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Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age
The classic reference volume on the theory and practice of war
The essays in this volume analyze war, its strategic characterisitics, and its political and social functions over the past five centuries. The diversity of its themes and the broad perspectives applied to them make the book a work of general history as much as a history of the theory and practice of war from the Renaissance to the present. Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age takes the first part of its title from an earlier collection of essays, published by Princeton University Press in 1943, which became a classic of historical scholarship. Three essays are repinted from the earlier book while four others have been extensively revised. The rest―twenty-two essays―are new.
The subjects addressed range from major theorists and political and military leaders to impersonal forces. Machiavelli, Clausewitz, and Marx and Engels are discussed, as are Napoleon, Churchill, and Mao. Other essays trace the interaction of theory and experience over generations―the evolution of American strategy, for instance, or the emergence of revolutionary war in the modern world. Still others analyze the strategy of particular conflicts―the First and Second World Wars―or the relationship between technology, policy, and war in the nuclear age. Whatever its theme, each essay places the specifics of military thought and action in their political, social, and economic environment. Together, the contributors have produced a book that reinterprets and illuminates war, one of the most powerful forces in history and one that cannot be controlled in the future without an understanding of its past.
The essays in this volume analyze war, its strategic characterisitics, and its political and social functions over the past five centuries. The diversity of its themes and the broad perspectives applied to them make the book a work of general history as much as a history of the theory and practice of war from the Renaissance to the present. Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age takes the first part of its title from an earlier collection of essays, published by Princeton University Press in 1943, which became a classic of historical scholarship. Three essays are repinted from the earlier book while four others have been extensively revised. The rest―twenty-two essays―are new.
The subjects addressed range from major theorists and political and military leaders to impersonal forces. Machiavelli, Clausewitz, and Marx and Engels are discussed, as are Napoleon, Churchill, and Mao. Other essays trace the interaction of theory and experience over generations―the evolution of American strategy, for instance, or the emergence of revolutionary war in the modern world. Still others analyze the strategy of particular conflicts―the First and Second World Wars―or the relationship between technology, policy, and war in the nuclear age. Whatever its theme, each essay places the specifics of military thought and action in their political, social, and economic environment. Together, the contributors have produced a book that reinterprets and illuminates war, one of the most powerful forces in history and one that cannot be controlled in the future without an understanding of its past.
941 pages, Paperback
First published March 1, 1943
305 people are currently reading
5894 people want to read
About the author
Peter Paret
55 books22 followersAmerican historian who has specialised in German military history in the Napoleonic era and German artists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 34 reviews
April 6, 2015
In my experience, anthologies are always a sort of coin toss with essays being either very good or very bad, due to the fact that it's a collection of different authors with different ideas and different styles. It's rare to find one where all the essays are great and interesting reads, but this book is one of those. A collection of essays on military history, strategy, and strategies starting with Machiavelli in the 16th century all the way to the end of the Cold War. Every major military leader and thinker in Western history during this time period is there and topics are varied enough so that it is not always Army tactics that are covered. It also includes essays on the Navy and Air power that are fascinating. It even includes a chapter on modern revolutionary wars, or insurgencies as we would call them today, that is not to be missed. And, I have to say, there wasn't one essay that I felt was superfluous or boring., an achievement for an anthology of this size. The only thing that I would say is that, since this was most recently updated in 1986, it does need to add a few new chapters on robotics and cyberwarfare. In spite of its age and length, this was a great read and I highly recommend it to anyone interested in the development of modern, Western military strategy over the centuries.
February 5, 2019
Reprint of a collection of essays first published in 1943... except just 3 essays were reprinted, 4 were revised and 22 were written for this reprint. All the essays trace the history of strategic thought and practice in war thru 5 centuries of European experience.
Why I started this book: This is a huge work that has repeatedly been listed on Military Professional Reading lists. Starting a new year, seemed like the best time to tackle this beast.
Why I finished it: This book is not only long but it is also dense. Which meant that it was a victory to read a chapter a day... one that I didn't consistently achieve. The strongest essays in this book were the first, as all essays relied on historical research and resources that were not available/unclassified for later essays on nuclear strategy and colonial "revolutionary" wars.
Why I started this book: This is a huge work that has repeatedly been listed on Military Professional Reading lists. Starting a new year, seemed like the best time to tackle this beast.
Why I finished it: This book is not only long but it is also dense. Which meant that it was a victory to read a chapter a day... one that I didn't consistently achieve. The strongest essays in this book were the first, as all essays relied on historical research and resources that were not available/unclassified for later essays on nuclear strategy and colonial "revolutionary" wars.
March 22, 2008
The bible of stragetic thought. It needs updating, with some post cold-war analysis. It is still the single best volume of western military thought. I have read the book numerous times and it still remains solid
March 24, 2024
Fascinating read on how we got our modern-day military and how things continue to progress. But the ultimate foundation was set centuries ago.
August 7, 2018
This was a mandatory read on the list for United States Army Command & General Staff College. We were assigned passages from the book rather than being required to read it cover to cover. I am interested in History and this was one of the few enjoyable blocks in the Army course. However, I graduated from the American public school system several years ago and I was not immediately invested in reading mandatory material.
While another book on our list, The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, ambitiously covered 700 years in only 194 pages, this book set out to cover roughly 500 years in 871 pages of actual text. This book provided great insight in the tactics, operations, and strategy of great military officers and their celebrated armies. Additionally, it covers some of the blunders. Part of the comprehensive insights include the diplomatic, informational, and economic environments surrounding those armies and their countries.
While another book on our list, The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, ambitiously covered 700 years in only 194 pages, this book set out to cover roughly 500 years in 871 pages of actual text. This book provided great insight in the tactics, operations, and strategy of great military officers and their celebrated armies. Additionally, it covers some of the blunders. Part of the comprehensive insights include the diplomatic, informational, and economic environments surrounding those armies and their countries.
November 4, 2018
Initially, I was very excited for this sweeping 871 page compilation of military strategy from over 25 expert contributors. However, by about 200 pages in, it became clear that I was NOT going to come away from this book with tried-and-true principals that I could transplant from military strategy to everyday life. Not only did I find this book completely impractical, but also an extremely laborious to read. (And not in the good way). A book of this size normally takes me about a month, but this one took nearly 3 months because of how much I avoided reading it. I learned almost nothing from this book, and really should have stopped reading it around page 200.
Silver lining: This was a good lesson in opportunity cost, and hopefully going forward I’ll have the balls to leave books like this I finished instead of forcing myself through hundreds of pages that were neither useful nor entertaining.
Silver lining: This was a good lesson in opportunity cost, and hopefully going forward I’ll have the balls to leave books like this I finished instead of forcing myself through hundreds of pages that were neither useful nor entertaining.
December 25, 2018
This is an updated and expanded version of the 1952 Makers of Modern Strategy Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler. It is unfortunate that the essay in the epilogue "Hitler the Nazi concept of war" by Edward Mead Earle is omitted. Of the added essays, I found Condoleezza Rice's "The Making of Soviet Strategy" most informative and interesting. It also speaks to her expertise on the matter.
September 12, 2009
Impressive in all respects even when considering the latest edition is from 1986.
January 5, 2010
Very interesting read for those of you who like to decipher how our military leadership has developed some of its current tactics
November 30, 2022
Collected essays, all brilliant. The WW2 edition however included an article about Japanese amphibious warfare which was not well treated. Otherwise all essays therein are brilliant.
January 10, 2023
I have read this book before. It has been a desk reference for years. In light of the last years events, it was time to reread this classic.
This book is the classic predecessor, to the equally classic book, Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, edited by Peter Paret, 1986. Paret’s Anthology acknowledges in the Introduction, that the concept and substance for his volume was inspired by E. M. Earle’s work in 1941 which culminated in publication in 1943.
E.M. Earle’s Makers of Modern Strategy is an anthology and analysis of the theory of war. It consists of five sections, twenty chapters and an epilogue for 516 reading pages (21 Essays). The list of contributors that begins on page 517 (pdf page 538) is impressive, and represents the best of military scholars of its time – Gordon Craig, Edward Mead Earle, Felix Gilbert, Harvey A. DeWeerd, Henry Guerlac, Hajo Holborn, et.al..
War is the dominant feature of humanity. It does, has, and will continue to challenge every other institution of society – The justice and equity of its society, its political system, its wisdom and purpose of foreign policy, its culture, morale, and most of all, – its resolve. There is no aspect which is not touched, modified and altered by the imperatives of war.
It is also important to note upfront that no work of this kind can ever stay up to date. More important is the fact that it defines and interprets crucial periods of earlier strategic thought and shows the interactions and links with history. Collectively the essays are linked chronologically and thematically.
It goes without saying that war is a manmade product. It grows directly out of things that Statesmen do or fail to do – it is the consequences of National Policy and lack thereof.
Strategy and strategic thought is dependent on the realities of society, politics, geography, and economics. The essays in this anthology touch on military and non-military factors and reflects the links among and between the domains of society, politics, institutions, personalities, and policies.
The Larger questions that a reader might consider in all this is what real impact did these theories have on conflict in the context of its era? What impact did these theories have on the subsequent peace and interwar periods that followed?
This anthology of theory is priceless and timeless. None of the essays reflect a chauvinism and all of them maintain intellectual honesty. I highly recommend this book as both a primer and a desk reference for novice and professional, and all those in between. This book and its companion I mentioned above are modern classics that will provide readers with a rich source of insight, knowledge and understanding. This book and its companion are serious and sophisticated studies of war.
The essays resonate with the same themes today as much as in 1948 and in the age of Thucydides. Strategy deals with war, how to wage war, and how to prepare and train for war. It is cliché to say that war is increasingly complicated and just a contemporary issue. Where the conduct of war was primarily the responsibility of a monarch and one or two generals, the problem of directing the whole resources of a nation toward a specific goal has become the responsibility of whole governments and society. The complications and considerations of non-military factors, economics, political, and psychological elements were recognized by Thucydides in his landmark History, and by Machiavelli and Lenin, just to name a few. Increasingly complicated is relative to its era. It may be more appropriate to reflect on the difference between what is complex vs what is complicated in strategy.
These makers of modern strategy were reformists and faced immediate and powerful opposition. Theory is the seed in which transformation challenges, and then replaces– sometimes – existing ideas. In some cases they become poster children for failure.
In many respects theory not only transforms the military, but the society and economy as well. Sometimes these conflicts over reform can rage for years and the advocates of these radical theories gain reputations for being dangerous.
The anthology presented in this book does not pretend to lead one to a complete understanding of the theory / strategy of war – that is an impossibility. But what it can do is refine and strengthen judgement. The primary task of theory is to be comprehensive and accommodate all aspects of its subject. It must be based on the “constants” or absolutes of its subject and not on temporary phenomena. Napoleonic warfare was temporary phenomena. Constants or absolutes are the social and political nature of war and the psychology of the commander. Constants are the two general forms of war – limited and absolute. Theory must pass the test of reality; it cannot exist on something disproved by reality. Lastly, theory must be flexible and have the potential for future development.
While it is not always readily apparent, the anthology reflects the increasingly dependent relationship between military and industrial functions with the commensurate growing participation of a civilian element. The book conveniently divides the history into periods and patterns. With Section I beginning with the origins of modern war and progressing through the age of revolutions to total war.
With the age of revolutions, war had suddenly become the business of the people, as all limits and conventional constraints seemed to be lifted and doctrine and strategy was upended. “The People” greatly complicated the planning and implementation of strategy; the resulting evolutions of strategy meant that the subtle impact of technology innovations were not readily evident; the development and growth of larger units and of specialized military staff became a requirement; there was the genesis of the transformation of civil-military relations; doctrines that lead to the debacles of the Great War (WW I); the requirement to increase professional knowledge and skill in multiple areas; and the requirement for civilian leaders to become geopoliticians. The chapters in this book link all this development and evolution in a social and chronological order so the reader may grasp the pitfalls, interpretations and failures. In this, the contributors of this anthology have done a marvelous job.
There are well defined themes that run throughout this anthology – the lightening war; the battle of annihilation; the war of maneuver; the war of position; the relationship between war and social institutions, and between economic strength and military power; psychology as a weapon; the question of the professional army vs the militia.
But what are the significant other lessons in this anthology? There is little evidence that anybody truly demonstrated an understanding and mastery of the theory and strategies of war. Statesmen and Soldiers ignored the interrelationships of politics, society, and war. By one example, Ludendorff’s 1918 offensive, in his own words, “tactics were to be valued more than pure strategy,” and began a disastrous policy of improvisation violating the principle strategy of annihilation and encirclement that he professed to follow. As a result, the grand offensive of 1918 degenerated into a series of uncoordinated and unproductive thrusts.
It becomes clearly evident that there is timeless relevance to Clausewitz theories in the development of strategy, but, understanding and application of strategy has proved elusive to soldiers and statesmen. Still today, civilians and statesmen are at best indifferent and at worst openly hostile to understanding the theories of war and the interconnections. Diplomacy and strategy, political commitments and military power are inseparable. The existence of a nation depends on its concepts of national interest and the means by which national interest is promoted.
The sentiments expressed in these essays feel the same in 2023 as they did 20 years ago, in 1943, and in 431 BC in the age of Pericles and Thucydides. – Ages in which war has become the concern of every man. The coordination of politics and war is as important now as it has been for the ages, and strategic planning that is isolated from the political can only lead to disaster.
This book is the classic predecessor, to the equally classic book, Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, edited by Peter Paret, 1986. Paret’s Anthology acknowledges in the Introduction, that the concept and substance for his volume was inspired by E. M. Earle’s work in 1941 which culminated in publication in 1943.
E.M. Earle’s Makers of Modern Strategy is an anthology and analysis of the theory of war. It consists of five sections, twenty chapters and an epilogue for 516 reading pages (21 Essays). The list of contributors that begins on page 517 (pdf page 538) is impressive, and represents the best of military scholars of its time – Gordon Craig, Edward Mead Earle, Felix Gilbert, Harvey A. DeWeerd, Henry Guerlac, Hajo Holborn, et.al..
War is the dominant feature of humanity. It does, has, and will continue to challenge every other institution of society – The justice and equity of its society, its political system, its wisdom and purpose of foreign policy, its culture, morale, and most of all, – its resolve. There is no aspect which is not touched, modified and altered by the imperatives of war.
It is also important to note upfront that no work of this kind can ever stay up to date. More important is the fact that it defines and interprets crucial periods of earlier strategic thought and shows the interactions and links with history. Collectively the essays are linked chronologically and thematically.
It goes without saying that war is a manmade product. It grows directly out of things that Statesmen do or fail to do – it is the consequences of National Policy and lack thereof.
Strategy and strategic thought is dependent on the realities of society, politics, geography, and economics. The essays in this anthology touch on military and non-military factors and reflects the links among and between the domains of society, politics, institutions, personalities, and policies.
The Larger questions that a reader might consider in all this is what real impact did these theories have on conflict in the context of its era? What impact did these theories have on the subsequent peace and interwar periods that followed?
This anthology of theory is priceless and timeless. None of the essays reflect a chauvinism and all of them maintain intellectual honesty. I highly recommend this book as both a primer and a desk reference for novice and professional, and all those in between. This book and its companion I mentioned above are modern classics that will provide readers with a rich source of insight, knowledge and understanding. This book and its companion are serious and sophisticated studies of war.
The essays resonate with the same themes today as much as in 1948 and in the age of Thucydides. Strategy deals with war, how to wage war, and how to prepare and train for war. It is cliché to say that war is increasingly complicated and just a contemporary issue. Where the conduct of war was primarily the responsibility of a monarch and one or two generals, the problem of directing the whole resources of a nation toward a specific goal has become the responsibility of whole governments and society. The complications and considerations of non-military factors, economics, political, and psychological elements were recognized by Thucydides in his landmark History, and by Machiavelli and Lenin, just to name a few. Increasingly complicated is relative to its era. It may be more appropriate to reflect on the difference between what is complex vs what is complicated in strategy.
These makers of modern strategy were reformists and faced immediate and powerful opposition. Theory is the seed in which transformation challenges, and then replaces– sometimes – existing ideas. In some cases they become poster children for failure.
In many respects theory not only transforms the military, but the society and economy as well. Sometimes these conflicts over reform can rage for years and the advocates of these radical theories gain reputations for being dangerous.
The anthology presented in this book does not pretend to lead one to a complete understanding of the theory / strategy of war – that is an impossibility. But what it can do is refine and strengthen judgement. The primary task of theory is to be comprehensive and accommodate all aspects of its subject. It must be based on the “constants” or absolutes of its subject and not on temporary phenomena. Napoleonic warfare was temporary phenomena. Constants or absolutes are the social and political nature of war and the psychology of the commander. Constants are the two general forms of war – limited and absolute. Theory must pass the test of reality; it cannot exist on something disproved by reality. Lastly, theory must be flexible and have the potential for future development.
While it is not always readily apparent, the anthology reflects the increasingly dependent relationship between military and industrial functions with the commensurate growing participation of a civilian element. The book conveniently divides the history into periods and patterns. With Section I beginning with the origins of modern war and progressing through the age of revolutions to total war.
With the age of revolutions, war had suddenly become the business of the people, as all limits and conventional constraints seemed to be lifted and doctrine and strategy was upended. “The People” greatly complicated the planning and implementation of strategy; the resulting evolutions of strategy meant that the subtle impact of technology innovations were not readily evident; the development and growth of larger units and of specialized military staff became a requirement; there was the genesis of the transformation of civil-military relations; doctrines that lead to the debacles of the Great War (WW I); the requirement to increase professional knowledge and skill in multiple areas; and the requirement for civilian leaders to become geopoliticians. The chapters in this book link all this development and evolution in a social and chronological order so the reader may grasp the pitfalls, interpretations and failures. In this, the contributors of this anthology have done a marvelous job.
There are well defined themes that run throughout this anthology – the lightening war; the battle of annihilation; the war of maneuver; the war of position; the relationship between war and social institutions, and between economic strength and military power; psychology as a weapon; the question of the professional army vs the militia.
But what are the significant other lessons in this anthology? There is little evidence that anybody truly demonstrated an understanding and mastery of the theory and strategies of war. Statesmen and Soldiers ignored the interrelationships of politics, society, and war. By one example, Ludendorff’s 1918 offensive, in his own words, “tactics were to be valued more than pure strategy,” and began a disastrous policy of improvisation violating the principle strategy of annihilation and encirclement that he professed to follow. As a result, the grand offensive of 1918 degenerated into a series of uncoordinated and unproductive thrusts.
It becomes clearly evident that there is timeless relevance to Clausewitz theories in the development of strategy, but, understanding and application of strategy has proved elusive to soldiers and statesmen. Still today, civilians and statesmen are at best indifferent and at worst openly hostile to understanding the theories of war and the interconnections. Diplomacy and strategy, political commitments and military power are inseparable. The existence of a nation depends on its concepts of national interest and the means by which national interest is promoted.
The sentiments expressed in these essays feel the same in 2023 as they did 20 years ago, in 1943, and in 431 BC in the age of Pericles and Thucydides. – Ages in which war has become the concern of every man. The coordination of politics and war is as important now as it has been for the ages, and strategic planning that is isolated from the political can only lead to disaster.
October 7, 2022
Excellent overview of nearly every notable western intellectual with something to say about strategy.
All of the usual suspects of Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Jomini are here along with a few oddballs that I really enjoyed including a chapter on Hamilton and early America.
Designed to be a must read for anyone attempting to understand the western canon of strategy and fully succeeds.
This book is already very long and exhaustive so I can't complain too much about omissions but I would have liked a few chapters on non western thinkers.
All of the usual suspects of Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Jomini are here along with a few oddballs that I really enjoyed including a chapter on Hamilton and early America.
Designed to be a must read for anyone attempting to understand the western canon of strategy and fully succeeds.
This book is already very long and exhaustive so I can't complain too much about omissions but I would have liked a few chapters on non western thinkers.
January 1, 2024
I read many of these short essays contained in this book for a class of Strategy and Policy: I’m no expert, however, if you aim to have a structured thinking on how war has evolved- not just on the battlefield but especially in terms of logistics, attainment of specific political goals, weapon systems, mobilization, technology etc etc, you gotta read this book. I every once in a while skim through it and I find interesting insights to draw on.
April 29, 2022
Not an easy read by any means but great as a reference book to understand how strategic thinking about the world has evolved. From Machiavellian bluntness to Jomini's lines and Clausewitz' war as extension of politics.
Gives you a good view of grand strategy ideas like the heartland thesis by Mackinder and takes up to the modern age where nuclear weapons made all previous theories obsolete.
Gives you a good view of grand strategy ideas like the heartland thesis by Mackinder and takes up to the modern age where nuclear weapons made all previous theories obsolete.
July 10, 2022
Excellent collection of essays on grand and military strategy. Only perused Napoleonic era, WW2 and Nuclear subjects (~1/4 to 1/3 of this massive volume). Skimmed some of the other historical and odd topics. Highly recommend the Freedman and Crowl essays on early nuclear strategists and Alfred Thayer Mahan, respectively.
March 10, 2018
A great survey of the many aspects of strategy that have affected military conflict in the past 500 years. A great starting point for any student of military history who seeks a deeper understanding of the factors involved in pushing forward campaigns and war. Highly recommended.
November 28, 2022
A Must read for everyone who seeks answers about the past and today's strategic movements of great leaders.
It is amazing how it matches the history pages with the ones of our future as humanity
A TRUE DIAMOND
It is amazing how it matches the history pages with the ones of our future as humanity
A TRUE DIAMOND
January 28, 2025
Worth reading if you're starting to get interested in national security military strategy on a deeper level. Covers a broad range of topics but the selected chapters come together to form a sort of curriculum. Could be a textbook for a course.
December 4, 2017
Lot of redundant information as the book bundles a number of papers.
January 24, 2021
One of the best collection of essays I read till date.
July 13, 2021
Required reading for military strategist and political scientist alike.
December 8, 2022
Fantastic book with incredibly well-written essays.
Want to read
March 15, 20231035- 7
October 22, 2023
This is the most detailed book I have read on the history of strategy. The book has incredible insights and perspectives I have never thought of before. Text is used at Command and Staff USMC PME.
January 19, 2025
Ένα ευχάριστο βιβλίο να διαβάσει κανείς που ενδιαφέρεται για ιστορία και στρατιωτικά ζητήματα. Εκτενέστατο και καλογραμμένο έργο. Αξίζει να το διαβάσει κανείς
April 9, 2020
This was a recommended read for a college course I took back in 2015 combining military history and psychology, the class was titled "Principles of War." I really enjoyed the course and learned a lot. Unfortunately that was 4+ years ago since the time of this review and I honestly don't remember anything specifically remarkable that sticks out in my mind about this book. However, I do remember it did enhance my experience for the class.
I may re-read this again one day, however for the time being I have quite the queue going and I am looking forward to getting through those before I start any sort of "re-read journey."
I may re-read this again one day, however for the time being I have quite the queue going and I am looking forward to getting through those before I start any sort of "re-read journey."
December 30, 2012
You can read this from cover to cover if you like, or choose a section that interests you and start there. Both a comprehensive overview of the development of modern strategy (mostly military, but does get into diplomacy and economics for some periods) and a good reference tool for students of military science, history, and international relations. The most recent edition covers post-Cold War.
March 21, 2012
This is a great resource and overview of classic strategy. It was first published in 1943, and has been updated about every generation or so. It gets down to the nitty gritty on the major strategists such as Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, etc. This should be in every strategist's library.
Read
August 9, 2007I've been meaning to read this book for years!
November 12, 2014
almost as though it a were a reader for a military strategy course, though I miss the ancient writings.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 34 reviews