Manny’s answer to “If something can be represented with numbers or symbols, does that also mean that they ARE numbers …” > Likes and Comments
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It depend on whether the representation is arbitrary or derived. If its derived then the things will contain something that isomorphic to the concept that the numbers or symbols represent. Hofstadter's Gödel, Escher, Bach talks about this.
No sensible person will deny that two isomorphic formal structures are really the same. And if the real world, or some part of the real world, is isomorphic to a formal structure, then it seems right to say it is that formal structure. But how do we know that any part of the real world actually is isomorphic to a formal structure? That's the problem.
Luckily, Tegmark and Omnès are both real (I know they sound like cartoon characters, but they are, honest), so it follows as an elementary corollary that their butts are also real.
Was Tegmark the one who was serious about asserting a quantum basis for consciousness?
(this caused me to look a little into the smallest brain structure and get my mind blown about the staggering complexity of the brain)
It seems the smallest brain structure is too large to admit quantum involvement.
And now you say that he says it's "obvious" that a thing is necessarily of the same class as it's representations (if not "the same as")
My poor STEM education included the obvious notion that a model is a simplification of the thing that is modeled, which I accept and have yet to see a serious rebuttal against.
I suppose I align with Omnès (whoever that is).
Tegmark wrote a paper refuting (or at least casting serious doubt on) Penrose's claim that the brain is a quantum computer.
He only says that subatomic particles are the same as their representations. It's a bold claim, but I don't see an obvious way to refute it.
Thanks for clarifying my mis-attribution. I had enough math to know I know very little about subatomic particles and their representations - all those pop-science book notwithstanding.
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Jonpatterns
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Feb 07, 2016 05:32AM
It depend on whether the representation is arbitrary or derived. If its derived then the things will contain something that isomorphic to the concept that the numbers or symbols represent. Hofstadter's Gödel, Escher, Bach talks about this.
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No sensible person will deny that two isomorphic formal structures are really the same. And if the real world, or some part of the real world, is isomorphic to a formal structure, then it seems right to say it is that formal structure. But how do we know that any part of the real world actually is isomorphic to a formal structure? That's the problem.Luckily, Tegmark and Omnès are both real (I know they sound like cartoon characters, but they are, honest), so it follows as an elementary corollary that their butts are also real.
Was Tegmark the one who was serious about asserting a quantum basis for consciousness? (this caused me to look a little into the smallest brain structure and get my mind blown about the staggering complexity of the brain)
It seems the smallest brain structure is too large to admit quantum involvement.
And now you say that he says it's "obvious" that a thing is necessarily of the same class as it's representations (if not "the same as")
My poor STEM education included the obvious notion that a model is a simplification of the thing that is modeled, which I accept and have yet to see a serious rebuttal against.
I suppose I align with Omnès (whoever that is).
Tegmark wrote a paper refuting (or at least casting serious doubt on) Penrose's claim that the brain is a quantum computer. He only says that subatomic particles are the same as their representations. It's a bold claim, but I don't see an obvious way to refute it.
Thanks for clarifying my mis-attribution. I had enough math to know I know very little about subatomic particles and their representations - all those pop-science book notwithstanding.
