Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger: The Problem of the Original Method and Phenomenon of Phenomenology

by Burt C. Hopkins

Introduction. Part Husserl's Phenomenological Account of Intentionality. Husserl's Phenomenological Method. The Intentionality of Logical Significance and Material Ontological Meaning. The Intentionality of Psychologically Pure Consciousness. The Intentionality of Transcendentally Pure Consciousness. Part Heidegger's Phenomenological Account of Intentionality. Heidegger's Concept of Phenomenology. The Phenomenological Inquiry into the Being of Intentionality. Being in the World Manifests Dasein's Original Transcendence. The Temporal Meaning of Transcendence. Part The Confrontation of Husserl's and Heidegger's Accounts of Intentionality. The Phenomenological Reflective or Hermeneutical? an Original or Derived Phenomenon? Part Discussion of the Conclusions. Gadamer's Assessment of the Controversy between Husserl and Heidegger. Ricoeur's Attempted Rapprochement between Phenomenology and Hermeneutics. Mohanty's Account of the Complementarity of Descriptive and Interpretive Phenomenology. Crowell's Account of Husserl's and Heidegger's Divergent Interpretations of Phenomenology's Transcendental Character. Landgrebe's Critique of Husserl's Theory of Phenomenological Reflection. Table of Abbreviations. Notes. Selected Bibliography. Index.

324 pages, Paperback

First published January 27, 1993