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Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence
A fascinating and authoritative account of espionage for the digital age, from one of America’s leading intelligence experts
Spying has never been more ubiquitous―or less understood. The world is drowning in spy movies, TV shows, and novels, but universities offer more courses on rock and roll than on the CIA and there are more congressional experts on powdered milk than espionage. This crisis in intelligence education is distorting public opinion, fueling conspiracy theories, and hurting intelligence policy. In Spies, Lies, and Algorithms, Amy Zegart separates fact from fiction as she offers an engaging and enlightening account of the past, present, and future of American espionage as it faces a revolution driven by digital technology.
Drawing on decades of research and hundreds of interviews with intelligence officials, Zegart provides a history of U.S. espionage, from George Washington’s Revolutionary War spies to today’s spy satellites; examines how fictional spies are influencing real officials; gives an overview of intelligence basics and life inside America’s intelligence agencies; explains the deadly cognitive biases that can mislead analysts; and explores the vexed issues of traitors, covert action, and congressional oversight. Most of all, Zegart describes how technology is empowering new enemies and opportunities, and creating powerful new players, such as private citizens that are successfully tracking nuclear threats using little more than GoogleEarth. And she shows why cyberspace is, in many ways, the ultimate cloak-and-dagger battleground, where nefarious actors employ deception, subterfuge, and advanced technology for theft, espionage, and information warfare.
A fascinating and revealing account of espionage for the digital age, Spies, Lies, and Algorithms is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the reality of spying today.
Spying has never been more ubiquitous―or less understood. The world is drowning in spy movies, TV shows, and novels, but universities offer more courses on rock and roll than on the CIA and there are more congressional experts on powdered milk than espionage. This crisis in intelligence education is distorting public opinion, fueling conspiracy theories, and hurting intelligence policy. In Spies, Lies, and Algorithms, Amy Zegart separates fact from fiction as she offers an engaging and enlightening account of the past, present, and future of American espionage as it faces a revolution driven by digital technology.
Drawing on decades of research and hundreds of interviews with intelligence officials, Zegart provides a history of U.S. espionage, from George Washington’s Revolutionary War spies to today’s spy satellites; examines how fictional spies are influencing real officials; gives an overview of intelligence basics and life inside America’s intelligence agencies; explains the deadly cognitive biases that can mislead analysts; and explores the vexed issues of traitors, covert action, and congressional oversight. Most of all, Zegart describes how technology is empowering new enemies and opportunities, and creating powerful new players, such as private citizens that are successfully tracking nuclear threats using little more than GoogleEarth. And she shows why cyberspace is, in many ways, the ultimate cloak-and-dagger battleground, where nefarious actors employ deception, subterfuge, and advanced technology for theft, espionage, and information warfare.
A fascinating and revealing account of espionage for the digital age, Spies, Lies, and Algorithms is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the reality of spying today.
360 pages, Hardcover
First published January 11, 2022
455 people are currently reading
3811 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 149 reviews
May 1, 2022
This book was very educational for me. I learned so much about the intelligence world, not just from the US perspective but also from the worlds perspective.
Espionage and intelligence gathering is as old as the beginning of humanity. It’s the corner stone of having advantage over enemies and allies alike. During the Cold War, espionage was between Russia and America but during modern times it’s everyone against everyone. With the rise of the internet, cyber attacks have become so prevalent, it holds serious danger to USA. As we have seen during the election of Donald Trump, Russian intelligence all the way from Kremlin hacked and interfered in our democracy. Algorithms are now hacking and interfering our minds, changing the way we think and act. China, Russia and North Korea are the fastest growing cyber attackers in the world. According to this book, America has a new invisible enemy, Algorithms! Of course that doesn’t mean, America is passive. They also have many agencies working on the same problem and waging war against others, such as Russia, China, North Korea and Iran.
It’s a very complicated problem with many tentacles. Stealing information from one another on the cyber space has become a common place. Also limiting information to the public is against Democratic values, so it’s a double edge sword.
Most Americans think the world of espionage is the world of James Bond or Jason Bourne. It is not! Far from it. It’s the world of algorithms, satellites and artificial intelligence.
As I said before, I learned so much from this book. Other reviews explained it in much more detail. It would take me ages to write everything down because there is so much information, so I suggest you also read other reviews.
A solid ⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️ from me! Enjoy!
Espionage and intelligence gathering is as old as the beginning of humanity. It’s the corner stone of having advantage over enemies and allies alike. During the Cold War, espionage was between Russia and America but during modern times it’s everyone against everyone. With the rise of the internet, cyber attacks have become so prevalent, it holds serious danger to USA. As we have seen during the election of Donald Trump, Russian intelligence all the way from Kremlin hacked and interfered in our democracy. Algorithms are now hacking and interfering our minds, changing the way we think and act. China, Russia and North Korea are the fastest growing cyber attackers in the world. According to this book, America has a new invisible enemy, Algorithms! Of course that doesn’t mean, America is passive. They also have many agencies working on the same problem and waging war against others, such as Russia, China, North Korea and Iran.
It’s a very complicated problem with many tentacles. Stealing information from one another on the cyber space has become a common place. Also limiting information to the public is against Democratic values, so it’s a double edge sword.
Most Americans think the world of espionage is the world of James Bond or Jason Bourne. It is not! Far from it. It’s the world of algorithms, satellites and artificial intelligence.
As I said before, I learned so much from this book. Other reviews explained it in much more detail. It would take me ages to write everything down because there is so much information, so I suggest you also read other reviews.
A solid ⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️ from me! Enjoy!
December 15, 2022
It’s very good if you’re interested in learning more about three letter agencies and the intelligence community in general.
Probably not that interesting if you’re not. This is a 10,000 foot view that comes from an academic slant, so little less hyperbole or chest beating then some tellings, and less critical than some journalistic accounts.
Probably not that interesting if you’re not. This is a 10,000 foot view that comes from an academic slant, so little less hyperbole or chest beating then some tellings, and less critical than some journalistic accounts.
February 7, 2022
Author Amy Zegart is a scholar, educator, and consultant in the field of national intelligence gathering and use. In Spies, Lies, and Algorithms, she provides a primer for the American public on the work of federal agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and fifteen more, of which you may not have heard. Zegart writes, "The U.S. Intelligence community (IC) is vast, comprising eighteen agencies and roughly one hundred thousand people that do everything from identifying strange gases in suspect buildings to eavesdropping on terrorists to compiling information for the President's Daily Brief each morning."
The cost, "For 2021, the total intelligence budget was an estimated $85 billion."
From surveys of her students and several follow-up national polls Zegart found that Americans know little of these agencies or their work. Ominously, most of what they think they know is derived from watching "Spytainment," movies and TV shows featuring James Bond, Jason Bourne, and their many studio clones. Clearly, a primer on the field of intelligence is timely.
Zegart traces the path of intelligence operations through American history. She shows George Washington to be an adept hand at deception and disinformation, fooling the British repeatedly. Ben Franklin supplied a stream of strategic false news through his basement newspaper while serving abroad during the American Revolution. The path of intel in American history is intermittent, showing up in wartime, but then quickly disappearing. This changed after World War II when the value of this resource--and the increasing need for it--led to the creation of CIA as an independent agency and the installation of continuing intel units within each military service. Today, that path is a highway as the magnitude of threats and the number of adversaries expands. Zegart writes, "Put most simply, intelligence is information that gives policymakers an advantage over their adversaries." She identifies, "three core missions of the U.S. Intelligence Community in action: intelligence collection, intelligence analysis, and covert action." The lack of balance between collection and analysis versus covert action is a topic she raises frequently.
Other issues she addresses include the question of the ethics of intelligence operations being conducted by a democracy; the scorecard of success versus failure in the IC over the years; and the growing importance of cyber warfare in the world today. The latter matter is the most unsettling examination in the book. People are deeply embedded in technology, but technology is so subject to attack and manipulation by various parties ranging from individual hackers to state sponsored agencies. The ability to bring down networks now crucial to our society and our very lives is quite real, as Zegart explains.
Corporate America is a big part of the problem as their technology has made possible attacks such as the Russian interference in the 2016 election. "While Facebook executives have been apologizing to Congress in public, they have been waging a campaign in private to deny, delay, and deflect regulation and stifle critics." Of another tech giant she notes, "Google executives citing ethical concerns, cancelled an artificial intelligence project with the Pentagon." Yet, "At the same time, Google agreed to help the Chinese government develop a more effective censored search engine..."
This highly recommended book is accessible to any reader. What any reader will find here is information that pertains to them quite directly.
The cost, "For 2021, the total intelligence budget was an estimated $85 billion."
From surveys of her students and several follow-up national polls Zegart found that Americans know little of these agencies or their work. Ominously, most of what they think they know is derived from watching "Spytainment," movies and TV shows featuring James Bond, Jason Bourne, and their many studio clones. Clearly, a primer on the field of intelligence is timely.
Zegart traces the path of intelligence operations through American history. She shows George Washington to be an adept hand at deception and disinformation, fooling the British repeatedly. Ben Franklin supplied a stream of strategic false news through his basement newspaper while serving abroad during the American Revolution. The path of intel in American history is intermittent, showing up in wartime, but then quickly disappearing. This changed after World War II when the value of this resource--and the increasing need for it--led to the creation of CIA as an independent agency and the installation of continuing intel units within each military service. Today, that path is a highway as the magnitude of threats and the number of adversaries expands. Zegart writes, "Put most simply, intelligence is information that gives policymakers an advantage over their adversaries." She identifies, "three core missions of the U.S. Intelligence Community in action: intelligence collection, intelligence analysis, and covert action." The lack of balance between collection and analysis versus covert action is a topic she raises frequently.
Other issues she addresses include the question of the ethics of intelligence operations being conducted by a democracy; the scorecard of success versus failure in the IC over the years; and the growing importance of cyber warfare in the world today. The latter matter is the most unsettling examination in the book. People are deeply embedded in technology, but technology is so subject to attack and manipulation by various parties ranging from individual hackers to state sponsored agencies. The ability to bring down networks now crucial to our society and our very lives is quite real, as Zegart explains.
Corporate America is a big part of the problem as their technology has made possible attacks such as the Russian interference in the 2016 election. "While Facebook executives have been apologizing to Congress in public, they have been waging a campaign in private to deny, delay, and deflect regulation and stifle critics." Of another tech giant she notes, "Google executives citing ethical concerns, cancelled an artificial intelligence project with the Pentagon." Yet, "At the same time, Google agreed to help the Chinese government develop a more effective censored search engine..."
This highly recommended book is accessible to any reader. What any reader will find here is information that pertains to them quite directly.
April 22, 2022
This was an enjoyable and well-written book from the brilliant Amy Zegart, but it was a bit disappointing for me because, despite the title, it's not really about the "future" of intelligence—it is more an excellent "introduction to intelligence" for the public at large, which is a laudable goal all by itself, though I would say it's also very much written from the traditionalist point of view. If you're experienced in the intelligence field you won't find much for you here and the book doesn't really break any new ground (aside for the very illuminating chapter on "intelligence education" and "spytainment"). This, and a little few errors here and there, cause me to give it only three stars.
March 15, 2022
This book is a great introduction into what actually goes on in the US Intelligence Community. Prof. Zegart will walk you through some of the common misconceptions, explain what the different elements are responsible for and what that actually means, and why it's been so hard for Presidents and Congress to manage. The book tends to be pretty forgiving of its subjects, though it isn't without criticism, but if you're looking for a skewering of the CIA or something you'll want to look elsewhere.
That said, the book does stay at a fairly high level, and while Zegart does a good job outlining some of the problems, I found myself a bit disappointed that it never took a next step to think about fixing them (except for recommending Congress should do its job more and adopt the 9/11 Commission recommendations, which, yeah seconded).
It's also a pretty easy read, accessible even if you don't have a background in the subject matter, and is well footnoted in case you want to start running down anything mentioned. Happy to have it on my shelf, though it's one I'll probably loan more than revisit.
That said, the book does stay at a fairly high level, and while Zegart does a good job outlining some of the problems, I found myself a bit disappointed that it never took a next step to think about fixing them (except for recommending Congress should do its job more and adopt the 9/11 Commission recommendations, which, yeah seconded).
It's also a pretty easy read, accessible even if you don't have a background in the subject matter, and is well footnoted in case you want to start running down anything mentioned. Happy to have it on my shelf, though it's one I'll probably loan more than revisit.
February 10, 2022
Amy Zegart provides an educator’s explanation of the world of intelligence that’s palatable for any level of reader. Effusive in her use of analogies to explain relatively complex discussions, the author provides a refreshingly honest review of our intelligence agencies and the roles they play in government. The book provides a wonderful description of the history of intelligence, how it has grown, the reasons we harbor misconceptions about what intelligence is and is not (and how we do and do not use/collect it), and what the future holds.
I particularly enjoyed the chapters regarding congressional oversight and the threats of cyber warfare. Both, I believe, are critical to understanding what our biggest threats are and how the nation can best shift our policy making to reflect those threats.
Absolutely enjoyed the book and would strongly recommend to anyone who wishes to expand their understanding of the intelligence world. It’s not all James Bond and Jason Bourne! (In fact, almost none of it is!)
I particularly enjoyed the chapters regarding congressional oversight and the threats of cyber warfare. Both, I believe, are critical to understanding what our biggest threats are and how the nation can best shift our policy making to reflect those threats.
Absolutely enjoyed the book and would strongly recommend to anyone who wishes to expand their understanding of the intelligence world. It’s not all James Bond and Jason Bourne! (In fact, almost none of it is!)
May 2, 2022
"Spies, Lies, and Algorithms" is an excellent introduction to the practice of intelligence in the United States and is ideal for a college undergraduate or somebody new to reading about intelligence.
Unfortunately, the title of this book is misleading and readers will not necessarily learn a great deal about either spying, the ethics of spycraft, how technology is used, or get an comprehensive overview of the history of American intelligence or any fresh insight about its future. Instead, "Spies, Lies, and Algorithms" introduces several topics related to US intelligence.
While Zegart's overview of the history of US intelligence and commentary are excellent, her insight too often summarizes more in-depth books, which she references, and the conventional wisdom on certain topics. The portions where Zegart describes Tetlock's superforcasting, Washington's spies, or the insight of Kahneman and Tversky simply summarize the key point of other excellent these, and many other, excellent books, providing a reading list for those who are eager for more substance. In other parts of the book Zegart discusses cases that have libraries written about them, such as Ames and Hanssen, without providing a more comprehensive overview of the problem of moles in particular and counterintelligence more generally.
On other topics, Zegart simply repeats the conventional wisdom that other writers and public figures have repeated for years. For example, Zegart examines the assumption that much intelligence is overclassified and cites the millions of intelligence reports the US government puts out each year, but she does not describe the nature of these millions of reports and explain why many seemingly innocuous reports have very high classifications. For example, a sensitive human source of information may tell a CIA Case Officer information that is public knowledge or could easily be inferred, but this raw report, and the derivative reports citing this report from a presumably credible source, will forever hold a high classification due to the great risk to the agent's life if somebody were to tie their information to them.
The problem with overclassifying is largely related to analytic products, which are a very small subset of the millions of intelligence products generated each year. This problem is particularly nuanced, which Zegart misses. A well-informed person, whether they are an academic, a market analyst, or an avid reader of The Economist, will likely often come to the same conclusions regarding current events as intelligence analysts, often drawing on the same underlying information. Any report this person writes would be unclassified, but a report from the CIA, for example, may carry a high classification. This would suggest that the CIA report, at least its conclusions, are overclassified. However, the CIA report likely, and should, include additional specific details that suggest very specific sources of information, contributing to a confidence assessment that differs from what a well-informed reader would come up with. To reach a wider audience, analysts must be trained to use and substitute reports from lower levels of classification that contribute to the same overall assessment. The problem, thus, is not necessarily overclassification, but discipline and training. Analysts may get caught up preparing a product for a particular customer, such as the President or a senior executive, and not consider that their analysis may have a much wider audience that could use the information as soon as possible. If the analyst does not "write for release," anticipating this wider audience, the "overclassified" report may not have the maximum intended impact.
Hopefully Zegart's book inspires people new to intelligence to read many of the books she references, and other to join the intelligence community. While her book lacks fresh insight or nuanced perspectives, her information and analysis is generally very good and she avoids the pitfalls of sensationalism or narrow-minded thinking that befalls other books on the intelligence community. For what it is, "Spies, Lies, and Algorothims" is well-balanced and a good introduction to the "IC" for the casual reader. Readers who have read a few books about the intelligence community, or are serving in it, could pick it up as a refresher, forgive the shortfalls outlined above as those of somebody who did not serve a career in the intelligence community, and learn a few things.
"Spies, Lies, and Algorithms" also leaves out some key topics related to intelligence that would have supported her overall narrative. For example, a chapter describing the intelligence process, from the collection of raw data to the finished intelligence products presented to generals/admirals, bureaucrats, and politicians, would have been fitting.
Overall, "Spies, Lies, and Algorithms" would have worked better reframed as a primer on issues related to intelligence for an audience unfamiliar with the topics. While the title and framing are misleading and the information presented relatively basic, Zegart's information and analysis of key issues are very good and many people would benefit from her book, especially politicians and journalists who often get distracted by the sensational topic of the day.
Unfortunately, the title of this book is misleading and readers will not necessarily learn a great deal about either spying, the ethics of spycraft, how technology is used, or get an comprehensive overview of the history of American intelligence or any fresh insight about its future. Instead, "Spies, Lies, and Algorithms" introduces several topics related to US intelligence.
While Zegart's overview of the history of US intelligence and commentary are excellent, her insight too often summarizes more in-depth books, which she references, and the conventional wisdom on certain topics. The portions where Zegart describes Tetlock's superforcasting, Washington's spies, or the insight of Kahneman and Tversky simply summarize the key point of other excellent these, and many other, excellent books, providing a reading list for those who are eager for more substance. In other parts of the book Zegart discusses cases that have libraries written about them, such as Ames and Hanssen, without providing a more comprehensive overview of the problem of moles in particular and counterintelligence more generally.
On other topics, Zegart simply repeats the conventional wisdom that other writers and public figures have repeated for years. For example, Zegart examines the assumption that much intelligence is overclassified and cites the millions of intelligence reports the US government puts out each year, but she does not describe the nature of these millions of reports and explain why many seemingly innocuous reports have very high classifications. For example, a sensitive human source of information may tell a CIA Case Officer information that is public knowledge or could easily be inferred, but this raw report, and the derivative reports citing this report from a presumably credible source, will forever hold a high classification due to the great risk to the agent's life if somebody were to tie their information to them.
The problem with overclassifying is largely related to analytic products, which are a very small subset of the millions of intelligence products generated each year. This problem is particularly nuanced, which Zegart misses. A well-informed person, whether they are an academic, a market analyst, or an avid reader of The Economist, will likely often come to the same conclusions regarding current events as intelligence analysts, often drawing on the same underlying information. Any report this person writes would be unclassified, but a report from the CIA, for example, may carry a high classification. This would suggest that the CIA report, at least its conclusions, are overclassified. However, the CIA report likely, and should, include additional specific details that suggest very specific sources of information, contributing to a confidence assessment that differs from what a well-informed reader would come up with. To reach a wider audience, analysts must be trained to use and substitute reports from lower levels of classification that contribute to the same overall assessment. The problem, thus, is not necessarily overclassification, but discipline and training. Analysts may get caught up preparing a product for a particular customer, such as the President or a senior executive, and not consider that their analysis may have a much wider audience that could use the information as soon as possible. If the analyst does not "write for release," anticipating this wider audience, the "overclassified" report may not have the maximum intended impact.
Hopefully Zegart's book inspires people new to intelligence to read many of the books she references, and other to join the intelligence community. While her book lacks fresh insight or nuanced perspectives, her information and analysis is generally very good and she avoids the pitfalls of sensationalism or narrow-minded thinking that befalls other books on the intelligence community. For what it is, "Spies, Lies, and Algorothims" is well-balanced and a good introduction to the "IC" for the casual reader. Readers who have read a few books about the intelligence community, or are serving in it, could pick it up as a refresher, forgive the shortfalls outlined above as those of somebody who did not serve a career in the intelligence community, and learn a few things.
"Spies, Lies, and Algorithms" also leaves out some key topics related to intelligence that would have supported her overall narrative. For example, a chapter describing the intelligence process, from the collection of raw data to the finished intelligence products presented to generals/admirals, bureaucrats, and politicians, would have been fitting.
Overall, "Spies, Lies, and Algorithms" would have worked better reframed as a primer on issues related to intelligence for an audience unfamiliar with the topics. While the title and framing are misleading and the information presented relatively basic, Zegart's information and analysis of key issues are very good and many people would benefit from her book, especially politicians and journalists who often get distracted by the sensational topic of the day.
April 4, 2023
Learned a lot from this book
April 2, 2022
Today’s Challenges and Issues in Intelligence Collection, Use, Misuse, and Oversight
Author Amy Zegart provides a much-needed and first-rate survey of the contemporary challenges and issues in intelligence collection and use. Spying today is misunderstood by a public whose impressions have been formed by spy thrillers now far removed from how nearly all intelligence is collected and weaponized.
Whereas our adversaries once threatened from abroad and we could often see them coming, now they can attack America’s critical infrastructure any time from any place. Spyware and malware can lurk undetected for years within millions of lines of code.
A major challenge which has emerged in recent years is the democratization of intelligence collection, such as civilian use of Google Earth and other open source software. Zegart discusses use of crowdsourcing, machine learning, and automated analytics which are not the sole purview of a well-funded government agency but can be used by ordinary citizens to collect intelligence information. Zegart argues that the CIA and other U.S. intelligence services (there are 18 in all including military) must learn to work with the private sector, especially to utilize the latest tools to sift through and manage an avalanche of data so easily collected but so challenging to prioritize and interpret.
Today’s off the shelf technologies give asymmetric advantage to countries who could not compete in an earlier era of U2 spy planes and government-launched satellites. Low-cost hacking technology is now available to North Korea and Iran, as well as China and Russia. These four countries are responsible for 77% of state-sponsored cyber attacks, according to the author.
Documents no longer have to be spirited out of a building or surreptitiously photographed. Edward Snowden stole documents which, if printed, would form a stack three miles high, while PFC Chelsea Manning stole 250,000 State Department cables which were transferred to a fake Lady Gaga CD.
Preventing such theft is not made easier by the fact that four million Americans have security clearances. Furthermore, argues Zegart, intelligence agencies tend to trust their own. Thus, Aldrich Ames, whose lifestyle, alcoholism, and poor performance reviews should have tripped multiple security triggers, carried on unimpeded for ten years and was paid $4.6 million for his treachery. On the other hand, those responsible for counterespionage can go too far, as occurred when James Angleton was in charge of counterintelligence. Angleton was sure everyone at the CIA was a spy and ended the careers of many innocent and talented CIA agents, thus also eroding the nation’s security.
Zegart is at her best when discussing such tradeoffs. For example, the higher the intelligence classification of information, the less analysis it gets because so few people have access. Therefore it is less likely to be subjected to skeptical questions about its quality and significance, especially if it seems to support pet theories or political agendas.
By contrast, anyone can share widely their “findings,” legitimate or fake, using social media and thereby influencing public opinion. Already video and documents can be doctored convincingly, and the problem of detecting this will become ever more difficult as technology improves. Even if accurate, such information — which once was easier for governments to conceal — can escalate a crisis or derail sensitive negotiations.
Congressional oversight of intelligence is poor, Zegart argues. Congress members seek committee assignments that enable them to deliver benefits to their constituents. But they cannot talk openly about what they are doing in service to the country as a result of membership on an intelligence committee. Furthermore, members of Congress have little information compared to the agencies they are supposed to supervise. Finally, there is a bifurcation of budget authority. The Intelligence Committees have oversight of agencies’ activities, but the Appropriations Committees control intelligence budgets. Secrecy constraints mean it is difficult for the two to have a dialogue and use the power of the purse to exert control over activities.
Zegart observes that unlike a physical invasion by a foreign power, cyber warfare is a “bleed every minute” campaign carried out over time. Victims may not know they have been attacked for months or years. Even when such an attack is discovered, nations are wrestling with how to deter or punish those responsible. This, the author says, depends upon 1) establishing clear red lines beyond which there will be penalties or retribution, 2) ensuring the capability and willingness to punish violators, and 3) the ability to identify the perpetrator.
This is an important book. Zegart addresses very timely and significant issues and does so with clarity and thoughtfulness. And one comes away with the uneasy feeling that the challenges will become ever greater in coming years.
Author Amy Zegart provides a much-needed and first-rate survey of the contemporary challenges and issues in intelligence collection and use. Spying today is misunderstood by a public whose impressions have been formed by spy thrillers now far removed from how nearly all intelligence is collected and weaponized.
Whereas our adversaries once threatened from abroad and we could often see them coming, now they can attack America’s critical infrastructure any time from any place. Spyware and malware can lurk undetected for years within millions of lines of code.
A major challenge which has emerged in recent years is the democratization of intelligence collection, such as civilian use of Google Earth and other open source software. Zegart discusses use of crowdsourcing, machine learning, and automated analytics which are not the sole purview of a well-funded government agency but can be used by ordinary citizens to collect intelligence information. Zegart argues that the CIA and other U.S. intelligence services (there are 18 in all including military) must learn to work with the private sector, especially to utilize the latest tools to sift through and manage an avalanche of data so easily collected but so challenging to prioritize and interpret.
Today’s off the shelf technologies give asymmetric advantage to countries who could not compete in an earlier era of U2 spy planes and government-launched satellites. Low-cost hacking technology is now available to North Korea and Iran, as well as China and Russia. These four countries are responsible for 77% of state-sponsored cyber attacks, according to the author.
Documents no longer have to be spirited out of a building or surreptitiously photographed. Edward Snowden stole documents which, if printed, would form a stack three miles high, while PFC Chelsea Manning stole 250,000 State Department cables which were transferred to a fake Lady Gaga CD.
Preventing such theft is not made easier by the fact that four million Americans have security clearances. Furthermore, argues Zegart, intelligence agencies tend to trust their own. Thus, Aldrich Ames, whose lifestyle, alcoholism, and poor performance reviews should have tripped multiple security triggers, carried on unimpeded for ten years and was paid $4.6 million for his treachery. On the other hand, those responsible for counterespionage can go too far, as occurred when James Angleton was in charge of counterintelligence. Angleton was sure everyone at the CIA was a spy and ended the careers of many innocent and talented CIA agents, thus also eroding the nation’s security.
Zegart is at her best when discussing such tradeoffs. For example, the higher the intelligence classification of information, the less analysis it gets because so few people have access. Therefore it is less likely to be subjected to skeptical questions about its quality and significance, especially if it seems to support pet theories or political agendas.
By contrast, anyone can share widely their “findings,” legitimate or fake, using social media and thereby influencing public opinion. Already video and documents can be doctored convincingly, and the problem of detecting this will become ever more difficult as technology improves. Even if accurate, such information — which once was easier for governments to conceal — can escalate a crisis or derail sensitive negotiations.
Congressional oversight of intelligence is poor, Zegart argues. Congress members seek committee assignments that enable them to deliver benefits to their constituents. But they cannot talk openly about what they are doing in service to the country as a result of membership on an intelligence committee. Furthermore, members of Congress have little information compared to the agencies they are supposed to supervise. Finally, there is a bifurcation of budget authority. The Intelligence Committees have oversight of agencies’ activities, but the Appropriations Committees control intelligence budgets. Secrecy constraints mean it is difficult for the two to have a dialogue and use the power of the purse to exert control over activities.
Zegart observes that unlike a physical invasion by a foreign power, cyber warfare is a “bleed every minute” campaign carried out over time. Victims may not know they have been attacked for months or years. Even when such an attack is discovered, nations are wrestling with how to deter or punish those responsible. This, the author says, depends upon 1) establishing clear red lines beyond which there will be penalties or retribution, 2) ensuring the capability and willingness to punish violators, and 3) the ability to identify the perpetrator.
This is an important book. Zegart addresses very timely and significant issues and does so with clarity and thoughtfulness. And one comes away with the uneasy feeling that the challenges will become ever greater in coming years.
October 11, 2022
A fascinating look at spying and intelligence from one of the foremost academic non-intelligence professional in the field. Zegart uses her many years of experience in this field to trace the history of intelligence operations and how the prolific number of spy novels and movies have blurred and often distorted the reality of how intelligence is gathered, works and employed. Even within the IC—intelligence community—wide disparities in analysis, levels of surety and the vast cognitive biases existing between Congressional intelligence committee members, the general public and others who consume or make life and death decisions based upon it cannot generally agree on how to interpret and use intelligence. Zegart skillfully makes distinctions between fact and fiction, and how technology today can distort public opinion, among dozens of other illuminating insights. She opines and concludes with a piece on how cyberspace is the ultimate cloak and dagger spy tool and what private citizens and others can do to better understand its positive and negative utility. This is a fantastic read as are all of Zegart’s books on spy craft, endeavoring to educate society by debunking common misunderstandings.
March 24, 2022
I learned so much! Author provided an interesting history of how our intelligence agencies came to be as well as what intelligence actually is. I found the last chapters the most fascinating - they focused on the future of intelligence and cybersecurity.
September 4, 2024
3.5 Stars Spies, Lies and Algorithms is a well researched and reasonably interesting book, but it is really aimed at beginners to the topics of intelligence and spying. Some of the book is pretty 101 level, and some is just common sense.
Intelligence is much more complex than it was 50 years ago. Do we really need to be told this? There is history here, but it’s very high level and told in the form of short example stories and quotes. It’s not a real, comprehensive and thorough history.
The author of the book is a professor at Stanford University, and I suspect the book was developed to use as a text for an undergraduate class on the topic. And for that purpose, it is no doubt perfect. The problem is that the audience for books on intelligence out here in the real world is generally more knowledgeable and sophisticated than your average 19 year old. So the book comes off as pretty basic to us.
Bottom line- if you are new you the topic, a solid read. But if you are past the 101 level of knowledge, you will find nothing new here except maybe a few good quotes from CIA directors.
Intelligence is much more complex than it was 50 years ago. Do we really need to be told this? There is history here, but it’s very high level and told in the form of short example stories and quotes. It’s not a real, comprehensive and thorough history.
The author of the book is a professor at Stanford University, and I suspect the book was developed to use as a text for an undergraduate class on the topic. And for that purpose, it is no doubt perfect. The problem is that the audience for books on intelligence out here in the real world is generally more knowledgeable and sophisticated than your average 19 year old. So the book comes off as pretty basic to us.
Bottom line- if you are new you the topic, a solid read. But if you are past the 101 level of knowledge, you will find nothing new here except maybe a few good quotes from CIA directors.
July 30, 2022
Overall review of Spies Lies and Algoritms
Amy decries the almost a total absence of transparency. As a result, academic research is almost zero. Most Americans cannot learn about intelligence even if they want to. Spytainment is all they have. Spytainment is movies such as Jason Bourne and James Bond, television series such as Homeland and 24, and the writings of Tom Clancy and others.
As a result of spytainment, there is a public mindset that sees intelligence agencies as far more powerful, capable and unaccountable than they actually are.
Also, we have “Deep State” thinking. A 2017 poll found that nearly half of all Americans (48 percent) believed that a “Deep State” of military, intelligence and government officials who try to secretly manipulate government policy exists.
Quoting Tom Clancy, “The difference between fiction and reality? Fiction has to make sense."
And looking back at history we have a long-standing viewpoint that “There is nothing more necessary than good intelligence to frustrate a designing enemy, and nothing that requires greater pains to obtain.” For that we have George Washington to thank in 1756! Until the mid-twentieth century, intelligence was considered a strictly wartime endeavor, not a peacetime capability to help policymakers gain advantage in international affairs.
The U.S. Intelligence Community is now harbored in 18 (!) components of the Federal Government allegedly under the auspices of the Director of National Intelligence. But that Director has to rely extensively on the other 17 components for information especially as to what intelligence he actually receives. Each of the Intelligence Community's eighteen agencies has a unique role and a culture that comes with it. Many factors explain why the right information often does not get to the right people at the right time in the intelligence world - including bureaucratic turf protection, agency cultures, career incentives, ingrained habits and a desire for autonomy.
Two decades after 9/11, and numerous commissions and oversight meetings, almost none of the principal commission's recommendations to improve intelligence oversight have been adopted. The least reformed part of the U.S. intelligence enterprise isn't the CIA, FBI, or NSA. It's Congress. There are too few leaders in Congress with the capabilities in engineering to effectively understand and comprehend technological realities. There is also a very limited electoral (as in re-electoral) mindset that encourages focus on intelligence. The visible rewards for re-election purposes lie in all of the other committees of Congress.
These shortfalls also extend to the more than 25,000 interest groups registered in Washington D.C., fewer than 1 percent (that's less than 250) of them are focused on intelligence issues. And those groups are small with tiny budgets and names you've never heard of.
For policymakers, the imperative is getting things done [short-term] and thus in getting re-elected. For intelligence officials, the imperative is getting things right [long-term].
So, the bottom line is that Amy is not optimistic that all of these challenges will be addressed in the near future. But it has gotten better, there has been progress, and we shouldn’t give up.
Isolated and interesting other observations from Spies, Lies, and Algorithms.
1. We have what is believed to be the first Twitter issued by the CIA in 2014. "We can neither confirm nor deny that this is our first tweet."
2. The volume of drone strikes reported by Amy are stunning to me. The following numbers do not count drone strikes on the "hot battlefields” of Iraq, Afghanistan, or Syria.
Bush - 50 strikes
Obama - 500 strikes
Trump - 200 strikes (first two years of his term)
The estimated outcome was the deaths of 4,300 terrorists and 600 civilians.
Because these mostly covert actions are in addition to the overt actions that get publicized, it is hard for me to understand the total impact that all of these actions are having. Every president from Truman to Trump has authorized covert action, even the "dark corner of the room" variety.
And covert actions are not concentrated with any "hawkish" political orientation. Jimmy Carter and Barack Obama, both of whom made averting wars and promoting human rights mainstays of their foreign policy agendas, turned to covert action as much as or more than their Republican predecessors.
3. Finding the right balance between risks to security and restrictions on liberties will always involve hard choices and heated debates. In democracies, intelligence agencies wield the power of the state at the people's will. One would like to think that is true, but is it?
4. Are there ethics in intelligence? Is that an oxymoron? The claim is sometimes made “It was the wrong thing to do for the right reasons." These are all good questions, heavy and thoughtful. One should have a way of resolving these questions but there isn’t any effective public forum to do so.
5. American military experts have said that there isn't a single major Chinese weapons system that isn't based on stolen U.S. technology.
6. According to former U.S. intelligence officials, two to three million people are engaged in espionage around the world, most of them aiming at the United States.
7. An expert judgment expert (Phil Tetlock) conducted a 20 year study examining how well experts forecasted the future. He asked almost 300 experts to make thousands of predictions about economic and political issues of the day, nearly 82,000 predictions in all. Findings were depressing. The predictions were about the same as random guessing. But some people did much, much better than average. More studies found the secret to success wasn't brilliance or what the forecasters knew. It was how they thought. Superforecasting skills can be learned through training, practice, measurement, and feedback.
Artificial intelligence is going to help. Use of algorithms is valuable. AI augments but does not replace human analysis. This is one segment of Amy’s research that I found most optimistic.
8. There exists a substantial and broad-based non-governmental open-source nuclear threat intelligence community. But there are no formalized or standardized quality control handbooks. Such non-governmental organizations can actually help our enemies by identifying and disclosing weaknesses in those enemies' deception and related activities.
Finding ways to codify and institutionalize current best practices, norms, and networks among leading non-governmental nuclear intelligence collectors and analysts is an important first step. The good news is that nascent efforts are underway.
9. While Facebook executives have been apologizing to Congress in public, they have been waging a campaign in private to deny, delay, and deflect regulation and stifle critics.
10. It's also a revolutionary shift for American tech companies, many of whom resist the idea that they have any responsibility for American national security. Just as tech leaders have been stunned by hearings showing Congress's poor understanding of technology, policymakers have been stunned by Silicon Valley's cavalier view of how their products are being used by malign actors.
11. A protest on May 21, 2016 in Houston set up one side under the banner "Heart of Texas'' and another called "United Muslims of America". What neither group knew was that both groups were created by a shadowy Kremlin-backed organization called the Internet Research Agency (IRA ironically). In Russia, hundreds of trolls masqueraded as Americans in around-the-clock shifts - tweeting, liking, friending and sharing in English to attract American followers. For both sites, more than 570,000 followers were recruited. Kremlin-instigated content on Facebook Platforms is estimated to have reached more than 126 million Americans in the run-up to the 2016 election - more than a third of the U.S. population.
It is believed the Russians (led by Putin) "wanted Donald Trump to win and Hillary to lose, but most of all they just wanted to f--- with us." The US Intelligence Community was caught with their hands in their pockets. Cyberspace is unlike any other battleground.
12. North Korea has only 28 websites.
13. Cyber has catapulted to the number threat to the U.S., ranking it ahead of terrorism.
14. Social media allows you to reach virtually anyone and to play with their minds... You can do whatever you want. You can be whoever you want. It's a place where wars are fought, elections are won, and error is promoted. There are no regulations. It's a no-man's land.
Amy decries the almost a total absence of transparency. As a result, academic research is almost zero. Most Americans cannot learn about intelligence even if they want to. Spytainment is all they have. Spytainment is movies such as Jason Bourne and James Bond, television series such as Homeland and 24, and the writings of Tom Clancy and others.
As a result of spytainment, there is a public mindset that sees intelligence agencies as far more powerful, capable and unaccountable than they actually are.
Also, we have “Deep State” thinking. A 2017 poll found that nearly half of all Americans (48 percent) believed that a “Deep State” of military, intelligence and government officials who try to secretly manipulate government policy exists.
Quoting Tom Clancy, “The difference between fiction and reality? Fiction has to make sense."
And looking back at history we have a long-standing viewpoint that “There is nothing more necessary than good intelligence to frustrate a designing enemy, and nothing that requires greater pains to obtain.” For that we have George Washington to thank in 1756! Until the mid-twentieth century, intelligence was considered a strictly wartime endeavor, not a peacetime capability to help policymakers gain advantage in international affairs.
The U.S. Intelligence Community is now harbored in 18 (!) components of the Federal Government allegedly under the auspices of the Director of National Intelligence. But that Director has to rely extensively on the other 17 components for information especially as to what intelligence he actually receives. Each of the Intelligence Community's eighteen agencies has a unique role and a culture that comes with it. Many factors explain why the right information often does not get to the right people at the right time in the intelligence world - including bureaucratic turf protection, agency cultures, career incentives, ingrained habits and a desire for autonomy.
Two decades after 9/11, and numerous commissions and oversight meetings, almost none of the principal commission's recommendations to improve intelligence oversight have been adopted. The least reformed part of the U.S. intelligence enterprise isn't the CIA, FBI, or NSA. It's Congress. There are too few leaders in Congress with the capabilities in engineering to effectively understand and comprehend technological realities. There is also a very limited electoral (as in re-electoral) mindset that encourages focus on intelligence. The visible rewards for re-election purposes lie in all of the other committees of Congress.
These shortfalls also extend to the more than 25,000 interest groups registered in Washington D.C., fewer than 1 percent (that's less than 250) of them are focused on intelligence issues. And those groups are small with tiny budgets and names you've never heard of.
For policymakers, the imperative is getting things done [short-term] and thus in getting re-elected. For intelligence officials, the imperative is getting things right [long-term].
So, the bottom line is that Amy is not optimistic that all of these challenges will be addressed in the near future. But it has gotten better, there has been progress, and we shouldn’t give up.
Isolated and interesting other observations from Spies, Lies, and Algorithms.
1. We have what is believed to be the first Twitter issued by the CIA in 2014. "We can neither confirm nor deny that this is our first tweet."
2. The volume of drone strikes reported by Amy are stunning to me. The following numbers do not count drone strikes on the "hot battlefields” of Iraq, Afghanistan, or Syria.
Bush - 50 strikes
Obama - 500 strikes
Trump - 200 strikes (first two years of his term)
The estimated outcome was the deaths of 4,300 terrorists and 600 civilians.
Because these mostly covert actions are in addition to the overt actions that get publicized, it is hard for me to understand the total impact that all of these actions are having. Every president from Truman to Trump has authorized covert action, even the "dark corner of the room" variety.
And covert actions are not concentrated with any "hawkish" political orientation. Jimmy Carter and Barack Obama, both of whom made averting wars and promoting human rights mainstays of their foreign policy agendas, turned to covert action as much as or more than their Republican predecessors.
3. Finding the right balance between risks to security and restrictions on liberties will always involve hard choices and heated debates. In democracies, intelligence agencies wield the power of the state at the people's will. One would like to think that is true, but is it?
4. Are there ethics in intelligence? Is that an oxymoron? The claim is sometimes made “It was the wrong thing to do for the right reasons." These are all good questions, heavy and thoughtful. One should have a way of resolving these questions but there isn’t any effective public forum to do so.
5. American military experts have said that there isn't a single major Chinese weapons system that isn't based on stolen U.S. technology.
6. According to former U.S. intelligence officials, two to three million people are engaged in espionage around the world, most of them aiming at the United States.
7. An expert judgment expert (Phil Tetlock) conducted a 20 year study examining how well experts forecasted the future. He asked almost 300 experts to make thousands of predictions about economic and political issues of the day, nearly 82,000 predictions in all. Findings were depressing. The predictions were about the same as random guessing. But some people did much, much better than average. More studies found the secret to success wasn't brilliance or what the forecasters knew. It was how they thought. Superforecasting skills can be learned through training, practice, measurement, and feedback.
Artificial intelligence is going to help. Use of algorithms is valuable. AI augments but does not replace human analysis. This is one segment of Amy’s research that I found most optimistic.
8. There exists a substantial and broad-based non-governmental open-source nuclear threat intelligence community. But there are no formalized or standardized quality control handbooks. Such non-governmental organizations can actually help our enemies by identifying and disclosing weaknesses in those enemies' deception and related activities.
Finding ways to codify and institutionalize current best practices, norms, and networks among leading non-governmental nuclear intelligence collectors and analysts is an important first step. The good news is that nascent efforts are underway.
9. While Facebook executives have been apologizing to Congress in public, they have been waging a campaign in private to deny, delay, and deflect regulation and stifle critics.
10. It's also a revolutionary shift for American tech companies, many of whom resist the idea that they have any responsibility for American national security. Just as tech leaders have been stunned by hearings showing Congress's poor understanding of technology, policymakers have been stunned by Silicon Valley's cavalier view of how their products are being used by malign actors.
11. A protest on May 21, 2016 in Houston set up one side under the banner "Heart of Texas'' and another called "United Muslims of America". What neither group knew was that both groups were created by a shadowy Kremlin-backed organization called the Internet Research Agency (IRA ironically). In Russia, hundreds of trolls masqueraded as Americans in around-the-clock shifts - tweeting, liking, friending and sharing in English to attract American followers. For both sites, more than 570,000 followers were recruited. Kremlin-instigated content on Facebook Platforms is estimated to have reached more than 126 million Americans in the run-up to the 2016 election - more than a third of the U.S. population.
It is believed the Russians (led by Putin) "wanted Donald Trump to win and Hillary to lose, but most of all they just wanted to f--- with us." The US Intelligence Community was caught with their hands in their pockets. Cyberspace is unlike any other battleground.
12. North Korea has only 28 websites.
13. Cyber has catapulted to the number threat to the U.S., ranking it ahead of terrorism.
14. Social media allows you to reach virtually anyone and to play with their minds... You can do whatever you want. You can be whoever you want. It's a place where wars are fought, elections are won, and error is promoted. There are no regulations. It's a no-man's land.
December 30, 2022
Dr. Amy Zegart is a friend and colleague of mine. I first met her when she tapped me on the shoulder to participate in her "Educating Journalists about Cyber" conferences she hosted annually at Stanford University. I also worked with her on the Stanford Cyber Policy Program Advisory Council for a couple of years. So, when I heard that she published this book, I was excited. If anybody could shed some light on how the United States does intelligence, it was Dr. Zegart. And she delivers in spades.
As an academic, she is rightly concerned about the opacity of how the intelligence sausage is made. Because of all the layers-upon-layers of secrecy inherent in any intelligence organization, multiplied by the 18 different intelligence organizations officially operating with overlapping missions, and the inbred distrust that each has for the others, understanding the intelligence process is hard enough for an insider (like a congressional oversight committee member), let alone an academic trying to enlighten her students. And that's not even including the average citizen who get's their idea of how the CIA, the NSA, and the FBI operates from popular culture entertainment like "Zero Dark Thirty," "Enemy of the State," and "The Silence of the Lambs."
She covers an extensive history of U.S. spying starting with General Washington (code number 711) in the Revolutionary War, to the stops and starts of the intelligence function through the War of 1812, the Civil War, and the two World Wars. After WWII (1947), the U.S. Congress made it official and created the CIA "to coordinate the activities of different intelligence offices in the military services, the Justice Department, and the State Department." The section on how the CIA tracked down Osama Bin Laden is illuminating.
That same year (1947), President Truman gave the CIA authority to "conduct “covert psychological operations designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities.” According to Dr. Zegart, a covert action is “an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly ... Covert action is active; its aim is to produce or affect outcomes. Espionage is more passive; its purpose is acquiring information."
But almost immediately, the CIA ran into controversy. The next year (1948), the NYTs claimed that the CIA is “one of the weakest links in our national security.” Because of the internal secrecy, the public rarely hears about the CIA's successes. But, when it screws up, the public scrutiny is loud (Bay of Pigs, CIA Assassination program, Domestic wire tapping, Iran-Contra, 9/11, WMD in Iraq, rendition and water boarding, etc).
And that's one of Dr. Zegart's criticisms. It's tough for anybody, but especially outsiders like academics, to assess how good the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) is without access to information. This is one of my pet peeves too. I don't want the IC to reveal sources and methods. People die if that happens. But I would appreciate an honest discussion of goals and objectives. Dr. Zegart says that, "between 1961 and 1974, "the CIA conducted more than nine hundred major covert actions and thousands of smaller ones." What's the win-loss record there in terms of national security objectives? Those shouldn't be secret. A public discussion of what those goals and objectives are would be appreciated; maybe not at the moment, but soon after so that a national debate about what we are trying to do is public.
Dr. Zegart then describes why the business of intelligence is so hard; why, in hind site, the CIA made obvious errors like the ones listed above. She doesn't try to excuse it, just explain it so that improvements can be made. Factors include an asymmetric information pictures for all 18 agencies on the same topic, An unwillingness to share between groups, human bias, unclear objectives, and the fact that most humans don't understand probabilities. That last one in near and dear to the cybersecurity professional too.
Most leaders want a yes/no answer. Will the company succumb to a ransomware attack this year? Is Osama Bin Laden in the bunker? But the world isn't binary. The world is on a spectrum of uncertainty. What does a CEO do with the fact that there is 20% chance of a successful ransomware attack this year? What does President Obama do when the range of answers from his staff about the location of Osama Bin Laden is between 30% and 80%? Those answers aren't satisfactory. But that's the world we live in. The question is can we make those predictions more accurate?
I was pleased to see Dr. Zegart advocate for Superforecasting as one solution. Made famous in the book "Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction” by Philip E. Tetlock and Dan Gardner, I have been a fan of this Cybersecurity Canon candidate book for a long time. I have been advocating to security professionals the use of their Superforecasting techniques to calculate the probability of material impact due to a cyber event for a while now. They work and the results are much better than the standard heat maps that security professionals have been using for two decades. Tetlock and Gardner say that it's possible to learn how to forecast the probabilities to really complex questions (like cyber risk to the business and the chances that President Putin will get assassinated in the next three years) and he ran a five year experiment to test it out. The Superforecasters blew the other teams away with their accuracy.
The rest of the book covers the several thorny subjects.
- Counterintelligence: The art of defending against the intelligence activities of others; especially moles.
- Coming to terms with covert action. This is serious stuff and it ranges from influence operations, to shifting the balance of political power in a foreign country, to destabilizing the economies of unfriendly regimes, and finally, to targeted killing. There are moral and ethical issues here. As Dr. Zegart insinuates, if you don't have a good way to measure wins and losses other than yes, we killed another terrorist, perhaps we should put the brakes on until we do.
- Congressional oversight. How does any government supervise spy operations when the entire enterprise is shrouded in secrets and mistrust. Dr. Zegart highlights some of the historic clashes in American history
- Open source intelligence and assessing the nuclear threat. Nuclear threat assessment has moved away from being solely the province of government intelligence organizations to a cornucopia of non-governmental special interests.
- Cyber. The relatively new development (last 30 years) of nation state continuous low-level cyber conflict. Governments have realized that they can get a lot done in terms of espionage, influence, and even some light destruction for a fraction of what it costs in the physical world to accomplish the same affect and falls just short of actual warfare.
By covering all this material, Dr. Zegart is educating the reader about how the U.S. intelligence process works and highlighting the places where much improvement is required. For me, the takeaway is that the average U.S. citizen's knowledge of the country's intelligence apparatus mostly comes from movies and TV shows. She is advocating more transparency so that the academic world of scholars and big thinkers can help solve some of these problems.
As an academic, she is rightly concerned about the opacity of how the intelligence sausage is made. Because of all the layers-upon-layers of secrecy inherent in any intelligence organization, multiplied by the 18 different intelligence organizations officially operating with overlapping missions, and the inbred distrust that each has for the others, understanding the intelligence process is hard enough for an insider (like a congressional oversight committee member), let alone an academic trying to enlighten her students. And that's not even including the average citizen who get's their idea of how the CIA, the NSA, and the FBI operates from popular culture entertainment like "Zero Dark Thirty," "Enemy of the State," and "The Silence of the Lambs."
She covers an extensive history of U.S. spying starting with General Washington (code number 711) in the Revolutionary War, to the stops and starts of the intelligence function through the War of 1812, the Civil War, and the two World Wars. After WWII (1947), the U.S. Congress made it official and created the CIA "to coordinate the activities of different intelligence offices in the military services, the Justice Department, and the State Department." The section on how the CIA tracked down Osama Bin Laden is illuminating.
That same year (1947), President Truman gave the CIA authority to "conduct “covert psychological operations designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities.” According to Dr. Zegart, a covert action is “an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly ... Covert action is active; its aim is to produce or affect outcomes. Espionage is more passive; its purpose is acquiring information."
But almost immediately, the CIA ran into controversy. The next year (1948), the NYTs claimed that the CIA is “one of the weakest links in our national security.” Because of the internal secrecy, the public rarely hears about the CIA's successes. But, when it screws up, the public scrutiny is loud (Bay of Pigs, CIA Assassination program, Domestic wire tapping, Iran-Contra, 9/11, WMD in Iraq, rendition and water boarding, etc).
And that's one of Dr. Zegart's criticisms. It's tough for anybody, but especially outsiders like academics, to assess how good the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) is without access to information. This is one of my pet peeves too. I don't want the IC to reveal sources and methods. People die if that happens. But I would appreciate an honest discussion of goals and objectives. Dr. Zegart says that, "between 1961 and 1974, "the CIA conducted more than nine hundred major covert actions and thousands of smaller ones." What's the win-loss record there in terms of national security objectives? Those shouldn't be secret. A public discussion of what those goals and objectives are would be appreciated; maybe not at the moment, but soon after so that a national debate about what we are trying to do is public.
Dr. Zegart then describes why the business of intelligence is so hard; why, in hind site, the CIA made obvious errors like the ones listed above. She doesn't try to excuse it, just explain it so that improvements can be made. Factors include an asymmetric information pictures for all 18 agencies on the same topic, An unwillingness to share between groups, human bias, unclear objectives, and the fact that most humans don't understand probabilities. That last one in near and dear to the cybersecurity professional too.
Most leaders want a yes/no answer. Will the company succumb to a ransomware attack this year? Is Osama Bin Laden in the bunker? But the world isn't binary. The world is on a spectrum of uncertainty. What does a CEO do with the fact that there is 20% chance of a successful ransomware attack this year? What does President Obama do when the range of answers from his staff about the location of Osama Bin Laden is between 30% and 80%? Those answers aren't satisfactory. But that's the world we live in. The question is can we make those predictions more accurate?
I was pleased to see Dr. Zegart advocate for Superforecasting as one solution. Made famous in the book "Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction” by Philip E. Tetlock and Dan Gardner, I have been a fan of this Cybersecurity Canon candidate book for a long time. I have been advocating to security professionals the use of their Superforecasting techniques to calculate the probability of material impact due to a cyber event for a while now. They work and the results are much better than the standard heat maps that security professionals have been using for two decades. Tetlock and Gardner say that it's possible to learn how to forecast the probabilities to really complex questions (like cyber risk to the business and the chances that President Putin will get assassinated in the next three years) and he ran a five year experiment to test it out. The Superforecasters blew the other teams away with their accuracy.
The rest of the book covers the several thorny subjects.
- Counterintelligence: The art of defending against the intelligence activities of others; especially moles.
- Coming to terms with covert action. This is serious stuff and it ranges from influence operations, to shifting the balance of political power in a foreign country, to destabilizing the economies of unfriendly regimes, and finally, to targeted killing. There are moral and ethical issues here. As Dr. Zegart insinuates, if you don't have a good way to measure wins and losses other than yes, we killed another terrorist, perhaps we should put the brakes on until we do.
- Congressional oversight. How does any government supervise spy operations when the entire enterprise is shrouded in secrets and mistrust. Dr. Zegart highlights some of the historic clashes in American history
- Open source intelligence and assessing the nuclear threat. Nuclear threat assessment has moved away from being solely the province of government intelligence organizations to a cornucopia of non-governmental special interests.
- Cyber. The relatively new development (last 30 years) of nation state continuous low-level cyber conflict. Governments have realized that they can get a lot done in terms of espionage, influence, and even some light destruction for a fraction of what it costs in the physical world to accomplish the same affect and falls just short of actual warfare.
By covering all this material, Dr. Zegart is educating the reader about how the U.S. intelligence process works and highlighting the places where much improvement is required. For me, the takeaway is that the average U.S. citizen's knowledge of the country's intelligence apparatus mostly comes from movies and TV shows. She is advocating more transparency so that the academic world of scholars and big thinkers can help solve some of these problems.
October 22, 2022
The audiobook was read by the author, which is always very nice and a huge plus.
One star was removed since the book did not match my expectations. So, that one may be on me.
If you have no idea whatsoever about intelligence services, what they do, and how they function in the USA, this is your book. It gives a thorough introduction in the baseline workings of these secret organisations, even some interesting anecdotes and examples.
If you want to understand the work of the intelligence services in the greater picture than national security, like relationships with allies, international laws, imperialism, colonialism, etc., you will be utterly disappointed. The author does list some examples of intelligence failings (Iraq WMD, etc.), but often followed by citations of former intelligence officers, senators or other government players. There is not a single citation of a person living under constant threat of misguided drone attacks for example. I don't mean the terrorists, but the occasional wedding party that was accidentally erased.
It is a patriotic book, a 1990s feel good about your country and don't ask questions book, without the stale taste of knowing the truth of people outside of "the shiny city on the hill." It strangely reminded me of the official stories I was told about the heroism of the East German Stasi prior to the Fall of the Berlin Wall. A little more introspective by the author with 30 years in that field would have been nice. But then, it was maybe my misguided, subjective expectation on this book.
One star was removed since the book did not match my expectations. So, that one may be on me.
If you have no idea whatsoever about intelligence services, what they do, and how they function in the USA, this is your book. It gives a thorough introduction in the baseline workings of these secret organisations, even some interesting anecdotes and examples.
If you want to understand the work of the intelligence services in the greater picture than national security, like relationships with allies, international laws, imperialism, colonialism, etc., you will be utterly disappointed. The author does list some examples of intelligence failings (Iraq WMD, etc.), but often followed by citations of former intelligence officers, senators or other government players. There is not a single citation of a person living under constant threat of misguided drone attacks for example. I don't mean the terrorists, but the occasional wedding party that was accidentally erased.
It is a patriotic book, a 1990s feel good about your country and don't ask questions book, without the stale taste of knowing the truth of people outside of "the shiny city on the hill." It strangely reminded me of the official stories I was told about the heroism of the East German Stasi prior to the Fall of the Berlin Wall. A little more introspective by the author with 30 years in that field would have been nice. But then, it was maybe my misguided, subjective expectation on this book.
May 20, 2023
A very necessary read. I've read many books about espionage. This is one of the best. The final chapter (on cyber threats) will make your mouth fall open.
April 14, 2022
It’s ok when it keeps to the main subject of the history of the CIA or the anecdotes from agents’ lives, but unfortunately it also includes the mandatory pop science segments on behavioral econ and artificial intelligence (rather loosely connected to the rest) and it’s hard not to roll your eyes if you’ve seen those before.
July 3, 2022
Great overview with broad chapter topics each in good depth for the amateur to understand. Audio presentation was good, with just the right amount of character.
March 18, 2023
I have been reading as much material on espionage as I can and this is the best book I have read. It is well-written, comprehensive (as near as I can tell) and easy to follow. Zegart digs into a lot of issues and gives specific examples of how American intelligence works, what are the challenges it faces, why it is necessary and how it is likely to change in the future. I've put longer notes on it below for my own use, but the short version is that this is excellent!
The first couple of chapter are about the myth of the spy. It emphasizes how Americans view spies through the lens of "spytertainment". It specifically singles out Zero Dark Thirty and 24 as distorting the utility of torture in gathering information. Zero Dark Thirty was so egregious that the CIA actually put out a disclaimer. The scariest thing is that Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia used the main character in 24 as an example in both oral arguments and in public statements, even though it was completely fiction. The author particularly takes exception to the "ticking time bomb" scenario to justify torture because the scenario has literally never come up. Americans simply do not know what intelligence agencies do and so think they can do anything.
From there, Zegart dives into the history of American intelligence gathering, which starts pretty simply. Washington was heavily invested in using covert activities from sending spies like Nathan Hale to disinformation about troop movement. Subsequent presidents didn't care much for it except during wartime until WW2. Part of the reason is that spying is inherently dishonest and often illegal, which goes against Americans self-perception. One Secretary of State, upon finding out that the USG had broken the codes of other countries, said "Gentlemen don't read each other's mail", so gave up a huge intelligence advantage. It wasn't until WW2 that the United States Government got serious about spying and even then the OSS (predecessor to the CIA) was disbanded after the war. The advent of the Cold War forced Truman to allow a permanent intelligence agency, which became the CIA and then added the NSA. This was in addition to intelligence sections of most branches of the armed forced as well as the State Department. Early efforts were pretty amateurish, but they eventually got better, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. Nevertheless, the losses were probably at least as big as the wins, but that is the game intelligence personnel play.
The book then moves to how intelligence works. One big emphasis is the unknowable aspects of many things. There isn't enough information to be certain of much, so they work with probabilities. They also have to verify information through independent sources to avoid misinformation. This makes it difficult to move with any sense of certainty, especially when policy makers don't understand the limitations of intelligence gathering.
Continuing to look at the difficulties of intelligence analysis, Zegart details some of the systematic problems of intelligence gathering. One is the need for data, which is easy to get for sports but very difficult to get for international affairs. Another is that not everyone has the same data. Intelligence is finding out other peoples' secrets, but you never know if it is the whole picture, part of the picture or misinformation. A third issue is the difficulty in determining success in order to learn from mistakes (or successes). The last issue is that the enemy is doing everything you are, so are sometimes getting your secrets and sometimes feeding you lies.
When Zegart moves to the "Seven Deadly Biases", she isn't dealing with issues unique to intelligence, but shows how well-known biases can severely hurt the efficacy of intelligence gathering. Confirmation bias (see Iraq War), Optimism bias (Iraq again), Groupthink (still Iraq) and Availability Bias (Iraq comes up a lot) are all things that affect people in all walks of life. The Fundamental Attribution Error is also wide spread, but even more dangerous in intelligence. We tend to think other people do bad things because of personality traits while we do them because of circumstances beyond our control (see most drivers). This makes it difficult to understand someone else's intentions and motivations, thereby making it difficult to anticipate the actions. Mirror imaging also hurts anticipating opponents moves because we believe they think like we think. Framing bias is a very interesting one because the way we perceive words and numbers changes from person to person. For example, the National Intelligence Estimate may say something is a "serious possibility" but when the analysts are asked for numbers, the numbers could vary from 20% to 80%. To counter a lot of these biases, which the CIA is well-aware of, George Tenet created the CIA Red Cell to think way outside the box and be devils advocates. In addition, the way you present information matters because of these biases. We are not as rational a species as well like to think. Finally, no one ever got demoted or brought before Congress for being too careful/paranoid and seeing threats that aren't there. That only happens when a threat is missed and turns out to be real.
When Zegart gets to counterintelligence, it made me realize why I couldn't be in that line of work. As mentioned earlier, everything we are trying, they are trying so it is difficult to know who/what to trust. There are two kinds of counter-intelligence, active and defensive. Active is trying to penetrate their organization to find out what they are doing. Defensive is trying to figure out when they have done that to us. There are four ways to turn an agent: Money, Ideology, Coercion, Ego (MICE). They work on our people as well as theirs. This leads to the need for compartmentalization to protect secrets but it also makes it harder to use those secrets. In addition, technological changes make it extremely difficult to be totally secure.
Flashing back to the early chapters of the book, we think of covert action as a cure-all, so most presidents use it. The definition from the 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act is "an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or publicly acknowledged." The key words here, according to Zegart, are influence (which covers a lot of ground), acknowledged (plausible deniability) and abroad (can't be here). There are four kinds of covert ops: Propaganda/information, political actions, economic and paramilitary. Why is it so popular with presidents? It is in-between of "doing nothing and sending in the marines". It also has a higher likelihood of success than over action. And plausible deniability is useful. A downside is that they don't work that often, partly because they are only used in desperate situations. Another downside is that it presents moral dilemmas for the people authorizing them and implementing them, which goes against our national self-image. A third is that most of them are of dubious legality (see drone strikes).
Congress is supposed to oversee these actions but generally doesn't want to. There are limits on how long a congressman can serve on the intelligence committee, so a lot don't know what they are doing until they are gone. It isn't a glamorous committee assignment that will help with reelection, so the most active congressmen don't want it. All this gives the intelligence community a lot of leeway.
Finally, Zegart looks at non-government actors, which includes businesses, terrorist organizations, criminals and private citizens using open-source material. She calls this the "democratization of intelligence" which makes it easier to find secrets but harder to understand what are the important ones. And, of course, it makes securing your own secrets that much harder.
The first couple of chapter are about the myth of the spy. It emphasizes how Americans view spies through the lens of "spytertainment". It specifically singles out Zero Dark Thirty and 24 as distorting the utility of torture in gathering information. Zero Dark Thirty was so egregious that the CIA actually put out a disclaimer. The scariest thing is that Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia used the main character in 24 as an example in both oral arguments and in public statements, even though it was completely fiction. The author particularly takes exception to the "ticking time bomb" scenario to justify torture because the scenario has literally never come up. Americans simply do not know what intelligence agencies do and so think they can do anything.
From there, Zegart dives into the history of American intelligence gathering, which starts pretty simply. Washington was heavily invested in using covert activities from sending spies like Nathan Hale to disinformation about troop movement. Subsequent presidents didn't care much for it except during wartime until WW2. Part of the reason is that spying is inherently dishonest and often illegal, which goes against Americans self-perception. One Secretary of State, upon finding out that the USG had broken the codes of other countries, said "Gentlemen don't read each other's mail", so gave up a huge intelligence advantage. It wasn't until WW2 that the United States Government got serious about spying and even then the OSS (predecessor to the CIA) was disbanded after the war. The advent of the Cold War forced Truman to allow a permanent intelligence agency, which became the CIA and then added the NSA. This was in addition to intelligence sections of most branches of the armed forced as well as the State Department. Early efforts were pretty amateurish, but they eventually got better, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. Nevertheless, the losses were probably at least as big as the wins, but that is the game intelligence personnel play.
The book then moves to how intelligence works. One big emphasis is the unknowable aspects of many things. There isn't enough information to be certain of much, so they work with probabilities. They also have to verify information through independent sources to avoid misinformation. This makes it difficult to move with any sense of certainty, especially when policy makers don't understand the limitations of intelligence gathering.
Continuing to look at the difficulties of intelligence analysis, Zegart details some of the systematic problems of intelligence gathering. One is the need for data, which is easy to get for sports but very difficult to get for international affairs. Another is that not everyone has the same data. Intelligence is finding out other peoples' secrets, but you never know if it is the whole picture, part of the picture or misinformation. A third issue is the difficulty in determining success in order to learn from mistakes (or successes). The last issue is that the enemy is doing everything you are, so are sometimes getting your secrets and sometimes feeding you lies.
When Zegart moves to the "Seven Deadly Biases", she isn't dealing with issues unique to intelligence, but shows how well-known biases can severely hurt the efficacy of intelligence gathering. Confirmation bias (see Iraq War), Optimism bias (Iraq again), Groupthink (still Iraq) and Availability Bias (Iraq comes up a lot) are all things that affect people in all walks of life. The Fundamental Attribution Error is also wide spread, but even more dangerous in intelligence. We tend to think other people do bad things because of personality traits while we do them because of circumstances beyond our control (see most drivers). This makes it difficult to understand someone else's intentions and motivations, thereby making it difficult to anticipate the actions. Mirror imaging also hurts anticipating opponents moves because we believe they think like we think. Framing bias is a very interesting one because the way we perceive words and numbers changes from person to person. For example, the National Intelligence Estimate may say something is a "serious possibility" but when the analysts are asked for numbers, the numbers could vary from 20% to 80%. To counter a lot of these biases, which the CIA is well-aware of, George Tenet created the CIA Red Cell to think way outside the box and be devils advocates. In addition, the way you present information matters because of these biases. We are not as rational a species as well like to think. Finally, no one ever got demoted or brought before Congress for being too careful/paranoid and seeing threats that aren't there. That only happens when a threat is missed and turns out to be real.
When Zegart gets to counterintelligence, it made me realize why I couldn't be in that line of work. As mentioned earlier, everything we are trying, they are trying so it is difficult to know who/what to trust. There are two kinds of counter-intelligence, active and defensive. Active is trying to penetrate their organization to find out what they are doing. Defensive is trying to figure out when they have done that to us. There are four ways to turn an agent: Money, Ideology, Coercion, Ego (MICE). They work on our people as well as theirs. This leads to the need for compartmentalization to protect secrets but it also makes it harder to use those secrets. In addition, technological changes make it extremely difficult to be totally secure.
Flashing back to the early chapters of the book, we think of covert action as a cure-all, so most presidents use it. The definition from the 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act is "an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or publicly acknowledged." The key words here, according to Zegart, are influence (which covers a lot of ground), acknowledged (plausible deniability) and abroad (can't be here). There are four kinds of covert ops: Propaganda/information, political actions, economic and paramilitary. Why is it so popular with presidents? It is in-between of "doing nothing and sending in the marines". It also has a higher likelihood of success than over action. And plausible deniability is useful. A downside is that they don't work that often, partly because they are only used in desperate situations. Another downside is that it presents moral dilemmas for the people authorizing them and implementing them, which goes against our national self-image. A third is that most of them are of dubious legality (see drone strikes).
Congress is supposed to oversee these actions but generally doesn't want to. There are limits on how long a congressman can serve on the intelligence committee, so a lot don't know what they are doing until they are gone. It isn't a glamorous committee assignment that will help with reelection, so the most active congressmen don't want it. All this gives the intelligence community a lot of leeway.
Finally, Zegart looks at non-government actors, which includes businesses, terrorist organizations, criminals and private citizens using open-source material. She calls this the "democratization of intelligence" which makes it easier to find secrets but harder to understand what are the important ones. And, of course, it makes securing your own secrets that much harder.
June 29, 2023
Balloons [Spy], June (Tiananmen) [Lies], and Goons [Algorithms]
This book is not just important and timely—it is an absolute game-changer.
Zegart's insightful analysis delves deep into the intricate world of intelligence, revealing the shocking truth about past, present, and future espionage. Her ability to accurately predict emerging threats (mostly from China), such as (illuded to) the spy balloons, social media disinformation campaigns, and election interference, is nothing short of extraordinary. With an uncanny knack for foreseeing the tactics employed by intelligence agencies, Zegart serves as a beacon of light in the murky depths of covert operations.
Prepare to be captivated as Zegart masterfully unravels the hidden web of deceit that underlies American intelligence. From historic covert operations to the cutting-edge algorithms that drive modern espionage, she leaves no stone unturned in her quest for truth. The result is a gripping narrative that will keep you on the edge of your seat, questioning everything you thought you knew about intelligence agencies.
In today's rapidly evolving world, where technology reigns supreme, Spies, Lies, and Algorithms is a wake-up call for all. Zegart's ability to connect the dots and shed light on the dark corners of intelligence-gathering is unparalleled. With meticulous research and a keen eye for detail, she exposes the inner workings of the intelligence community, unveiling a reality that is both awe-inspiring and deeply unsettling.
I wholeheartedly recommend this book to anyone seeking a comprehensive understanding of the history and future of American intelligence. Prepare to have your mind expanded and your perspectives challenged. Spies, Lies, and Algorithms earns a well-deserved high score, serving as an enlightening and eye-opening journey into the depths of intelligence operations.
Remember, the truth is stranger than fiction, and in the realm of espionage, nothing is as it seems. Brace yourself for a thrilling adventure through the tangled web of spies, lies, and algorithms—a journey you won't soon forget!
4.6/5
This book is not just important and timely—it is an absolute game-changer.
Zegart's insightful analysis delves deep into the intricate world of intelligence, revealing the shocking truth about past, present, and future espionage. Her ability to accurately predict emerging threats (mostly from China), such as (illuded to) the spy balloons, social media disinformation campaigns, and election interference, is nothing short of extraordinary. With an uncanny knack for foreseeing the tactics employed by intelligence agencies, Zegart serves as a beacon of light in the murky depths of covert operations.
Prepare to be captivated as Zegart masterfully unravels the hidden web of deceit that underlies American intelligence. From historic covert operations to the cutting-edge algorithms that drive modern espionage, she leaves no stone unturned in her quest for truth. The result is a gripping narrative that will keep you on the edge of your seat, questioning everything you thought you knew about intelligence agencies.
In today's rapidly evolving world, where technology reigns supreme, Spies, Lies, and Algorithms is a wake-up call for all. Zegart's ability to connect the dots and shed light on the dark corners of intelligence-gathering is unparalleled. With meticulous research and a keen eye for detail, she exposes the inner workings of the intelligence community, unveiling a reality that is both awe-inspiring and deeply unsettling.
I wholeheartedly recommend this book to anyone seeking a comprehensive understanding of the history and future of American intelligence. Prepare to have your mind expanded and your perspectives challenged. Spies, Lies, and Algorithms earns a well-deserved high score, serving as an enlightening and eye-opening journey into the depths of intelligence operations.
Remember, the truth is stranger than fiction, and in the realm of espionage, nothing is as it seems. Brace yourself for a thrilling adventure through the tangled web of spies, lies, and algorithms—a journey you won't soon forget!
4.6/5
January 5, 2024
Well researched and insightful book especially in respects to the current threats and challenges faced by US Intelligence Agencies. Gives a reader great insight to the wide variety of threats facing the United States as well as how rapid technological advances directly help, challenge, and change the state of intelligence and even geopolitical competition.
December 13, 2024
It was a really good read and helpful in thinking about the role of security in our country. It does a great job of highlighting the importance of thinking about how technology is changing rapidly and so how we approach security will also rapidly change.
August 3, 2022
Simplistic, paints itself as the holy grail for intelligence knowledge but is highly repetitive and relies on easily explainable psychology
March 22, 2023
Boring but had good information about the intelligence community
August 22, 2023
9 chapters of history, 1 chapter of right now, little tidbits of future.
January 7, 2024
3.5 ⭐️
Approachable and a great primer for people who are dipping their toe into the subject, but not particularly groundbreaking if you are already familiar with the state of the modern American intelligence landscape and technological espionage.
Approachable and a great primer for people who are dipping their toe into the subject, but not particularly groundbreaking if you are already familiar with the state of the modern American intelligence landscape and technological espionage.
June 26, 2022
challenges of US intelligence community -interesting in parts but nothing earth shattering
January 7, 2023
Really interesting read tracing the history of and future challenges for the intelligence community. Definitely a well researched and worthwhile perspective.
Focus on AI and cyber intelligence and the challenges of congressional oversight for highly classified things.
Focus on AI and cyber intelligence and the challenges of congressional oversight for highly classified things.
August 30, 2023
I think this is a very interesting book that takes in the historical, current and futuristic shenanigans of the intelligence world. Many highlights, notes and food for thought embedded therein. I highly reccomend for any one who loves the dark alley of the intelligence world. Good book!
July 17, 2023
Ten chapters, ten days to read.
My summary of this book is a familiar quote, “It’s not paranoia if they are really out to get you.” ~Harold Finch
Interesting, eye-opening, and a few wtf moments. I am on the side of “How can anyone possibly think that way?”
Moving back to “Cult of the Dead Cow” to finish it.
My summary of this book is a familiar quote, “It’s not paranoia if they are really out to get you.” ~Harold Finch
Interesting, eye-opening, and a few wtf moments. I am on the side of “How can anyone possibly think that way?”
Moving back to “Cult of the Dead Cow” to finish it.
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