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Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC
In this provocative and thoughtful book, Amy Zegart challenges the conventional belief that national security agencies work reasonably well to serve the national interest as they were designed to do. Using a new institutionalist approach, Zegart asks what forces shaped the initial design of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council in ways that meant they were handicapped from birth.
Ironically, she finds that much of the blame can be ascribed to cherished features of American democracy--frequent elections, the separation of powers, majority rule, political compromise--all of which constrain presidential power and give Congress little incentive to create an effective foreign policy system. At the same time, bureaucrats in rival departments had the expertise, the staying power, and the incentives to sabotage the creation of effective competitors, and this is exactly what they did.
Historical evidence suggests that most political players did not consider broad national concerns when they forged the CIA, JCS, and NSC in the late 1940s. Although President Truman aimed to establish a functional foreign policy system, he was stymied by self-interested bureaucrats, legislators, and military leaders. The NSC was established by accident, as a byproduct of political compromise; Navy opposition crippled the JCS from the outset; and the CIA emerged without the statutory authority to fulfill its assigned role thanks to the Navy, War, State, and Justice departments, which fought to protect their own intelligence apparatus.
Not surprisingly, the new security agencies performed poorly as they struggled to overcome their crippled evolution. Only the NSC overcame its initial handicaps as several presidents exploited loopholes in the National Security Act of 1947 to reinvent the NSC staff. The JCS, by contrast, remained mired in its ineffective design for nearly forty years--i.e., throughout the Cold War--and the CIA's pivotal analysis branch has never recovered from its origins. In sum, the author paints an astonishing the agencies Americans count on most to protect them from enemies abroad are, by design, largely incapable of doing so.
Ironically, she finds that much of the blame can be ascribed to cherished features of American democracy--frequent elections, the separation of powers, majority rule, political compromise--all of which constrain presidential power and give Congress little incentive to create an effective foreign policy system. At the same time, bureaucrats in rival departments had the expertise, the staying power, and the incentives to sabotage the creation of effective competitors, and this is exactly what they did.
Historical evidence suggests that most political players did not consider broad national concerns when they forged the CIA, JCS, and NSC in the late 1940s. Although President Truman aimed to establish a functional foreign policy system, he was stymied by self-interested bureaucrats, legislators, and military leaders. The NSC was established by accident, as a byproduct of political compromise; Navy opposition crippled the JCS from the outset; and the CIA emerged without the statutory authority to fulfill its assigned role thanks to the Navy, War, State, and Justice departments, which fought to protect their own intelligence apparatus.
Not surprisingly, the new security agencies performed poorly as they struggled to overcome their crippled evolution. Only the NSC overcame its initial handicaps as several presidents exploited loopholes in the National Security Act of 1947 to reinvent the NSC staff. The JCS, by contrast, remained mired in its ineffective design for nearly forty years--i.e., throughout the Cold War--and the CIA's pivotal analysis branch has never recovered from its origins. In sum, the author paints an astonishing the agencies Americans count on most to protect them from enemies abroad are, by design, largely incapable of doing so.
336 pages, Kindle Edition
First published September 1, 1999
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178 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
February 22, 2017
Zegart challenges the traditional realist belief that national security agencies were designed at their creation to optimally work in the national best interest. Looking at the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency, she uses the organizations’ histories to argue that each of these entities was created from turf battles within existing government bureaucracies. They were primarily created by the Executive branch, with little to no Congressional input. Existing government agencies fought over how these new entities should look and the powers they should have. Each of the existing government agencies (i.e. Navy, State Department, etc.) was more interested in protecting their own turf than in creating well designed new agencies that might compete with them. Although I’m not saying her “new institutionalist” approach is wrong, I do not believe anyone knows what an “optimal” or perfect national security agency would look like. No human created entity is formed in a vacuum.
December 29, 2007
This book was a well structured argument about the innate flaws in the design of three major government institutions. That's part of the problem, it was too structured. Each chapter followed the same headings and was summarized against the same thesis points, giving more the impression of an academic exercise as opposed to a work of natural insight.
I agree with some of her conclusions, but am uncertain about the value of her argument. I feel that the book lacks any grounding in the assessment of the different functions that each institution fulfills. Furthermore the book lacks any perspective on the role of these institutions as compared to any others - in different countries, in different times. Without those foundations, her analysis, at best, puts you in the position of measuring each institution against some sort of "bureaucratic ideal" which is unrealistic, unhelpful and ultimately misleading.
I agree with some of her conclusions, but am uncertain about the value of her argument. I feel that the book lacks any grounding in the assessment of the different functions that each institution fulfills. Furthermore the book lacks any perspective on the role of these institutions as compared to any others - in different countries, in different times. Without those foundations, her analysis, at best, puts you in the position of measuring each institution against some sort of "bureaucratic ideal" which is unrealistic, unhelpful and ultimately misleading.
July 8, 2014
Whenever I find myself explaining to anyone the workings and dysfunction of the national security apparatus, I end up recommending this book. Anyone who has worked in government in national security will find much of their experience and frustration explained by Zegart's model (a modification of the bureaucratic politics model). This is not a book written by an ivory tower academic writing about what they think government looks like, or how it should function, or some new model of international politics, it is a description of reality from someone who knows what it looks like on the inside.
If that was all this book was, it would be enough, but it is much more - it is one of the best, and possibly only, complete histories of the Truman reorganization of National Security at the beginning of the Cold War, a history that deserves much more scrutiny and attention from military, intelligence, and Cold War historians alike.
If that was all this book was, it would be enough, but it is much more - it is one of the best, and possibly only, complete histories of the Truman reorganization of National Security at the beginning of the Cold War, a history that deserves much more scrutiny and attention from military, intelligence, and Cold War historians alike.
December 8, 2010
New institutionalism -- National Security Agency Model (original design, political players in executive branch, exogenous events).
Open issue: study relationship between agency design and policy outcomes.
Open issue: study relationship between agency design and policy outcomes.
January 13, 2016
An interesting and provoking analysis of the national security apparatus's history, but one that has several important questions that remain unanswered - particularly on why particular lobbying decisions were made in 1947-8 by the various US agencies.
Read
January 5, 2008Reading for class. She thanks Condi Rice in the beginning so I am a little scared. But should be interesting.
February 1, 2021
Livro originalmente publicado em 1999. Busca a elaboração de uma teoria para o entendimento de como se formam e como se desenvolvem as agências norte-americanas na área de segurança nacional. Examina a experiência do Conselho Nacional de Segurança, do Estado-Maior Conjunto das Forças Armadas e da CIA.
November 30, 2007
A fine political sciene academic book. A number of strengths:
- A well organized book. One looking to just understand the argument or theory of the book can read the first two chapters and the conclusion.
- A strong case is made on behalf of new institutionalism, as opposed to realism, in explaining the creation and development of the National Security Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Central Intelligence Agency. Bottom line is that foreign policy agencies are created amidst the politics of the day and are never created so as to achieve true national security objectives. Among the interesting findings is that Congress and the interest group community was not seriously involved in the creation or development of the three national security structures. New institutional theory regarding domestic areas does involve Congress and IGs. Worse for anyone hoping to fix initial design flaws is the fact that, as hard as it is to make agencies function from the get-go, it's even harder to fix them later on.
- The case studies are well written and interesting narratives.
Some weaknesses:
- Congress's involvement does not necessarily mean formal votes and hearings. Hence, influential folks can play a role in behind the scenes manners.
- Congress pushed through the Goldwater-Nichols Act in the 1980s with a SecDef who was opposed, a president who was not engaged. That's a heck of a piece of contrary evidence that Zegart does not dedicate enough time to.
- A tad bit too much repetition.
- Politics in the late 1940s is not the same as politics in the early 21st century. Globalization and the interlocking nature of domestic and foreign policies may weaken Zegart's findings.
More can be said. Overall, a fine book and well worth the time.
- A well organized book. One looking to just understand the argument or theory of the book can read the first two chapters and the conclusion.
- A strong case is made on behalf of new institutionalism, as opposed to realism, in explaining the creation and development of the National Security Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Central Intelligence Agency. Bottom line is that foreign policy agencies are created amidst the politics of the day and are never created so as to achieve true national security objectives. Among the interesting findings is that Congress and the interest group community was not seriously involved in the creation or development of the three national security structures. New institutional theory regarding domestic areas does involve Congress and IGs. Worse for anyone hoping to fix initial design flaws is the fact that, as hard as it is to make agencies function from the get-go, it's even harder to fix them later on.
- The case studies are well written and interesting narratives.
Some weaknesses:
- Congress's involvement does not necessarily mean formal votes and hearings. Hence, influential folks can play a role in behind the scenes manners.
- Congress pushed through the Goldwater-Nichols Act in the 1980s with a SecDef who was opposed, a president who was not engaged. That's a heck of a piece of contrary evidence that Zegart does not dedicate enough time to.
- A tad bit too much repetition.
- Politics in the late 1940s is not the same as politics in the early 21st century. Globalization and the interlocking nature of domestic and foreign policies may weaken Zegart's findings.
More can be said. Overall, a fine book and well worth the time.
Want to read
February 18, 2017DNF but will finish later
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews