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Expression and Meaning Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts
正版授权 卖家 : Boolee 加微信[soweinc]每天分享好书,邀你加入国际微信群学习交流.微信好友低至5优惠 .书名:表述和意义:言语行为研究(语言学文库)简介:作者:（美）塞尔 著，张绍杰 导读出版社:外语教学与研究出版社出版时间:2003年08月装订方式:平装分类:社会科学|语言文字|语言文字学当代国外语言学与应用语言学文库
196 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1979
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Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
December 18, 2022
I enjoyed this book. The arguments are just precise, intricate, and fussy enough that the appeal and engagement might not be there for some readers. However, I have found Searle's writing (here and elsewhere) to be remarkably clear, efficient, and engaging. If you are at all interested in how we use language on a day-to-day basis to reference a material world and order ourselves socially with respect to that material world, these essays offer some good content.
As is the case with many collections of essays, some essays are better than others. If you only read one, however, the first ("A taxonomy of illocutionary acts") is a must. The chapters on "Indirect speech acts," "Literal meaning," and "Referential and attributive" meaning are also good. The other essays are extensions or clarifications of ideas that Searle has worked out in other places or rebuttals of counter-arguments that his work as accumulated along the way. Those essays feel a little more like watching a sculptor sweeping the studio rather than watching the sculptor create art but they are still useful in niche ways.
As is the case with many collections of essays, some essays are better than others. If you only read one, however, the first ("A taxonomy of illocutionary acts") is a must. The chapters on "Indirect speech acts," "Literal meaning," and "Referential and attributive" meaning are also good. The other essays are extensions or clarifications of ideas that Searle has worked out in other places or rebuttals of counter-arguments that his work as accumulated along the way. Those essays feel a little more like watching a sculptor sweeping the studio rather than watching the sculptor create art but they are still useful in niche ways.
May 25, 2017
More speech act theory
December 1, 2022
This book consists of seven previously published essays.
Essay one provides a taxonomy of the illocutionary acts. There are: assertives, directives, commissives, expressives and declarations.
Essays two through four deal with indirect speech acts, fiction and metaphor.
The fifth essay is a discussion of literal meaning. In it, Searle claims that “the notion of the literal meaning of a sentence only has application relative to a set of contextual or background assumptions.” There is no zero context or null context. He uses the example of “the cat is on the mat.” What if the cat is in zero gravity and you are observing it upside down from inside a spacecraft?
The sixth essay discusses the difference between reference and attribution, as explained by Keith Donnellan. Searle concludes that this is not a major issue. In a referential use the speaker is aiming at a particular object, while in attribution, the speaker is not.
The final chapters in on speech acts and linguistic theory.
The essays are all interesting and informative, except for the last. I have never study linguistics.
Essay one provides a taxonomy of the illocutionary acts. There are: assertives, directives, commissives, expressives and declarations.
Essays two through four deal with indirect speech acts, fiction and metaphor.
The fifth essay is a discussion of literal meaning. In it, Searle claims that “the notion of the literal meaning of a sentence only has application relative to a set of contextual or background assumptions.” There is no zero context or null context. He uses the example of “the cat is on the mat.” What if the cat is in zero gravity and you are observing it upside down from inside a spacecraft?
The sixth essay discusses the difference between reference and attribution, as explained by Keith Donnellan. Searle concludes that this is not a major issue. In a referential use the speaker is aiming at a particular object, while in attribution, the speaker is not.
The final chapters in on speech acts and linguistic theory.
The essays are all interesting and informative, except for the last. I have never study linguistics.
October 19, 2024
THE SECOND PART OF A “TRILOGY” BY THE FAMED ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHER,
John Rogers Searle (born 1932) is an American philosopher at UC Berkeley. He wrote in the Introduction to this 1979 book, “These essays represent a continuation of a line of research begun in ‘Speech Acts.’ Most of them were originally projected as chapters of a larger work in which discussions of some of the outstanding problems of speech act theory---for example, metaphor, fiction, indirect speech acts, and a classification of types of speech acts---were to have been embedded in a general theory of meaning, in which I hoped to show in what ways the philosophy of language was based on the philosophy of mind, and in particular how certain features of speech acts were based on the Intentionality of the mind. The original chapter on Intentionality however has now grown into a book length manuscript of its own, and… it seemed a better idea to publish these studies as a separate volume. This book is not intended as a collection of unrelated essays, and my main aim in this introduction is to say something about how they are related.” (Pg. vii)
He continues, “The method I use in this essay is in a sense empirical. I simply look at uses of language and find these five types of illocutionary point, and when I examine actual discourse I find, or at least claim, that utterances can be classified under these headings… Perhaps the chief methodological conclusion to be derived from this essay is that we do not need to postulate either alternative deep structures or an extra set of conversational postulates to account for these cases…” (Pg. viii-ix)
He concludes the first chapter with the statement, “The most important conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is this. There are not, as Wittgenstein… and many others have claimed, an infinite or indefinite number of language games or uses of language. Rather, the illusion of limitless uses of language is engendered by an enormous unclarity about what constitutes the criteria for delimiting one language game or use of language from another. If we adopt illocutionary point as the basic notion on which to classify uses of language, then there are a rather limited number of basic things we do with language: we tell people how things are, we try to get them to do things, we commit ourselves to doing things, we express our feelings and attitudes and we bring changes through our utterances. Often, we do more than one of these at once in the same utterance.” (Pg. 29)
He says, “The hypothesis I wish to defend is simply this: In indirect speech acts the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, together with the general powers of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer. To be more specific, the apparatus necessary to explain the indirect part of indirect speech acts includes a theory of speech acts, certain general principles of cooperative conversation… and mutually shared factual background information of the speaker and the hearer, together with an ability on the part of the hearer to make inferences.” (Pg. 32)
He ends the second chapter, “The question, How do I know when he has made a request when he only asked me a question about my abilities? may be like the question, How do I know it was a car when all I perceived was a flash going past me on the highway? If so, the answer to our problem may be neither ‘I have a set of axioms from which it can be deduced that he made a request’ nor ‘I have a set of syntactical rules that generate an impressive deep structure for the sentence he uttered.’” (Pg. 57)
He begins the fifth chapter, “The view I shall be attacking is sometimes expressed by saying that the literal meaning of a sentence is the meaning that it has in the ‘zero context’ or the ‘null context.’ I shall argue that for a large class of sentences there is no such thing as the zero of null context for the interpretation of sentences, and that as far as our semantic competence is concerned we understand the meaning of such sentences only against a set of background assumptions about the contexts in which the sentence could be appropriately uttered.” (Pg. 117)
He concludes the book, “The purpose of language is communication. The unit of human communication in language is the speech act, of the type called illocutionary act [i.e., ‘an act performed in saying something’]. The problem… of the theory of language is to describe how we get from the sounds to the illocutionary acts… The rules enable us to get from the brute facts of making of noises to the institutional facts of the performance of illocutionary acts of human communication.
"Now, if that is the case, then the role of a theory of speech acts in a grammar will be quite different from what either the proponents of generative syntax or even most of the proponents of generative semantics have considered. The theory of speech acts is not an adjunct to our theory of language, something to be consigned to the realm of ‘pragmatics,’ or performance; rather, the theory of speech acts will necessarily occupy a central role in our grammar, since it will include all of what used to be called semantics as well as pragmatics.” (Pg. 178)
This book will be of great interest to anyone studying Searle’s thought and its development, or contemporary analytic philosophy in general.
John Rogers Searle (born 1932) is an American philosopher at UC Berkeley. He wrote in the Introduction to this 1979 book, “These essays represent a continuation of a line of research begun in ‘Speech Acts.’ Most of them were originally projected as chapters of a larger work in which discussions of some of the outstanding problems of speech act theory---for example, metaphor, fiction, indirect speech acts, and a classification of types of speech acts---were to have been embedded in a general theory of meaning, in which I hoped to show in what ways the philosophy of language was based on the philosophy of mind, and in particular how certain features of speech acts were based on the Intentionality of the mind. The original chapter on Intentionality however has now grown into a book length manuscript of its own, and… it seemed a better idea to publish these studies as a separate volume. This book is not intended as a collection of unrelated essays, and my main aim in this introduction is to say something about how they are related.” (Pg. vii)
He continues, “The method I use in this essay is in a sense empirical. I simply look at uses of language and find these five types of illocutionary point, and when I examine actual discourse I find, or at least claim, that utterances can be classified under these headings… Perhaps the chief methodological conclusion to be derived from this essay is that we do not need to postulate either alternative deep structures or an extra set of conversational postulates to account for these cases…” (Pg. viii-ix)
He concludes the first chapter with the statement, “The most important conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is this. There are not, as Wittgenstein… and many others have claimed, an infinite or indefinite number of language games or uses of language. Rather, the illusion of limitless uses of language is engendered by an enormous unclarity about what constitutes the criteria for delimiting one language game or use of language from another. If we adopt illocutionary point as the basic notion on which to classify uses of language, then there are a rather limited number of basic things we do with language: we tell people how things are, we try to get them to do things, we commit ourselves to doing things, we express our feelings and attitudes and we bring changes through our utterances. Often, we do more than one of these at once in the same utterance.” (Pg. 29)
He says, “The hypothesis I wish to defend is simply this: In indirect speech acts the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, together with the general powers of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer. To be more specific, the apparatus necessary to explain the indirect part of indirect speech acts includes a theory of speech acts, certain general principles of cooperative conversation… and mutually shared factual background information of the speaker and the hearer, together with an ability on the part of the hearer to make inferences.” (Pg. 32)
He ends the second chapter, “The question, How do I know when he has made a request when he only asked me a question about my abilities? may be like the question, How do I know it was a car when all I perceived was a flash going past me on the highway? If so, the answer to our problem may be neither ‘I have a set of axioms from which it can be deduced that he made a request’ nor ‘I have a set of syntactical rules that generate an impressive deep structure for the sentence he uttered.’” (Pg. 57)
He begins the fifth chapter, “The view I shall be attacking is sometimes expressed by saying that the literal meaning of a sentence is the meaning that it has in the ‘zero context’ or the ‘null context.’ I shall argue that for a large class of sentences there is no such thing as the zero of null context for the interpretation of sentences, and that as far as our semantic competence is concerned we understand the meaning of such sentences only against a set of background assumptions about the contexts in which the sentence could be appropriately uttered.” (Pg. 117)
He concludes the book, “The purpose of language is communication. The unit of human communication in language is the speech act, of the type called illocutionary act [i.e., ‘an act performed in saying something’]. The problem… of the theory of language is to describe how we get from the sounds to the illocutionary acts… The rules enable us to get from the brute facts of making of noises to the institutional facts of the performance of illocutionary acts of human communication.
"Now, if that is the case, then the role of a theory of speech acts in a grammar will be quite different from what either the proponents of generative syntax or even most of the proponents of generative semantics have considered. The theory of speech acts is not an adjunct to our theory of language, something to be consigned to the realm of ‘pragmatics,’ or performance; rather, the theory of speech acts will necessarily occupy a central role in our grammar, since it will include all of what used to be called semantics as well as pragmatics.” (Pg. 178)
This book will be of great interest to anyone studying Searle’s thought and its development, or contemporary analytic philosophy in general.
March 2, 2025
【Expression and Meaning (1979) / John R. Searle】
John Searle easily says things like "I describe that John is a Fascist" is not a sentence (cf. p.24), but, as my online best friend Lina says, it's going too far to deny the emergence of this sentence in English in future (it probably is already used by some). P F Strawson was aware of that, and used a more careful language about grammatical errors (in that era).
This nonchalance even gets graver in the next paper, "Indirect Speech Acts," which is about how a human being (from the US middle class in 1970s) would think. Oh yes, "let's go to movies to night" and "I have to eat popcorn tonight" (p.33.) incorrect in a normal context? In 2020s introvert culture, it's likely a correct in a normal context (an increase of introvert population noted). JL Austin, his master in philosophy, didn't make this type of simple error of overlooking the cultural context.
Further you read, further you doubt. He's read a lot of fictions, but had no clue about discussing them. There are even factual errors, calling Iris Murdoch (married in 1950s) "Miss" (throughout the third chapter published in 1977). And it's not even a literature trivia quiz, as Murdoch herself was Searle's contemporary philosopher who was even philosophically close to his position. It's likely Searle didn't even care about her philosophy despite writing about her fiction.
I'm really speechless now. Even truism like "Could we make our whole mode of sensibility filly explicit?" (p.130.) sounds empty that he is dubious of having enough sensibility to be an academic.
John Searle easily says things like "I describe that John is a Fascist" is not a sentence (cf. p.24), but, as my online best friend Lina says, it's going too far to deny the emergence of this sentence in English in future (it probably is already used by some). P F Strawson was aware of that, and used a more careful language about grammatical errors (in that era).
This nonchalance even gets graver in the next paper, "Indirect Speech Acts," which is about how a human being (from the US middle class in 1970s) would think. Oh yes, "let's go to movies to night" and "I have to eat popcorn tonight" (p.33.) incorrect in a normal context? In 2020s introvert culture, it's likely a correct in a normal context (an increase of introvert population noted). JL Austin, his master in philosophy, didn't make this type of simple error of overlooking the cultural context.
Further you read, further you doubt. He's read a lot of fictions, but had no clue about discussing them. There are even factual errors, calling Iris Murdoch (married in 1950s) "Miss" (throughout the third chapter published in 1977). And it's not even a literature trivia quiz, as Murdoch herself was Searle's contemporary philosopher who was even philosophically close to his position. It's likely Searle didn't even care about her philosophy despite writing about her fiction.
I'm really speechless now. Even truism like "Could we make our whole mode of sensibility filly explicit?" (p.130.) sounds empty that he is dubious of having enough sensibility to be an academic.
November 9, 2018
Searle believes that speaking and writing consists in performing speech acts of a quite specific kind called 'illocutionary acts'. For someone who makes fun of the jargon of other philosophers that is quite impressive.
Here are some essays, most of them written to give him the opportunity to quote himself.
Seriously, there is one essay on the logical Status of fictional discourse, which sounds more interesting than it is. Iris Murdoch, he says, does not perform a special kind of illocutionary when writing fiction, as one might believe, but "pretends" to assert. That, to me is a question of definition. Why bother? he asks. Indeed, why? Only he has an answer that seems to satisfy him.
The essay on metaphors again is not as illuminating as I hoped it would be. I have a problem with the distinction between literal and metaphorical meaning. Sally is an iceberg is one of his examples of a metaphor. A strange one, as it is found in dictionaries. So it is at best a dead metaphor. So what is the literal meaning of Sally is nice? The original meaning of nice is stupid. So the current "literal" meaning is due to metaphorical shifting.
One nice joke about Heidegger. Klaus Heidegger, who finished second in the 1977 World Cup standings.
5/10
Here are some essays, most of them written to give him the opportunity to quote himself.
Seriously, there is one essay on the logical Status of fictional discourse, which sounds more interesting than it is. Iris Murdoch, he says, does not perform a special kind of illocutionary when writing fiction, as one might believe, but "pretends" to assert. That, to me is a question of definition. Why bother? he asks. Indeed, why? Only he has an answer that seems to satisfy him.
The essay on metaphors again is not as illuminating as I hoped it would be. I have a problem with the distinction between literal and metaphorical meaning. Sally is an iceberg is one of his examples of a metaphor. A strange one, as it is found in dictionaries. So it is at best a dead metaphor. So what is the literal meaning of Sally is nice? The original meaning of nice is stupid. So the current "literal" meaning is due to metaphorical shifting.
One nice joke about Heidegger. Klaus Heidegger, who finished second in the 1977 World Cup standings.
5/10
April 21, 2019
Define es Illocutionary acts of speech act
This book did not define speech act but focused on the illocutionary acts. While at times difficult to follow along, it does define/demonstrate the illocutionary act.
This book did not define speech act but focused on the illocutionary acts. While at times difficult to follow along, it does define/demonstrate the illocutionary act.
July 20, 2019
1. illocutionary acts vs. illocutionary verbs; 2. constative/illocutionary --> assertive/directive/commisive/expressive/declarative. 3 fictional speech acts vs. serious/non-fictional speech acts.
December 19, 2007
Brilliant, scathing articles.
February 7, 2016
More speech acts
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