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368 pages, Hardcover
First published May 15, 2018
Hamas neither espouses an ideology of global terror nor does it seek to create a transnational Islamic caliphate.87 It is a movement that utilizes Islamic discourse to deal with contemporary ailments and that is geographically tethered to the specific political and social environment of the occupation.
In that sense, Hamas is akin to a religious and armed anticolonial resistance movement. Understanding Hamas’s political drivers and motivations, however, would complicate Israel’s efforts to present the movement as little more than a terrorist organization committed to its destruction. Such a portrayal has been extremely useful for Israel on several levels. First, it excuses and justifies the forceful marginalization of a democratically elected government and the collective punishment inherent in besieging two million Palestinians. As the preceding chapters have shown, operations carried out by the Israeli army against Gaza are then understood as a legitimate form of self-defense, most often preemptive. For each of the three major operations of the last decade—Cast Lead, Pillar of Defense, and Protective Edge—a clear pattern has emerged whereby Israeli provocations, often after Palestinian unity deals are signed, trigger opportunities for Israel to claim self- defense and launch spectacular attacks on Gaza. By preventing unity and containing Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Israel has effectively cultivated a fig leaf that legitimates its policies toward the strip. Rather than positioning Gaza’s marginalization as a result of Hamas, it is perhaps more accurate to state that Hamas has become marginalized as a result of Gaza, as evident in its failure to overcome its entrenchment there.
Second, with Hamas’s dismissal as a terrorist organization, the thread linking the early days of Palestinian nationalism, from al-Qassam to the PLO and through to Hamas, gets eclipsed. Central to this continuity from fedayeen to “Islamic terrorists” are key Palestinian political demands that remain unmet and unanswered and that form the basis of the Palestinian struggle: achieving self-determination; dealing with the festering injustice of the refugee problem created by Israel’s establishment in 1948; and affirming the right to use armed struggle to resist an illegal occupation.90 In this light, Hamas is the contemporary manifestation of demands that began a century ago. Israeli efforts to continue sidelining these demands, addressing them solely from a military lens, have persisted. From antiguerilla warfare to its own War on Terror, Israel merely employs contemporary language to wage a century-old war.
Israel does not have a Hamas problem; it has a Palestine problem. (226-227)
On February 25, 1994, an American Jewish settler named Baruch Goldstein walked into the Ibrahimi Mosque in the West Bank city of Hebron during prayer time. Standing behind the rows of kneeling figures in front of him, Goldstein opened fire. Within minutes, twenty nine Muslim worshippers [sic] had been killed and close to one hundred injured. [...] Forty-one days after the shooting, once the time allotted for Muslim ritual mourning had been respected, a member of Hamas approached a bus stop in Afula, a city in northern Israel. Standing next to fellow passengers, the man detonated a suicide vest, killing seven Israelis. This was on April 6, 1994, a day that marked Hamas's first lethal suicide bombing in Israel.I've been biding my time for years now, waiting until the right book with enough technical chops and skin in the game came around to talk both politics and political history in a world where Islamic democracy is murder but Christian oligarchy is the land of the free and home of the brave.
Israel does not have a Hamas problem; it has a Palestine problem.You see, I'm sick and tired of bleeding hearts throwing up their trauma and not citing their sources while raking in millions, if not billions, of settler state tax money for their military industrial complex test labs.
Hamas's thinking was grounded in a revolutionary's mind-set, questioning why past policies enacted by the PLO had to persist in light of the most recent democratic election. Perhaps more importantly, leaders argued that the arguments were redundant given Israel's chronic failure to meet its own responsibility.This history goes into intensive and unflinching detail about the history of Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah, also known as Hamas, and the ways in which it has both acted and been acted against on the broader scale of anticolonial revolutionary movements, post-WWII ethnic migration and forcible displacement, and the US as the biggest bully on the 'might makes right' playground.
For Hamas, before talk of statehood and governance came talk of unity and liberation. [...] International diplomatic engagement with the former and isolation and starvation of the latter communicated quite clearly what concessions Palestinian political parties needed to abide by to gain entry into the international community. As Hamas's political overtures had been ignored during its years in office, the movement saw through its geographic "liberate" base in Gaza an opportunity to implement its own defiant government of resistance that would safeguard what it viewed as the purest principles of the Palestinian struggle.For might does make right, over and over and over again, and the headlines being mewled and puked today are the ones being spewed out in 1994, in 2000, in 2006 and 2014, to the point that I have say that the violence between Israeli occupation and Palestinian nationality will never cease until either every single last Palestinian is dead or the US turns its back on Israel.
By April 2014, it became increasingly clear that the tireless efforts of Secretary of State John Kerry would fail to produce a political settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. In a leaked recording of a closed-door meeting, Secretary Kerry warned that Israel risked becoming an "apartheid state" if the US-sponsored peace process failed to produce a two-state reality. (Beaumont, The Guardian, 4/28/14)We are talking about a power play where a single ethnic group that was previously systematically betrayed on every ethical and political front imaginable has been given a carte blanche to do the same to a national group for the last three quarters of a century so that a country that would gladly see the two burn can have its imperial profits and keep its hand clean at the same time.
The American approach was rooted in the belief that Palestinians had voted [in 2006] for change, seeking a less corrupt government than Fatah's, but that they still desired a negotiated peace settlement in the form of a two-state solution, unlike Hamas. In reality, Palestinians had voted Hamas in for a number of reasons, including frustration with Fatah's corruption, resentment at the failed and endless peace talks, Hamas's reliability in providing welfare services, and indeed its defiant rhetoric against the occupation.Because if you think the US gives a single fuck about combating antisemitism or litigating war crimes, I suggest you get your head out of The Book Thief/The Boy in the Striped Pajamas/Washington Post/New York Times mentality and grow up.
With Hamas's takeover, [Gaza Strip] came under absolute internal Palestinian control, as Hamas's government rejected any official engagement with the Israel state. Imposed curfews, home demolitions, and midnight raids by Israel's occupying forces, or by Palestinian security following Israeli orders, were no longer a daily occurrence as they were in the West Bank.At this point, if you're a US citizen, the complete and utter collapse of your government would do a lot more good for the rest of the world, politically as well as environmentally, than you being any sort of status quo-sanctioned hero would.
The Mecca Agreement indicated Hamas's willingness to abide, on a practical level, with the demands of the international community. Rather than acknowledging these concessions, Israel condemned the incoming cabinet. In particular, it denounced its commitment to the right of return through UN Resolution 194, a key demand for Palestinians writ large—not just Hamas. This underscored Israel's unwillingness to deal with certain political aspects that form the core of Palestinian nationalism, not of Hamas's political agenda.All in all, sorry if you came to this review looking for an answer or at least reassurance.
It should be noticed here that many scholars who question Islam's compatibility with democracy have no similar concerns about the compatibility of Israel's explicit Jewish character with its democratic nature, despite the fact that its democratic credentials are strongly by religious preference. (See Gorenberg, The Unmaking of Israel & Yiftachel, Ethnocracy)I'm too busy shoring up for the time liberals decide it's politically pragmatic to legalize the hunting of trans people for sport to tell you that doxing yourself in that Google Form sign up for the next 'big protest' (it's actually a rally when a bunch of people show up and actively refuse to give the government a reason to take them seriously) is going to do anything but get you blacklisted from AI-vetted job applications.
As with past escalations, the assault was portrayed as necessary self-defense against Hamas's consistent aggression, overlooking the movement's effectiveness at restraining rocket fire from Gaza and the violence inherent in the act of the blockade itself.Your best bet is to join a union or mutual aid network and learn how to actually communicate without continually absolving the settler state, but that's certainly not going to get you trending on the algorithm.
While Hamas had embraced the democratic process, it had done so less in the spirit of government and more with the desire to lead the Palestinian struggle. In many respects, this development is the belated outcome of the Oslo Accords. Sidelining the Palestinians in a permanent state of restricted autonomy and curtailing their sovereignty did not in fact lead to their pacification, but rather it sparked a search for alternatives that might sustain the national revolution.By the way, it's still easier for me to legally acquire a gun than to get a proper passport, in case you're wondering why the world is the way it is these days.
As Meshal noted, before the teenagers were kidnapped there was full calm in the West Bank and relative calm in Gaza. He added that this was unnatural given the persistent occupation and Israel's unyielding stranglehold on the strip. Now that the Palestinians had achieved unity, Meshal questioned, a war was suddenly declared? "Are Palestinians just meant to surrender and die a slow death?" he asked, noting that Palestinians were being asked to accept their fate of living under occupation in the West Bank and under blockade in the Gaza Strip with no efforts to resist the status quo.