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Practices of Reason: Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
This book is an exploration of the epistemological, metaphysical, and psychological foundations of the Nicomachean Ethics . In a striking reversal of current orthodoxy, Reeve argues that scientific knowledge ( episteme ) is possible in ethics, that dialectic and understanding ( nous ) play
essentially the same role in ethics as in an Aristotelian science, and that the distinctive role of practical wisdom ( phronesis ) is to use the knowledge of universals provided by science, dialectic, and understanding so as to best promote happiness ( eudaimonia ) in particular circumstances and to
ensure a happy life. Turning to happiness itself, Reeves develops a new account of Aristotle's views on ends and functions, exposing their twofold nature. He argues that the activation of theoretical wisdom is primary happiness, and that the activation of practical wisdom--when it is for the sake
of primary happiness--is happiness of a secondary kind. He concludes with an account of the virtues of character, external goods, and friends, and their place in the happy life.
essentially the same role in ethics as in an Aristotelian science, and that the distinctive role of practical wisdom ( phronesis ) is to use the knowledge of universals provided by science, dialectic, and understanding so as to best promote happiness ( eudaimonia ) in particular circumstances and to
ensure a happy life. Turning to happiness itself, Reeves develops a new account of Aristotle's views on ends and functions, exposing their twofold nature. He argues that the activation of theoretical wisdom is primary happiness, and that the activation of practical wisdom--when it is for the sake
of primary happiness--is happiness of a secondary kind. He concludes with an account of the virtues of character, external goods, and friends, and their place in the happy life.
- GenresPhilosophy
238 pages, Hardcover
First published May 25, 1992
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32 people want to read
About the author
C.D.C. Reeve
35 books23 followersC. D. C. Reeve is a philosophy professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He works primarily in Ancient Greek philosophy, especially Plato and Aristotle. He is also interested in philosophy generally, and has published work in the philosophy of sex and love, and on film. He has also translated many Ancient Greek texts, mostly by Plato and Aristotle.
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November 18, 2013
Practices of Reason is a sympathetic exposition of the arguments of the Nichomachean Ethics within the context of Aristotle's entire corpus. It is, first and foremost, a study of argument, both as regards the general, formal method of dialectic and the particulars of Peripatetic ethics. It is not a study of texts, except insofar as ambiguities allow for various translations. In such cases Reeve is careful to save appearances by adopting interpretations most conducive to his heuristic belief that Aristotle is coherent. There is no mention of textual provenance or transmission; no discussion of historical or sociological context; no source, redaction or form criticism. There is no sense conveyed of Aristotle as an historical personage. As in the later Middle Ages, he is again "the Philosopher," a timeless persona.
Whether or not Reeve's arguments work can be examined on two levels. Ideally, the historian of ancient philosophy might evaluate them as a contribution to Aristotle studies. The non-specialist, however, can do little more than deal with Reeve, analyzing his moves, his treatment of selected passages. The graduate student of philosophy might thereby be moved to return to the classical text, to take it--and ancient thought--more seriously than hitherto.
Reeve does succeed in portraying Aristotle as a relevant thinker, particularly as regards the employment of dialectic. Without emphasizing it until his conclusion, Reeve takes the method seriously enough to use it himself, seeing it as a practical means of combining the work of philosophy with that of the other sciences. Philosophy is legitimated as a means of resolving the perplexities, the aporiai, generated by their respective teachings, their endoxa. This, of course, is in keeping with prevailing contemporary views of the discipline.
The older view, however, while including the analysis of propositions, was broader than this. The Ethics constitutes a portion of an answer to the question of living. What is the good life? Simply stated, the best life is one founded upon, and responsible to, a practicable social order allowing contemplative study. The final end, the telos of existence is nous knowing itself, human self-recognition in the transcendence of mortal contingency. But in Reeve's view:
". . . and it is surely one that will meet with little
opposition, science and dialectic have not just taken
these Aristotelian conclusions hostage, they have
decisively killed them off. No one now believes that
everything in the world is trying to become as much
like Aristotle's god as possible, or, indeed, that there
is such a god for them all to try to become like. No
one believes, therefore, that study or the contemplation
of that god can possibly be primary eudaimonia or what,
so to speak, human life is all about. A major doctrine
of the Ethics--if I am right the major doctrine--has
therefore been falsified by science and dialectic and
become incredible."
Given the relatively small claims made for Aristotle's Prime Mover in comparison to those made for other, much more popular conceptions, this remark is itself incredible. Have Judaism, Christianity and Islam been decisively killed off--or just the Aristotelian contributions to them? Or is it simply that modern conceptions of philosophy, of human being, are enervated?
Whether or not Reeve's arguments work can be examined on two levels. Ideally, the historian of ancient philosophy might evaluate them as a contribution to Aristotle studies. The non-specialist, however, can do little more than deal with Reeve, analyzing his moves, his treatment of selected passages. The graduate student of philosophy might thereby be moved to return to the classical text, to take it--and ancient thought--more seriously than hitherto.
Reeve does succeed in portraying Aristotle as a relevant thinker, particularly as regards the employment of dialectic. Without emphasizing it until his conclusion, Reeve takes the method seriously enough to use it himself, seeing it as a practical means of combining the work of philosophy with that of the other sciences. Philosophy is legitimated as a means of resolving the perplexities, the aporiai, generated by their respective teachings, their endoxa. This, of course, is in keeping with prevailing contemporary views of the discipline.
The older view, however, while including the analysis of propositions, was broader than this. The Ethics constitutes a portion of an answer to the question of living. What is the good life? Simply stated, the best life is one founded upon, and responsible to, a practicable social order allowing contemplative study. The final end, the telos of existence is nous knowing itself, human self-recognition in the transcendence of mortal contingency. But in Reeve's view:
". . . and it is surely one that will meet with little
opposition, science and dialectic have not just taken
these Aristotelian conclusions hostage, they have
decisively killed them off. No one now believes that
everything in the world is trying to become as much
like Aristotle's god as possible, or, indeed, that there
is such a god for them all to try to become like. No
one believes, therefore, that study or the contemplation
of that god can possibly be primary eudaimonia or what,
so to speak, human life is all about. A major doctrine
of the Ethics--if I am right the major doctrine--has
therefore been falsified by science and dialectic and
become incredible."
Given the relatively small claims made for Aristotle's Prime Mover in comparison to those made for other, much more popular conceptions, this remark is itself incredible. Have Judaism, Christianity and Islam been decisively killed off--or just the Aristotelian contributions to them? Or is it simply that modern conceptions of philosophy, of human being, are enervated?
Displaying 1 of 1 review