Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend has developed an extremely distinctive and influentical approach to problems in the philosophy of science. The most important and seminal of his published essays are collected here in two volumes, with new introductions to provide an overview and historical perspective on the discussions of each part. Volume 1 presents papers on the interpretation of scientific theories, together with papers applying the views developed to particular problems in philosophy and physics. The essays in volume 2 examine the origin and history of an abstract rationalism, as well as its consequences for the philosophy of science and methods of scientific research. Professor Feyerabend argues with great force and imagination for a comprehensive and opportunistic pluralism. In doing so he draws on extensive knowledge of scientific history and practice, and he is alert always to the wider philosophical, practical and political implications of conflicting views. These two volumes fully display the variety of his ideas, and confirm the originality and significance of his work.
Paul Karl Feyerabend was an Austrian-born philosopher of science best known for his work as a professor of philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley, where he worked for three decades (1958–1989).
His life was a peripatetic one, as he lived at various times in England, the United States, New Zealand, Italy, Germany, and finally Switzerland. His major works include Against Method (published in 1975), Science in a Free Society (published in 1978) and Farewell to Reason (a collection of papers published in 1987). Feyerabend became famous for his purportedly anarchistic view of science and his rejection of the existence of universal methodological rules. He is an influential figure in the philosophy of science, and also in the sociology of scientific knowledge.
Файерабенд е бацето на философията. Забелязал съм, че се съчетава добре с "Очерци върху скептицизма" на Секст Емпирик (друго велико баце на философия), която може да е писана преди хилядолетия, но стабилно сипва скептическа просвета. Като цяло, истинският скептицизъм (който за мен има доста общо с епистемичната анархия) няма обособена траектория и се самопремахва. Понеже ако всичко е относително, то е относително и това, че всичко е относително. Което все пак значи, че всичко е относително, и следователно именно понеже и твърдението, че всичко е относително, е относително, не можем да сме сигурни, че всичко е относително или че не е относително.
Та и тука, още от въведението, Файерабенд подгрява философите на науката (и някои наивни учени) за опитите да разделят теориите от наблюденията. Само дето теориите и наблюденията са неминуемо много навързани...
Entre el dadaísmo epistemológico y la inconmensurabilidad, Feyerabend es un referente obligado para abrir los límites de las teorías del conocimiento. Su manera de concebir la gnoseología no sólo cuestiona sino que obliga a ampliar cualquier visión filósofica, haciéndonos preguntar si la ciencia tiene límites y, además, en el caso de que los haya, a qué tipo de límites nos enfrentamos.