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The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science: A Historical and Critical Essay
Excerpt from The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science: A Historical and Critical Essay
How curious, after all, is the way in which we moderns think about our world And it is all so novel, too. The cosmology underlying our mental processes is but three centuries old - a mere infant in the history of thought - and yet we cling to it with the same embarrassed zeal with which a young father fondles his new-born baby. Like him, we are ignorant enough of its precise nature like him, we nevertheless take it piously to be ours and allow it a subtly pervasive and unhindered control over our thinking.
About the Publisher
Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com
This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.
How curious, after all, is the way in which we moderns think about our world And it is all so novel, too. The cosmology underlying our mental processes is but three centuries old - a mere infant in the history of thought - and yet we cling to it with the same embarrassed zeal with which a young father fondles his new-born baby. Like him, we are ignorant enough of its precise nature like him, we nevertheless take it piously to be ours and allow it a subtly pervasive and unhindered control over our thinking.
About the Publisher
Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com
This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.
384 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1924
46 people are currently reading
990 people want to read
About the author
Edwin Arthur Burtt
26 books13 followersEdwin Arthur Burtt (1892 – September 6, 1989) was an American philosopher who wrote extensively on the philosophy of religion. His doctoral thesis published as a book under the title The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science has had a significant influence upon the history of science that is not generally recognized, according to H. Floris Cohen. He was educated at Yale University, Union Theological Seminary and Columbia University. He became the prestigious Susan Linn Sage Professor of Philosophy at Cornell University in 1941. (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edwin_Ar...)
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Displaying 1 - 24 of 24 reviews
November 5, 2020
After spending a summer at the cottage on Lake Michigan with my little brother, Fin, my co-parent, Martin, and I drove his Galaxy 500 up to the area of Hayward, Wisconsin to spend a week visiting Bill and his girlfriend, Terry, who had spent their summer at the cottage of his parents and had invited us, months before, to visit.
We arrived to several surprises. First, Terry's older sister Jan was there. I had dated her briefly several years prior and the charm was not gone. Second, Bob, another friend, even more charmed, had driven up to be close to Jan. She did not want to be close to him. I don't recall him leaving the car. Third, there were dogs, big dogs. Fourth, the cottage had recently been inadvertantly burned down and everyone was staying, with the dogs and some bicycles, in a playhouse built by Bill and his dad during Bill's childhood. It was cramped. Terry was with Bill. Jan moved in on Martin. I moved to the pier on the lake.
And, as one does at such times, I turned to philosophy, namely E.A. Burtt's doctoral dissertation on the faith assumptions originally motivating and currently underlying the physical sciences--a book which I find has had considerable impact on my subsequent thinking about the sciences. Of all the books I've read since about the origins of the contemporary physical sciences, this study of its axiomatic assumptions is the best.
We arrived to several surprises. First, Terry's older sister Jan was there. I had dated her briefly several years prior and the charm was not gone. Second, Bob, another friend, even more charmed, had driven up to be close to Jan. She did not want to be close to him. I don't recall him leaving the car. Third, there were dogs, big dogs. Fourth, the cottage had recently been inadvertantly burned down and everyone was staying, with the dogs and some bicycles, in a playhouse built by Bill and his dad during Bill's childhood. It was cramped. Terry was with Bill. Jan moved in on Martin. I moved to the pier on the lake.
And, as one does at such times, I turned to philosophy, namely E.A. Burtt's doctoral dissertation on the faith assumptions originally motivating and currently underlying the physical sciences--a book which I find has had considerable impact on my subsequent thinking about the sciences. Of all the books I've read since about the origins of the contemporary physical sciences, this study of its axiomatic assumptions is the best.
December 12, 2021
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030315: this is a later addition. i can see through this summary how husserl was so interested in putting philosophy on a scientific basis, how he could be, as our entire western culture, so convinced this is the way of thinking not 'theoretical', not 'experimental', but source of way of thinking that describes an ontology of being always already in the world by referring to what we experience. this is 'phenomenon'. this is why husserl calls phenomenology the 'first science'... but this also reflects concerns that by 'mathematization' we are deleting an aspect of life. though in this book there is an awareness of this limiting effect. 'mathematization' is what early continental philosophers contend with, a belief the way of natural science thinking is not the way to understand the world, only as cartesian coordinates of x, y, on a graph. continental thought recognizes how left, right, before, behind, are perspective 'lived world', but all this is a challenge rather than reason to discard analytic science thought unless you are heidegger...
270215 first review: my knowledge of science- as it is defined here, 'natural science' meaning mostly physics- is in many ways advanced beyond my knowledge of poetry, but both as theory, not practice. i have never thought or worked as a scientist. so this is a rating perhaps from experienced ignorance, but it reflects how this work stimulates further interests even as it summarizes how we got to this thought space, that of 'modern science', in opposition to classical greek and roman and its varied strands throughout the middle ages. this is 'western science'. this is itself a historical document, from 1924, and explicates this worldview along the lines of biographies of great men...
starting with copernicus, kepler, galileo, descartes, on to hobbes, more, gilbert, boyle, all leading to newton, this biographical order happens to be that of great ideas, order to much of which i am not familiar. my cosmological history is simply that through the centuries, man has gradually diminished in models of how the universe worked. how qualities of scholaticism were overcome by quantities of science...
i have always had copernicus and kepler conflated- copernicus was more theoretician, bothered that orbits of the planets as defined by ptolemy, with the earth at the centre, required too many circles upon circles. kepler took this idea and searched for experimental evidence, receiving much from tycho brahe. no, with the level of tech available, predictions and descriptions by the heliocentric model were not really more accurate, but the idea had the beauty of simplicity...
galileo is the man who devised tech by which such modern cosmology could be examined, though at least as important, he was the one who could unify the glory, order, eternal beauty, of the heavens, with the rather more messy confusion of our terrestrial world. proving copernicus accurate was not only moving man from the centre, the purpose, the religious duty, of the universe- but also uniting little mankind with the sublime, awesome, patterns of the heavens...
descartes, as the previous names, did some science, but it is his philosophy that resonates, that animates, for the entire history of modern science. famously, he advanced doubt as a method, the first meditation the 'i think therefore i am', and this is perhaps the beginning of displacing a christian god, from the creating and guiding of all the complexities of the universe. physical science promises to do everything by regular laws, though it is not surprising to see these europeans insist god behind it all, even if no longer final cause (why the universe) but only efficient cause (how the universe)...
hobbes and more, leading to gilbert and boyle, are less interesting to me. the only part where physics is not solely the 'modern science' which this book describes the founding, adding some 'physical chemistry'- but primarily this is fascinating to read arguments, hear disputes, between this and that natural philosopher. they had no facebook, but it seems like everyone knew everyone and there was no lack of correspondence... all of which leads to the biggest name, the final name, so dominant the term 'modern science' could be named after him alone, this is where authors of this book most clearly show the rising divide between science and philosophy...
newton is worth the long chapter given him, and certainly i can see how modern scientists can be so impatient if his genius is not acknowledged, for this entire book is a good story, an engaging narrative, and he is here the model of scientist. so there may be some doubt towards his thought, there is apparently some frustration that he, no more than galilleo, wrote little about how he came up with science answering such a wide range of physical experience, wrote little about how he decided what he studied, wrote some rather unscientific work as enthusiastically- this being to aver to god all teleological difficulty, as well as what we consider pseudosciences, like alchemy...
so newton was not perfect. but what he did come up with! starting with his fourfold progression of concepts, his 'rules': simplicity (no more than this), identical causality (same effects must derive from same causes), universality (all like this), validity (empirical truth)... yes, he tended towards philosophy, to metaphysics, when he was not looking... and then through his 'method', which he would not call 'hypothetical deduction' (hypothesis is a big no for newton), by which he came to believe proof of his rules, here three: simplification of what examined (no more than this), mathematization (transforming real into math such as calculus- where i started to discover i would not be a scientist) and experimental verification (not hypothetical but actual)...
this book ends with a modest chapter summing up where metaphysics of 'modern science' has brought us, throughout the world, in all cultures, in the early 20th century not much different from in the early 21st century. the author holds out the promise the story is not yet over, as any work building on it will make a great sequel- though he is writing from 1924, the aspiration to see such remarkable progress in the 'human sciences' still seems current, and likely as frustrated. but then maybe this is what philosophers are for, this is what artists are for...
030315: this is a later addition. i can see through this summary how husserl was so interested in putting philosophy on a scientific basis, how he could be, as our entire western culture, so convinced this is the way of thinking not 'theoretical', not 'experimental', but source of way of thinking that describes an ontology of being always already in the world by referring to what we experience. this is 'phenomenon'. this is why husserl calls phenomenology the 'first science'... but this also reflects concerns that by 'mathematization' we are deleting an aspect of life. though in this book there is an awareness of this limiting effect. 'mathematization' is what early continental philosophers contend with, a belief the way of natural science thinking is not the way to understand the world, only as cartesian coordinates of x, y, on a graph. continental thought recognizes how left, right, before, behind, are perspective 'lived world', but all this is a challenge rather than reason to discard analytic science thought unless you are heidegger...
270215 first review: my knowledge of science- as it is defined here, 'natural science' meaning mostly physics- is in many ways advanced beyond my knowledge of poetry, but both as theory, not practice. i have never thought or worked as a scientist. so this is a rating perhaps from experienced ignorance, but it reflects how this work stimulates further interests even as it summarizes how we got to this thought space, that of 'modern science', in opposition to classical greek and roman and its varied strands throughout the middle ages. this is 'western science'. this is itself a historical document, from 1924, and explicates this worldview along the lines of biographies of great men...
starting with copernicus, kepler, galileo, descartes, on to hobbes, more, gilbert, boyle, all leading to newton, this biographical order happens to be that of great ideas, order to much of which i am not familiar. my cosmological history is simply that through the centuries, man has gradually diminished in models of how the universe worked. how qualities of scholaticism were overcome by quantities of science...
i have always had copernicus and kepler conflated- copernicus was more theoretician, bothered that orbits of the planets as defined by ptolemy, with the earth at the centre, required too many circles upon circles. kepler took this idea and searched for experimental evidence, receiving much from tycho brahe. no, with the level of tech available, predictions and descriptions by the heliocentric model were not really more accurate, but the idea had the beauty of simplicity...
galileo is the man who devised tech by which such modern cosmology could be examined, though at least as important, he was the one who could unify the glory, order, eternal beauty, of the heavens, with the rather more messy confusion of our terrestrial world. proving copernicus accurate was not only moving man from the centre, the purpose, the religious duty, of the universe- but also uniting little mankind with the sublime, awesome, patterns of the heavens...
descartes, as the previous names, did some science, but it is his philosophy that resonates, that animates, for the entire history of modern science. famously, he advanced doubt as a method, the first meditation the 'i think therefore i am', and this is perhaps the beginning of displacing a christian god, from the creating and guiding of all the complexities of the universe. physical science promises to do everything by regular laws, though it is not surprising to see these europeans insist god behind it all, even if no longer final cause (why the universe) but only efficient cause (how the universe)...
hobbes and more, leading to gilbert and boyle, are less interesting to me. the only part where physics is not solely the 'modern science' which this book describes the founding, adding some 'physical chemistry'- but primarily this is fascinating to read arguments, hear disputes, between this and that natural philosopher. they had no facebook, but it seems like everyone knew everyone and there was no lack of correspondence... all of which leads to the biggest name, the final name, so dominant the term 'modern science' could be named after him alone, this is where authors of this book most clearly show the rising divide between science and philosophy...
newton is worth the long chapter given him, and certainly i can see how modern scientists can be so impatient if his genius is not acknowledged, for this entire book is a good story, an engaging narrative, and he is here the model of scientist. so there may be some doubt towards his thought, there is apparently some frustration that he, no more than galilleo, wrote little about how he came up with science answering such a wide range of physical experience, wrote little about how he decided what he studied, wrote some rather unscientific work as enthusiastically- this being to aver to god all teleological difficulty, as well as what we consider pseudosciences, like alchemy...
so newton was not perfect. but what he did come up with! starting with his fourfold progression of concepts, his 'rules': simplicity (no more than this), identical causality (same effects must derive from same causes), universality (all like this), validity (empirical truth)... yes, he tended towards philosophy, to metaphysics, when he was not looking... and then through his 'method', which he would not call 'hypothetical deduction' (hypothesis is a big no for newton), by which he came to believe proof of his rules, here three: simplification of what examined (no more than this), mathematization (transforming real into math such as calculus- where i started to discover i would not be a scientist) and experimental verification (not hypothetical but actual)...
this book ends with a modest chapter summing up where metaphysics of 'modern science' has brought us, throughout the world, in all cultures, in the early 20th century not much different from in the early 21st century. the author holds out the promise the story is not yet over, as any work building on it will make a great sequel- though he is writing from 1924, the aspiration to see such remarkable progress in the 'human sciences' still seems current, and likely as frustrated. but then maybe this is what philosophers are for, this is what artists are for...
May 23, 2016
I am quite baffled by the fact that I had never heard of Burtt's book in my prior discussions of 20th-century post-positivist philosophy of science. This book is primarily a competent refutation of the positivist doctrine by means of an analysis of the metaphysics of 17th century thinkers. Secondly, it is a historical inquiry on the emergence of modern scientific metaphysics.
Burtt's study begins with Copernicus and his first seeds of a mathematisation of the world, and culminates in Newton's theological conclusions and the latter's divinisation of space. One of Burtt's main arguments is that despite appearances, the Aristotelian metaphysics of essence, substance and quality were not discarded in favour of a positivist worldview, but were rather replaced by the metaphysics of mass, time, and space. An important defect of the new metaphysics, however, was a separation of minds from the world of sense experience. More specifically, the Galilean doctrine of primary and secondary qualities (as well as its subsequent evolution in French and British natural philosophy) sets the stage for dualism: on the one hand, the world is intrinsically geometrical; on the other hand, minds resist mathematical treatment. As the French historian of science Alexander Koyre once wrote, "[t]wo worlds: this means two truths. Or no truth at all."
Burtt's study begins with Copernicus and his first seeds of a mathematisation of the world, and culminates in Newton's theological conclusions and the latter's divinisation of space. One of Burtt's main arguments is that despite appearances, the Aristotelian metaphysics of essence, substance and quality were not discarded in favour of a positivist worldview, but were rather replaced by the metaphysics of mass, time, and space. An important defect of the new metaphysics, however, was a separation of minds from the world of sense experience. More specifically, the Galilean doctrine of primary and secondary qualities (as well as its subsequent evolution in French and British natural philosophy) sets the stage for dualism: on the one hand, the world is intrinsically geometrical; on the other hand, minds resist mathematical treatment. As the French historian of science Alexander Koyre once wrote, "[t]wo worlds: this means two truths. Or no truth at all."
April 20, 2021
«این کتاب را دوبار بخوانید و یا با کسی بخوانید که آنرا دوبار خوانده است»
دیگر اینبار ننوشتنِ ریویو کم لطفی بود.
نوشتهای که پنجشنبههای نصف سالم را به خود اختصاص میداد و بهانهی یادگیری مطالب ارزشمندی برایم بود را میبایست حداقل اندکی توصیف میکردم!
از امتیازی که به کتاب دادم احتمالا جهت گیری این متن واضح باشد، منتها طبق اصل مختصر و مفید نویسی، چند خطی مینویسم:
- اگر به علتِ تفنن و یا در لحظههای فراغت ایام سربازی و یا جهت پُر کردن اوقات پِرت دانشجویی کتاب را دست گرفتهاید، کار اشتباهی نکردید! ولی؛
به احتمال زیاد چیز زیادی دستگیرتان نخواهد شد و همچنین خود را در فهمِ زبانِ مادریتان نیز عاجز مییابید. خلاصه اینکه بنظرم این کتاب برای خالی نماندن عریضه انتخاب درستی نمیباشد.
- اگر به سیرِ تاریخی که بر سر علوم طبیعی آمده علاقه دارید و یا میخواهید از میزان توجه اندیشمندان کلیدیِ علم به مابعدالطبیعهشان و تاثیر و تأثُر این دو بر هم باخبر شوید، این نوشته سیصد و اندی صفحهایِ ادوین آرثربرت را از دست ندهید.
- فارغ از محتوای علمی و ایده هایِ نهفته در متن، ترجمهی عارفانه_شاعرانهی کتاب، این نکته را تضمین میکند که پس از مطالعه، شعاعِ دایرهی لغاتتان حداقل دو سانت افزایش یابد!
در پایان توصیه میکنم که برای حظِّ ژرفتر علمی و بهره برداری بهتر ادبی، آن را جمع خوانی کنید:)
دیگر اینبار ننوشتنِ ریویو کم لطفی بود.
نوشتهای که پنجشنبههای نصف سالم را به خود اختصاص میداد و بهانهی یادگیری مطالب ارزشمندی برایم بود را میبایست حداقل اندکی توصیف میکردم!
از امتیازی که به کتاب دادم احتمالا جهت گیری این متن واضح باشد، منتها طبق اصل مختصر و مفید نویسی، چند خطی مینویسم:
- اگر به علتِ تفنن و یا در لحظههای فراغت ایام سربازی و یا جهت پُر کردن اوقات پِرت دانشجویی کتاب را دست گرفتهاید، کار اشتباهی نکردید! ولی؛
به احتمال زیاد چیز زیادی دستگیرتان نخواهد شد و همچنین خود را در فهمِ زبانِ مادریتان نیز عاجز مییابید. خلاصه اینکه بنظرم این کتاب برای خالی نماندن عریضه انتخاب درستی نمیباشد.
- اگر به سیرِ تاریخی که بر سر علوم طبیعی آمده علاقه دارید و یا میخواهید از میزان توجه اندیشمندان کلیدیِ علم به مابعدالطبیعهشان و تاثیر و تأثُر این دو بر هم باخبر شوید، این نوشته سیصد و اندی صفحهایِ ادوین آرثربرت را از دست ندهید.
- فارغ از محتوای علمی و ایده هایِ نهفته در متن، ترجمهی عارفانه_شاعرانهی کتاب، این نکته را تضمین میکند که پس از مطالعه، شعاعِ دایرهی لغاتتان حداقل دو سانت افزایش یابد!
در پایان توصیه میکنم که برای حظِّ ژرفتر علمی و بهره برداری بهتر ادبی، آن را جمع خوانی کنید:)
July 10, 2012
another challenging, yet thought-provoking read. i do have to confess that i would need to revisit this again sometime in future. but, definitely gave me a better understading on how science (philosophy of) drifted from theology. irony is that this drift has left the science w/ whole new set of problems to deal w/ and new ideals to be assumed, unscientifically, of course. one of them is, 'there is simply no science possible of the realm of sensible phenomena unless the trustworthiness of our immediate perception of spatial directions and relations be taken for granted.' - p. 318. topic of drift between science and theology always interested me. but, i dread having to learn philosophy in order to stay on this topic...
May 9, 2024
This one was a pleasant surprise.
Although, cogno-hemispherically*, I am very right brained, meaning I am much more able to absorb, comprehend and communicate artistically than through scientific or mathematical data, I feel strangely drawn towards science books, despite their (for me) often challenging language and all too often generally atheistic bent.
Little surprise then, that I often find myself closing the final page feeling like a veritable Simple Jack.
I would like to tell myself this is largely due to the fact I do the majority of my reading in this genre in audiobooks. That may be the case, at least to a reasonable extent. But it is still definitely the case that, at best, I might be able to form an overall, pretty vague conception of what the whole thing is about (whatever the subject) but without truly engaging in or being able to articulately relate what I have learned.
This book, being read in print and just being excellent besides that, was still a hard one to follow along with here and there. But, given its age especially (published in the 1930s), the potential it had to be unbearably dry, and indeed the ambitious objectives of the writer, it was remarkably readable and informative without ever trying my patience. Professor Burtt has produced a wonderful and intricate, if still concise, history of the scientific revolution, its leading thinkers, and an inquiry into how their ideas intersected to both complement and challenge each other, sometimes entirely to overthrow.
As the writer also had written in religious philosophy (I'm almost certain he was not a Christian, or any other mainstream theist - if a theist at all), there are also some more interesting and less common elements than you would usually find in a book like this, as he does go to some good length in explaining how religious beliefs (many of them genuinely pious and not just a product of their time) also influenced both the thinking of the scientific torchbearers, and receptions to them.
* Yes, I made that phrase up. At least, I think I did.
Although, cogno-hemispherically*, I am very right brained, meaning I am much more able to absorb, comprehend and communicate artistically than through scientific or mathematical data, I feel strangely drawn towards science books, despite their (for me) often challenging language and all too often generally atheistic bent.
Little surprise then, that I often find myself closing the final page feeling like a veritable Simple Jack.
I would like to tell myself this is largely due to the fact I do the majority of my reading in this genre in audiobooks. That may be the case, at least to a reasonable extent. But it is still definitely the case that, at best, I might be able to form an overall, pretty vague conception of what the whole thing is about (whatever the subject) but without truly engaging in or being able to articulately relate what I have learned.
This book, being read in print and just being excellent besides that, was still a hard one to follow along with here and there. But, given its age especially (published in the 1930s), the potential it had to be unbearably dry, and indeed the ambitious objectives of the writer, it was remarkably readable and informative without ever trying my patience. Professor Burtt has produced a wonderful and intricate, if still concise, history of the scientific revolution, its leading thinkers, and an inquiry into how their ideas intersected to both complement and challenge each other, sometimes entirely to overthrow.
As the writer also had written in religious philosophy (I'm almost certain he was not a Christian, or any other mainstream theist - if a theist at all), there are also some more interesting and less common elements than you would usually find in a book like this, as he does go to some good length in explaining how religious beliefs (many of them genuinely pious and not just a product of their time) also influenced both the thinking of the scientific torchbearers, and receptions to them.
* Yes, I made that phrase up. At least, I think I did.
July 21, 2017
Both the subject matter and the author’s clear style of writing make reading this book a truly enjoyable experience… well, almost. I would have given this book 5 stars, were it not for the last chapter dedicated to Newton. Everything that comes before leads up to Newton who, we are told, is the culmination of the new metaphysics introduced by Copernicus and carried along different paths by Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Hobbes, et al. All the preceding chapters dedicated to these thinkers are thoroughly fascinating, especially the first two, in which the divergence with Greek and medieval metaphysics can be seen more clearly. And because there are many contributors to early modern science, we get only a brief overview of their main metaphysical commitments, which makes for quick and easy reading. But when we get to Newton, the pace of reading slows down considerably, as we go into the minutiae of, for example, Newton’s various characterizations of the ether or his idiosyncratic conceptions of the deity in relation to the new mechanical world. In the end, however, I got the impression that Newton made no significant contribution to metaphysics. The author himself notes that Newton, in eschewing philosophical speculation, simply inherited the metaphysical prejudices of his time. But if that was the case, why is Newton so important as to make him the culmination of the whole book? I have no idea. On the basis of what was presented, I take it that Newton functioned merely as the last step before the thorough mechanization of our image of the cosmos, and this mainly because once the mathematics was worked out for such an obvious and powerful force as gravity, future scientists simply had no need for Newton’s confused intermingling of science and theology. In other words, because Newton's philosophical contribution was negligible (or confused), his successors needed only to look to his mathematics. I found myself skipping several long quotations of Newton, because I just didn’t see the point in trudging through them. They were that boring.
The good news is that the rest of the book is top notch. For anyone that wants to understand why it is that modern philosophy is bogged down by puzzles like the mind-body problem, the primary/secondary-qualities distinction, and the natures of time and space, this book will give you the background, as well as a glimpse of how ancient and medieval philosophy approached these issues. Highly recommended.
The good news is that the rest of the book is top notch. For anyone that wants to understand why it is that modern philosophy is bogged down by puzzles like the mind-body problem, the primary/secondary-qualities distinction, and the natures of time and space, this book will give you the background, as well as a glimpse of how ancient and medieval philosophy approached these issues. Highly recommended.
January 18, 2010
In my Junior year at The University of Wisconsin I took a History of Science survey course and, while Burtt's book was not on the syllabus, I read this book as additional reading for the class. This classic provides a thoughtful overview and analysis of the shift from the medieval to modern view of man's place in the universe. In doing so it examines the works of Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Gilbert, Boyle, Newton, and others. Both a criticism and a history of the changing world view due to the revolution in science experienced during the lives of those thinkers, it assists in understanding both their methods and accomplishments. I enjoyed this work as it spanned the thought of two of my areas of interest - philosophy and the history of science.
May 15, 2018
الكتاب يبين الافتراضات الميتافيزيقية المتضمنة في مفهومنا للعلم الحديث.
عبر تناول أعمال شخصيات رئيسية ساهمت في تغيير مفهومنا للكون، مثل كوبرنيكوس، غاليلو، ديكارت، وأخرى كان لها تأثير على نيوتن، يوضح الكاتب تطور هذه الافتراضات لتصل إلى صورتها شبه النهائية عند نيوتن.
عبر تناول أعمال شخصيات رئيسية ساهمت في تغيير مفهومنا للكون، مثل كوبرنيكوس، غاليلو، ديكارت، وأخرى كان لها تأثير على نيوتن، يوضح الكاتب تطور هذه الافتراضات لتصل إلى صورتها شبه النهائية عند نيوتن.
October 11, 2016
دو کتاب برای تغییر مسیر اندیشیدن به تاریخ و فلسفه علم
یکی که همین
دومی هم خوابگردها
یکی که همین
دومی هم خوابگردها
September 4, 2025
I really liked this book.
Science is really important (crazy, I know) but when scientists perform their experiments, they have to make assumptions about the world. From what I've gathered, metaphysics is all about the things about the world that people take for granted. Burtt says, "there is no escape from metaphysics, that is, from the final implications of any proposition or set of propositions. The only way to avoid becoming a metaphysician is to say nothing." His point is that when scientists investigate the world and conduct experiments, they are making assumptions. Burtt invents a positivist (a positivist is someone who thinks that knowledge can only be obtained by deduction from sensory experience) statement to demonstrate some metaphysical assumptions that are implicit:
"[A positivist example] can perhaps be fairly stated in some such form as the following: It is possible to acquire truths about things without presupposing any theory of their ultimate nature; or, more simply, it is possible to know a correct knowledge of the part without knowing the nature of the whole. Let us look at this position closely. That it is in some sense correct would seem to be vouched for by the actual successes of science, particularly mathematical science; we can discover regular relations among certain pieces of matter without knowing anything further about them. The question is not about its truth or falsity, but whether there is metaphysics in it. Well, subject it to a searching analysis, and does it not swarm with metaphysical assumptions? In the first place it bristles with phrases which lack precise definition, such as 'ultimate nature', 'correct knowledge', 'nature of the whole', and assumptions of moment are always lurking in phrases which are thus carelessly used. In the second place, defining these phrases how you will, does not the statement reveal highly interesting and exceedingly important implications about the universe? Taking it in any meaning which would be generally accepted, does it not imply, for example, that the universe is essentially pluralistic (except, of course, for thought and language), that is, that some things happen without any genuine dependence on other happenings; and can therefore be described in universal terms without reference to anything else? Scientific positivists testify in various ways to this pluralistic metaphysic; as when they insist that there are isolable systems in nature, whose behavior, at least in all prominent respects, can be reduced to law without any fear that the investigation of other happenings will do more than place that knowledge in a larger setting. Doubtless, strictly speaking, we could not say that we knew what would happen to our solar system if the fixed stars were of a sudden to vanish, but we do know that it is possible to reduce the major phenomena of our solar system to mathematical law on principles that do not depend on the presence of the fixed stars, and hence with no reason to suppose that their disappearance would upset our formulations in the least. Now this is certainly an important presumption about the nature of the universe, suggesting many further considerations. Let us forbear, however, to press our reasoning further at this point; the lesson is that even the attempt to escape metaphysics is no sooner put in the form of a proposition than it is seen to involve highly significant metaphysical postulates."
Burtt also makes the point that there is something worse that pops up when people (in general, but scientists in particular) try to avoid metaphysics. Since any statement about the world makes assumptions, and because metaphysics is inevitable, "your metaphysics will be held uncritically because it is unconscious; moreover, it will be passed on to others far more readily than your other notions inasmuch as it will be propagated by insinuation than by direct argument."
These statements come in the last third of the book, and they seem that much more important because Burtt had spent the first two thirds explaining the metaphysical assumptions that were made by earlier philosophers and scientists like Aristotle, Kepler, Galileo, and Descartes among others.
Burtt says, "it ought to be the prime lesson of the present historical study that attempts to formulate this new viewpoint [a new metaphysical viewpoint for the sake of scientific advancement] by the mere synthesis of scientific data or the logical criticism of its assumptions are bound to be inadequate in any case... nothing can provide the panorama needed for this effort except extensive historical analysis of the sort that might include the present study as a humble contribution."
Burtt doesn't deny the successes of science, "But when, in the interest of learning the field for exact mathematical analysis, men sweep out of the temporal and spatial realm all non-mathematical characteristics, concentrate them in a lobe of the brain, and pronounce them the semi-real effects of atomic motions outside, they have performed a rather radical piece of cosmic surgery which deserves to be carefully examined."
I don't know how valuable this book will be to practicing scientists or if the author's goals will be achieved, but I'm sure it will be valuable to anyone interested in understanding what early scientific (before Newton or even before Galileo) thought was like. It is a very valuable history of the philosophy of science.
Science is really important (crazy, I know) but when scientists perform their experiments, they have to make assumptions about the world. From what I've gathered, metaphysics is all about the things about the world that people take for granted. Burtt says, "there is no escape from metaphysics, that is, from the final implications of any proposition or set of propositions. The only way to avoid becoming a metaphysician is to say nothing." His point is that when scientists investigate the world and conduct experiments, they are making assumptions. Burtt invents a positivist (a positivist is someone who thinks that knowledge can only be obtained by deduction from sensory experience) statement to demonstrate some metaphysical assumptions that are implicit:
"[A positivist example] can perhaps be fairly stated in some such form as the following: It is possible to acquire truths about things without presupposing any theory of their ultimate nature; or, more simply, it is possible to know a correct knowledge of the part without knowing the nature of the whole. Let us look at this position closely. That it is in some sense correct would seem to be vouched for by the actual successes of science, particularly mathematical science; we can discover regular relations among certain pieces of matter without knowing anything further about them. The question is not about its truth or falsity, but whether there is metaphysics in it. Well, subject it to a searching analysis, and does it not swarm with metaphysical assumptions? In the first place it bristles with phrases which lack precise definition, such as 'ultimate nature', 'correct knowledge', 'nature of the whole', and assumptions of moment are always lurking in phrases which are thus carelessly used. In the second place, defining these phrases how you will, does not the statement reveal highly interesting and exceedingly important implications about the universe? Taking it in any meaning which would be generally accepted, does it not imply, for example, that the universe is essentially pluralistic (except, of course, for thought and language), that is, that some things happen without any genuine dependence on other happenings; and can therefore be described in universal terms without reference to anything else? Scientific positivists testify in various ways to this pluralistic metaphysic; as when they insist that there are isolable systems in nature, whose behavior, at least in all prominent respects, can be reduced to law without any fear that the investigation of other happenings will do more than place that knowledge in a larger setting. Doubtless, strictly speaking, we could not say that we knew what would happen to our solar system if the fixed stars were of a sudden to vanish, but we do know that it is possible to reduce the major phenomena of our solar system to mathematical law on principles that do not depend on the presence of the fixed stars, and hence with no reason to suppose that their disappearance would upset our formulations in the least. Now this is certainly an important presumption about the nature of the universe, suggesting many further considerations. Let us forbear, however, to press our reasoning further at this point; the lesson is that even the attempt to escape metaphysics is no sooner put in the form of a proposition than it is seen to involve highly significant metaphysical postulates."
Burtt also makes the point that there is something worse that pops up when people (in general, but scientists in particular) try to avoid metaphysics. Since any statement about the world makes assumptions, and because metaphysics is inevitable, "your metaphysics will be held uncritically because it is unconscious; moreover, it will be passed on to others far more readily than your other notions inasmuch as it will be propagated by insinuation than by direct argument."
These statements come in the last third of the book, and they seem that much more important because Burtt had spent the first two thirds explaining the metaphysical assumptions that were made by earlier philosophers and scientists like Aristotle, Kepler, Galileo, and Descartes among others.
Burtt says, "it ought to be the prime lesson of the present historical study that attempts to formulate this new viewpoint [a new metaphysical viewpoint for the sake of scientific advancement] by the mere synthesis of scientific data or the logical criticism of its assumptions are bound to be inadequate in any case... nothing can provide the panorama needed for this effort except extensive historical analysis of the sort that might include the present study as a humble contribution."
Burtt doesn't deny the successes of science, "But when, in the interest of learning the field for exact mathematical analysis, men sweep out of the temporal and spatial realm all non-mathematical characteristics, concentrate them in a lobe of the brain, and pronounce them the semi-real effects of atomic motions outside, they have performed a rather radical piece of cosmic surgery which deserves to be carefully examined."
I don't know how valuable this book will be to practicing scientists or if the author's goals will be achieved, but I'm sure it will be valuable to anyone interested in understanding what early scientific (before Newton or even before Galileo) thought was like. It is a very valuable history of the philosophy of science.
November 17, 2018
Many regard philosophy and science as entirely separate fields, but Burtt makes a case through extensive engagement with primary sources that science requires a metaphysical stance, one which suffers from unthinking dogmatism when it is not critically reflected upon and analyzed (which always happens when we assume science can be done without philosophy).
March 10, 2025
This work was originally titled The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science in 1924, excising the word "physical" from subsequent editions. Popular information leads us to think that the work was derived from the author's PhD thesis. So far, no one else denies this.
Metaphysics. A current AI definition: "Metaphysics is the study of the most general features of reality, including existence, objects and their properties, possibility and necessity, space and time, change, causation, and the relation between matter and mind. It is one of the oldest branches of philosophy."
It was a much-maligned field of endeavor as it "intruded" upon the mechanistic aspects of science (teleology, thin hypothesizing, empiricism, experiments etc.) well before Dr. Burtt's birth in Massachusetts in 1892. But the good doctor shows in his treatise that, if anything, what we construe as modern science may've intruded on metaphysics.
Burtt, trained in theology as well as either history or philosophy (later in his career he became the prestigious Susan Linn Sage Professor of Philosophy at Cornell) had a reason for removing "physical" from the title. The problems he acknowledged in a 1931 re-write of this book's conclusion moved the problem he outlined, out of what he covered in the physical sciences, over to that of "the" sciences, generally. His original introduction showed it clearly, and he re-emphasized it in 1931: to paraphrase without going too far off course, that early medieval science notions, presuppositions, any details, needed to be collected or re-collected and collated into better understandable wholes not only to recreate the "thick, fat textuality" of metaphysics from then - but, then, to use this to prepare the ground for new cosmogonies (physical sciences) and for new appreciations of the so-called "soft" sciences. The latter, due to his inability here to define it, will have to settle for this: that the "soft" ones are really the "hard" ones. This is due to his explicating the mathematical takeover of the sciences to the detriment of scientific advance; namely, the qualitative insights "soft" sciences contain will feed the "hard" ones. Math like music is too thin and feeds off itself. He wrote this before WWII and the realization that we've gone too far in the physical/mathematical side - as atomic weapons demonstrated.
The good news is that this has been done, post WWII (e.g., Astronomies and Cultures in Early Medieval Europe by McCluskey; also the works of Karl Popper in defining actual science and protecting it, so to speak, from classicist "post modern scientism" epistemologists: the latter is on par with restorations such as by McCluskey). But there is, naturally, little utility (as in, functional, science) to have armies of science historians rolling tons of metaphysical thickness without any immediate use for it. This goes against the accidental deistic revolution Newton created, wherein (according to his mostly-German explainers, like the deist, Kant, and Liebnitz and Hegel) you need only "thinness of thought" (there comes math and statistics!) to proceed clearly to "do" science. No: you don't. These non-intuitive worshippers of Newton's Principia forgot his intuition-aimed Opticks. In their typical fashion of excising "the unimportant," there the Opticks went (trash can). Elitists ignore the tinkering of non elites. Tell that to Franklin: he read the Opticks to develop the current through which light would eventually be created for the lamps the classicists would later use to critique his invention with. (But, ack! That is mere utility!)
These are the main themes of the book. There are armies of "secondary laborers" in the science fields, unlike that of the "genius level." This is explained by the himself-ingenious, one time Avalon Professor in the History of Science at Yale, Derek J. de Solla Price. If we could but get Big Science to march in the direction Price describes to actually carry out the prescient Burtt's aims for reconstructing early metaphysical strides, there would be no need for immediate utility. It would be available, though. This was proven by Big Science using CO2 fears to motivate and fund whole armies of atmospheric scientists to keep repeating the message of immanent death from it, for years. If the shoe fits for the one, it will for the other.
As you go through Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Gilbert, Boyle and Newton, you see in Burtt's work the missing areas of the theistic natural philosophers leading to the perhaps inevitable break with a supporting God (that in parting shots, Newton referred to either as "Lord God," or "a Force" in his second preface to the Principia) powering science from its "thick, fat textuality" out of the St. Augustines and contemplative Patristic Fathers, into the "thinness" of the post-Newtonian workers in science: those who've eschewed contemplation and revelation from their work in order to keep seeking revelation via math and statistics (only).
In other works Dr. Burtt pointed to a schism in western philosophy, and the one (classical philosophy: Kant, Wittgenstein, Mannheim) vs. the other (post-Roman period philosophy: Descartes, Spinoza, Berkeley; the Millses. Popper). The former side with nonintuitive rationalization of all physical phenomena; the latter are skeptical of this and seek a mend with a more theistic approach wedded to nonintuitive teleology/math proofs as they relate to science - which is observation and study of physical phenomena in (Newton's) piecemeal fashion joined with other observation where it fits.
Above all this - and Burtt is loath to enter the domain, but underlines it all over the place in what's unseen as you read - is an ancient Judaic understanding that, unlike Kant, realizes there is no such thing as a rational god in a Kantian sense - which led to the transcendentalists and probably "religious revivals" across the planet in the mid 1800s. Rather, Burtt suggests that, like the theists once did, we accept that there is such a thing as a supra-rational god SO rational, that we cannot delineate His (Her's!) rationality. In his sections on Boyle, read of this intently to see a demonstration of theism in science at its once best: the Laws of Gravity and Boyle's Law are human laws, not God's, since we, the imperfect, discovered them from an infinitude of possibilities amid a probable perfection not allowed us (yet). In this there is great room for insight and revelation. For often, it seems, "strides in science" are preceded by flashes of a kind of "light" called insight.
Metaphysics. A current AI definition: "Metaphysics is the study of the most general features of reality, including existence, objects and their properties, possibility and necessity, space and time, change, causation, and the relation between matter and mind. It is one of the oldest branches of philosophy."
It was a much-maligned field of endeavor as it "intruded" upon the mechanistic aspects of science (teleology, thin hypothesizing, empiricism, experiments etc.) well before Dr. Burtt's birth in Massachusetts in 1892. But the good doctor shows in his treatise that, if anything, what we construe as modern science may've intruded on metaphysics.
Burtt, trained in theology as well as either history or philosophy (later in his career he became the prestigious Susan Linn Sage Professor of Philosophy at Cornell) had a reason for removing "physical" from the title. The problems he acknowledged in a 1931 re-write of this book's conclusion moved the problem he outlined, out of what he covered in the physical sciences, over to that of "the" sciences, generally. His original introduction showed it clearly, and he re-emphasized it in 1931: to paraphrase without going too far off course, that early medieval science notions, presuppositions, any details, needed to be collected or re-collected and collated into better understandable wholes not only to recreate the "thick, fat textuality" of metaphysics from then - but, then, to use this to prepare the ground for new cosmogonies (physical sciences) and for new appreciations of the so-called "soft" sciences. The latter, due to his inability here to define it, will have to settle for this: that the "soft" ones are really the "hard" ones. This is due to his explicating the mathematical takeover of the sciences to the detriment of scientific advance; namely, the qualitative insights "soft" sciences contain will feed the "hard" ones. Math like music is too thin and feeds off itself. He wrote this before WWII and the realization that we've gone too far in the physical/mathematical side - as atomic weapons demonstrated.
The good news is that this has been done, post WWII (e.g., Astronomies and Cultures in Early Medieval Europe by McCluskey; also the works of Karl Popper in defining actual science and protecting it, so to speak, from classicist "post modern scientism" epistemologists: the latter is on par with restorations such as by McCluskey). But there is, naturally, little utility (as in, functional, science) to have armies of science historians rolling tons of metaphysical thickness without any immediate use for it. This goes against the accidental deistic revolution Newton created, wherein (according to his mostly-German explainers, like the deist, Kant, and Liebnitz and Hegel) you need only "thinness of thought" (there comes math and statistics!) to proceed clearly to "do" science. No: you don't. These non-intuitive worshippers of Newton's Principia forgot his intuition-aimed Opticks. In their typical fashion of excising "the unimportant," there the Opticks went (trash can). Elitists ignore the tinkering of non elites. Tell that to Franklin: he read the Opticks to develop the current through which light would eventually be created for the lamps the classicists would later use to critique his invention with. (But, ack! That is mere utility!)
These are the main themes of the book. There are armies of "secondary laborers" in the science fields, unlike that of the "genius level." This is explained by the himself-ingenious, one time Avalon Professor in the History of Science at Yale, Derek J. de Solla Price. If we could but get Big Science to march in the direction Price describes to actually carry out the prescient Burtt's aims for reconstructing early metaphysical strides, there would be no need for immediate utility. It would be available, though. This was proven by Big Science using CO2 fears to motivate and fund whole armies of atmospheric scientists to keep repeating the message of immanent death from it, for years. If the shoe fits for the one, it will for the other.
As you go through Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Gilbert, Boyle and Newton, you see in Burtt's work the missing areas of the theistic natural philosophers leading to the perhaps inevitable break with a supporting God (that in parting shots, Newton referred to either as "Lord God," or "a Force" in his second preface to the Principia) powering science from its "thick, fat textuality" out of the St. Augustines and contemplative Patristic Fathers, into the "thinness" of the post-Newtonian workers in science: those who've eschewed contemplation and revelation from their work in order to keep seeking revelation via math and statistics (only).
In other works Dr. Burtt pointed to a schism in western philosophy, and the one (classical philosophy: Kant, Wittgenstein, Mannheim) vs. the other (post-Roman period philosophy: Descartes, Spinoza, Berkeley; the Millses. Popper). The former side with nonintuitive rationalization of all physical phenomena; the latter are skeptical of this and seek a mend with a more theistic approach wedded to nonintuitive teleology/math proofs as they relate to science - which is observation and study of physical phenomena in (Newton's) piecemeal fashion joined with other observation where it fits.
Above all this - and Burtt is loath to enter the domain, but underlines it all over the place in what's unseen as you read - is an ancient Judaic understanding that, unlike Kant, realizes there is no such thing as a rational god in a Kantian sense - which led to the transcendentalists and probably "religious revivals" across the planet in the mid 1800s. Rather, Burtt suggests that, like the theists once did, we accept that there is such a thing as a supra-rational god SO rational, that we cannot delineate His (Her's!) rationality. In his sections on Boyle, read of this intently to see a demonstration of theism in science at its once best: the Laws of Gravity and Boyle's Law are human laws, not God's, since we, the imperfect, discovered them from an infinitude of possibilities amid a probable perfection not allowed us (yet). In this there is great room for insight and revelation. For often, it seems, "strides in science" are preceded by flashes of a kind of "light" called insight.
July 19, 2017
As I understand this book Burtt is distressed that the world view that says that the only valid description of reality must ultimately be mathematical. Newton is the central figure in this story, but Burtt starts earlier to give an interesting account of how the Aristotelian qualitative world picture was overthrown. I think that Burtt's argument that we should consider the values at work in the selection of the explanatory models used by scientists has been taken up by many since Burtt. While this may make Burtt seem 'old hat,' his passion, attention to detail and clarity of exposition make this a book still worth reading.
August 19, 2024
Super. An elegant, clarifying study of the rise to cultural dominance—in despite of some of its proponents’ own reservations and inconsistencies—of the mechanistic materialism of modern science (at least up until the late 19th century) with its corollary dualist, and almost inevitably diminished, account of mind. Burtt’s concluding critique and prospectus for a better metaphysics and philosophy of mind are inspiring.
May 1, 2017
If you were moved by Lewis's Discarded Image, Burtt's work will take what you love poetically and bring it down to earth with all the weight it deserves.
February 14, 2017
چرا برای پدیده ها تبیینی ریاضی ارائه میکنیم؟
چه تفاوتی است بین تبیین ریاضی از پدیده ها با تفسیرهای مذهبی، اسطوره ای و...
وقتی که با مدلسازی ریاضی تبیینی از یک پدیده ارائه میکنیم، سیستمی از اجزاء را ساخته ایم که در نظمی هماهنگ و احتمالا زیبا باهم کار میکنند. اما چه تضمینی است برای انکه وقتی این اجزاء با چنان نظمی در کنار هم باشند ان پدیده روی خواهد داد؟
آیا مدلسازی ریاضی برای تبیین و تفسیر یک پدیده کافی است؟
آیا براستی با هماهنگ کردن و احتمالا زیبا شدن هماهنگی اجزاء دخیل در یک پدیده بدنبال تبییین یک پدیده هستیم و یا اینکه اینکار بهانه ای است برای لذت بردن از ادراک نظم و زیبایی؟
آیا واقعا با مدلسازی، داریم جهان و پدیده های انرا توصیف میکنیم یا ذهنی که به شناخت ان میپردازد؟
***
اینها سوالاتی است که هنگام مطالعه این کتاب دوست دارم که در پس زمینه ذهنم باشد.
چه تفاوتی است بین تبیین ریاضی از پدیده ها با تفسیرهای مذهبی، اسطوره ای و...
وقتی که با مدلسازی ریاضی تبیینی از یک پدیده ارائه میکنیم، سیستمی از اجزاء را ساخته ایم که در نظمی هماهنگ و احتمالا زیبا باهم کار میکنند. اما چه تضمینی است برای انکه وقتی این اجزاء با چنان نظمی در کنار هم باشند ان پدیده روی خواهد داد؟
آیا مدلسازی ریاضی برای تبیین و تفسیر یک پدیده کافی است؟
آیا براستی با هماهنگ کردن و احتمالا زیبا شدن هماهنگی اجزاء دخیل در یک پدیده بدنبال تبییین یک پدیده هستیم و یا اینکه اینکار بهانه ای است برای لذت بردن از ادراک نظم و زیبایی؟
آیا واقعا با مدلسازی، داریم جهان و پدیده های انرا توصیف میکنیم یا ذهنی که به شناخت ان میپردازد؟
***
اینها سوالاتی است که هنگام مطالعه این کتاب دوست دارم که در پس زمینه ذهنم باشد.
January 27, 2015
I have to confess that this was one of the hardest reads of my life so far. Nevertheless, I was able to extract a superficial understanding of the way science evolved from the middle ages to our present day.
What was missing for me was the exercise of previous philosophy readings. I felt my base was not there in the first place, so understanding this critique while lacking the vocabulary to decode it was pretty much an impossible task. Still, I may read this again later when I'll be older and wiser.
What was missing for me was the exercise of previous philosophy readings. I felt my base was not there in the first place, so understanding this critique while lacking the vocabulary to decode it was pretty much an impossible task. Still, I may read this again later when I'll be older and wiser.
October 25, 2015
A very good piece of work for anyone wanting to delve into the history of science. He shows how modern scientific thinking resulted from a change in the view of reality itself ascribing all that is to mathematics. There was also a complete change in the opinion of the human mind. Even for those who still believed in God He became merely the first cause. Mankind, as well, lost his place above nature. It is a fascinating study of how different scientists today really think in ways vastly different from their predecessors several hundred years ago.
November 10, 2011
Another very tough read. Written in the 1930's but an excellent explanation of the birth of Naturalism and Reductionism through Galileo, Kepler, Decartes, Newton and others. As it turns out, it was quite sensible to move towards dualism and the "death of God" as Nietzsche put it :). I am convinced that many people who throw around the word "Dualism" (as it is so popular today) don't really understand from whence it came, nor what it truly means. Me too, but now I do.
October 17, 2008
Read it more than 20 years ago and it was foundational to my understanding of science as an ideology/culture/institution. I want to build a course around this book, perhaps with a title like, "The culture of modern science."
January 9, 2011
from ILL fascinating
July 17, 2013
Excellent contribution.
April 19, 2017
This one by Edwin Arthur Burtt was originally entitled The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science. The revised edition came out in the 1930s with the title omitting "physical."
Indeed, it covers most of the big ones - Copernicus to Newton. But sandwiched in between is Descartes, Henry More, and Thomas Hobbes (why Spinoza is left out is beyond me: he is the one who corrected Descartes on the unity issue of the individual and the soul, but this is implied in Burtt's treatment of More). Anyway, remember: this is the metaphysical basis for what Galileo, Copernicus, Gilbert, Kepler, Boyle and Newton stood upon.
The most fascinating thing I discovered is how far we have drifted from the so-called Theistic science-philosophers (literally, they called themselves "natural philosophers") and how Deism - since the time of the great transcendentalist Kant - has covered over their demanding, in-hand-with-the-"force" (Lord God, according to Newton) Theistic forebears, who went into their researches with God on their tongue and the spirit of discovery in their hoping minds. To read the literalist Kant, who like most Germans attempt to define all thought with a single value statement, one would think that all human discovery has been made, and that it all belongs to a rational God (whom we need not trouble ourselves thinking about). This, when in fact, the savants like Bacon and Boyle (the latter in particular) understood, as it was described in holy scripture, that any discovery made by man is MAN'S property and knowledge, and not that of any "rational" deity. Boyle in particular drives this rationality amid MEN: God, according to both Boyle and Newton, was perhaps "supra-rational": that is, revelatory, and - intelligently enough - beyond man's total comprehension. (This is pointed out by the great Jew, Barush [Benedictus; Bernard] Spinoza in cabalistic ways not easily understood and is not treated in this work). Theism is posited in the modern fad-fashion as being somehow old fashioned and pre-rational when indeed, if you read this book, it clearly IS NOT.
Fascinating. I would point out that this reading is perfectly suited to the confused modern mind on the issue of science research and education. Kant's view and appreciation of the founder scientists is clearly Teutonic and limited, and especially irritating in a nuclear age that casts great shades of moral doubt on the validity and importance of modern science, as one often infers that most science, once gained, admits to little more gain.
Indeed, it covers most of the big ones - Copernicus to Newton. But sandwiched in between is Descartes, Henry More, and Thomas Hobbes (why Spinoza is left out is beyond me: he is the one who corrected Descartes on the unity issue of the individual and the soul, but this is implied in Burtt's treatment of More). Anyway, remember: this is the metaphysical basis for what Galileo, Copernicus, Gilbert, Kepler, Boyle and Newton stood upon.
The most fascinating thing I discovered is how far we have drifted from the so-called Theistic science-philosophers (literally, they called themselves "natural philosophers") and how Deism - since the time of the great transcendentalist Kant - has covered over their demanding, in-hand-with-the-"force" (Lord God, according to Newton) Theistic forebears, who went into their researches with God on their tongue and the spirit of discovery in their hoping minds. To read the literalist Kant, who like most Germans attempt to define all thought with a single value statement, one would think that all human discovery has been made, and that it all belongs to a rational God (whom we need not trouble ourselves thinking about). This, when in fact, the savants like Bacon and Boyle (the latter in particular) understood, as it was described in holy scripture, that any discovery made by man is MAN'S property and knowledge, and not that of any "rational" deity. Boyle in particular drives this rationality amid MEN: God, according to both Boyle and Newton, was perhaps "supra-rational": that is, revelatory, and - intelligently enough - beyond man's total comprehension. (This is pointed out by the great Jew, Barush [Benedictus; Bernard] Spinoza in cabalistic ways not easily understood and is not treated in this work). Theism is posited in the modern fad-fashion as being somehow old fashioned and pre-rational when indeed, if you read this book, it clearly IS NOT.
Fascinating. I would point out that this reading is perfectly suited to the confused modern mind on the issue of science research and education. Kant's view and appreciation of the founder scientists is clearly Teutonic and limited, and especially irritating in a nuclear age that casts great shades of moral doubt on the validity and importance of modern science, as one often infers that most science, once gained, admits to little more gain.
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