"Judicious in every respect: selection, translation and structuring of the texts, footnotes, bibliography, and index. . . . The book of choice for undergraduate courses." --Edward M. Galligan, University of North Carolina
Ancient Mediterranean physician and philosopher. His philosophical work is the most complete surviving account of ancient Greek and Roman skepticism.
In his medical work, tradition maintains that he belonged to the "empiric school", as reflected by his name. However, at least twice in his writings, Sextus seems to place himself closer to the "methodic school", as his philosophical views imply.
all of the Hackett editions are good, but this one - with judicious notes by Philip Hallie that situate the work in ancient, early-modern, and modern context, and a top-notch, matter-of-fact translation by Sanford Etheridge - takes the cake.
I came to SE by way of Montaigne, and the original text lays bare just how much borrowing the MdM did, particularly in his fun, digression-filled "An Apology for Raymond Sebond."
The selections here are useful. As philosophy goes, this aligns neatly with my own: "undogmatic" acceptance of common-sense "recollective signs" that constitute daily life, while subjecting all dogmatic claims to penetrating analysis that leaves them "in the balance" and allows for the suspension of judgment.
The point of SE's handbook, which consists primarily of arguments pro / contra established dogmatic positions of rival philosophical schools, isn't to argue that nothing can be known, there is no truth, etc. Rather, the point is to suspend judgment on non-evident claims and go on with one's life, which is exactly the sort of bare-bones/minimalist system needed during periods of increasing mystification and complexity.
If you've read Wittgenstein or Hume, or even bk 2, ch 3 of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, there are some similarities and overlaps...most notably to W, who has no use for language that lacks antitheses, that conveys nothing in "normal usage," etc.
Kids engaged in various types of formal debate, as well as folks looking for heuristics to wield in logical arguments, would be well served to read or at least skim/highlight this book. It's dry reading if you're not interested in back-and-forth argumentation or don't really know the landscape of Greco-Roman philosophy, but if you've got any grounding in any of that, I highly recommend this book.
The editor and translator do a really good job of contextualizing Sextus Empiricus. I feel like I have a much better understanding of skepticism. Turns out, skepticism is far more practical than I had thought based on the digs at it from other philosophers. It's a position of humility about how we know stuff rather than a rejection.
I'm questioning, so I'm in! giovanni papini on this subject; "Am I skeptical? unfortunately, no. the skeptic is lucky: at least he has a belief." by saying that, he managed to draw my attention to him for a long time. and every time Papini's name comes up, this word of hers keeps coming to mind. why should a skeptic have faith? is he not a skeptic who doubts because he questions? what he meant by faith, papini could not figure out. November. i sometimes say did he use faith because he was in philosophy, but philosophy also needs to make him question, not make him believe. there is no belief in philosophy anyway. I don't know what papini means, but there is no doubt that skepticism comes from a mind that can question the basis.
it is because there is no accurate and precise information and it cannot be known that today it is the language of science that humanity is very advanced in science. skepticism, which is a value that exalts a person so much, is defined as an obsessive personality disorder when it spreads to a person's body. besides, its return to man is nothing but pain. life is simple and uniform. the way of life should also be like this, but for a person of a skeptical nature, he bleeds himself a lot because his return is perfectionism. this is the pain that will not end.
skepticism is a philosophical movement that abstains from mystical and religious issues. he is generally perceived as a denier, but skepticism proceeds from the internal contradictions, structural disorders of religious arguments, but he does not say there is none, he says we cannot know. in other words, he cares about staying neutral until he gets to the truth. also, this meant development for man.
another false narrative is the statement that he claims that no definite knowledge can be reached through reason. such a definition would be to remove skepticism from rationality and evaluate it completely on the religious point. the basic criterion of skepticism is reason. he paved the way for a great development by saying that every 'thing' can be known by the mind, but the clear knowledge that will reach the 'thing' cannot be reached, and enabled the development of man, phenomenology, philology and especially epistemology.
today, when evaluating skepticism, we need to evaluate the philosophy of language and the philosophy of knowledge together. a mere skepticism does not go beyond the philosophy of antiquity. it is limited. although the importance of knowledge, language and septic philosophy, which constitute the philosophy of being, is limited to scientific research today, the basic question of the life we live lies here.
sextus empiricus is a superhuman who created this way of thinking during his lifetime. to reach philosophy itself... I think this has been one of the books I have enjoyed the most in this format of vitality, where we will disappear and disappear into nothingness.
It is from a feeling of puzzlement or ignorance, a doubting attitude, that man's whole search for knowledge emerged. p. 3 Scepticism sought was not a sort of paralytic anaesthesia; it was peaceful living acording to the institutions of one's own country and the dictates of one's own feelings, experience and common sense. All three philosophies wanted tranquility, not paralysis; a peaceful life, not an imitation of death. p. 7 Sceptical doubt is not denial; it is the suspension of judgement, the frefusal to assert and refusal to deny. p. 9 Pyrrho if a man would be happy he msut ask himself three questions and answer them as best he canp-- first, What is the stuff of things? Next, In what relation do we stand to things around us? and last, result -- absence of fanaticism concerning matters that cannot be proved. p. 13-14 !!!!!!!!!!!!! . . . consensus gentium, or universally - believed - therefore - true, argument for God's existence. . . . p. 21 aporetic (doubting. . . . p. 32
[utterance] All things are false, for example, asserts its own falsity together with that of all other things. p. 36 propaedeutic Socrates, for example, found himself embarassed: he remained in doubt and declared that he was ignorant both of his own nature and of his relationship to the universe, "For I do not knwo," he says, "whether I am a man or some other kind of beast more complex than Typhon." p. 131 {we do not know with out thoughts what we are} Plato's definition of man is even worse than the others. He says, "Man is a featherless, two-footed, flat nailed animal, receptive of political science." p. 134 No one is definitely the criterion of truth. * * * in addition to this, it is either by mere assertion that a man claims to be the criterion, or it is because he is using a criterion. * * * . . . we must declare that the criterion of truth is undiscoverable. p. 145 For the existence of God is not self-evident. p. 176 Therefore, the existence of God cannot be demonstrated from anything else. p. 177 God neither appears of himself not is apprehended by means of any of his products. For these reasons, than, it cannot be apprehended whether God exists. * * * . . . if they say that he takes thought of all things, they will be saying that God is responsible for what is evil, while if they say he takes forethought for some things, or even for nothing, they will necessarily be saying that God is either malicious or weak, which is manifest impiety. p. 178 The question was, after all, what was the original cause which brought men to a belief in gods? p. 183 . . . the incorporeal is inanimate and without senses and capable of no activity, nor is it a body, since every body is both subject to change and perishable, while the Divinity is imperishable. Therefore the Divinity does not exist. p. 208
Book one was very informative, demonstrating that many contemporary philosophers and debtors do not understand post-academic skepticism. I feel confident in explaining how skepticism worked, and what it entails.
Book two was much more dense, and I had a difficult time understanding it frankly. I will try re-reading it in the future when I've become more accustomed to reading philosophy.
Book three was interesting because you see a lot of contemporary theistic arguments and counter-arguments pop up. The unmoved mover, the epicurean trilemma, and the largest island argument all crop up. It just goes to show how theistic debate has been around for ages.
The footnotes and intro were awesome, and helped me understand what was going on.
If I could kill Sextus Empiricus for righting this horrible volume I would. It is the most back-asswards book I have ever read. I get that he believe this "suspend judgement" thin but it's total bull crap!