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Gambling on Development
In the last thirty years, the developing world has undergone tremendous changes. Overall, poverty has fallen, people live longer and healthier lives, and economies have been transformed. And yet many countries have simply missed the boat. Why have some countries prospered, while others have failed?
Stefan Dercon argues that the answer lies not in a specific set of policies, but rather in a key ‘development bargain’, whereby a country’s elites shift from protecting their own positions to gambling on a growth-based future. Despite the imperfections of such bargains, China is among the most striking recent success stories, along with Indonesia and more unlikely places, such as Bangladesh, Ghana and Ethiopia. Gambling on Development is about these winning efforts, in contrast to countries stuck in elite bargains leading nowhere.
Building on three decades’ experience across forty-odd countries, Dercon winds his narrative through Ebola in Sierra Leone, scandals in Malawi, beer factories in the DRC, mobile phone licences in Mozambique, and relief programmes behind enemy lines in South Sudan. Weaving together conversations with prime ministers, civil servants and ordinary people, this is a probing look at how development has been achieved across the world, and how to assist such successes.
Stefan Dercon argues that the answer lies not in a specific set of policies, but rather in a key ‘development bargain’, whereby a country’s elites shift from protecting their own positions to gambling on a growth-based future. Despite the imperfections of such bargains, China is among the most striking recent success stories, along with Indonesia and more unlikely places, such as Bangladesh, Ghana and Ethiopia. Gambling on Development is about these winning efforts, in contrast to countries stuck in elite bargains leading nowhere.
Building on three decades’ experience across forty-odd countries, Dercon winds his narrative through Ebola in Sierra Leone, scandals in Malawi, beer factories in the DRC, mobile phone licences in Mozambique, and relief programmes behind enemy lines in South Sudan. Weaving together conversations with prime ministers, civil servants and ordinary people, this is a probing look at how development has been achieved across the world, and how to assist such successes.
360 pages, Hardcover
Published January 1, 2022
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956 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 39 reviews
January 10, 2023
A frustratingly clunky articulation of an important central argument - that countries failure to ‘develop’ is not simply due to ignorance that can be resolved by a McKinsey, Dalberg or OPM action plan, but rather because those in power aren’t committed to making development progress. To demonstrate what I mean by clunky, I’ll write the rest of my review in the style this book is written or, in other words, as if the reader has short term memory loss.
Earlier in this review, I provided a broad overview of my thoughts on the book. In what follows, I present a few of my more specific takeaways.
Now that I’ve introduced this part of the review, I’ll delve into the first of my specific takeaways, before addressing the second and third. I very much welcomed the book’s central argument and extensive array of anecdotal and empirical evidence supporting it. Quite how the development community still thinks that endless diagnostic tools conjured up by expensive foreign consultants are the key to ‘unlocking’ progress is beyond me. The author introduces two powerful concepts that can hopefully put an end to this thinking. First, aid is like dancing the tango and both parters (that is, donors and recipient countries) need to be aligned for it to work. Second, although we know some of the ingredients that lead to development progress, we don’t know how and in what order they should be combined. In other words, we don’t know the don’t know the best recipe for development and, as such, should avoid prescribing the same recipe for all situations.
Having introduced my first key takeaway from the book - that I liked the central argument and some of the key concepts used to unpack it - I’ll now describe my second takeaway, before concluding with the third. Dercon focuses a great deal on how donors can do more good - primarily by targeting aid towards countries with an existing or emerging development bargain - but not on how they could do less harm. Dercon’s anecdotes from countries like Ghana, Ethiopia and Rwanda constantly highlight the role of skilled local technocrats that are genuinely committed to development, but it wasn’t until the final chapter that Dercon acknowledges that almost all such technocrats are poached by international donor agencies offering higher salaries than national ministries. Why do we still simply accept this as a reality? Before they start tinkering with politics, donors should first ensure that they aren’t themselves undermining the commitment of local elites to development.
Now that I’ve introduced takeaways one and two, I’ll conclude with my third: Dercon makes a strong case for greater experimentation in aid. Because aid is linked so acutely to human suffering, there is naturally a tendency to view failure as a disaster. But as so many self-help books attest to, this view of failure isn’t conducive to future success. This book is a valuable reminder that aid needs to shed its defensive mindset if it is to try new things and truly understand what works.
This final part of the review discusses how the relentless, page-by-page introduction and summarising of the actual meat of the book really ruined the experience of what was otherwise an interesting read.
Earlier in this review, I provided a broad overview of my thoughts on the book. In what follows, I present a few of my more specific takeaways.
Now that I’ve introduced this part of the review, I’ll delve into the first of my specific takeaways, before addressing the second and third. I very much welcomed the book’s central argument and extensive array of anecdotal and empirical evidence supporting it. Quite how the development community still thinks that endless diagnostic tools conjured up by expensive foreign consultants are the key to ‘unlocking’ progress is beyond me. The author introduces two powerful concepts that can hopefully put an end to this thinking. First, aid is like dancing the tango and both parters (that is, donors and recipient countries) need to be aligned for it to work. Second, although we know some of the ingredients that lead to development progress, we don’t know how and in what order they should be combined. In other words, we don’t know the don’t know the best recipe for development and, as such, should avoid prescribing the same recipe for all situations.
Having introduced my first key takeaway from the book - that I liked the central argument and some of the key concepts used to unpack it - I’ll now describe my second takeaway, before concluding with the third. Dercon focuses a great deal on how donors can do more good - primarily by targeting aid towards countries with an existing or emerging development bargain - but not on how they could do less harm. Dercon’s anecdotes from countries like Ghana, Ethiopia and Rwanda constantly highlight the role of skilled local technocrats that are genuinely committed to development, but it wasn’t until the final chapter that Dercon acknowledges that almost all such technocrats are poached by international donor agencies offering higher salaries than national ministries. Why do we still simply accept this as a reality? Before they start tinkering with politics, donors should first ensure that they aren’t themselves undermining the commitment of local elites to development.
Now that I’ve introduced takeaways one and two, I’ll conclude with my third: Dercon makes a strong case for greater experimentation in aid. Because aid is linked so acutely to human suffering, there is naturally a tendency to view failure as a disaster. But as so many self-help books attest to, this view of failure isn’t conducive to future success. This book is a valuable reminder that aid needs to shed its defensive mindset if it is to try new things and truly understand what works.
This final part of the review discusses how the relentless, page-by-page introduction and summarising of the actual meat of the book really ruined the experience of what was otherwise an interesting read.
May 6, 2025
I’m not entirely convinced by the author’s theory of development. The main idea of the book is centered around this concept of an "elite bargain", how and why certain countries manage to turn elite agreements into real development progress. He thinks that for development to happen, three things need to be in place: (1) the political deal has to be real and credible, (2) the state needs to have the capacity to deliver on that deal, and (3) the government has to be able to learn from its mistakes and adapt.
These are big and interesting ideas, but I felt like the book didn’t really explain clearly why this works in some countries and not in others. For example, when comparing Nigeria and the DRC (which struggled) with Ethiopia (which made more progress), the differences in outcomes weren’t convincing enough, specially since all of them started with fairly similar development levels and natural resources. The author doesn’t really dig into why some elites are willing to commit to a long-term national vision, while others just focus on short-term personal gain.
That said, I do agree with his broader argument that aid alone isn’t enough to drive development. Real change has to come from within these countries, especially from the elites who have the power to shift the direction. They need to take a long-term view and be willing to accept fewer immediate benefits for the chance of bigger payoffs down the line. In the end, aid just plays a supporting role with topping up of the government budgets but can never replace the hard work of local leadership and reform.
These are big and interesting ideas, but I felt like the book didn’t really explain clearly why this works in some countries and not in others. For example, when comparing Nigeria and the DRC (which struggled) with Ethiopia (which made more progress), the differences in outcomes weren’t convincing enough, specially since all of them started with fairly similar development levels and natural resources. The author doesn’t really dig into why some elites are willing to commit to a long-term national vision, while others just focus on short-term personal gain.
That said, I do agree with his broader argument that aid alone isn’t enough to drive development. Real change has to come from within these countries, especially from the elites who have the power to shift the direction. They need to take a long-term view and be willing to accept fewer immediate benefits for the chance of bigger payoffs down the line. In the end, aid just plays a supporting role with topping up of the government budgets but can never replace the hard work of local leadership and reform.
June 2, 2022
This is a great book for insights into how development actually works in countries. Its deeply informed by country expertise, personal professional experiences and decades of research. It gives an ecclectic view on development that puts at the centre stage the interaction between politics and economics and the need for a political commitment to development. There are too many good insights to summarize here.
Let me only give four points of criticism to explain what could have been better imho:
1. The book claims to be about overall development but in the end focusses too strongly on how certain political actors (who the author had most contact with) affect development. For me, this was super interesting because the book was informed by personal insights into closed door policymaking that is often inaccessible to outsiders interested in development (like me). But given the claim of generality, I felt it was too restrictive.
2. Relatedly, I felt the mechanisms through which high level political decision-making affects development (e.g. economic growth) was underexplored. For me (& I would claim research on development econ more generally), these links are not super clear. E.g. does the development bargain affect development mostly through expectations (people and businesses investing in their future), through reducing frictions (e.g. reducing petty corruption as discussed in great chapters on Nigeria & Ethiopia) or through even other channels? Also, it seemed to be implied that development is something that happens rather directly: elites commit to development and economic growth and prosperity follows. But many gains probably play out over longer time horizons. E.g. investing in early childhood education probably only pays off in GDP some decades later.
3. I felt the metaphor of a gamble on development was more confusing than helpful. The author forcefully shows that many roads lead to development or to stagnation (e.g. Bangladesh vs Indonesia vs Uganda or Malawi). But according to the metaphor, there should be countries with a development bargain who fail to develop (those who lose the gamble) - i didnt see any example for this. It was also unclear exactly who was gambling here. It should be the elites but it wasnt clear that the elites have more to lose from gambling on development than gambling on rent-seeking and stagnation.
4. At last, the policy conclusions were insightful but not always obviously following from the previous analyses. E.g. while I buy the idea that a development bargain is needed for development, it is not immediately evident to me that aid is better spent in countries with a development bargain. While I might be ignorant here, the evidence shown for this seemed to be based less on rigorous empirical evidence. There clearly is an issue of spurious correlation in that practitioners might more easily conceive aid as beneficial if the entire economy and society are improving (as in case of a development bargain). I would have liked to see better evidence on this point.
Let me only give four points of criticism to explain what could have been better imho:
1. The book claims to be about overall development but in the end focusses too strongly on how certain political actors (who the author had most contact with) affect development. For me, this was super interesting because the book was informed by personal insights into closed door policymaking that is often inaccessible to outsiders interested in development (like me). But given the claim of generality, I felt it was too restrictive.
2. Relatedly, I felt the mechanisms through which high level political decision-making affects development (e.g. economic growth) was underexplored. For me (& I would claim research on development econ more generally), these links are not super clear. E.g. does the development bargain affect development mostly through expectations (people and businesses investing in their future), through reducing frictions (e.g. reducing petty corruption as discussed in great chapters on Nigeria & Ethiopia) or through even other channels? Also, it seemed to be implied that development is something that happens rather directly: elites commit to development and economic growth and prosperity follows. But many gains probably play out over longer time horizons. E.g. investing in early childhood education probably only pays off in GDP some decades later.
3. I felt the metaphor of a gamble on development was more confusing than helpful. The author forcefully shows that many roads lead to development or to stagnation (e.g. Bangladesh vs Indonesia vs Uganda or Malawi). But according to the metaphor, there should be countries with a development bargain who fail to develop (those who lose the gamble) - i didnt see any example for this. It was also unclear exactly who was gambling here. It should be the elites but it wasnt clear that the elites have more to lose from gambling on development than gambling on rent-seeking and stagnation.
4. At last, the policy conclusions were insightful but not always obviously following from the previous analyses. E.g. while I buy the idea that a development bargain is needed for development, it is not immediately evident to me that aid is better spent in countries with a development bargain. While I might be ignorant here, the evidence shown for this seemed to be based less on rigorous empirical evidence. There clearly is an issue of spurious correlation in that practitioners might more easily conceive aid as beneficial if the entire economy and society are improving (as in case of a development bargain). I would have liked to see better evidence on this point.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
December 23, 2022
This is an example of a book that would have been better as a magazine article. It's basic thesis is novel and compelling: most conventional theories of development don't explain the full breadth of data. For example, many non-democractic countries (China, Vietnam, Korea during the dictatorship) develope quite well, falsifying the requirement for democracy for development. Similarly, a strong state is not required for development, as shown by the example of Bangladesh, Indonesia, and others. The author argues that the basic requirement for development is the emergence of a consensus amongst the elite ("elite bargain") in which the elite agree to focus on development by whatever locally appropriate means. They agree that it's better to make the pie bigger than to fight over who gets a larger fraction of it.
This is a good point. But that's really all there is to it. The rest of the book plumbs this in more words but not much more detail. The datasets cited are generally public and often public-facing interfaces, nothing special there. I'd call it 3.5 stars. Certainly not worth the very high cost.
This is a good point. But that's really all there is to it. The rest of the book plumbs this in more words but not much more detail. The datasets cited are generally public and often public-facing interfaces, nothing special there. I'd call it 3.5 stars. Certainly not worth the very high cost.
January 20, 2023
While the book is titled Gambling on Development, its central theme can be summarized by the concept of "elite bargain". The elites, formed by leaders and technocrats of a country, decide collectively that they have more to gain in economically developing the country than in profiteering from destructive rent-seeking activities. Without this bargain, no matter how much financial aide is packaged, an emerging country will not be able to develop into a more advance nation.
December 11, 2024
Where does his book start off?
Stefan Dercon delves into the classic debate: does corruption keep countries poor, or does poverty cause corruption (of course, somewhat a chicken-and-the-egg question)? The author sides more with the argument that it’s corruption that is keeping countries poor. This perspective likely stems from his work with the IMF, where he witnessed firsthand how corrupt politicians siphon aid money into their own pockets. For instance, he provides a fascinating account of how funds intended to combat Ebola in Sierra Leone largely ended up in the hands of the president’s cronies.
He also draws heavily from the literature on cronyism and elite bargains. This literature suggests that in many underdeveloped countries, there exists a "bargain" between the political ruler and the country’s elites. The elites—typically the military and big business—are bought off using state revenues in exchange for supporting the ruler. Essentially, the elite bargain ensures that the ruler and his cronies can monopolize wealth and power by exploiting the rest of the population. This bargain preserves the status quo rather than pursuing development.
His Theory: The Development Bargain
Dercon says that there is an alternative to this dilemma, which he calls the development bargain. Instead of an elite bargain with his cronies, the ruler can also bet on development. This gamble involves pursuing policies that prioritize economic growth under the assumption that doing so will benefit not only the country but also the ruler himself. The logic is that the richer the country, the larger the cake from which the leader and his cronies can eat—as long as development doesn't destabilize his grip on power.
However, this gamble is risky because it can empower opposition groups and destabilize the regime of the ruler. For this reason, elites typically resist transitioning to such a bargain unless they are convinced it offers them higher rewards than the status quo. When successful, however, the development gamble can unlock the key to economic growth. This is the core of his theory: successful countries have leaders willing to take a leap of faith and gamble on development.
Problematizing His Theory
I think the author’s idea is intuitive and can account for one important factor of development. The problem is that Dercon sells this idea as a universal theoretical explanation, rather than merely one ingredient for development (be it an important one). The grand narrative of the development bargain is foisted on a variety of countries in a variety of historical epochs, ignoring crucial historical and political contexts. It’s the classic dilemma of grand narratives: once you have a hammer, everything starts to look like a nail.
Dercon’s theory focuses almost exclusively on domestic politics. It neglects international factors such as alliances, international trade flows, and geopolitical orders. His singular focus on the development bargain, fails to capture the heterogeneous time-specific and country-specific contexts under which development occurs. Countries like Germany, Japan, Korea, Poland, or Indonesia didn’t only get the domestic political bargain right—they also profited from broader economic and geopolitical forces that uniquely favored rapid economic growth. For example: Free security guarantees for Germany and Japan during the Cold War (providing political stability which most countries in Africa could only dream about); millions of manufacturing jobs moving to East Asia as a result of globalization; to name just a few.
My impression is that he is so eager to hammer his grand theory on to the complex local circumstances of widely diverse countries that he tends to downplay other causes of underdevelopment like war. For instance, Dercon writes about the Democratic Republic of the Congo: “Conflict no doubt has played a role in the country’s troubles […]. And yet persistent conflict is hardly the cause of the DRC’s ongoing troubles. It is a consequence of an elite bargain built on predatory behavior.”
A Mainstream Approach to Development
The book’s approach to development is deeply rooted in mainstream development thinking. Dercon thinks and speaks in the terms of the traditional aid-focused donor community: “If only there was no corruption, then our aid would do miracles.” The fact of the matter is that no country has ever gotten rich through aid. His thinking remains constrained by this conventional narrative, failing to critically reflect on the limitations and biases of this approach.
Political Views and Lacking Criticism of Development Institutions
Dercon shows little sympathy for African freedom fighters like Julius Nyerere or Kwame Nkrumah. The sincere (if sometimes misguided) efforts of these African founding fathers do not seem to qualify as development bargains for him. At the same time, he is remarkably forgiving of brutal dictators like Indonesia’s Suharto.
The author also generally avoids any criticism of institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, despite their role in some of the development failures he describes. For instance, he acknowledges that Kenya experienced strong growth for three decades after independence but then shrank in the 1980s and 1990s. However, he fails to mention how the IMF and World Bank's policy prescriptions contributed to this decline. It seems like offending his colleagues at the IMF is not conducive to the career of a respectable Oxford professor who is careful not to burn any bridges.
All in all, I found the book provided an intuitive and thought-provoking new perspective on why some countries develop and others don’t. The country’s elite has to perceive development as a gamble worth taking. The spoils of development need to be larger than the risk of destabilizing their grip on power. I enjoyed Dercon's rich and detailed exploration of countries from Malawi to Afghanistan to Bangladesh. However, with his catchy slogan of the “development bargain,” the author produces yet another grand development narrative that is supposed to explain the wealth of all countries irrespective of their historical or geopolitical context. By neglecting broader historical and geopolitical factors, the author oversimplifies the causes and the process of development.
Stefan Dercon delves into the classic debate: does corruption keep countries poor, or does poverty cause corruption (of course, somewhat a chicken-and-the-egg question)? The author sides more with the argument that it’s corruption that is keeping countries poor. This perspective likely stems from his work with the IMF, where he witnessed firsthand how corrupt politicians siphon aid money into their own pockets. For instance, he provides a fascinating account of how funds intended to combat Ebola in Sierra Leone largely ended up in the hands of the president’s cronies.
He also draws heavily from the literature on cronyism and elite bargains. This literature suggests that in many underdeveloped countries, there exists a "bargain" between the political ruler and the country’s elites. The elites—typically the military and big business—are bought off using state revenues in exchange for supporting the ruler. Essentially, the elite bargain ensures that the ruler and his cronies can monopolize wealth and power by exploiting the rest of the population. This bargain preserves the status quo rather than pursuing development.
His Theory: The Development Bargain
Dercon says that there is an alternative to this dilemma, which he calls the development bargain. Instead of an elite bargain with his cronies, the ruler can also bet on development. This gamble involves pursuing policies that prioritize economic growth under the assumption that doing so will benefit not only the country but also the ruler himself. The logic is that the richer the country, the larger the cake from which the leader and his cronies can eat—as long as development doesn't destabilize his grip on power.
However, this gamble is risky because it can empower opposition groups and destabilize the regime of the ruler. For this reason, elites typically resist transitioning to such a bargain unless they are convinced it offers them higher rewards than the status quo. When successful, however, the development gamble can unlock the key to economic growth. This is the core of his theory: successful countries have leaders willing to take a leap of faith and gamble on development.
Problematizing His Theory
I think the author’s idea is intuitive and can account for one important factor of development. The problem is that Dercon sells this idea as a universal theoretical explanation, rather than merely one ingredient for development (be it an important one). The grand narrative of the development bargain is foisted on a variety of countries in a variety of historical epochs, ignoring crucial historical and political contexts. It’s the classic dilemma of grand narratives: once you have a hammer, everything starts to look like a nail.
Dercon’s theory focuses almost exclusively on domestic politics. It neglects international factors such as alliances, international trade flows, and geopolitical orders. His singular focus on the development bargain, fails to capture the heterogeneous time-specific and country-specific contexts under which development occurs. Countries like Germany, Japan, Korea, Poland, or Indonesia didn’t only get the domestic political bargain right—they also profited from broader economic and geopolitical forces that uniquely favored rapid economic growth. For example: Free security guarantees for Germany and Japan during the Cold War (providing political stability which most countries in Africa could only dream about); millions of manufacturing jobs moving to East Asia as a result of globalization; to name just a few.
My impression is that he is so eager to hammer his grand theory on to the complex local circumstances of widely diverse countries that he tends to downplay other causes of underdevelopment like war. For instance, Dercon writes about the Democratic Republic of the Congo: “Conflict no doubt has played a role in the country’s troubles […]. And yet persistent conflict is hardly the cause of the DRC’s ongoing troubles. It is a consequence of an elite bargain built on predatory behavior.”
A Mainstream Approach to Development
The book’s approach to development is deeply rooted in mainstream development thinking. Dercon thinks and speaks in the terms of the traditional aid-focused donor community: “If only there was no corruption, then our aid would do miracles.” The fact of the matter is that no country has ever gotten rich through aid. His thinking remains constrained by this conventional narrative, failing to critically reflect on the limitations and biases of this approach.
Political Views and Lacking Criticism of Development Institutions
Dercon shows little sympathy for African freedom fighters like Julius Nyerere or Kwame Nkrumah. The sincere (if sometimes misguided) efforts of these African founding fathers do not seem to qualify as development bargains for him. At the same time, he is remarkably forgiving of brutal dictators like Indonesia’s Suharto.
The author also generally avoids any criticism of institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, despite their role in some of the development failures he describes. For instance, he acknowledges that Kenya experienced strong growth for three decades after independence but then shrank in the 1980s and 1990s. However, he fails to mention how the IMF and World Bank's policy prescriptions contributed to this decline. It seems like offending his colleagues at the IMF is not conducive to the career of a respectable Oxford professor who is careful not to burn any bridges.
All in all, I found the book provided an intuitive and thought-provoking new perspective on why some countries develop and others don’t. The country’s elite has to perceive development as a gamble worth taking. The spoils of development need to be larger than the risk of destabilizing their grip on power. I enjoyed Dercon's rich and detailed exploration of countries from Malawi to Afghanistan to Bangladesh. However, with his catchy slogan of the “development bargain,” the author produces yet another grand development narrative that is supposed to explain the wealth of all countries irrespective of their historical or geopolitical context. By neglecting broader historical and geopolitical factors, the author oversimplifies the causes and the process of development.
December 30, 2023
Audiobook: A very interesting and informative book spoiled by terrible narration. The narrators voice was reduced to an inaudible whisper whenever an 'aside' was spoken. Incredibly irritating. I gave up at the start of the last section. Shameful production.
December 29, 2023
This book is too general to be defending such a huge claim. It needs a lot more details about specific cases so I can deem its argument as credible.
I liked the idea, but it's hard to support it with the type of evidence that I like.
I liked the idea, but it's hard to support it with the type of evidence that I like.
January 3, 2023
Interessant boek van iemand met veel ervaring in ontwikkelingseconomie. Waarom lukt ontwikkeling in sommige landen wel en in andere landen niet? Dercon beargumenteert (overtuigend) dat er niet een simpel recept is dat elk land kan volgen, wat blijkt uit het feit dat hele verschillende landen op hele verschillende manieren redelijk succesvol zijn. Het geheim zit volgens hem in een "development bargain", waarbij de elites in een land een serieuze commitment aan economische ontwikkeling hebben. Naast dit zit bevat het ook een prima samenvatting van verschillende stromingen in ontwikkelingseconomie en een aantal mooie voorbeelden waar ik veel te weinig van wist.
Interessant dus, schrijfstijl was ik geen gigantische fan van. Hij kondigde vooral de hele tijd aan wat hij in de volgende paragraaf ging zeggen, wat enigszins vermoeiend was.
Interessant dus, schrijfstijl was ik geen gigantische fan van. Hij kondigde vooral de hele tijd aan wat hij in de volgende paragraaf ging zeggen, wat enigszins vermoeiend was.
April 21, 2023
One might not embrace the author's conclusions, but the quality of the scholarship warrants reading this book!
His central thesis - that a developmental bargain amongst national political and business elites prioritising productivity and economic growth over distributional (to themselves, via rent-seeking) objectives - resonates with me given my professional experiences in the emerging and frontier markets. Those who control the levers of power are central to the drama of economic development.
The title of the book, Gambling on Development, discloses the "secret sauce "of the developmental bargain. The elite have to gamble that growth oriented policies (another trite expression, excuse me - "growing the pie") where other groups benefit will work to their advantage, rather than concentrating on policies whose outcome increase their wealth and power (distributing more of the pie to themselves) but likely fail to realise the economies true potential or beyond.
Post-script after second reading: the country case studies in Part II were the primary focus. The distinctions between, say, an Ethiopia and a Nigeria, demonstrate that weak institutional development can be more damaging to development than conflict.
His central thesis - that a developmental bargain amongst national political and business elites prioritising productivity and economic growth over distributional (to themselves, via rent-seeking) objectives - resonates with me given my professional experiences in the emerging and frontier markets. Those who control the levers of power are central to the drama of economic development.
The title of the book, Gambling on Development, discloses the "secret sauce "of the developmental bargain. The elite have to gamble that growth oriented policies (another trite expression, excuse me - "growing the pie") where other groups benefit will work to their advantage, rather than concentrating on policies whose outcome increase their wealth and power (distributing more of the pie to themselves) but likely fail to realise the economies true potential or beyond.
Post-script after second reading: the country case studies in Part II were the primary focus. The distinctions between, say, an Ethiopia and a Nigeria, demonstrate that weak institutional development can be more damaging to development than conflict.
March 31, 2023
Dercon's big idea, based upon his academic and governmental experience, is pretty simple but has big implications: a country won't develop unless its leaders strike a development bargain. In other words, the limiting constraints to development are less policy papers, big external interventions, or epistemologically conservative micro-level ones, but instead more "political" factors like cooperation, motivation, experimentation, and leadership. Further, this bargain will come about as a political risky venture, hence the title. I appreciate the author's theory. It has one strength in the fact that it was shaped by academic as well as governmental experience—the author served as a civil servant in the British aid department. In this role he picked up many interesting anecdotes, met people from different perspectives and positions in the countries in question, and was positioned to learn broad, generalizable lessons about development. His theory seems descriptive across the many countries he covers even with the immense diversity of their contexts. With that said, I found that there were some limitations.
First, the theory, as an elite-focused one, seems a bit too dismissive about "civil society" or bottom-up efforts for change. While the grassroots might be weaker or more divided by non-developmental concerns as Dercon says, more "ordinary" people still have a role to play in setting the conditions for elites. They can be voters selecting on (non)developmental or economic issues, potential revolutionaries who the ruling dispensation fears and tries to pacify, as well as congregants, members, supporters, or organized consumers and state beneficiaries—people who give social, political, cultural, religious, or economic elites the basis of their power. I think Dercon could have integrated this better into his theory, because one could argue that if the constraints set for the elites aren't amenable to a "development bargain" being struck, there won't be one.
Second, I found myself wondering about the individual cases he picked up for this book and if the author was able to apply the theory accurately using his own impressions. For example, Dercon claims that in 1991, India's leaders finally struck a development bargain. From that point, the economy began to grow, and he gives the perspective of relevant Indian figures to highlight the break in history. Yet, while few would deny the importance of the 1991 reforms, observers examining Indian economic growth have found that the decisive break began in the 1980s. In other words, Dercon's personal observation-based assessment of elite bargains can get it wrong, or at least not distinguish precisely when and how the bargains come to be; if his account was, in fact, accurate with the numbers he would have given us a story about what changed in the 80s.
This flaw is potentially more troubling in the cases of Rwanda and Ethiopia, hailed as the potential "African Lions" (a conscious parallel with the "Asian Tiger" economies) of our times. Dercon again gives us his impression of the capable and driven people in these countries, from the heights of politics to technocratic offices to those building up these countries in agriculture and industry. He points to their high recorded rates of economic growth. The problem lies not only in the fact that both of these countries still have widespread extreme poverty, so marking the improvements is less easy than in, say, China, but also in the fact that both Rwandan and Ethiopian authorities have been subject to credible criticism of doctoring their economic growth and other development figures. That's not to say there's been no progress in either country, but it's hard to assess how much there has been and it is therefore difficult to say whether or not the African Lions are real or hype. Only if and when this is cleared up can we judge if Dercon's observations and application of his theory are accurate.
From these cases it should be pretty clear where the issues in Dercon's theory lie. It's often very hard to tell when politics and society truly shifts towards development, especially in the present. Leaders will often want to seem developmental and they may or may not be good at delivering that. They may be better at giving the impression that they are doing things capably than they are at actually achieving change. Dercon's theory, then, might be useful descriptively after the fog clears, but rather hard to apply predictively as the future looms ahead. It's for this reason I have to knock down the book to 3 stars. Some might find other hiccups, such as a repetitive style. Even with those sorts of flaws, he also has worthwhile insights on the role of aid in development, which might make the book more valuable for development practitioners. On the whole, I found myself thinking the book demonstrated the core theoretical idea's inherent weaknesses, probably unintentionally, as well as its strengths.
First, the theory, as an elite-focused one, seems a bit too dismissive about "civil society" or bottom-up efforts for change. While the grassroots might be weaker or more divided by non-developmental concerns as Dercon says, more "ordinary" people still have a role to play in setting the conditions for elites. They can be voters selecting on (non)developmental or economic issues, potential revolutionaries who the ruling dispensation fears and tries to pacify, as well as congregants, members, supporters, or organized consumers and state beneficiaries—people who give social, political, cultural, religious, or economic elites the basis of their power. I think Dercon could have integrated this better into his theory, because one could argue that if the constraints set for the elites aren't amenable to a "development bargain" being struck, there won't be one.
Second, I found myself wondering about the individual cases he picked up for this book and if the author was able to apply the theory accurately using his own impressions. For example, Dercon claims that in 1991, India's leaders finally struck a development bargain. From that point, the economy began to grow, and he gives the perspective of relevant Indian figures to highlight the break in history. Yet, while few would deny the importance of the 1991 reforms, observers examining Indian economic growth have found that the decisive break began in the 1980s. In other words, Dercon's personal observation-based assessment of elite bargains can get it wrong, or at least not distinguish precisely when and how the bargains come to be; if his account was, in fact, accurate with the numbers he would have given us a story about what changed in the 80s.
This flaw is potentially more troubling in the cases of Rwanda and Ethiopia, hailed as the potential "African Lions" (a conscious parallel with the "Asian Tiger" economies) of our times. Dercon again gives us his impression of the capable and driven people in these countries, from the heights of politics to technocratic offices to those building up these countries in agriculture and industry. He points to their high recorded rates of economic growth. The problem lies not only in the fact that both of these countries still have widespread extreme poverty, so marking the improvements is less easy than in, say, China, but also in the fact that both Rwandan and Ethiopian authorities have been subject to credible criticism of doctoring their economic growth and other development figures. That's not to say there's been no progress in either country, but it's hard to assess how much there has been and it is therefore difficult to say whether or not the African Lions are real or hype. Only if and when this is cleared up can we judge if Dercon's observations and application of his theory are accurate.
From these cases it should be pretty clear where the issues in Dercon's theory lie. It's often very hard to tell when politics and society truly shifts towards development, especially in the present. Leaders will often want to seem developmental and they may or may not be good at delivering that. They may be better at giving the impression that they are doing things capably than they are at actually achieving change. Dercon's theory, then, might be useful descriptively after the fog clears, but rather hard to apply predictively as the future looms ahead. It's for this reason I have to knock down the book to 3 stars. Some might find other hiccups, such as a repetitive style. Even with those sorts of flaws, he also has worthwhile insights on the role of aid in development, which might make the book more valuable for development practitioners. On the whole, I found myself thinking the book demonstrated the core theoretical idea's inherent weaknesses, probably unintentionally, as well as its strengths.
April 15, 2023
Written by a former DFID chief economist, "Gambling on Development" combines theory and practice in looking at what it takes for development to succeed. After reviewing past key development thinkers in one chapter (Sachs, Easterly, Stiglitz, Collier, Acemoglu and Robinson, etc.), Dercon lays out his key hypothesis: that successful development doesn't stick to one rigid recipe but can take a variety of routes. Rather than a particular political and economic configuration, successful development is based on an elite bargain or development bargain - the commitment by those in power to strive for growth and development.
Dercon takes us through multiple examples of successful, partially successful, and unsuccessful developmental paths - based partially on a review of key history and partially on his own travels and engagement with countries' leadership around the world. He shows that successful development has happened both in states with strong state involvement - as in China and the East Asian tigers - and in states with weaker states - as in the case of Bangladesh, where a strong NGO sector has led the pursuit of (partly successful) development. Interestingly, he shares the discussions and interactions with key national leaders, including leaders of countries who don't care about their poor (such as Sierra Leone and DRC) and hence aren't leading successful development, and leaders of countries (such as Ethiopia and Rwanda) who have committed to growth and development and have experienced success.
Dercon proposes dividing development aid into two broad categories: aid for states with an elite development bargain and aid for states without such a bargain. In the former, money can more easily be spent on supporting development objectives, but the author recommends focusing on three areas in particular: trade policy (strengthening the development bargain by encouraging a more profitable export trade, limiting opportunities for rent-seeking that happen more often through natural resources exports), tackling illicit financial flows (pushing for global transparency about who owns and controls wealth and limiting the ability of elites to to stash money offshore, as well as more tightly regulating professional services firms that provide services for corrupt politicians), and promoting global public goods (specifically in the areas of mitigating climate change, conflict resolution and security, and research and knowledge sharing to solve specific problems faced by poorer countries). I particularly appreciate the author's recognition that illicit financial flows are not limited to authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states, but are in fact a significant issue in the United States and Western European countries as well.
How to help countries without a development bargain? Here, Dercon proposes not a complete withholding of aid but rather a lowering of ambitions: alleviating some suffering rather than transforming a country's health care system, for example. The author proposes three ways to use aid for such states: shift economic incentives to serve as the foundation of political and economic deals underlying a potential elite bargain, improve the accountability and functioning of the state (including through supporting civil society and improved quality of elections), and enhance the delivery of programs targeting people in healthcare and other areas (including through cash transfer programs), including humanitarian aid.
One critique of this two-part division is the extent to which one is able to identify countries that have an elite development bargain, those that don't, and those in between. Some amount of fuzziness is inevitable around the margins of this approach. The author mentions successful economic growth as one potential late indicator of an elite bargain, but otherwise it would seem that personal involvement with key country and bureaucratic leaders, and at least some improvements in internal systems would be the best indicators for states in the earlier stages of molding an elite bargain for development. On the other hand, the fuzziness of determining what is and isn't an elite bargain is no more fuzzy than the extent to which specific economic and political frameworks may lead to development and the approach is at least an improvement on other approaches by recognizing and centering the agency of the elites involved in development endeavors. While not an ultimate answer to all of the complexities of development, "Gambling on Development" extends the conversation in a new and important direction and is a must read for anyone interested in or working in international development.
Dercon takes us through multiple examples of successful, partially successful, and unsuccessful developmental paths - based partially on a review of key history and partially on his own travels and engagement with countries' leadership around the world. He shows that successful development has happened both in states with strong state involvement - as in China and the East Asian tigers - and in states with weaker states - as in the case of Bangladesh, where a strong NGO sector has led the pursuit of (partly successful) development. Interestingly, he shares the discussions and interactions with key national leaders, including leaders of countries who don't care about their poor (such as Sierra Leone and DRC) and hence aren't leading successful development, and leaders of countries (such as Ethiopia and Rwanda) who have committed to growth and development and have experienced success.
Dercon proposes dividing development aid into two broad categories: aid for states with an elite development bargain and aid for states without such a bargain. In the former, money can more easily be spent on supporting development objectives, but the author recommends focusing on three areas in particular: trade policy (strengthening the development bargain by encouraging a more profitable export trade, limiting opportunities for rent-seeking that happen more often through natural resources exports), tackling illicit financial flows (pushing for global transparency about who owns and controls wealth and limiting the ability of elites to to stash money offshore, as well as more tightly regulating professional services firms that provide services for corrupt politicians), and promoting global public goods (specifically in the areas of mitigating climate change, conflict resolution and security, and research and knowledge sharing to solve specific problems faced by poorer countries). I particularly appreciate the author's recognition that illicit financial flows are not limited to authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states, but are in fact a significant issue in the United States and Western European countries as well.
How to help countries without a development bargain? Here, Dercon proposes not a complete withholding of aid but rather a lowering of ambitions: alleviating some suffering rather than transforming a country's health care system, for example. The author proposes three ways to use aid for such states: shift economic incentives to serve as the foundation of political and economic deals underlying a potential elite bargain, improve the accountability and functioning of the state (including through supporting civil society and improved quality of elections), and enhance the delivery of programs targeting people in healthcare and other areas (including through cash transfer programs), including humanitarian aid.
One critique of this two-part division is the extent to which one is able to identify countries that have an elite development bargain, those that don't, and those in between. Some amount of fuzziness is inevitable around the margins of this approach. The author mentions successful economic growth as one potential late indicator of an elite bargain, but otherwise it would seem that personal involvement with key country and bureaucratic leaders, and at least some improvements in internal systems would be the best indicators for states in the earlier stages of molding an elite bargain for development. On the other hand, the fuzziness of determining what is and isn't an elite bargain is no more fuzzy than the extent to which specific economic and political frameworks may lead to development and the approach is at least an improvement on other approaches by recognizing and centering the agency of the elites involved in development endeavors. While not an ultimate answer to all of the complexities of development, "Gambling on Development" extends the conversation in a new and important direction and is a must read for anyone interested in or working in international development.
June 30, 2024
A decent if not especially memorable book by a great economist.
Dercon is an incredible economist with unparalleled experience in the world of international development. This book does two main things. The first is to describe in broad terms the central idea that development progresses through "development bargains," whereby the elites in a country decide that it is in their interest to push forward broad development on a national level, which helps them but also helps the people in the country more generally. While Dercon doesn't make this his exclusive focus, the main thing that makes this approach stand apart is that he rejects the idea that authoritarianism, corruption or ethnic heterogeneity necessarily preclude development.
The second part, which takes up the bulk of the book, is a description of the development trajectories of nearly twenty countries over the last few decades, peppered with a few anecdotes but mostly comprising of official statistics and Dercon's own assessment. They are grouped together to bring out aspects of their development paths, e.g. the extent to which corruption drags the country down or conversely how backroom deals actually push the country forward.
The central problem of the book is that while the "development bargain" idea makes some sense, Dercon does not delve into the clear next question-- why it is that some elites (in his framing) embark on a development bargain and others don't. The term "elites" is also a little too easy, and Dercon does not try to be explicit about whether he thinks political, economic or other elites "matter" more than others. In the end it's hard to avoid the feeling that there's a sort of truism here-- a country will develop if those who have power to develop it manage to find a way to develop it. I don't think that Dercon's approach is that superficial at all, but I feel that the book doesn't give more of it. Like his "Hippos in the Lake" countries, I feel like Dercon's central, meaningful point-- which I'd love to understand in full-- is mostly underwater, and only the ears are visible from this book. Certainly you will not come away with an understanding of "Why some countries win and others lose," per the subtitle.
The descriptions of the countries themselves are interesting, but I can't shake the feeling that I'll forget nearly all the details the moment I put down the book. Some aspects are simply not going to be relevant ten years from now; this is the disadvantage of focusing on how things are (which will change) compared to the broad history (which will remain history in the future). The anecdotes are good but relatively sparse. And because we're talking about 20 countries, little sticks about any individual one. You do get a sense of there being different types of countries, which is the main point here, but they feel more like sub-headlines than pieces that comprise a single puzzle.
Overall, the book is not bad, and it contains many nuggets of helpful information, but overall disappointing and missing key elements that would have given it real weight.
Dercon is an incredible economist with unparalleled experience in the world of international development. This book does two main things. The first is to describe in broad terms the central idea that development progresses through "development bargains," whereby the elites in a country decide that it is in their interest to push forward broad development on a national level, which helps them but also helps the people in the country more generally. While Dercon doesn't make this his exclusive focus, the main thing that makes this approach stand apart is that he rejects the idea that authoritarianism, corruption or ethnic heterogeneity necessarily preclude development.
The second part, which takes up the bulk of the book, is a description of the development trajectories of nearly twenty countries over the last few decades, peppered with a few anecdotes but mostly comprising of official statistics and Dercon's own assessment. They are grouped together to bring out aspects of their development paths, e.g. the extent to which corruption drags the country down or conversely how backroom deals actually push the country forward.
The central problem of the book is that while the "development bargain" idea makes some sense, Dercon does not delve into the clear next question-- why it is that some elites (in his framing) embark on a development bargain and others don't. The term "elites" is also a little too easy, and Dercon does not try to be explicit about whether he thinks political, economic or other elites "matter" more than others. In the end it's hard to avoid the feeling that there's a sort of truism here-- a country will develop if those who have power to develop it manage to find a way to develop it. I don't think that Dercon's approach is that superficial at all, but I feel that the book doesn't give more of it. Like his "Hippos in the Lake" countries, I feel like Dercon's central, meaningful point-- which I'd love to understand in full-- is mostly underwater, and only the ears are visible from this book. Certainly you will not come away with an understanding of "Why some countries win and others lose," per the subtitle.
The descriptions of the countries themselves are interesting, but I can't shake the feeling that I'll forget nearly all the details the moment I put down the book. Some aspects are simply not going to be relevant ten years from now; this is the disadvantage of focusing on how things are (which will change) compared to the broad history (which will remain history in the future). The anecdotes are good but relatively sparse. And because we're talking about 20 countries, little sticks about any individual one. You do get a sense of there being different types of countries, which is the main point here, but they feel more like sub-headlines than pieces that comprise a single puzzle.
Overall, the book is not bad, and it contains many nuggets of helpful information, but overall disappointing and missing key elements that would have given it real weight.
July 6, 2022
Felicitously exactly the book I had been looking for - a fantastically helpful framework for thinking about the current mental models of 'how aid and development work' and a very well informed and nuanced suggestion of an improved model, taking much greater consideration of how a country's 'elite bargain' around a broad, lasting commitment to development across the country's elites, rather than 'rent seeking' or short term behaviours ultimately determines the efficacy of aid, and determines which countries improve their society and economy over time.
I found the early chapters on the 'what are the common models and conceptual frames' to be tremendously helpful in beginning to recognise the motivations for the actions people take, and things I had heard at the Education World Forum for example - and beginning to understand the ecosystem a bit better, and understand specific behaviours in a wider frame, and therefore also know what options speakers were choosing not to take, or to ignore. I found it a wonderful book.
The tone is at times patronisingly rude about 'other countries', extremely comfortable in sitting in judgement on others, and sometimes lacks humility even whilst espousing it. Much of this comes from I suspect a frustration at lack of responsible action, but sitting so comfortably in judgement and having little sense of one's own frailties as a human and a culture is never a great idea. But... overall it is still a very, very helpful book.
I found the early chapters on the 'what are the common models and conceptual frames' to be tremendously helpful in beginning to recognise the motivations for the actions people take, and things I had heard at the Education World Forum for example - and beginning to understand the ecosystem a bit better, and understand specific behaviours in a wider frame, and therefore also know what options speakers were choosing not to take, or to ignore. I found it a wonderful book.
The tone is at times patronisingly rude about 'other countries', extremely comfortable in sitting in judgement on others, and sometimes lacks humility even whilst espousing it. Much of this comes from I suspect a frustration at lack of responsible action, but sitting so comfortably in judgement and having little sense of one's own frailties as a human and a culture is never a great idea. But... overall it is still a very, very helpful book.
October 31, 2023
Excellent book. I really enjoyed this and will recommend widely for those interested in development economics.
The first thing this book does really well is giving the reader a great background introduction to the popular theories and books in the development economics space from the past 15-20 years. This sets the stage really well for introducing his own thesis, and gives the reader plenty of information about where to read more about any specific theory they have an interest in.
The second thing I enjoyed was the breadth of examples used in describing his theory of the Elite bargain. This combined with his personal anecdotes and general history of each country analysed gives a holistic picture of the situation in each place, and more broadly how we might expect the development of that country to go.
And finally, I think because Dercon has spent so long working with these countries on these issues, it has a certain humility around how much we can achieve as outsiders while still retaining optimism that progress can and will be made.
The first thing this book does really well is giving the reader a great background introduction to the popular theories and books in the development economics space from the past 15-20 years. This sets the stage really well for introducing his own thesis, and gives the reader plenty of information about where to read more about any specific theory they have an interest in.
The second thing I enjoyed was the breadth of examples used in describing his theory of the Elite bargain. This combined with his personal anecdotes and general history of each country analysed gives a holistic picture of the situation in each place, and more broadly how we might expect the development of that country to go.
And finally, I think because Dercon has spent so long working with these countries on these issues, it has a certain humility around how much we can achieve as outsiders while still retaining optimism that progress can and will be made.
February 10, 2023
Interesting read from a donor/academic on (effectiveness) of developmental aid. Honest and realistic. Also, the treatment and short summary of a range of countries and their (lack of) success serves as a nice introduction.
The main point is clear: change has to come from the country itself, the elite has to be willing to take the developmental gamble to make things better.
All the cross-referencing and meta-communication within the book is sometimes a bit too much. This funny review, albeit a bit harsh, confers the point I'm trying to make: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...
Summary in blogpost: https://wilte.wordpress.com/2023/02/1...
The main point is clear: change has to come from the country itself, the elite has to be willing to take the developmental gamble to make things better.
All the cross-referencing and meta-communication within the book is sometimes a bit too much. This funny review, albeit a bit harsh, confers the point I'm trying to make: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...
Summary in blogpost: https://wilte.wordpress.com/2023/02/1...
May 20, 2023
The book is at its best in shining a light on the inner workings of Whitehall via the former DfID and their dealings with aid recipients
The development bargain framework, defined as a commitment by those with the power to shape politics, the economy, and society, to striving for growth and development, however given the wide range of contextual and policy examples then discussed, this framework reads little more than a flimsy concept
Development issues and the author's development bargain framework explored through several country case studies of differing wealth, living standards and zoomorphic metaphors, which were tiresome, at best, and dehumanising, at worst, to read
Unfortunately a disappointing read
The development bargain framework, defined as a commitment by those with the power to shape politics, the economy, and society, to striving for growth and development, however given the wide range of contextual and policy examples then discussed, this framework reads little more than a flimsy concept
Development issues and the author's development bargain framework explored through several country case studies of differing wealth, living standards and zoomorphic metaphors, which were tiresome, at best, and dehumanising, at worst, to read
Unfortunately a disappointing read
January 30, 2023
Dercon's core arguments on recalibrating our traditional approach to development aid are not entirely novel. Some practitioners (e.g. Autesserre) have previously brought into light parallels to alternative (and more creative) pathways. To his credit, however, Dercon was humble enough to recognize the severe limits of any kind of development and offered sensible rationale for making practical (but not always conscionable) choices like working with those holding elite bargains. A great addition to the development community.
June 12, 2024
Stefan Dercon's "Gambling on Development" offers a thought-provoking exploration of development, particularly the concept of "development bargains" struck by elites. As a humanitarian aid worker, I found the book valuable in highlighting the importance of long-term growth strategies and effective state function. However, my experience working in some of the world's most challenging environments compels me to offer some additional perspectives.
Read full review : https://vpgoyal.blogspot.com/2024/05/...
Read full review : https://vpgoyal.blogspot.com/2024/05/...
September 14, 2022
This is a good read for anyone looking to build a career in international development. While there is no silver bullet for development issues, it is good to glean knowledge and experience from those who have gone ahead in that path. The case studies were interesting to read, although I would have appreciated a deeper dive in some countries studies like Nigeria.
January 27, 2023
The central premise of the book is strong but getting there is a bit of work. The collection of thoughts and stories throughout are interesting but disconnected in style to other areas of the book. Would have enjoyed reading this more 10 years ago in grad school or as an article on the central thesis.
January 30, 2025
The development bargain sounded initially like a interesting concept, especially with the emphasis on having local elites internally accept/develop their own development bargain. However, the analysis strikes me as to adhoc. The concept of development/elite bargain seems to keep changing across country to posthoc explain success or failure.
December 19, 2022
Why are some countries wealthy, and why do some remain poor? An excellent introduction to development finance, with case studies of individual countries. A good mix of statistical and anecdotal evidence.
November 19, 2024
Prof. Dercon could have concluded the book in just five or so chapters. The excessive number of examples makes it feel overly drawn-out and somewhat dry. While the argument is compelling, the writing style makes me want to finish the book more out of obligation than genuine enjoyment.
January 26, 2025
Informative and balanced. With all development theories, it is sometimes difficult to separate the chicken from the egg. How do you induce an elite to 'gamble on development' and create inclusive institutions is a question that is difficult to answer. They don't emerge from a vacuum.
August 18, 2025
Currently, the most updated book on development.
What is missing? A response to the question: "What do we do when the elite is not choosing the development bargain?" It misses all aspects related to bottom-up solutions and civil-society.
What is missing? A response to the question: "What do we do when the elite is not choosing the development bargain?" It misses all aspects related to bottom-up solutions and civil-society.
Currently reading
September 1, 2025I just love how after mentioning the successful development stories in China, India, Vietnam and so on, the author references exactly zero book by economists/policy makers in these countries.
Probably not worth my time.
Probably not worth my time.
January 4, 2023
Brilliant book examining decades of thought in international development, and why we should pay closer attention to the political economy, or 'development bargains' in each country.
July 30, 2023
I laugh a seminal work! What an amazing read about the different perspective of development funding and growth!
December 3, 2023
Very readable presentation of the state of play of development challenges, past and current aid practices, successes and failures.
The recipes put forward make sense based on my own experience.
The recipes put forward make sense based on my own experience.
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