Philosophy discussion

Tomas wrote: "This group should have a dedicated space for continental philosophy."

If enough members are interested in the subject I can create a dedicated folder for it. Let me know.

I believe it is appropriate, though I suspect I can do no more than leech knowledge out of you guys in this subject.

Okay, I've set up this section for discussions about continental philosophy. Perhaps this thread can serve for general remarks. For one thing, we might consider here what topics and philosophers continental philosophy should include.

I must confess that the term "continental" always baffled me, as did the opposition between "continental" and "analytic" movements (perhaps we might discuss the relevance of the latter here as well?). Both of these terms seem to be defined in terms of each other, and hence we can understand either only in relation to its projected opposite. To me, not only do both terms designate an incongruous array of styles, thinkers and projects, but it also seems that they really serve to slice up the unity of philosophical thought into little camps that can be stamped with the brand of some cultural/national group or another. The analytics are almost always Anglo-American and proud of it in some way or another (for their more rigorous standards of meaning and for their hard-nosed empiricism, both of which are often held up polemically against the supposedly fluffy and speculative continental thinkers) and the term "continental" explicitly designates a specific geo-cultural location, as though the thought is bound up with the place and the cultural context and has no value without.

Furthermore, the frequent antagonism between the two seems fuelled more by a kind of mutual nationalistic resentment. This is just my general impression gleaned from conversations with both types and from random remarks of high-profile thinkers from both sects, but a lot of the heated attacks on both sides seem motivated by a deep-rooted sense of pride in their respective -national- intellectual traditions, as though some quality or achievement of mind belongs exclusively to one and is entirely lacking in the other.

I am wondering what anyone else thinks. For my own part, these terms have no meaning outside these tribalistic motives, and I believe that such nationalistic sentiments should have no place in philosophy. They are particularly dangerous, as they split the unity of tradition into warring factions.

elena, this is a question i can perhaps help. i am interested almost exclusively in continental philosophy, interested enough to know this is somewhat an artificial division, interested in this particular syllabus that firstly concerns various progeny of phenomenology. this is one book that is helpful:

Analytic versus Continental: Arguments on the Methods and Value of Philosophy
by James Chase, Jack Reynolds

Elena wrote: "I must confess that the term "continental" always baffled me, as did the opposition between "continental" and "analytic" movements (perhaps we might discuss the relevance of the latter here as well..."


Elena, you seem very insightful and your presentation of your ideas are so articulately done. I imagine you do this with ease. It takes me a while to form a similar quality of critical thought. If there was an option to rate your content then I would give it full credit for quality, orderliness, insightfulness, and contribution to the discussion.

I read somewhere maybe on Wikipedia that the distiction between the two traditions were made by the americans who called their way analytic and the other way continental to basically say our way is better and your way is too confusing so I am justified in ignoring it.

Elena, I agree with your caution here.

As far as I understand scholarship in America, there are three "continental" divisions: eidetic phenomenology (Husserl, Brentano, etc.), existential phenomenology (Sartre, Heidegger, Nietzsche, etc.), and the so-called critical theorists (Derrida, Foucault, etc.). The exact composition of these lists is not terribly important, nor is the possibility that they are not exhaustive. However, they are meaningful in characterising what thinkers are taught at what universities.

To me, eidetic phenomenology resembles the style of analytic philosophy more so than it resembles the style of existential phenomenology (especially if one considers Brentano and Husserl as exemplars/fathers of the movement). Recall that Husserl's philosophy (Heidegger was a student of Husserl's) was largely influenced by a major critique of his earlier work by none other than the arch-analytic philosopher-- G. Frege. But Frege is a "continental" figure, on the basis of geography! (So is Wittgenstein.)

Existential phenomenology, as with all existentialism, takes itself to be heading away from the "Wissenschaft" conception of philosophy championed by Kant, Rickert, and Husserl. Instead, Heidegger (and Sartre) develop and transform existentialism as it was conceived in the later parts of the 1800s.

Critical theory is the only one of these groups that I think is, for better or for worse, not treated in any of the major US philosophy departments. It tends to reside in English/ text criticism circles, alongside other hermeneutical methods of interpreting texts (Freudian, Lacanian, etc.). As such, I think it serves as the best candidate for a group of its own. Foucault and Derrida, it seems, are truly interested in different questions from the earlier two groups--they don't do "ethics" or "metaphysics" in the way the others might. (Foucault considered himself a Heideggerian in an alleged confession on his death bed.)

These are vague impressions, but I think that this folder should be *very* specific about what is being discussed there.

I, for one, study Frege, Kant, Husserl, and (occasionally) Heidegger. I also read Anglophone philosophy. I consider myself neither a continental nor an analytic philosopher, since I don't think that label strictly has any philosophical content. I just study who I study. The reason is this: I believe that these thinkers have different, incompatible ways of approaching similar questions. Philosophy investigates these incompatibilities; philosophers ought not draw a sociological distinction where a logical or philosophical one is required.

I should also note that where I live in Germany at the moment, this 'divide' draws blank stares among most German philosophy students. They study everyone, and if they give pride of place to any one philosopher, it is probably Kant. Again, though it is my impression, the term "continental" is a relatively stale battle cry for many people. For those wanting to indicate their areas of interest, I think saying something like "critical theory" or "phenomenology" is more precise and meaningful. These two areas, at least, correspond to specific methodological disputes. For instance, in phenomenology, with which I am most familiar, the discussion over just what the "phenomenological reduction" entails is of great importance. I think you would be hard-pressed to find a similar example of such a central methodological or philosophical dispute that characterises "continental" philosophy as such.

This is very opinionated, I realize, but I did my undergrad at an institution that rather slovenly abused the term "continental philosophy" as something to be proud of. I hope my view helps a bit. Also, since I study many of these non-Anglophone thinkers, I of course do not mean to offend anyone who does work in "continental" philosophy. I have respect for every thinker I mentioned (though some are dead wrong/confounding, etc.)

There are perhaps three ways one can define "continental" thought:

1) all Western thought outside the Analytic movement (starting with... Socrates?...). This is, strictly speaking, the only correct definition, and is useless for being overly broad.

2) The kind of philosophy recently and -actually- practised on "the continent," (your definition, it seems, Brian). This means anything from Bergson to Wittgenstein to Heidegger to Husserl to Derrida, and yes, to the analytic Frege. A lot of this philosophy shows an interest in the phenomenological method as a possibly foundational method, as you point out, but in fact, each thinker has an irreducibly particular system, and irreducibly distinct notions of phenomenology even when they agree on its necessity.

3) The Continental as the self-serving, imaginary projection of the Analytics. I will discuss this below.

I think "Continental" has functioned chiefly as a polemical term: while "Analytic" designates a projected ideal style for philosophy, "Continental" seems to be the philosophical bogeyman to be avoided at all costs. It is true of perhaps every intellectual movement that it defines itself in terms of some projected construct that is supposed to designate what it understands to be the opposition, the peril, the negative valuation in philosophical pursuit. The negative other is essential for defining the positive stance (a dynamic the critical theorists remind continually us of). It is essential to shut out viable options through rhetoric if not argument (and it's usually the former, because it -is- a matter of valuational commitment) in order to define a workable project. And this is what the Analytics did.

One crucial item you missed from your list though, Brian, is idealism, and it is precisely this that lies at the heart of this polemical construct. "Continental" was from the start conceived as a mode of philosophy characterized by speculation and grand abstraction. This makes sense, historically, as the term gained currency as the Analytic movement emerged, through Russell's cronies. At the time, Hegelianism reigned, and their entire movement was a reaction against its excesses. Analytic thought was to be a “corrective” for the lack of rigour and the insufficiently defined and unmanageable abstractions deployed by Hegelians.

So much for definition 3. If you look at definitions 1 and 2, however, it seems the term “Continental” as understood by the Analytic thinkers is anachronistic, finished. It makes no sense historically, and it makes no sense in the light of actual practice on “the Continent.” And because of this, the Analytic project too is finished, as it only makes sense as a "corrective" and alternative to the stylistic gestalt their initial "Continental" construct designates which no longer exists, if it ever did in the form they conceived it in. As far as I know, the Analytic movement never adequately dealt with either phenomenology, or, more broadly, with post-Kantian thought (such as Cassirer), both of which were far more influential legacies of Continental thought than Hegelianism was.

Elena, I actually agree with you completely.

Analytic philosophy in a sense "created" Continental philosophy, kind of like how Oriental Studies "created" the Orient (to borrow Edward Said's idea).

In my work on the history of analytic philosophy, there is definitely an (irrational?) fear of idealism. (I mean, there are weirder ideas within Analytical Philosophy than that of Idealism. Just read David Chalmers.) Dennett notes in "Content and Consciousness" that he has cooked up a phenomenology that avoids the "obscurities" of the noetic/noematic distinction.

On the other hand, many "analytic philosophers" today are starting to become cognisant of this, and many no longer practice 'analytic philosophy' in the historical sense.

Brian Leiter quotes Julian Young in his influential definition on the PhilosophicalGourmet.com:

"The Continental tradition contains most of the great, truly synoptic, European thought of the past 200 years. That is why…whereas analytic philosophy has proved of little or no interest to the humanities other than itself, the impact of Continental philosophy has been enormous. But there is also a great deal of (mostly French) humbug in the Continental tradition. This is why there is a powerful need for philosophers equipped with analytic methodology to work within…the Continental tradition—to sort the gold from the humbug."

It's worth a read: http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com/a...

He doesn't mention *any* of the Neo-Kantians or *any* Phenomenologists. This is probably the single most influential post on the analytic/continental divide on the internet; I hear many of my colleagues refer to it.

What is the Différance?

In simplest terms possible: Analytic philosophy in the Anglo world continues in the Cartesian tradition of modern philosophy, maintaining that philosophy must ultimately be an aid to mathematics, formal sciences, and natural sciences; In contrast, continental-style philosophy, descending from phenomenology and existentialism, has generally come to the 'post-modern' conclusion that for philosophy to remain significant after its fragmentation into modern, specialized sciences and technics (Heidegger's thesis) it must now turn more to the concept (or theory) of art -- in the broadest meaning of art: intelligent activity not reducible to any formal method or rules -- as the defining characteristic, criteria, and hope for genuine thinking (anti-formalism). Note that a non-formal or negative criterion is arguably a contradiction in terms, thus the legitimate danger of falling into obscurantism. I believe both philosophical traditions are important, but it is nevertheless true that a brilliant continental figure like Deleuze is way ahead -- historically-informed and 'avant-garde' -- compared to most Anglo analytic philosophers. Deleuze in particular is also a sharper logician than many 'fuzzy' continentals, thus he perhaps comes closest in spirit to the great synthetic philosophers like Kant and Hegel. Who was the last great, panoptic, synthetic thinker from the analytic school? They don't make 'em like that.

I cite an interest in Continental philosophy in my profile for descriptive reasons, so that people might have a better idea about my personal interests. That's it #:^) No hidden agenda or feelings of superiority or marginalization are implied in my usage.

I'd say that the distinction between Continental and analytic philosophy refers more specifically to substantive differences in the approach to philosophy than to nationalistic concerns. I think the term is somewhat unfortunate, and simliar to "postmodernism" in that regard. The more we dig into the meanings of these labels, the less meaningful they appear to be. I think it's easy to overanalyze here, but philosophers and those interested in philosophy never met a category they didn't want to tear apart, so this is inevitable.

Admittedly, it's easier to explain Continental philosophy by saying what it isn't, and specifically from distinguishing it from analytic philosophy, that is, in what I would call for lack of a better term, "non-discursive" logical systems, linguistic, positivistic approaches to questions pertaining to the nature of reality which have been boiled down into propositional statements (I admit a lack of understanding here--I don't read much of it). In citing a specific interest in Continential philosophy I mean to demonstrate an interest in hermeneutical, existential, phenomenological, and (postmodern) anti-foundational approaches to the nature of human existence. While the former appears to be concerned primarily with the logical and/or linguistic basis of truth and/or truth claims, the latter is concerned with the ways in which truth claims come to be instantiated within our understanding of reality. One tries to define the validity (or lack thereof) of logical constructs pertaining to the nature of reality, and the other tries to demonstrate how our understanding has been informed, paradigmatically, in various ways since the presocratics. Bertrand Russell is perhaps the founding figure of the Analytic tradition and Martin Heidegger is cited as the impetus for the Continental tradition (although German Idealism, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche certainly precede him). That's a rough sketch, to be sure, and maybe a bit sketchy #:^), but if you can't begin to define your terms, then what have you got?

In short, I find the distiction Continental/analytic to be descriptive rather than normative. I find it to be substantive, also, with respect to their differing approaches and not chimerical, picayune, or inherently derrogatory. Obviously, viewpoints within this rough schema will contain such elements, but the distinction is not itself predicated upon these, other than that each persuasion will include certain methodological assumptions, and therefore certain normative implications from these, as the subject matter of philosophy will involve the investigation of truth in some fashion.

Finally, as to the usefulness of this section on the board, I would suggest that its principle value might be that it could promote fruitful discussion regarding an interdisciplinary approach to philosophy, combining elements of literature, literary theory, and psychoanalysis, for example. Philosophy is a large tent, and we have a tendency to talk past one another at times. This is fine, although, when the topic pertains to truth and the nature of reality, the inherent validity of differing methodologies might not always be apparent.

Continental philosophy is political in nature and therefore useless.

..." he said, somewhat flatly.

G.L. wrote: "Continental philosophy is political in nature and therefore useless."


I wouldn't agree that completely as a political perspective is still somewhat important in a highly politicized society which we live in.

Does anyone recommend certain works that a person should read if they are just starting to delve into continental philosophy?

As recommended earlier you can read contrasts between analytics and continental philosophical thoughts but if you want pure continental thought, i would suggest on phenomenonology books by Dermot Moran- introduction to and reader of. this is where i started my interest in phenomenonology...

Katie wrote: "Does anyone recommend certain works that a person should read if they are just starting to delve into continental philosophy?"

I don't find much of a practical distinction in that label, but it probably depends on what kind of philosophy catches your attention and maybe what era.

Katie wrote: "Does anyone recommend certain works that a person should read if they are just starting to delve into continental philosophy?"

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari What Is Philosophy?
The other work of these philosophers however is more difficult. Deleuze's Difference and Repetition is definitely a Doctoral Thesis in that it delves heavily into metaphysics of Spinoza, Leibniz, Heidegger, Kant, Hume, Bergson, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and more.
Their other Joint works Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus are interesting, the latter being the better work, but they are difficult. If anything, try reading A Thousand Plateaus first section called Rhizome. This will give you a more Postmodern introduction.

Another Continental Philosopher I would recommend is Henri Bergson. What you get with Bergson is an understanding of the split between Analytic and Continental. It is often stated that the dividing line is Husserl and Frege, but Bergson is in there forgotten because he tried to critique the Einstein's formulation of time, or more accurately, he agreed with the concept of spacetime, but Einstein based his model on the Lorentz-Maxwell model that used a Newtonian Mechanic that Einstein let out which leads to a confusions of the duration felt in spacetime. Recommended readings would be 1) The Creative Mind which includes the essay "An Introduction to Metaphysics" but it includes also much more, 2) Creative Evolution which uses his metaphysical understanding of Philosophical Intuitionism with Duration to add a compatible metaphysics to the physics of Evolution, and 3) Deleuze's book on Bergson Bergsonism this book gives an entire well documented account of Bergson's Oeuvre.

I would recommend Basic Writings Martin Heidegger by the Harper Perennial press which includes many great pieces from Martin Heidegger. In it I would thoroughly recommend "On the Essence of Truth," "What Is Metaphysics," the introduction to Being and Time and more. What this book does is that it gives you the essence of Heidegger's works. *Note* It is important while reading Heidegger that he fell into the Nazi Party. Whatever the current literature states towards his redemption or not, his ideas are important but you can see the connectivity of the young Heidegger that fell victim to the problem of Nationalism.

Read Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex and The Ethics of Ambiguity these are great works that give you an introduction to the 1) Early Academic Feminism, and 2) an Ethics that critique Universalistic Models of Morality and Ethics.

You can try Sartre's Existentialism is a Humanism, I'm not really a fan of his work. I own his Critique of Dialectical Reason (I do not recommend this book) but its first pages states as its goal what Deleuze attempts to get rid of in his philosophy.

Have and understanding of Husserl, I haven't read any of his books.

The godfather of Continental Philosophy, Nietzsche, if you are to read his books, then I recommend you to read Thus Spake Zarathustra and Beyond Good and Evil at the same time. Why? Because BGE is the critique while TSZ is the solution to the problem. Other of his works are On the Genealogy of Morals and The Birth of Tragedy the latter is his first work and it shows, but there is still stuff to be gained from it. If you read his works, the Walter Kaufmann Translations are considered the best. He also has a good Biographical work on Nietzsche you should check out. Again back to Deleuze, he has a book on Nietzsche called Nietzsche and Philosophy which one can see the great influence on his work and an anti-Hegelianism.

Also see these writers, Kierkegaard, Leibniz, Spinoza, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Kant, Hegel, Ferdinand de Saussure, Derrida and Foucault.

These are all recommendations, have fun.

August wrote: "Katie wrote: "Does anyone recommend certain works that a person should read if they are just starting to delve into continental philosophy?"

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari What Is Philosophy?
T..."

Thank you so much for all of these recommendations. Most of these names are already familiar to me, but I didn't have an idea of where a good starting point would be. I am definitely interested in reading Bergson and also Heidegger despite his somewhat unapologetic Nazism.

I totally sympathize with your not being a fan of Sartre. Existentialism is a Humanism is the only work I've read of Sartre but it immediately made me not want to read any more of Sartre.

I've read a couple of works by Nietzsche and I know that someday I'll have to tackle Beyond Good and Evil. But I've had so many people kind of spoil the book for me by outlining Nietzsche's main argument that the prospect of reading a book that I already kind of know the gist of is not exciting, to say the least.

Hi, my name is Continental Philosophy and I'm an alcoholic.

:-\