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The Hacker and the State: Cyber Attacks and the New Normal of Geopolitics
Packed with insider information based on interviews, declassified files, and forensic analysis of company reports, The Hacker and the State sets aside fantasies of cyber-annihilation to explore the real geopolitical competition of the digital age. Tracing the conflict of wills and interests among modern nations, Ben Buchanan reveals little-known details of how China, Russia, North Korea, Britain, and the United States hack one another in a relentless struggle for dominance. His analysis moves deftly from underseas cable taps to underground nuclear sabotage, from blackouts and data breaches to billion-dollar heists and election interference.
Buchanan brings to life this continuous cycle of espionage and deception, attack and counterattack, destabilization and retaliation. He explains why cyber attacks are far less destructive than we anticipated, far more pervasive, and much harder to prevent. With little fanfare and far less scrutiny, they impact our banks, our tech and health systems, our democracy, and every aspect of our lives. Quietly, insidiously, they have reshaped our national-security priorities and transformed spycraft and statecraft.
The contest for geopolitical advantage has moved into cyberspace. The United States and its allies can no longer dominate the way they once did. The nation that hacks best will triumph.
Buchanan brings to life this continuous cycle of espionage and deception, attack and counterattack, destabilization and retaliation. He explains why cyber attacks are far less destructive than we anticipated, far more pervasive, and much harder to prevent. With little fanfare and far less scrutiny, they impact our banks, our tech and health systems, our democracy, and every aspect of our lives. Quietly, insidiously, they have reshaped our national-security priorities and transformed spycraft and statecraft.
The contest for geopolitical advantage has moved into cyberspace. The United States and its allies can no longer dominate the way they once did. The nation that hacks best will triumph.
384 pages, Hardcover
First published February 1, 2020
190 people are currently reading
2348 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 84 reviews
April 7, 2025
I learned a lot from this - many details of major state-level hacks, or hacks on states.
One curiosity is that you gradually realize that constant, low-level state-level hacking actually keeps systems relatively resilient - there's constant coevolution going on. Still, one must wonder at the *distribution* in damage done. It sure feels very tail-dominated in the book, and that's rather scary. But that's just the vibe I get, not a serious analysis.
The subject is inherently frustrating and a difficult target for an author, in that almost none of what happens is publicly known. So there's necessarily a considerable amount of speculation and fill-in-the-dots. But there was still a lot of meat in the book and many fascinating details.
I'll finish with a very brief recurring thought: software *is* eating the world; even moreso, AI will eat the world, and as that becomes true, there will be more and more overlap between computer security and safety in general. I suspect we're all going to spend the rest of our lives learning more and more about computer security, whether we want to or not. This book is a useful piece of that unwelcome but necessary education.
One curiosity is that you gradually realize that constant, low-level state-level hacking actually keeps systems relatively resilient - there's constant coevolution going on. Still, one must wonder at the *distribution* in damage done. It sure feels very tail-dominated in the book, and that's rather scary. But that's just the vibe I get, not a serious analysis.
The subject is inherently frustrating and a difficult target for an author, in that almost none of what happens is publicly known. So there's necessarily a considerable amount of speculation and fill-in-the-dots. But there was still a lot of meat in the book and many fascinating details.
I'll finish with a very brief recurring thought: software *is* eating the world; even moreso, AI will eat the world, and as that becomes true, there will be more and more overlap between computer security and safety in general. I suspect we're all going to spend the rest of our lives learning more and more about computer security, whether we want to or not. This book is a useful piece of that unwelcome but necessary education.
August 11, 2020
The first red flag was Harvard University Press.
The second red flag is the qualifications of the bureaucrat.
In fact, this is a rehash of the 1950s push that "In order to fight the Red, we have to become more Red" with some tech jargon thrown in. The problem is more profound and flies way over the grasp of Buchanan. Systems are designed to be usable. Stuxnet was possible because Windows XP is made for grandma to see online pictures of her grandsons and not to secure critically important infrastructure. Add to that some stories of how the spook industry deliberately weakened computer security because they wanted to get in, add $10 million of tax money used to break perfectly good cryptography (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-us...), or how they pay people who could be doing Humanity a favor by bringing better security just to backdoor the same security (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_EC...). The list can go on and on. And the US tax payer is paying for this useful idiot (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Usefu...) to tell them that they have to fear people that the government wants dead.
The second red flag is the qualifications of the bureaucrat.
In fact, this is a rehash of the 1950s push that "In order to fight the Red, we have to become more Red" with some tech jargon thrown in. The problem is more profound and flies way over the grasp of Buchanan. Systems are designed to be usable. Stuxnet was possible because Windows XP is made for grandma to see online pictures of her grandsons and not to secure critically important infrastructure. Add to that some stories of how the spook industry deliberately weakened computer security because they wanted to get in, add $10 million of tax money used to break perfectly good cryptography (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-us...), or how they pay people who could be doing Humanity a favor by bringing better security just to backdoor the same security (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_EC...). The list can go on and on. And the US tax payer is paying for this useful idiot (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Usefu...) to tell them that they have to fear people that the government wants dead.
February 27, 2021
This is an excellent overview of state-sponsored cyber attacks (NotPetya, Russian interference in US elections, Stuxnet, Iranian operations against Sheldon Adelson, ...), and makes the consistent and well supported argument that 1) cyber isn't like nuclear or other WMD which are primarily deterrents vs. actually used 2) cyber isn't useful for deterrence because attacks can't be well calibrated or predicted, and can't demonstrate ability to escalate clearly if not complied with.
A lot of the information about these attacks is more thoroughly reported elsewhere, but it did include some interesting and new-to-me information about US vs. USSR economic/espionage operations in the 1980s (where the US intentionally fed bad data and components to USSR to make suboptimal decisions and failed equipment -- most of this is still classified and not reported anywhere in detail that I've found.)
Overall, I tend to agree with the author that cyber isn't particularly like nuclear in any way, and is much more like traditional intelligence/influence operations.
A lot of the information about these attacks is more thoroughly reported elsewhere, but it did include some interesting and new-to-me information about US vs. USSR economic/espionage operations in the 1980s (where the US intentionally fed bad data and components to USSR to make suboptimal decisions and failed equipment -- most of this is still classified and not reported anywhere in detail that I've found.)
Overall, I tend to agree with the author that cyber isn't particularly like nuclear in any way, and is much more like traditional intelligence/influence operations.
May 13, 2023
Well researched and readable survey of cyber attacks in the context of foreign affairs and politics. Most of the cases are covered in more detail in other books and magazines but Buchanan better features the use of cyber in shaping as opposed to signaling.
January 7, 2022
This book was incredibly enlightening on the whole cyber arena, with many different states and actors examined and explained in the support of Buchanan’s thesis of the book. I think he made a great case for the thesis, how cyber is better at shaping and changing geopolitics rather than sending messages to other nations like conventional/nuclear weapons. I wish more time was spent on the what our cyber command and others do, but likely little is known anyways. The case studies are detailed and make their points well. Espionage, attack, and destabilization are the themes of this book, and cyber is definitely one of the most present and constant ways this is happening right now, and yet doesn’t have much talk about. Go Hoyas!
March 1, 2021
This is a good book. I didn't agree with all the points the author raised, but they did prompt more questions which is always good, and the central thesis - that cyber operations are used more to shape the strategic environment and are not at all suited to the language of warfare and deterrence, is spot on.
April 17, 2021
Quite eye-opening and extremely captivating.
June 1, 2025
Навіть я, віце-президент з інженерії найуспішнішої кібербезпекової компанії в Україні із стажем 8 років тільки в ній, офігів від безкарності, наглості і можливостей урядів якщо стоїть питання когось шпекнути.
З книжки складається таке враження, що Агенство з національної безпеки США спокійно і довго, не напружуючись, шпекали всіх направо і наліво, включно із союзниками, поки не стався Ассанж і Shadows Brokers.
І якщо з Асанджем все ясно — довбанутий лівак-робінгуд, який за все хороше і проти всього поганого, тобто капіталізму. То з Shadow Brokers – все до сих пір неясно. Ні хто такі, ні яка мотивація, ні нафіга виклали в публічний доступ робочі інструменти і дійсні оперативні інструкції АНБ? Щось мутили-крутили з тим викупом, ніхто щось не давав, то вони образились і виклали все безкоштовно в доступ. І в результаті, всі державні і мамкіни хакери отримали в свої руки «ядерні боєголовки» і почали розмахувати ними, хто де хотів.
Тупо відкрили скриньку Пандори. До того всі намагались поводитись плюс-мінус пристойно, але після того як побачили що мутили американці – клєма впала.
Тепер нормою є ситуації, коли американці з АНБ випадково знаходять на своїх джамп-серверах китайців, які їх знайши-ламанули і спостерігають як ті працюють, а американці починають спостерігати як спостерігають китайці за тим як працюють американці. І всі на тій самій машинці тусять.
Або, коли брити з GCHQ одночасно але окремо від союзничків американців з NSA сідають на вузли трафіку і починають «читати» тупо все, що ходить тунелями, тими вашими VPNами і TORами.
Або північнокорейці, які взяли інструменти і за 10 років прогреснули з анєкдотів-ходячих до тіпів, які крадучи МІЛЬЯРДИ ДОЛАРІВ, що погано лежать, фінінсують народно-визвольну армію і ще мають трошки на чорний день.
Одним словом книга про те як людство вийшло із відносно-спокійного кібер-шмібер раю і попало в страшний сон з техаською різнею бензопилою, де тупо всі проти всіх, стратегічна тріада перетворилась в квадраду і нікому вже ніфіга не смішно.
Книга інтірєсна, дуже научно-популярна і корисна для всіх прошарків нашого населення. Особливо полікує тих, хто досі думає: та кому я треба і юзає той самий пароль.
З книжки складається таке враження, що Агенство з національної безпеки США спокійно і довго, не напружуючись, шпекали всіх направо і наліво, включно із союзниками, поки не стався Ассанж і Shadows Brokers.
І якщо з Асанджем все ясно — довбанутий лівак-робінгуд, який за все хороше і проти всього поганого, тобто капіталізму. То з Shadow Brokers – все до сих пір неясно. Ні хто такі, ні яка мотивація, ні нафіга виклали в публічний доступ робочі інструменти і дійсні оперативні інструкції АНБ? Щось мутили-крутили з тим викупом, ніхто щось не давав, то вони образились і виклали все безкоштовно в доступ. І в результаті, всі державні і мамкіни хакери отримали в свої руки «ядерні боєголовки» і почали розмахувати ними, хто де хотів.
Тупо відкрили скриньку Пандори. До того всі намагались поводитись плюс-мінус пристойно, але після того як побачили що мутили американці – клєма впала.
Тепер нормою є ситуації, коли американці з АНБ випадково знаходять на своїх джамп-серверах китайців, які їх знайши-ламанули і спостерігають як ті працюють, а американці починають спостерігати як спостерігають китайці за тим як працюють американці. І всі на тій самій машинці тусять.
Або, коли брити з GCHQ одночасно але окремо від союзничків американців з NSA сідають на вузли трафіку і починають «читати» тупо все, що ходить тунелями, тими вашими VPNами і TORами.
Або північнокорейці, які взяли інструменти і за 10 років прогреснули з анєкдотів-ходячих до тіпів, які крадучи МІЛЬЯРДИ ДОЛАРІВ, що погано лежать, фінінсують народно-визвольну армію і ще мають трошки на чорний день.
Одним словом книга про те як людство вийшло із відносно-спокійного кібер-шмібер раю і попало в страшний сон з техаською різнею бензопилою, де тупо всі проти всіх, стратегічна тріада перетворилась в квадраду і нікому вже ніфіга не смішно.
Книга інтірєсна, дуже научно-популярна і корисна для всіх прошарків нашого населення. Особливо полікує тих, хто досі думає: та кому я треба і юзає той самий пароль.
June 18, 2021
The Hacker and the State is an attempt to ask what cyber attacks mean for geopolitics. The answer, according to Buchanan (who has a PhD from Kings War Studies, and now at Harvard) is that Cyber is best thought of as akin to Special Forces. Able to undertake sabotage, theft, intelligence, basic retaliation etc, but not useful for signalling future intentions or capabilities as more conventional military forces allow.
This book is an excellent overview of major cyber attacks and failures in recent decades. It clearly demonstrates why and how the US and Five-eyes network has a commanding position at the heart of the internet because of geography, history, wealth and ambition. From there the story flows out through the NSA's dubious use of corporate ties and global standards, to the way others states such as Russia, China, Iran and North Korea have used cyber attacks to hurt or steal from each other.
The strength of this book is that it is grounded in the study of strategic studies. While it covers many events you'll have read about online, there's always a lurking 'so what does this mean' question driving the discussions. The book argues that the cyber world matters immensely for international politics which it somewhat successfully demonstrates. (Showing at least that the arena is viewed as incredibly significant by the states themselves, even if not clearly demonstrating that state relations or the global environment is that different because of it).
In doing so, Buchanan reveals the investment, concern, and layer upon layer of ethical, political and security complexities that the cyber arena forces on states. One amusing section is the description of how North Korea had hacked China, and South Korea had hacked North Korea, and the US had hacked South Korea, and this enabled the US to gain access to files which China had hacked from someone else. Thomas Schelling, eat your heart out. The book covers many of the well known cases of hacking, worms, ransomware, destruction and outright theft, (Stuxnet, Wannacry, Sony & North Korea) in strong detail, while also highlighting many which are far less well known, such as the loss of NSA tools via the still-unknown 'shadow brokers'.
Overall, a very useful read for those looking to better understand this domain or who know a bit about the arena and want a refresher from a sharp analytical perspective.
Recommended. Ohh, and before you go buy it, update your computer to get the latest security patches. Like right now.
This book is an excellent overview of major cyber attacks and failures in recent decades. It clearly demonstrates why and how the US and Five-eyes network has a commanding position at the heart of the internet because of geography, history, wealth and ambition. From there the story flows out through the NSA's dubious use of corporate ties and global standards, to the way others states such as Russia, China, Iran and North Korea have used cyber attacks to hurt or steal from each other.
The strength of this book is that it is grounded in the study of strategic studies. While it covers many events you'll have read about online, there's always a lurking 'so what does this mean' question driving the discussions. The book argues that the cyber world matters immensely for international politics which it somewhat successfully demonstrates. (Showing at least that the arena is viewed as incredibly significant by the states themselves, even if not clearly demonstrating that state relations or the global environment is that different because of it).
In doing so, Buchanan reveals the investment, concern, and layer upon layer of ethical, political and security complexities that the cyber arena forces on states. One amusing section is the description of how North Korea had hacked China, and South Korea had hacked North Korea, and the US had hacked South Korea, and this enabled the US to gain access to files which China had hacked from someone else. Thomas Schelling, eat your heart out. The book covers many of the well known cases of hacking, worms, ransomware, destruction and outright theft, (Stuxnet, Wannacry, Sony & North Korea) in strong detail, while also highlighting many which are far less well known, such as the loss of NSA tools via the still-unknown 'shadow brokers'.
Overall, a very useful read for those looking to better understand this domain or who know a bit about the arena and want a refresher from a sharp analytical perspective.
Recommended. Ohh, and before you go buy it, update your computer to get the latest security patches. Like right now.
July 26, 2025
A masterful overview of the last 20 years of state-sponsored hacking and how cyber capabilities are used for espionage, attacks, and destabilization. The core thesis of the book is that hacking as a tool of statecraft is poor for signaling, but very effective for shaping the environment in which states compete and collaborate. The cyber capabilities of states are rapidly evolving and outpacing the defenses and norms that could constrain them.
Each chapter is built around specific incidents, making it eminently readable and engaging. My understanding of the technical aspects of hacking operations has grown, and you need just a basic understanding of how computer networks and software work to follow along.
Highly recommend for anyone who wants to learn more about the world of cyber and geopolitics, including how normal citizens and businesses are increasingly involved as collateral damage.
Each chapter is built around specific incidents, making it eminently readable and engaging. My understanding of the technical aspects of hacking operations has grown, and you need just a basic understanding of how computer networks and software work to follow along.
Highly recommend for anyone who wants to learn more about the world of cyber and geopolitics, including how normal citizens and businesses are increasingly involved as collateral damage.
October 11, 2022
Interesting, insightful analysis of how nation-state cyber operations of the last several decades affected geopolitics. If you follow cybersecurity news, you probably won't learn much about the technical aspects of the operations, but you may learn about the geopolitical aspects.
The book covers hacking by the US (including Stuxnet), China, Iran, North Korea (including WannaCry), Russia (including attacks on Ukraine, meddling in the 2016 US election, and NotPetya), and The Shadow Brokers (including EternalBlue).
Notes
Introduction
Cyber capabilities aren't nearly as powerful as nuclear weapons or even most conventional military capabilities. They aren't as dependable, fungible, or retargetable as traditional arms. Policymakers understand what nuclear and conventional weapons can do, but understand cyber capabilities far less. Instead of comparing cyber operations to nuclear or conventional weapons, it's better to understand them as shaping tools, more akin to espionage, sabotage, destabilization.
Exploiting Home-Field Advantage
Five Eyes spends tens of millions of dollars a year working with friendly countries to increase their collection reach. At least 33 countries secretly partner with Five Eyes on cable access.
Countries provide NSA access to telecom facilities, and NSA provides equipment for processing, storing, and transporting data, and sometimes shares intel with country.
Defeating Encryption
When NSA "incidentally" collects Americans' data from foreign sources under Executive Order 12333, it can keep it for 5 years (longer if the NSA claims it's necessary).
Counterintelligence
Types of NSA collection
• 1st-party: NSA collects info itself
• 2nd-party: another Five Eyes member collects info, shares with NSA
• 3rd-party: an entity outside Five Eyes collects info, shares with NSA
• 4th-party: NSA helps itself to info a foreign intel agency has about a 3rd nation; can be passive (e.g., tapping networks), active (e.g., hacking into a foreign intel agency's networks), or victim-sharing and victim-stealing (finding a foreign intel agency's targets and hacking into them)
Strategic Sabotage
Some US officials privately blamed Israel for making Stuxnet too aggressive, leading to its spread and public learning of it.
Election Interference
White House was worried that if it confronted Russia too directly about interfering in 2016 election, it could escalate into full-scale cyber conflict, including potential manipulation of votes on election day.
Russia sought to amplify radical groups and other opposition forces in US, expressing dissatisfaction with status quo.
Russia organized protests, demonstrations, rallies throughout US. They sometimes organized protests and counter-protests to pit Americans against each other.
Russia's goals for interfering in US 2016 election: increase discord in US, help Trump win.
Exposure
The Shadow Brokers were likely performing sabotage in form of exposure, working to erode NSA's capacity to use its hacking tools.
Russia may have been behind The Shadow Brokers, performing counterintelligence.
Widespread Disruption
NotPetya was designed to send political message to world business leaders that those doing business in Ukraine would suffer, to make Ukraine less attractive to foreign investors.
Conclusion
3 characteristics of nation-state hacking
1. Its versatility as a tool of geopolitical shaping.
2. Its weakness as a means of geopolitical signaling.
3. Its ambition, which increases as capabilities increase.
Cyber capabilities are ill-suited to signaling (communicating with other states, to encourage or discourage future behavior), unlike conventional and nuclear arms. They rarely offer clear, credible, or calibrated means of signaling and coercion.
Reasons cyber capabilities are poor for signaling
1. Visibility enhances signaling, but cyber capabilities usually benefit from, or require, secrecy. Signaling with conventional military capabilities makes them more useful, and makes use of force more credible. In contrast, revealing cyber capabilities generally makes them less effective.
2. They're difficult to use for predictable, calibrated force. They don't effectively communicate threat of violence. Their damage is difficult to control.
3. Even visible, controllable cyber ops are more difficult to interpret than conventional statecraft tools.
4. Effective signaling requires credible commitment (serious threat), and cyber ops don't effectively communicate this.
Cyber ops are more similar to special ops and other covert actions.
Rather than using cyber capabilities for signaling, nations have found them more useful for grappling with each other for strategic advantage without triggering armed conflict.
Harm of hacking is increasing faster than deterrence and defenses against them.
Hacking is becoming more powerful for espionage, attack, destabilization.
Policymakers on all sides have chosen to view cyber ops not as acts of war or public crises, but as part of everyday digital melee.
The book covers hacking by the US (including Stuxnet), China, Iran, North Korea (including WannaCry), Russia (including attacks on Ukraine, meddling in the 2016 US election, and NotPetya), and The Shadow Brokers (including EternalBlue).
Notes
Introduction
Cyber capabilities aren't nearly as powerful as nuclear weapons or even most conventional military capabilities. They aren't as dependable, fungible, or retargetable as traditional arms. Policymakers understand what nuclear and conventional weapons can do, but understand cyber capabilities far less. Instead of comparing cyber operations to nuclear or conventional weapons, it's better to understand them as shaping tools, more akin to espionage, sabotage, destabilization.
Exploiting Home-Field Advantage
Five Eyes spends tens of millions of dollars a year working with friendly countries to increase their collection reach. At least 33 countries secretly partner with Five Eyes on cable access.
Countries provide NSA access to telecom facilities, and NSA provides equipment for processing, storing, and transporting data, and sometimes shares intel with country.
Defeating Encryption
When NSA "incidentally" collects Americans' data from foreign sources under Executive Order 12333, it can keep it for 5 years (longer if the NSA claims it's necessary).
Counterintelligence
Types of NSA collection
• 1st-party: NSA collects info itself
• 2nd-party: another Five Eyes member collects info, shares with NSA
• 3rd-party: an entity outside Five Eyes collects info, shares with NSA
• 4th-party: NSA helps itself to info a foreign intel agency has about a 3rd nation; can be passive (e.g., tapping networks), active (e.g., hacking into a foreign intel agency's networks), or victim-sharing and victim-stealing (finding a foreign intel agency's targets and hacking into them)
Strategic Sabotage
Some US officials privately blamed Israel for making Stuxnet too aggressive, leading to its spread and public learning of it.
Election Interference
White House was worried that if it confronted Russia too directly about interfering in 2016 election, it could escalate into full-scale cyber conflict, including potential manipulation of votes on election day.
Russia sought to amplify radical groups and other opposition forces in US, expressing dissatisfaction with status quo.
Russia organized protests, demonstrations, rallies throughout US. They sometimes organized protests and counter-protests to pit Americans against each other.
Russia's goals for interfering in US 2016 election: increase discord in US, help Trump win.
Exposure
The Shadow Brokers were likely performing sabotage in form of exposure, working to erode NSA's capacity to use its hacking tools.
Russia may have been behind The Shadow Brokers, performing counterintelligence.
Widespread Disruption
NotPetya was designed to send political message to world business leaders that those doing business in Ukraine would suffer, to make Ukraine less attractive to foreign investors.
Conclusion
3 characteristics of nation-state hacking
1. Its versatility as a tool of geopolitical shaping.
2. Its weakness as a means of geopolitical signaling.
3. Its ambition, which increases as capabilities increase.
Cyber capabilities are ill-suited to signaling (communicating with other states, to encourage or discourage future behavior), unlike conventional and nuclear arms. They rarely offer clear, credible, or calibrated means of signaling and coercion.
Reasons cyber capabilities are poor for signaling
1. Visibility enhances signaling, but cyber capabilities usually benefit from, or require, secrecy. Signaling with conventional military capabilities makes them more useful, and makes use of force more credible. In contrast, revealing cyber capabilities generally makes them less effective.
2. They're difficult to use for predictable, calibrated force. They don't effectively communicate threat of violence. Their damage is difficult to control.
3. Even visible, controllable cyber ops are more difficult to interpret than conventional statecraft tools.
4. Effective signaling requires credible commitment (serious threat), and cyber ops don't effectively communicate this.
Cyber ops are more similar to special ops and other covert actions.
Rather than using cyber capabilities for signaling, nations have found them more useful for grappling with each other for strategic advantage without triggering armed conflict.
Harm of hacking is increasing faster than deterrence and defenses against them.
Hacking is becoming more powerful for espionage, attack, destabilization.
Policymakers on all sides have chosen to view cyber ops not as acts of war or public crises, but as part of everyday digital melee.
October 14, 2023
En genomgång av cyberkrigsföringens historia och teori. Bra för oss nybörjare.
January 22, 2021
Very concise summary of things ongoing. It goes over all major campaigns that we are aware of - Stuxnet, Sandworm, NotPetya etc. Even though detailed descriptions of a single attack (like Zero Hour, book about Stuxnet) are more interesting to read, I took some things from this as well:
- In military terms cyberwarfare is poor tool for signalling, meaning that it can't be used to demonstrate force and prevent need to use it. It's effective only when used without warning.
- Even though this book and other sources name multiple countries with cyber warfare capabilities, truth is that only three have it.
- Something that shouldn't be surprising is that no matter how many of such operations are exposed and stopped, it's only tip of iceberg, compared to all that are ongoing and aren't or never will be discovered.
- In military terms cyberwarfare is poor tool for signalling, meaning that it can't be used to demonstrate force and prevent need to use it. It's effective only when used without warning.
- Even though this book and other sources name multiple countries with cyber warfare capabilities, truth is that only three have it.
- Something that shouldn't be surprising is that no matter how many of such operations are exposed and stopped, it's only tip of iceberg, compared to all that are ongoing and aren't or never will be discovered.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
May 20, 2020
Amazing breakdown of some of the most influential cyberattacks in history. This is a must read!
This book broke down the key points of the most significant cyber attacks in history. Highly intellectual and easy to follow. This read will force you to think and provoke a fire inside you that you haven’t felt in a long time.
This book broke down the key points of the most significant cyber attacks in history. Highly intellectual and easy to follow. This read will force you to think and provoke a fire inside you that you haven’t felt in a long time.
September 20, 2020
The well-established theatres of war (land, sea, and air) have been changing through the years along with the development of new technologies. However, one of these new technologies - Internet - created an entirely new arena - the cyberspace. Information warfare, espionage, and destabilisation have also been conducted in the pre-Internet times but the Internet expanded the states' capacities to run their operation in all of these domains. As Edward Snowden mentioned in his autobiography, espionage is currently the most efficient when done online. Propaganda can be augmented through the sockpuppets on social media. Cyber weapons can ground down the physical infrastructure - NSA's Stuxnet, which attacked Iranian centrifuges, was the first known case.
Ben Buchanan describes the world of state-sponsored cyber attacks and how they relate to geopolitical goals. The cyber capabilities started existence in the most technologically developed nations (the US, and other member of Five Eyes alliance) which exploited their home-field advantage due to technological development and access to undersea cables. Then the cyber capacities expanded to other major states (Russia and China), and eventually got picked up by other states (Iran or North Korea). Currently, private sector companies offer easy to use cyber tech to states with deep pockets (e.g. Saudi Arabia).
The book is split into three main parts:
1. Espionage - describes how the cyber capacities evolved from the original signal interception capabilities. Encryption and decryption being some of the drivers of the current capacities of the states most advanced in the cyber area. These capacities led the states to include backdoors in the encryption algorithms (e.g. Dual_EC_DRBG). Strategic espionage is used by the states to understand the position of their adversaries before important negotiations or to steal technical secrets. Buchanan gives examples of the NSA and PLA using network penetration for their advantage, e.g. speeding up the development of the air fleet in the case of China.
2. Attack - offensive cyber capacities for a while were a realm of sci-fi but Stuxnet changed this perception. Shamoon (2012) was Iran's operation aimed at scarring Saudi-owned Aramco. Ababil (2012) was another Iranian operation of targeted sabotage (using DDoS), this time aimed at the BoA, NYSE, and Chase Bank. Coercive cyber capacities were evidenced by North Korean attempts to suppress the release of the film The Interview and subsequent hacking of Sony's email and dumping them online. Testing and signalling is exemplified by Russian exploits in Ukraine (CRASHOVERRIDE), resulting in blackouts in large parts of the country.
3. Destabilisation - election interference was probably the cyber action that gained the most coverage in the news due to the Russian influence campaign in 2016 US election. However, the author describes the British campaign to drag the US into WW2 as much more influential. In that campaign, a made up Market Analysts Inc. stated that 60% of US representatives support backing Great Britain in the war against the Nazis.
Buchanan goes into great detail in describing how the network of Democratic National Committee was compromised in 2015 and how the information was leaked.
The chapter on Exposure described how states use the cyber attacks to leak the tools or expose cyber operations of their adversaries. The main point is the leak of NSA's hacking tools by the group calling themselves the Shadow Brokers (attributed to the Russians). The motivation for this attack remains unclear but the author provides suggestions that Russian services work closely with cyber criminals which might use these tools for their own purposes. The leaked tools were later used in ransomware attacks (WannaCry or NotPetya). This usage of the cyber tools shed lights on the US capacities and dangers related to allowing the existence of bugs/backdoors in popular software.
Theft is a way for the state-sponsored hackers to obtain funds. North Korean operations aimed at financial institutions are given as examples. They specialised in extracting funds from banks, with the attack on the central bank of Bangladesh being the best known. However, the private banks are their most common target. NK hackers seem to have a very good understanding of the SWIFT system which they used in the past to steal large sums.
Buchanan concludes stating that hacking is a versatile tool for geopolitical shaping but it is not particularly useful for geopolitical signalling. Cyber operations might have unintended consequences and often rely on secrecy so are less straightforward tools of signalling than deploying conventional weapons (e.g. joint exercises or deploying warships). The cyber operations and their aggresiveness are likely to grow in capability. Luckily, for the civilians, the cyber capabilities are far from the destructive powers of nuclear weapons.
Ben Buchanan describes the world of state-sponsored cyber attacks and how they relate to geopolitical goals. The cyber capabilities started existence in the most technologically developed nations (the US, and other member of Five Eyes alliance) which exploited their home-field advantage due to technological development and access to undersea cables. Then the cyber capacities expanded to other major states (Russia and China), and eventually got picked up by other states (Iran or North Korea). Currently, private sector companies offer easy to use cyber tech to states with deep pockets (e.g. Saudi Arabia).
The book is split into three main parts:
1. Espionage - describes how the cyber capacities evolved from the original signal interception capabilities. Encryption and decryption being some of the drivers of the current capacities of the states most advanced in the cyber area. These capacities led the states to include backdoors in the encryption algorithms (e.g. Dual_EC_DRBG). Strategic espionage is used by the states to understand the position of their adversaries before important negotiations or to steal technical secrets. Buchanan gives examples of the NSA and PLA using network penetration for their advantage, e.g. speeding up the development of the air fleet in the case of China.
2. Attack - offensive cyber capacities for a while were a realm of sci-fi but Stuxnet changed this perception. Shamoon (2012) was Iran's operation aimed at scarring Saudi-owned Aramco. Ababil (2012) was another Iranian operation of targeted sabotage (using DDoS), this time aimed at the BoA, NYSE, and Chase Bank. Coercive cyber capacities were evidenced by North Korean attempts to suppress the release of the film The Interview and subsequent hacking of Sony's email and dumping them online. Testing and signalling is exemplified by Russian exploits in Ukraine (CRASHOVERRIDE), resulting in blackouts in large parts of the country.
3. Destabilisation - election interference was probably the cyber action that gained the most coverage in the news due to the Russian influence campaign in 2016 US election. However, the author describes the British campaign to drag the US into WW2 as much more influential. In that campaign, a made up Market Analysts Inc. stated that 60% of US representatives support backing Great Britain in the war against the Nazis.
Buchanan goes into great detail in describing how the network of Democratic National Committee was compromised in 2015 and how the information was leaked.
The chapter on Exposure described how states use the cyber attacks to leak the tools or expose cyber operations of their adversaries. The main point is the leak of NSA's hacking tools by the group calling themselves the Shadow Brokers (attributed to the Russians). The motivation for this attack remains unclear but the author provides suggestions that Russian services work closely with cyber criminals which might use these tools for their own purposes. The leaked tools were later used in ransomware attacks (WannaCry or NotPetya). This usage of the cyber tools shed lights on the US capacities and dangers related to allowing the existence of bugs/backdoors in popular software.
Theft is a way for the state-sponsored hackers to obtain funds. North Korean operations aimed at financial institutions are given as examples. They specialised in extracting funds from banks, with the attack on the central bank of Bangladesh being the best known. However, the private banks are their most common target. NK hackers seem to have a very good understanding of the SWIFT system which they used in the past to steal large sums.
Buchanan concludes stating that hacking is a versatile tool for geopolitical shaping but it is not particularly useful for geopolitical signalling. Cyber operations might have unintended consequences and often rely on secrecy so are less straightforward tools of signalling than deploying conventional weapons (e.g. joint exercises or deploying warships). The cyber operations and their aggresiveness are likely to grow in capability. Luckily, for the civilians, the cyber capabilities are far from the destructive powers of nuclear weapons.
July 23, 2025
Three years into my medical career in Los Angeles, I never imagined I would fall victim to such a sophisticated financial scam. Like many others, I casually browsed Instagram for entertainment, but one day, I encountered a charismatic Canadian user who piqued my interest. He introduced me to the world of binary options trading, promising extraordinary returns with minimal risk. According to him, an investment of just $4,000 would not only secure financial freedom but also allow me to buy a home and establish a medical practice within a year. Enticed by the prospects, I made the decision to invest.At first, everything appeared above board. The trading platform he recommended looked professional, and my initial investments yielded modest, yet promising returns. This success fueled my trust, and I gradually increased my involvement, ultimately investing a substantial $100,000. However, when I attempted to withdraw my earnings, I was informed that additional funds were required to access my profits. Concerned but driven by a sense of urgency, I complied. It wasn’t until much later that the truth became clear: I had fallen prey to an elaborate scam. My total losses amounted to $180,000.Crushed and financially shattered, I sought out help from several sources. It was during this low point that I was referred to Pyramid Hack Solution, a team of experts specialising in the recovery of funds lost to online fraud. Although initially skeptical, I reached out to them, hoping for a glimmer of hope. From the moment I made contact, Pyramid Hack Solution’s team displayed remarkable professionalism, expertise, and a well-defined strategy. They assured me that recovery was possible and immediately began working on my case.Employing forensic tools and advanced tracking techniques, Pyramid Hack Solution was able to trace the fraud network and uncover crucial details about the perpetrators. Throughout the process, their team kept me fully informed, offering regular updates and demonstrating exceptional transparency. After weeks of diligent effort, they succeeded in recovering a significant portion of my lost funds. The relief I felt was indescribable.Thanks to the dedicated white hackers at Pyramid Hack Solution, I was able to recover more than I ever expected. Their unwavering commitment to my case not only restored my financial stability but also provided a sense of closure. If you’ve fallen victim to a similar scam, I highly recommend reaching out to Pyramid Hack Solution. Their recovery services are invaluable, and they are fully committed to helping people recover what they’ve lost. Website; https://pyramidhacksolution.com WhatsApp; +447401467910
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
February 13, 2025
Ben Buchanan’s The Hacker and the State is a groundbreaking exploration of how cyber operations have become an essential instrument of statecraft in the modern world. Drawing on real-world incidents and in-depth research, Buchanan reveals how nations wield cyber capabilities to achieve strategic goals, from espionage and disruption to influence and deterrence.
One of the book’s greatest strengths is its clarity and structure. Buchanan organizes a complex and often opaque topic into a series of compelling case studies, including cyber incidents involving the United States, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. By examining events such as the Stuxnet attack on Iran’s nuclear program, Russia’s operations against Ukraine, and China’s long-term cyber-espionage campaigns, Buchanan paints a vivid picture of how cyber tools are shaping international relations.
Buchanan’s writing is both rigorous and accessible, balancing technical detail with broader geopolitical implications. He excels at connecting individual cyber operations to the larger strategies of states, showing how these activities blur the line between war and peace. His analysis avoids alarmism, instead offering a sober assessment of how cyber capabilities are fundamentally altering the dynamics of power.
Where The Hacker and the State truly stands out is in its focus on the "new normal" of geopolitics. Buchanan highlights how cyber operations have become routine, with states using them not just in moments of crisis but as part of their everyday strategic playbooks. This normalization of cyber conflict, he argues, represents a profound shift in how power is exercised on the global stage.
If the book has any limitations, it is its concentration on state-level actors, leaving less room to explore the role of private companies or non-state groups in the cyber domain. However, this focus allows Buchanan to maintain a sharp and cohesive narrative.
The Hacker and the State is an essential read for anyone interested in cybersecurity, international relations, or the future of conflict. Buchanan’s work is a wake-up call to policymakers and citizens alike, emphasizing the need to understand and adapt to this new form of global competition.
One of the book’s greatest strengths is its clarity and structure. Buchanan organizes a complex and often opaque topic into a series of compelling case studies, including cyber incidents involving the United States, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. By examining events such as the Stuxnet attack on Iran’s nuclear program, Russia’s operations against Ukraine, and China’s long-term cyber-espionage campaigns, Buchanan paints a vivid picture of how cyber tools are shaping international relations.
Buchanan’s writing is both rigorous and accessible, balancing technical detail with broader geopolitical implications. He excels at connecting individual cyber operations to the larger strategies of states, showing how these activities blur the line between war and peace. His analysis avoids alarmism, instead offering a sober assessment of how cyber capabilities are fundamentally altering the dynamics of power.
Where The Hacker and the State truly stands out is in its focus on the "new normal" of geopolitics. Buchanan highlights how cyber operations have become routine, with states using them not just in moments of crisis but as part of their everyday strategic playbooks. This normalization of cyber conflict, he argues, represents a profound shift in how power is exercised on the global stage.
If the book has any limitations, it is its concentration on state-level actors, leaving less room to explore the role of private companies or non-state groups in the cyber domain. However, this focus allows Buchanan to maintain a sharp and cohesive narrative.
The Hacker and the State is an essential read for anyone interested in cybersecurity, international relations, or the future of conflict. Buchanan’s work is a wake-up call to policymakers and citizens alike, emphasizing the need to understand and adapt to this new form of global competition.
April 25, 2024
Ben Buchanan’s short(ish) book packs quite a wallop. As he reviews all the main cybersecurity incidents of the past decade (including Stuxnet, Sandworm, NotPetya and many others) he shows what they may do well and what they do less well as instruments of state policy. Such instruments are either used to shape events or to signal commitments or preferences. Other weapons, such as nuclear or convention weapons are good at both. By participating in joint military exercises with regional allies such as Korea and Japan the US signals its commitment to these allies to rivals such as North Korea or China, and aims to shape their behavior. When deploying US troops in the territory of European NATO Allies, the US knows such troops wouldn’t be able to stop a Russian Army incursion. The troops are in fact hostages whose presence in a possible battlefield serves to signal a commitment to retaliate if Russia invades and American troops are killed and hurt. But cyberweapons (“exploits”) are very bad at signaling because their meaning is equivocal. They normally work best to shape behaviors when used without obvious state sponsorship. These exploits also are unlike conventional weapons in that even relatively poor and unsophisticated states may develop significant capabilities in the field and that non state actors may also be quite proficient and dangerous. They are also liable to spread if they become compromised, which may happen easily, and it is also usually hard to limit the damage they do. In this sense they are quite unpredictable and so bad and signaling. Thus, unlike conventional weapons, they are mostly useless unless actively deployed, and even when experts deploy them, their use may lead to very unexpected results. In this sense they are perhaps more like terrorism than traditional state capabilities and therefore more suitable for subversion than statecraft. But both political and military leaders fail to remark these differences and thus they are unable to properly understand cyberweapons as tools of state policy.
February 5, 2023
A breathless recent history of cyberwar and geopolitical upshots. Covers Stuxnet, Petya and NotPetya, the Sony Pictures hack, the Shadow Brokers, EternalBlue, WannaCry, and more. Other books cover some of these episodes in more narrative detail; like This Is How They Tell Me the World Ends: The Cyberweapons Arms Race and Sandworm: A New Era of Cyberwar and the Hunt for the Kremlin's Most Dangerous Hackers. This one covers more ground, and has a tighter, briefing-like ryhthm. Less journalistic.
If nothing else, it is useful to remember just how wild the recent history of nation state hacking is (and ∴ probably its future). There are nations spying on allies in order to spy on other nations. The most costly cyberattack in history enabled by an exploit developed by the NSA and stolen for reasons and by means which remain unclear. The world's biggest shipping firm being hit by such fast-spreading malware that only a single hard drive in an it's Ghanaian office was spared by a power cut, from which the rest of the company's operations were recovered. And remember that time North Korea held a major film studio to ransom over a Seth Rogen film?
I totally missed that Buchanan also wrote The New Fire: War, Peace, and Democracy in the Age of AI, which I also enjoyed.
If nothing else, it is useful to remember just how wild the recent history of nation state hacking is (and ∴ probably its future). There are nations spying on allies in order to spy on other nations. The most costly cyberattack in history enabled by an exploit developed by the NSA and stolen for reasons and by means which remain unclear. The world's biggest shipping firm being hit by such fast-spreading malware that only a single hard drive in an it's Ghanaian office was spared by a power cut, from which the rest of the company's operations were recovered. And remember that time North Korea held a major film studio to ransom over a Seth Rogen film?
I totally missed that Buchanan also wrote The New Fire: War, Peace, and Democracy in the Age of AI, which I also enjoyed.
December 1, 2024
Relationships can, in fact, be very fragile and sensitive in nature. The slightest action of straying or cheating, even if it appears insignificant, can break a relationship developed over months or even years of shared moments and mutual trust. Opportunities for cheating on someone you love or truly care about abound and are always waiting for us both online and offline through various forms. That is why I am not surprised most of the time when I come across people who are seriously concerned and would like to spy on partners they suspect may be cheating. If you have ever been in this kind of dire need, then you would know quite vividly how hard it can be. Indeed, it truly is a tough task to pull through. But let me let you in on what I later learned: it actually is much easier than you would otherwise think, especially if one should chance upon the right kind of tech-savviness to help out. In the case of meeting the right techie, I bestow upon you the greatest urge to communicate with the geniuses at Cyberpunk Programmers. You can do that so easily by sending them an email at cyberpunk@programmer.net or by reaching them through WhatsApp at +447848161773 . Not only will these services assist you with the application or specific features that will keep you constantly updated about another person's location, but they can also enable you to monitor all of the social media messaging platforms used by any person remotely without even having physical access to their mobile phones.
April 5, 2020
I learned about some interesting hacks; Notpetya, the Shadow Brokers, Stuxnet, Wiper, Sony, Juiper, Shamoon, ... amongst others I have already forgotten.
I thought that there was a lot of speculation dressed as 'educated opinion' or fact. I get that due to the nature of cyber attacks a lot is let to be inferred. But, it seems to me that there are many possible unknown unknowns. Often, I thought statements of the form; X must have been an unintended consequence, or it is clear that Y desired Z, ... were worthy of skepticism.
I don't really get why pieces of software or brands that continue to be hacked continue to be used.
Windows get many mentions, are they inept, complicit or something else? Juniper seemed to be complicit in spying yet still operates.
Other interesting points the author makes.
- Everyday businesses dont seem to be able to avoid the cyber war between states.
- The difference between signalling and shaping.
Finally, I would be interested in seeing an analysis of the human costs of cyberwar. I think that cyberwar is seen by many as a way to achieve political goals, without the need for a bloody / messy war. However, it seems to me that many of these hacks effected everyday people. Deleting their medical / financial records, crippling their power supply, a dictator or crazy person elected via manipulation, ... etc
I thought that there was a lot of speculation dressed as 'educated opinion' or fact. I get that due to the nature of cyber attacks a lot is let to be inferred. But, it seems to me that there are many possible unknown unknowns. Often, I thought statements of the form; X must have been an unintended consequence, or it is clear that Y desired Z, ... were worthy of skepticism.
I don't really get why pieces of software or brands that continue to be hacked continue to be used.
Windows get many mentions, are they inept, complicit or something else? Juniper seemed to be complicit in spying yet still operates.
Other interesting points the author makes.
- Everyday businesses dont seem to be able to avoid the cyber war between states.
- The difference between signalling and shaping.
Finally, I would be interested in seeing an analysis of the human costs of cyberwar. I think that cyberwar is seen by many as a way to achieve political goals, without the need for a bloody / messy war. However, it seems to me that many of these hacks effected everyday people. Deleting their medical / financial records, crippling their power supply, a dictator or crazy person elected via manipulation, ... etc
December 8, 2021
Buchanan does a great job of highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the espionage capabilities of utilizing computers and computer networks. And he does so in an unbiased manner by highlighting the actions taken by all types of nations.
Just like a vulnerability found in software or an application is not enough in and of itself to cause lasting damage, it has to be paired with other weaknesses and actions to cause issues, Cyberattacks on their own are not enough for geopolitical signalling. If a state wants to deter or change its adversary's behaviour, cyber actions have to be used as a part of a more extensive action.
As some people have rightly said, Cyberwar will not happen. It's interesting when people hype up the scenarios where cyber-attacks lead to a MAD-MAX-style apocalypse. To stop an attack from reaching that stage, all you have to do is shut down your computer. And even if it were to cause an apocalypse, it would be limited to the Global North. Most developing countries will stay safe from this dark future, like Ghana, whose power outage saved Maersk shipping company from going bust.
I enjoyed reading about the capabilities of the NSA and their doctrine of NOBUS (nobody but us) and the effort they put in snooping on other people, companies, and even countries. One thing is sure the importance of cybersecurity will only increase.
Just like a vulnerability found in software or an application is not enough in and of itself to cause lasting damage, it has to be paired with other weaknesses and actions to cause issues, Cyberattacks on their own are not enough for geopolitical signalling. If a state wants to deter or change its adversary's behaviour, cyber actions have to be used as a part of a more extensive action.
As some people have rightly said, Cyberwar will not happen. It's interesting when people hype up the scenarios where cyber-attacks lead to a MAD-MAX-style apocalypse. To stop an attack from reaching that stage, all you have to do is shut down your computer. And even if it were to cause an apocalypse, it would be limited to the Global North. Most developing countries will stay safe from this dark future, like Ghana, whose power outage saved Maersk shipping company from going bust.
I enjoyed reading about the capabilities of the NSA and their doctrine of NOBUS (nobody but us) and the effort they put in snooping on other people, companies, and even countries. One thing is sure the importance of cybersecurity will only increase.
Read
July 19, 2025I lost over $42,000 worth of Bitcoin to a fake crypto trading platform back in 2021. At the time, I was new to crypto and thought I was investing with a legitimate broker. When I tried to withdraw my funds, they suddenly cut off all communication. I was devastated and ashamed. I stumbled upon Recuva Hackers while researching recovery options, and I was skeptical at firstbut from the first consultation, they were professional, transparent, and incredibly reassuring. They conducted a thorough blockchain forensics investigation, tracking the transaction path through multiple wallet layers.
Within three weeks, Recuva Hackers recovered 95% of my stolen assets, directly into a secure wallet they helped me set up. Their cyber specialists are clearly experienced in navigating complex theft cases, and they didn't give up even when the trail got cold. They gave me more than just my money back they restored my confidence and peace of mind. I cant recommend them highly enough!
Contact Email: support@recuvahackersolutions.com
Telegram: @recuvahacker_solutions
whatsapp: +1 4173828079
website: https://recuvahackersolutions.com
Within three weeks, Recuva Hackers recovered 95% of my stolen assets, directly into a secure wallet they helped me set up. Their cyber specialists are clearly experienced in navigating complex theft cases, and they didn't give up even when the trail got cold. They gave me more than just my money back they restored my confidence and peace of mind. I cant recommend them highly enough!
Contact Email: support@recuvahackersolutions.com
Telegram: @recuvahacker_solutions
whatsapp: +1 4173828079
website: https://recuvahackersolutions.com
August 22, 2025
A good summary of modern cyber attack efforts by individual and state actors alike, with enough investigation into the key events to keep you interested in how these attacks unfolded. In some parts it reads like techno-thriller fiction, which is to the books benefit.
The book unfortunately comes with a clear pro-American western bias. I did not partake in my usual research before listening, and only realised afterwards that, amongst his other roles, Ben Buchanan was the Former White House Special Advisor for AI. Cyber attacks against Russia and Iran by the USA and Israel receive scant criticism against a puddle-deep analysis of geo-political tensions. Similar retaliatory events carried out by these States receive vociferous criticism, apparently due to their undermining the core fundamentals of democracy. This handling is very clumsy for anyone who has actually done the investigative deep dives into the role of the USA (namely the actions of the CIA) in world affairs, especially the Middle East and tarnish an otherwise interesting book.
5.5/10, rounded up. Treat with interest, but caution.
The book unfortunately comes with a clear pro-American western bias. I did not partake in my usual research before listening, and only realised afterwards that, amongst his other roles, Ben Buchanan was the Former White House Special Advisor for AI. Cyber attacks against Russia and Iran by the USA and Israel receive scant criticism against a puddle-deep analysis of geo-political tensions. Similar retaliatory events carried out by these States receive vociferous criticism, apparently due to their undermining the core fundamentals of democracy. This handling is very clumsy for anyone who has actually done the investigative deep dives into the role of the USA (namely the actions of the CIA) in world affairs, especially the Middle East and tarnish an otherwise interesting book.
5.5/10, rounded up. Treat with interest, but caution.
August 23, 2023
Tidbits:
- State posturing is normally about signaling, e.g. the US committing soldiers to Europe, not in a number where they would actually be able to make any meaningful resistance, but as Schelling said "Bluntly, they can die. They can die heroically, dramatically, and in a manner that guarantees that the action cannot stop there." With hacking it's different, cyber capabilities are cryptic and want to stay that way. You don't want your foe to know what you're capable of, but you want them to expect the worst.
- Interventions in other states:
-- New York Herald: three-fifths of surveyed convention delegates back support to Great Britain in its uphill battle against the Nazis. Fake poll spread by British Intelligence to push the Republican party toward choosing a pro-war candidate.
-- Russian intervention in election:
--- Pope Francis endorsement of Donald Trump
- North Korea earned $2B from one attack hacking banks, quite a good haul for a country with a $28B GDP.
- State posturing is normally about signaling, e.g. the US committing soldiers to Europe, not in a number where they would actually be able to make any meaningful resistance, but as Schelling said "Bluntly, they can die. They can die heroically, dramatically, and in a manner that guarantees that the action cannot stop there." With hacking it's different, cyber capabilities are cryptic and want to stay that way. You don't want your foe to know what you're capable of, but you want them to expect the worst.
- Interventions in other states:
-- New York Herald: three-fifths of surveyed convention delegates back support to Great Britain in its uphill battle against the Nazis. Fake poll spread by British Intelligence to push the Republican party toward choosing a pro-war candidate.
-- Russian intervention in election:
--- Pope Francis endorsement of Donald Trump
- North Korea earned $2B from one attack hacking banks, quite a good haul for a country with a $28B GDP.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
February 14, 2025
My name is Johnny Widman, and I’m sharing my experience in the hope that it. I had invested £209,000 into a website that seemed legitimate and was promising significant returns. might help others avoid a similar scam However, when I attempted to withdraw my profits, things took a sudden turn for the worse. I received a message instructing me to contact support to process the withdrawal. Naively, I followed the instructions, only to discover that my supposed profits were fabricated Then I found I was scammed. All at once, my €209,000 was gone. I couldn’t believe it. The money I had worked so hard to save was wiped out in an instant, and I was left devastated. A friend of mine introduce me to a Company Call Cyber Constable Intelligence and they successful help recover my lost Funds with ease, If you find yourself in need of assistance with recovering lost funds, don’t hesitate to contact them: Website: www cyber constable intelligence com W h a t s App:1 ( 2 5 2 ) 3 7 8 7 6 1 1
February 1, 2025
After finishing this book I can say for sure that cyber crimes don’t receive the attention they deserve. How quickly we forget about the news of cyber attacks. Since it leaves people physically unharmed, we just stop talking about it in a few weeks after attack.
I’m from Ukraine. When I’ve seen so many passages about my country and the things that happened less than 10 years ago, I realized that I hardly remember them, though they brought a lot of harm to everyone.
Fair to say, the world of hackers has much more players involved than we expected. Many authoritarian regimes use all the tools that leaked to the internet in order to pursue their goals.
That’s quite enough for a review, but the book was worth reading. Definitely.
I’m from Ukraine. When I’ve seen so many passages about my country and the things that happened less than 10 years ago, I realized that I hardly remember them, though they brought a lot of harm to everyone.
Fair to say, the world of hackers has much more players involved than we expected. Many authoritarian regimes use all the tools that leaked to the internet in order to pursue their goals.
That’s quite enough for a review, but the book was worth reading. Definitely.
February 1, 2021
Absolutely excellent! Very, very informative and well written. The writing style and the content were just stellar, there were several stories covered that I didn't know had happened. Thoroughly informative, I was worried the slant against Trump would mean author was biased, but he wasn't, very good author; wish he'd covered Qatar/Saudi/UAE hacking a bit more Reuters covered the UAE thing well and Saudi-MBS hacking of Bezos, happened or not - it is fascinating. Hacking does seems like it will be a bigger and bigger part of state power.
February 4, 2021
An exceptionally well-written analysis of the impacts of cyber attacks and warfare, and the relative contributions these activities have on geopolitics. The book is well-organized. It contains a lot of detail while not going down unnecessary rabbit holes. This book is great for helping to understand the impact of events that we hear about in the news, and those we don't. Maintaining perspective while enabling proactive defenses and proportional responses is an essential characteristic for leaders in this new era.
October 16, 2022
I just wanted to complement my traditional geopolitical understanding with the online governmental threatning created by cyber attacks and ... It fills the gap with a thorough journey into key historical moments, essentially, on the non-ending game between russia (former URSS), US and Iran. However, I found it sometimes explaining in too much detail some attacks which made my reading longer than normal.
Overall, it worths the reading because exposes, despite with no such impact as military actions, how cyber shapes geopolitical balance and may explain underlying brutal actions from states.
Overall, it worths the reading because exposes, despite with no such impact as military actions, how cyber shapes geopolitical balance and may explain underlying brutal actions from states.
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