood are the events nearly 70 years ago that helped shape current realities.

In 1949 the world was recovering from war. China invaded by Japan in World War II, nominally was under control of a Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-shek. Beginning in the spring of 1949, Communist forces under Mao Zedong rapidly conquered Nationalist controlled territories, leading to a situation where the fate of Chiang's government, which had enjoyed American support, was increasingly in doubt.

Kevin Peraino, using recently declassified information as well as Russian and Chinese sources, studies the U.S. response to what many viewed as a cataclysmic event. China under Chiang had been an object of American mission efforts as well as trade and a wartime alliance, all of which was in jeopardy. For that reason, the Truman administration faced significant factions who pressed for continued efforts to prop up the failing regime, led by one-time Truman ally, Warren Judd. These efforts were also fostered by Madame Chiang, who took up residence in the U.S., probably the most effective ambassador Chiang could have employed.

Louis Johnson, Truman's Secretary of Defense favored efforts to support Chiang while Dean Acheson, as Secretary of State was much more doubtful of Chiang's ability to survive, even on Taiwan. Acheson also recognized that China and Russia may not have had as much in common as was projected. There were even reasons to support rather than resist this new government. In the end, it wasn't to be, even though there was good reason for the suspicions that the relationship between Russia and Communist China was an uneasy alliance at best. Instead, the U.S. extended its policy of containment, withholding recognition to the People's Republic of China until the late 1970's, and becoming involved in conflicts first in Korea and then in Indochina, leading to our Vietnam ordeal.

Peraino's book explores how foreign policy is often constrained by the politically possible at home as well as by other global actors. Fears of Communism, of atomic war, and the concern not to be the administration that "lost" China placed great pressures on the Truman administration, which resulted in a compromise between acceptance of the new reality and the effort to project a strong response shaping events for at least a generation, and perhaps down to the present day. One wonders what might have happened if early American recognition and support of Mao had been possible. Would China have gone through the ordeals of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution? Would we have been embroiled in Korea and Vietnam? At the same time, would the vibrant, indigenous Chinese Christian movement have arisen, now estimated to number more than 100 million adherents?

It is not given to us to know "what if." But Peraino helps us understand what happened and what resulted and how that has shaped the international landscape down to our own day. We see both the necessity of intelligent foreign policy in the careers of people like Acheson and George Kennen, and the limits even very bright people face. We see both the pressures and the folly involved in backing failing governments. And we see how Truman's ideals of achieving the "federation of the world" of Tennyson's "Locksley Hall" come smack up against the realities of the Cold War, one that really hasn't ended to this very day.

____________________________

Disclosure of Material Connection: I received a complimentary review copy of this book from the publisher in exchange for an honest review. The opinions I have expressed are my own.

[Geoffrey · Rating 4 out of 5]

(Note - I was able to read an advanced copy of this work courtesy of NetGalley)

There are so many figures and such a packed mass of happenings covered in this book, but not once did I ever find myself information-swamped in any way. Far from it, instead I finished “A Force So Swift” to find myself honestly amazed by just how clear a view I was given of the incredible array of complexities that the Truman administration had to manage and maneuver against in the face of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China and the mighty changes in the post-WWII global setup that came in its wake. Peraino, simply put, does nothing less than a first-rate job of bringing clarification to a particularly complicated (not to mention very relevant) slice of history and putting it within magnificently easy and comprehensible grasp.

[Nicholas Bilka · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good

Good, if occasionally tedious account of the policy struggles going on in Washington as Mao stood on the precipice of taking over all of China.

[Clem · Rating 5 out of 5]

If you’re looking for an easy, somewhat brief primer of the events in 1949 that led to the culmination of Mao Tse-Tung and the formation of Communist China, this is a great, easily digestible book to achieve your goal. I want to emphasize “brief” and “primer”. This book is only 276 pages (excluding sources, references, etc.), and there’s not really a lot of detail that can be covered when you are talking about such a dense subject. You can very easily argue that this book doesn’t cover as much as it should, but as the title suggests, the main focus is on one pivotal year and the key leaders from the perspective of the United States.

The author gives us a bit of history before the pivotal year and has a nice concluding chapter that talks about how these events sculpted the current China as we know it today. Mainly, though, this is a blow by blow account of Mao’s pivotal year of his conquest of China, and Truman and the American leadership deciding how to handle the whole mess.

It seemed like this book was much more about Truman (and members of his cabinet and congress) than it was about Mao. We don’t read, for example, the multitude of atrocities that were committed throughout China in order for the communists to achieve their rapacious goal. We read very little of the rapes, the pillaging, and the cannibalism as a result of the famine imposed by the communist armies. In fact, had you been a novice of history, you might wonder why, exactly, this whole event was such a big deal. Countries encounter civil wars all the time, right? Can’t you just chalk this one off as yet another one?

Well, hindsight tells us differently, sadly. In many ways, these events in China led to Truman’s eventual downfall, yet the apologist in me says we shouldn’t judge him too harshly. Had he actually gone in with an iron fist, he may have prevented (or eliminated) a brutal dictator, yet this is what George W. Bush did in Iraq, and history doesn’t remember him kindly either. Part of the criticism of the Truman’s administration during 1949 is that he seemed determined to keep Communism out of Europe post World War II, but not Asia. How come? This is where allegations of racism come into play. The thought amongst many at this time in history was that these “little yellow men” weren’t really that big of a concern, and they would have to fix these problems on their own without allied intervention. Again, this leads to speculation. Had we played a firmer hand with China, it’s very possible that the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam could have been avoided. We must concede, though, that’s it’s much easier to look backwards and reflect on “what we could have done differently”. Plus, Harry Truman wasn’t alone in his thinking. In fact we read much more about the comings and goings of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who essentially shared Truman’s view, and possibly even led Truman to his way of thinking.

The main focus of this book, though, isn’t necessarily whether or not Truman and company made the ‘right or wrong’ decision. The author simply educates his readers on the particular events during the current year and lets his readers make up their own minds. It’s not a scathing critique, nor a dogmatic defense. It’s simply an account of what happened and the motivations of the main players.

It was also very easy to read, and the author does a magnificent job keeping his readers’ attention. The chapters are all fairly short, and he begins each chapter with a “hook” that immediately grabs and retains your interest for the remainder of the particular chapter. This is crucial to someone like myself who tends to get bored rather easily; especially in terms of world history. Many times I’ll read a mammoth history book and come away with the conclusion that the particular book could have been twice as good had it been half as long. Kevin Peraino’s account, however, left me with the opposite conclusion. Had this book been twice as long, it would have been…..well….twice as good. You simply wanted more. Fortunately, there are many other volumes out there that can placate your appetite if you feel as I did. Peraino is an excellent writer. According to Amazon, his portfolio is rather slim in terms of written works. Let’s hope to see more by him in the future; regardless of the topic.

[David · Rating 4 out of 5]

TLDR: A Force So Swift is a surprisingly brisk read for a book that deals primarily in diplomatic politicking. It is a good primer on modern Chinese history and an interesting look at American foreign policy at a pivotal tipping point.

1949 was a momentous year in the history of the world that is dimly remembered as such, particularly in the West. This is perhaps because, as author Kevin Peraino describes, after a decade dominated by World War II the American public was eager to settle back into normal life and were far more interested in the the struggle for the World Series pennant, for example, than the struggle for the future of East Asia. Peraino does an excellent job of dissecting the year through the lens of all the major figures and events, centering chiefly around the Chinese Civil War.

Factions in China had long been tearing the country apart even before the Japanese invaded in 1937, but following World War II the conflict crystallized into the fight between Soviet-backed Mao Zedong’s Communists and US-backed Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists. Through letters, personal notes, and declassified Chinese, Soviet, and American intelligence documents, Peraino weaves together a comprehensive narrative.

As Mao's forces swept over the Nationalists with ease, American politicians were split on how to handle the threat of losing a malleable partner in East Asia. The arms and money they had already sunk into nationalist China were squandered. Nationalist soldiers surrendered en masse and the American-made armaments were soon being used for the exact opposite reason they were sent in the first place. In America, President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson grappled with how to respond: either to cut losses and leave Chiang to his fate; or continue support with more money, armaments, or possibly even armed intervention. Much political infighting and hand-wringing ensued. On the other hand, Mao acted unilaterally and decisively, occasionally reaching out to a seemingly disinterested Stalin for support.

Ultimately, fearing strong opposition could spark World War 3, the US withdrew all aid. Mainland China belonged to the Communists. Chiang and the remaining Nationalists fled to Taiwan, preparing for what they felt would be an inevitable invasion to wipe them out. They were spared such a fate, but Mao’s victory and how the superpowers reacted - both as it unfolded and in its aftermath - reverberated deeply. Most immediately, North Korea, emboldened by a defeated Nationalist China and a vanished US presence, launched its invasion into South Korea. The US was drawn into a brutal three year war ending in stalemate. Ho Chi Minh would also benefit by Mao’s ascension, having a safe haven in the north if necessary and a new partner whose aid would be used to expel both the French and later the Americans in decades of vicious fighting.

As Peraino points out in the epilogue, the events of 1949 are still relevant today. As in that year, nations still do not know exactly how to deal with China as their power is consolidated in the Pacific and expanded worldwide. The most recent parallel, however, is the Communist party setting the groundwork to allow President Xi Jinping to remain in power for life, the first Chinese leader to be able to do so since Mao.

[Joseph Spuckler · Rating 4 out of 5]

A Force So Swift: Mao, Truman, and the Birth of Modern China, 1949 by Kevin Peraino is the account of the fall of Nationalist China and the actions of the Truman administration. Peraino is a veteran foreign correspondent who has reported from around the world. A senior writer and bureau chief at Newsweek for a decade, he was a finalist for the Livingston Award for foreign reporting and part of a team that won the National Magazine Award in 2004. He is the author of Lincoln in the World: The Making of a Statesman and The Dawn of American Power.

The close of World War II saw the fall of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Europe was left in ruins by the war. The USSR was rising in power as the war came to a close. It was seen as a threat to Western Europe as it demonstrated its will in Eastern Europe. The Berlin Airlift 1949-1949 showed the Soviet commitment against the West. The United States and Europe worked on a plan of containment. In the East, China was still fighting a civil war that was interrupted by WWII and Japanese occupation and related atrocities. The United States was now occupying Japan and putting down the communist movement there. At home, the second Red Scare was beginning with McCarthy and Nixon rising in power.

At a time when the US should have been looking for a partner like nationalist China to contain the Soviet Union in the East, it didn't give meaningful support. America was tired of war. The Marshall Plan took care of Europe. Occupation forces in Japan were taking care of the East. Americans wanted to go back to peacetime and leave the world to itself.

China was mostly left to its own. The US did not want the communists and Mao to rule but did not find much confidence in the Nationalists. Poor leadership in battle and corruption plagued the Nationalist movement. Madame Chiang worked in America creating a public relations lobby to gain support for the Nationalists. Well spoken and elegant she was unable to find the support in the federal government she needed. The Soviets were on their guard. They were distrustful of Mao and his peasant army. During the WWII and before The USSR supported Nationalists turning to Mao when the US picked up support for the Nationalists and as the tide was turning in the civil war.

Peraino gives the reader an inside look at the major players on the world stage especially concentrating on Truman and the Chiangs. The roles of India and Britain are also discussed. A historical look at the civil war shows how easily things could have been different. Although the Chinese civil war was not fought in a vacuum it did not seem to get the attention it deserved. China was still considered an undeveloped country with only a few main cities. Its large population and land mass were not seen at its current potential. China looked to be a country that would remain poor and unorganized.  With the exception of the Koreas, it is the only other separated country.  The Nationalists still govern Taiwan (Formosa) and the Communists the mainland.  Both see themselves as the true Chinese government.  A fascinating look at the creation of modern China. 

[Skjam! · Rating 3 out of 5]

In 1949, Chen Yong was an idealistic boy in his teens, his military uniform too large for him, cheering in Beijing as Mao Zedong declared that the People’s Republic of China was born. Now, he is an old man who fondly remembers those early days, even as his memory of the specifics fades. It was a tumultuous year, not only for China itself, but for its neighbors and the far off United States of America. The response of America’s government, as led by president Harry Truman, would have a long-lasting effect on world politics.

This book covers that pivotal year, from Madame Chiang’s desperate mission to the States to raise sympathy and funds for the Nationalist cause, to Mao’s solidification of his alliance with the Soviet Union. It covers the major players, Generalissimo Chang, Dean Acheson, Secretary of Defense Johnson, and a Congressman from Minnesota named Walter Judd, who led the “China bloc” that tried to draw Truman into direct military support of the Nationalists, or at least giving them much more money.

Some of the people involved get much more attention than others–there’s a full description of Madame Chiang’s family life and childhood, but her husband is picked up only when he becomes involved with her. (The Generalissimo spent much of the year semi-retired before deciding to evacuate to Taiwan and consolidate his forces there.)

There’s also considerable time devoted to what Truman had intended to do with his time as president, as opposed to what reality had in store for him. Sometimes, universal peace and brotherhood have to be put on hold.

Reading about Chiang’s behavior as he rose to power doesn’t make me think he would have been that much better as China’s leader than Mao–it was an early of example of supporting terrible people in office for the sole reason of being anti-Communist. Sadly for the Chinese, Mao turned out to be a better general than practical economist or agriculturial planner. Plus, he let his personality cult overwhelm any real reforms.

The writing is college-level, and the vocabulary sometimes gets a bit pretentious. All Chinese names use the modern transliteration. There are copious end notes, with explanations of where sources differ, a small photo insert, bibliography and index.

This book is primarily valuable as a snapshot of one particular issue at a particular time– the serious scholar will want to pair this volume with a more general history of China, or a full biography of one of the major players. That said, I recommend this book to those interested in the starting point of Red China and how it got that way.

[Rosa So · Rating 5 out of 5]

I am not usually a fan of history (in fact it was one of my least favourite subjects in school), but this book defies expectations of a historical text. We all know how the story ends, and the content is based on real sources and events; but it reads entirely like a novel, with the same page-turning effect of a good thriller.

It was the year 1949, when the world was facing a turbulent time right after WWII, with new world power structures still being established. Japan was in shambles, Europe was in chaos, UN was just birthed and US was just getting used to being the new world leader - the only one with atomic bomb technology. With this backdrop, the complicated politics between US and China unfolds, that ultimately led to the rise of Mao and later on China's cultural revolution, the Korean war and Vietman war.

Hind sight is 20-20, and 1949 was indeed a pivotal year that determined the course of history even till today. Perhaps even Truman himself did not envisioned that his decisions would have such long lasting effects on world dynamics in years to come.

Each politician had his/her own biases, beliefs and worldview, that influenced the final action or inaction. Most decisions were made through much deliberation, against great opposing voices and not without anxiety and uncertainty from the decision makers themselves. It may be easy to judge those decisions now, but this narrative made it clear that the leaders were doing what they believed was the best, given the limited information they had when making the call.

This book was interesting not just because of its captivating narrative, but also because this series of world events directly affected my family - the experiences of my grandparents and later on my parents, who lived through the Mao era. How one man rose in power so quickly to control such a large nation is mind-boggling. It was the unique political and cultural climate that made it possible only at that precarious inflection in history. Perhaps it's like the title of the book suggests - that Mao's army was a 'force so swift' that nothing could have stood in their way.

Ultimately, there are no what-ifs or do-overs in history (though it may be an amusing exercise to imagine). Time marches onward and waits for no man. Those who slumber will be left in the dust of change, whether good or bad. We can only glean certain lessons through studying history to avoid similar mistakes. Let's hope that the current generation will not take our (relative) peace, freedom and democracy for granted.

A highly recommended read. I would not call this book light reading, but certainly suspenseful, exciting and highly informative.

[Jim Gallen · Rating 5 out of 5]

1949 was a crucial year in the history of Modern China and the Sino-American relationship. “A Force So Swift” is the story of the triangle of relationships between the Communists under Mao Zedong who were taking over the country, the Nationalists under Chiang who were in flight and the Truman Administration that was trying to balance national interests with domestic political pressures.

During 1949 the situation in China was in flux and American policy in the Far East was a work in process. Although the Communists were in the ascendency, their position was far from secure as Nationalist and other opposition groups continued resistance. American policy of containment of Communism was established in Europe but had not, yet, been applied to Asia.

Several characters figure in this work. Mao is rather distant actor who guides his revolution and makes feints toward the United States before establishing his relationships with Stalin and the Soviet Union. Much more attention is focused on Madame Chiang Kai-shek, the Georgia educated First Lady of China whose extended residence in the United States served as a bridge between her husband and his government in China, the Administration in Washington and the political opposition in the United States.

Prominent Americans in this book include President Truman, who made the decisions on America’s response to developments in China, Secretary of State Dean Acheson who favored non-intervention, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson who advocated support for the nationalists and Rep. Walter Judd, the Minnesota Republican who used the “Lost China” issue against Truman and the Democrats.

This tome is a through study of the competing forces that guided the United States to support the Nationalists without becoming directly involved in the Chinese conflict for over twenty years. Author Kevin Peraino has skillfully crafted a narrative that seizes the reader’s interest while leading him through the convoluted maze of Chinese history and policy extant in 1949. It is a valuable aid to understanding this segment of the Sino-American relationship.

I did receive a free copy of this book to read and review.