Constructing Cassandra: Reframing Intelligence Failure at the Cia, 1947-2001

by Milo Jones

Constructing Cassandra analyzes the intelligence failures at the CIA that resulted in four key strategic surprises experienced by the US: the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Iranian revolution of 1978, the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks--surprises still play out today in U.S. policy. Although there has been no shortage of studies exploring how intelligence failures can happen, none of them have been able to provide a unified understanding of the phenomenon. To correct that omission, this book brings culture and identity to the foreground to present a unified model of strategic surprise; one that focuses on the internal make-up the CIA, and takes seriously those Cassandras who offered warnings, but were ignored. This systematic exploration of the sources of the CIA's intelligence failures points to ways to prevent future strategic surprises.

392 pages, Kindle Edition

Published August 21, 2013

Reviews

[Michal · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very interesting and useful book for practitioners of strategic warning, but provides valuable lessons and ideas for any organization or team which works in the forecasting domain, trying to anticipate future events. We can all learn from CIA mistakes described in the book because the authors did a great work of diagnosing the cultural and organizational causes of these warning failures.