Philosophy discussion

Tomas wrote: "Is anyone else interested in this topic? From A theory to B theory; three dimensionalism versus four dimensionalism; expanding block versus shrinking block.

Just testing the waters. Perhaps there..."

I am fascinated by this topic. So far I have studied it much more from a scientific perspective (time in relation to entropy, time in quantum mechanics and in special and general relativity etc.) than from a philosophical perspective. But I would like to participate, maybe contribute the little I know about the subject, and learn about the philosophical treatment of this concept from you guys. So count me in please.

I'm definitely interested in it, as it comes up in a lot of religios/spiritual discussions I see and read. I don't know about it, so I have a lot of questions about it.

Does Kant get a say too, or do we gag him and shove him into a corner? His idea that fundamental notions such as time must first and foremost (if not last) be discussed in reference to the a priori forms of -mind- is not one that is often admitted into such debates, alas. I'd be interested to find out how many are interested at all in considering that perspective.

I strongly agree with you Elena, Kant's position about time and space as fundamental, elementary a-priori forms of mind (on which any subsequent acquisition and elaboration of knowledge is based), is a important milestone which simply can't be ignored. Kant courageously tried to explicitly and systematically address what is the origin of our representation of space and time. The ontological meaning of space and time is also a philosophical question that has bothered humankind since antiquity and that again Kant tried to address. Of course his conceptions do reflect a "classical" view of space and time, which has been made partially obsolete by the developments of modern science (which has demonstrated that our mental representation of space and time is just a rough approximation of physical reality), but Kant's approach to the study of the concepts of space and time is definitely very important.

Elena wrote: "Does Kant get a say too, or do we gag him and shove him into a corner? His idea that fundamental notions such as time must first and foremost (if not last) be discussed in reference to the a priori forms of -mind-"

On this point Elena I think you have touched the pivot at the center of the great philosophical split between (a) the Naturwissenschaften, practiced by those more inclined to the physical sciences, who want to objectify or spatialize time into a kind of natural entity and (b) the Geisteswissenschaften, practiced by those who, more humanistic in inclination, understand time to be mind itself, the subject, concept, embodied historicity, memory, and projection, and thus of a distinctly different order special to the humanities, irreducible to an object of natural science.

I asked whether there was any room for Kant in this discussion because when this same topic was brought up on another forum and I brought up Kant's perspective, I essentially got hisses and boos from the positivistically inclined. Of course modern physics as well as evolutionary theory have corroborated Kant's perspective - the former tells us that any formulation of the laws of nature must include the position of the observer formulating said laws, while the latter reminds us that we are organisms bound to certain conditions. This includes our minds and their cognitive apparatus; these do not function outside a certain as-yet-unknown domain for which they were adapted to function. A more extreme consequence of this view was pointed out by Nietzsche:

“Life no argument. - We have arranged for ourselves a world in which we can live - by positing bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion and rest, form and content; without these articles of faith nobody now could endure life. But that does not prove them. Life is no argument. The conditions of life might include error.”

One could add the high-order abstractions of "time" and "space" to this list. So it turns out it is -unscientific- to proceed as the positivists would have us proceed. Note that what I am arguing for is NOT that we inhabit some mind bubble. Instead, I believe it would behoove us to actually figure out what those limiting conditions for our minds are, as well as what the range of applicability for our cognitive apparatus actually is before we presume to describe domains beyond their purview, such as time-in-itself.

So, Tom, I wasn't thinking so much of historical time, but more fundamentally of time as something that can never be conceived in-itself (I am perfectly willing to go along with the Naturwissenschaften project so long as its practitioners introduce the badly-needed element of self-reflexivity about what they're doing). It can be conceived only insofar as it appears in our own experience. Therefore, considering our exact ontological position by beginning with a consideration of the formal limits of our understanding, as well as of how time figures in our cognitive equipment, seems to me to be the sensible way of approaching any such grand subject as Time. Unless of course we are willing to risk chasing our anthropomorphic projections, which is a danger that haunts all metaphysical speculation.

I've just started looking into quantum mechanics just out of interest and I'm enthralled! Hooked! Although I know very little at present I sway against the classical concepts and am much more in agreement with time being an illusion of our minds. I will follow this thread with interest and try desperately to keep up with all your big words! I feel quite dumb but interested nevertheless. Lol

Elena wrote: "I asked whether there was any room for Kant in this discussion because when this same topic was brought up on another forum and I brought up Kant's perspective, I essentially got hisses and boos fr..."
Hi Elena, I would partially disagree with your statement that the latest scientific developments have corroborated Kant's vision. Actually, the very traditional (classic/intuitive) concepts of time and space have not just been challenged by Einstein's relativity theory (whereby basic concepts such as simultaneity of events and space and time as separate "dimensions" have been demonstrated as completely illusory), but even more profoundly by quantum physics: even Einstein himself was so disturbed by this that he spent the last years of his life trying (un-successfully) to fight the bizarre and un-intuitive (actually, sometimes contra-intuitive) results of quantum physics, bizarre but demonstrably true as proved by a huge number of experimental results.
Kant was a beautiful mind, a towering intellect who addressed in a systematic way these concepts of space and time, and he was far ahead of his times when he developed his theory of space and time, but we should not forget that after all he was a product of his period. It appears clear, especially at the light of the latest developments in quantum mechanics, that the "intuitive" representation of space and time based on a priori mental forms is only a rough, basic representation of reality that is at best incomplete when trying to describe the world, and it can actually be a serious obstacle to the progress of scientific research when exploring the innermost and most fundamental workings of reality. This is way beyond a naïve concept of subjectivism or relativism: the very basic concepts of time, space, matter, reality, mass, particle, cause and effect, simultaneity, wave, mass, force etc., as developed by our minds throughout history are inadequate now to actually accurately describe and comprehend reality at its most fundamental level (apart from the language of mathematics, of course, but this is a different topic).
I am not saying that we should not fully include Kant in this discussion, not at all: any serious discussion about time and space must involve Kant. What I am saying is that his position is a fundamental milestone, but definitely not the final answer, as his views ultimately reflect a classical worldview (and it could not have been otherwise).
On the other hand, I agree with your statement "Instead, I believe it would behoove us to actually figure out what those limiting conditions for our minds are, as well as what the range of applicability for our cognitive apparatus actually is before we presume to describe domains beyond their purview, such as time-in-itself."
This is a very good point, and science has reached a fascinating but dangerous point in its history whereby the conceptual apparatus of our minds really struggles to cope with the latest scientific developments. BUT it is also true though that science has demonstrated that the traditional concepts of time and space have been proved an acceptably accurate representation of reality at human scale level - and it could not have been otherwise: evolution has doted us with a cognitive apparatus adequate to survive the competitive evolutionary pressures so that we could survive as a species, otherwise we would not be here discussing philosophical issues :) .
Yes as you said this by itself does not "prove" it, but science has proved it experimentally in several occasions throughout history. Of course, it is a completely different story when we want to understand reality at its innermost core... with these regards, (as you said): "consideration of the formal limits of our understanding, as well as of how time figures in our cognitive equipment, seems to me to be the sensible way to proceed".
I agree with this, and it is fundamental that we recognise the limitations of our cognitive apparatus as a precondition for a discussion about "TIME", but I would like this discussion not to be limited to this aspect.. in other words even if we manage to clarify and be aware of the limitations of our cognitive apparatus (no mean feat!) at the end of the day we still need to be willing to (using your words) "risk chasing our anthropomorphic projections".

Jo wrote: "I've just started looking into quantum mechanics just out of interest and I'm enthralled! Hooked! Although I know very little at present I sway against the classical concepts and am much more in ag..."

Hi Jo, quantum mechanics is totally fascinating... when you actually get to the details and comprehend the implications of some of its results ... it is simply mind-shattering. It makes you appreciate the beauty of nature.. and there are some aspects of it (such as the amazing symmetries of the structure of reality at its core, and symmetry-breaking events of the early Universe) that can only be described as beautiful and mind-boggling. Unfortunately quantum mechanics can be sometimes quite difficult, but believe me it is really intellectually rewarding. And unfortunately sometimes it does not go easy on maths... I can recommend you some good introductory (but quite deep at the same time) books on the subject ... but I will shut up now, apologies to the other readers for digressing....

Fortunr - thank you very much for your reply. I would like your recommendation of books! Am I right in thinking that you can't really discuss time without considering space? I'm about to watch some you tube links with regards to other dimensions and our holographic view of ourselves! Apologies if this a completely different thing to what you guys are discussing! I'm not scientifically educated at all just interested.

Jo wrote: "Fortunr - thank you very much for your reply. I would like your recommendation of books! Am I right in thinking that you can't really discuss time without considering space? I'm about to watch some..."
Hi Jo, whilst space and time are qualitatively different (time for example being one-directional only, at least at macroscopic level), and they appear as separate elements in the physical laws, in relativity it is clear that they are all just closely interconnected dimensions of the same 4-dimensional space-time continuum. Dealing separately with concepts of space and time as if they were independent of each other is therefore an approach that can be pursued only if we do not forget the fact that space and time are just different dimensions of the same fundamental object. And even philosophers such as Aristotle and Kant and several others implicitly recognised this interconnectedness by dealing with "space" and "time" as essentially one single discussion item.
If anybody is interested in understanding the scientific perspective of these fascinating issues (without being entangled in the underlying maths) I would recommend the following, as a start:
- http://www.ws5.com/spacetime/ (contains good links to sites describing the concepts of space and time as highlighted by modern science in relativity and quantum mechanics)
- http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/10... (very good introductory book on quantum mechanics)
- http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/10... (beautiful introductory book on quantum mechanics)
- http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/11... (good book on the relationship between physics and philosophy written by Heisenberg, one of the founders of Quantum Mechanics)

Kindest regards

Fortunr.. Thank you very indeed for your help I shall put them on my to read list! :-)

Elena: I might challenge the notion that there is time that is not historical time: any such notion, as in mathematical physics, is an abstraction of the analytical understanding (breaking experience down into particular parts) away from the concrete, as Hegel would describe it. This does not mean that the Naturwissenschaften of our modern, mathemtaical physics is an illegitimate enterprise, only that it is limited, one-sided, and un-self-reflexive regarding its own a priori and historical-material conditions. I might argue that this is why modern mathematical physics seems to be reaching an exhaustion point with the the highly speculative string theories and many worlds theories. The mathematical possibilities explorable in conjuction with experimental sense data have perhaps been played out, and there are indications that physicists and neuroscientists are beginning to take more seriously the connection between time and mind. I've seen a couple recent books by scientists on this point, which I will relay when I recall the titles.

Tom wrote: "Elena: I might challenge the notion that there is time that is not historical time: any such notion, as in mathematical physics, is an abstraction of the analytical understanding (breaking experien..."
Hi Tom, you mentioned that "I might argue that this is why modern mathematical physics seems to be reaching an exhaustion point with the highly speculative string theories and many worlds theories.".
Let me comment about this particular point: the reason why physics seems to be reaching an exhaustion point (assuming that we agree on this point) is simply due to technical/technological reasons: the "smaller" you go when experimentally testing new theories, and/or the higher you go with the mass of the particles you need to check/generate, the higher are the energies you need to run the actual experiment Theories such as string theory are highly speculative simply because the dimensions involved are so small that it is not possible, with the CURRENT technology, to properly test them. But this does not mean that these theories will never be testable; there may be (and there will probably be) ways in the future to test these theories indirectly. Note that similar statements about the "end of scientific discovery" had been made at the dawn of the 20th Century, just before Einstein came up with the Theory of Relativity and before Quantum Physics developed.
I am also a bit confused with regards to your point about mathematical physics being "un-self-reflexive regarding its own a priori and historical-material conditions": could you please clarify this point, as I struggle to see how the scientific method can be categorised in this way.

Fortunr: By a priori conditions I mean for example that any conception of time requires a concept of before and after, regardless of any experimental data involved with scientific method. Scientific method presupposes such concepts before it can even begin. By historical-material conditions I mean basically what you've pointed out yourself, that investigation in physics is shaped by the media or technology available at a particular historical time and place, which is highly significant for showing the interdependence of theory and practice. For example, in that 17th-century mechanical physics arose with men using mechanical clocks and the conceptual clarification of mechanical theory lays the ground for the industrial revolution in manufacturing. Self-reflexivity in science means recognizing such a priori, universal, conceptual conditions, and some particularizing historical-material conditions, as essential aspects of science.

Tom wrote: "Fortunr: By a priori conditions I mean for example that any conception of time requires a concept of before and after, regardless of any experimental data involved with scientific method. Scientifi..."
Thanks Tom for clarifying your thoughts to me. I am not sure that science, in defining time, really needs concepts of "before" and "after", as the best scientific definition of time is in relation to increasing system entropy: essentially the passing of time is defined in relation to increasing levels of entropy.
But probably I am here anticipating the actual detailed discussion over the nature of time... and actually your point about the dependence of science on and a priori concepts is a very important and contentious point that does not just apply to the concept of "time" but to the scientific developments in wider terms.
With regards to your point that investigation in physics is shaped by the media or technology available at a particular historical time, I agree with you on this, but on the other hand I do not think that the methodological and epistemological aspects of the scientific method (since the consolidation of the scientific method itself in the 19th century) are significantly dependent on historical contingencies at all. After all, all the scientific method simply requires is that any theory be mathematically consistent, be able to accurately predict future results, and be able to be consistently, experimentally and independently verified under a set of controlled and verifiable conditions. What changes is the direction that the scientific research can take at any point in time, and what can actually be experimentally verified.
On the other hand, I fully agree with you on science sometimes lacking "self-reflexivity", which in your definition means recognizing a priori, universal, conceptual elements on which it may be based. This is definitely a potential methodological weakness that sometimes shows itself when scientists try to describe and discuss new theories and experimental results with concepts and terminologies that are ambiguous.

Fortune wrote: I am not sure that science, in defining time, really needs concepts of "before" and "after", as the best scientific definition of time is in relation to increasing system entropy: essentially the passing of time is defined in relation to increasing levels of entropy.

Does entropy have a temporal direction? If it does then it presupposes the concepts of before and after, they underly it skeletally, as it were, as a priori conceptual grounds for "entropy" to be itself a coherent, complex concept. A priori conditions are those which are not empirical datums, but are the most basic concepts needed for any observation to yield meaningfully ordered data, at all, in the first place. First principles of organization; metaphysics, those principles and categories of meaning presupposed for empirical physics to be possible, for empirical data to appear in some kind of order. In Kant's argument he claims these principles are part of our own conditions of comprehension, e.g., we might ask whether God would see, or whether the absolutley objective world is in itself structured by the same linear flow of befores and afters as WE make sense of it, but for Kant such speculations become meaningless, and he shows that all we can know for absolutely certain here is that WE necessarily, a priori, categorically make sense of all particular instances of temporal phenomena, like the entropy of a thermodynamic system, in terms of underlying universal concepts like the temporal order of before and after. Such concepts are called a priori because of the the purely logical priority found when we break and analyze a more complex concept down into its contained, simpler, constituent, elemental concepts: entropy and energy are more complex concepts with more content, they necessarily require a priori the logical precedence of a more basic concept of time as such, which includes a logical meaning to before and after. They also seem to require a priori concepts of substance and spatial movement as well.

Does life not DECREASE entropy?

So why is this ignored when speaking of time?

Tom wrote: "Fortune wrote: I am not sure that science, in defining time, really needs concepts of "before" and "after", as the best scientific definition of time is in relation to increasing system entropy: es..."
Hi Tom, thank for your post, I think you have very nicely highlighted the strengths of Kant's position.
I would just like to clarify that, if we use entropy as a measurement of the state evolution of the Universe, entropy does not have a temporal direction - entropy DEFINES the temporal direction. As such it would not require a concept of before or after, but the concepts of before or after would be derived a posteriori from the fact that the entropy value has increased from value X ("before") to value X+ ("after"). But, using your definition of a priori concepts (to which I agree), "A priori conditions are those which are not empirical datums, but are the most basic concepts needed for any observation to yield meaningfully ordered data, at all, in the first place", then you will probably answer that under this definition of entropy you still need basic concepts such as "increase" or "greater than". At the end of the day, you are still reverting back to some basic concepts, and this is something to which it is very difficult to object - Kant's position appears very strong, from this perspective. It would be interesting to see if somebody in our group has a different opinion... such as that there is no real a-priori knowledge, but everything (including spatiality, time etc.) is derived from experience (currently a minority position within the scientific community, but this is a question that has not been settled in a definitive way at all)...
I do not personally disagree with the concept of a-priori conceptual "knowledge" (but I think nevertheless that this is an assumption that is not beyond disputation). Having said this, I can see several points where Kant's position appears to me obsolete (but this may just be due to my potential misunderstanding of Kant's position, so I would be happy to be corrected here):
- Kant's position appears to me very "sequential": in other words Kant didn’t conceive of the possibility of other subsequent empirical observations coming into conflict with the a-priori spatial and time intuitions. In other words, he didn’t conceive of an inner conflict in his system between scientific inquiry and spatial and time intuition. And recent scientific history has proved that such conflict does exist.
- Kant's conception of time and space appears to me very "classic" (for lack of better terms), that is grounded in the naïve worldview of his age. I think that, were Kant born at the beginning of the 20th century, he would have elaborated a quite more sophisticated view of these basic concepts. Which brings me to the next point...
- ...what appears to be "basic" or a "priori" might not be actually be as such: Kant appears to define these a-priori concepts as something that we are "born with", almost part of the architecture of our mind, something that is not culturally changeable or modifiable by experimentation. And he listed space and time (together with other things) as such concepts. Well, I do not think that things are necessarily so simple: it appears to me, just as an example, that even the "basic" concept itself of space has changed: the way we perceive space now as children of the 20th century science is actually quite different and richer than the naïve view of the 19th century. I see no problem in conceptualising space-time as one single entity subject to warping as a result of gravity. I see no problem in conceptualising space itself as a medium (almost like a "substance") which has specific properties fundamentally different to the naïve conception of Newtonian physics. Funnily enough, some Aristotelian concepts might not be so wrong after all... What is then the "a-priori" concept of space ? Me might discover actually that, if we strip down the conceptual layers determined by the specific worldviews of the different eras, there might be not much left. My point is that we should really be careful before jumping into the conclusion that a concept is "a-priori", and we should be careful in clearly identifying what this concept actually contain.
- I do not think that Kant really understood that intuitions of space and time have their limits of applicability when it comes to the sciences. Actually I do not think that Kant really understood the scientific method. This is the unavoidable tragedy of the modern era... too much human knowledge to learn, so that polymaths such as Leonardo da Vinci can't possibly exist anymore... Moreover, Kant did not fully appreciate, in my opinion, the absolutely fundamental role that mathematics can play. The language of mathematics has proven to be the fundamental language with which nature is structured, a language which does transcend our intuition, sometimes with pretty astonishing results: for example, the discovery of antimatter was predicted by Dirac simply because his mathematical equations required supplementary solutions, which could not be provided by the then known standard matter particles. And in several other instances it was mathematics which forced to fundamentally re-thinking of the fundamental structure of reality.... oppps I am now revealing my shameless Platonist tendencies :)

Gun wrote: "Does life not DECREASE entropy?

So why is this ignored when speaking of time?"
Hi Gun, entropy is a concept that is very easily misunderstood. Actually life is one of the biggest generators of an increase in entropy. What locally might seem as a decrease of entropy is actually an increase of entropy if you look at the total system. Essentially life relies on chemical reactions which can be viewed as thermodynamic events, and all such events increase entropy as a result of the 2nd law of thermodynamics (the saddest law known, as this law is nothing but the ultimate death sentence of the Universe).
I have appended here an example taken from this website, which explains it in a nice way (http://www.nmsea.org/Curriculum/Prime...
"In fact, your body is creating some entropy right now as it generates heat. One of the reasons that your body temperature has to be higher than the surrounding air, or that you have to sweat off water if it isn't, is that you have to get rid of the extra entropy (otherwise, you would become disorganized and eventually die). The energy that your warm body radiates carries away the extra entropy. It does this because losing this energy decreases the number of microscopic states that the atoms and molecules of your body can be in."

A clarification needs to be made here: when I mentioned Kant, I did not mean that his particular identification of the a priori forms of time was correct and should enter this discussion. It was not and it should not, as a result. It was based on the scientific understanding of his historic moment. I assumed this goes without saying. Instead, where Kant has been corroborated by modern physics and evolutionary thought is precisely in soundness of the fundamental perspectival shift he initiated. It was his genius to show that considering the a priori forms of mind is the -starting point - for ontological reflection. Later science showed why.

I am perfectly willing to concede that his discussion of the a priori may be incomplete, as any project is necessarily bound by its historical conditions - including the project of identifying the a priori conditions of our understanding (I elaborated on this perspective in my review of his Critique of Pure Reason: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...). We may need to add extra dimensions of the a priori, and even revise the concepts he identifies as primary and reduce them to more fundamental notions than he could grasp (such as time and space, in a relativity universe, considered as aspects of a continuum, continuum and process being more cognitively primary than either time or space, perhaps).

That we can find observations that do not fit our a priori cookie-cutters is a good test of the Kantian theory. Still, his ideas stand as valid pointers towards the limits of -intelligibility-. That we can -gather- counter-intuitive data does not mean we can -understand- it. We do not understand it. We can barely hold it in our attention (cognitive psychology is yet another science that backs Kant on this matter: what we cannot make -sense- of, or fit into some pre-existing framework of meaning and intelligibility, we will register, if at all, with the greatest of difficulty. Science thus becomes a great challenge to perceive what we as yet can barely intuit in Kant's sense, and not at all understand). Our reason is not (yet?) equipped with the right conceptual instruments for such a grasp of reality.

It will be a great intellectual adventure to forge more adequate tools for reason to make sense of this mess. A more holistic framework that takes as its formal/aesthetic guide the metaphor of systems as opposed to laws/principles, one based on such concepts as emergence, on field as opposed to essential unit, on relation as opposed to substance, on dynamic as opposed to static form, and that favours an emphasis on interacting and mutually-effecting levels of formal complexity, certainly helps form a worldview within which reason can spread its wings beyond its classical formal parameters. More work in this area is badly needed. Pour on humanity all the technology you want - if you don't also do some heavy conceptual rewiring, scientific advance will not be possible. Unless of course you conceive of science as a stockpile of disjointed data. We have so much data already, and so little imaginative/rational power to hold it all within awareness long enough to -understand- it.

From this follows that I do not believe the structuring principles of mind are absolute and universal. In fact, history, culture and worldview are precisely what Kant left out of his analysis. Yet, they provide the fundamental conceptual substrate, as well as the sense of form, that guide reason at any time. I believe the a priori principles are not some prison bars of mind, but that instead, we're autopoietic beings, capable of taking our evolution in our own hands, provided that we're armed with an adequate, accurate understanding of our actual condition. With knowledge of the a priori as it is given to us now, we can push forward to new formal dimensions. I think. I hope.

While Kant said transcendental inquiry was the only solid starting point, note that he never said it was the -end point-. It really cannot be. In fact, he said metaphysics would only end if we were willing to amputate an essential part of what makes us human. But most people get confused here and discard the tool because it cannot do everything for them, as though that were a sign of its weakness. But no one tool can do everything for us. This is, however, no comment on its indispensable and incomparable usefulness within its proper domain. In fact, the Kantian perspective is so powerful a tool that it truly is the best starting point for reflection available to us right now, imo. I think of it as preparatory work for an adequate metaphysics. Starting on this path is the -only- way we can hope to go beyond philosophy as justified merely on aesthetic grounds. We must be able to say more than: "Ooh, I really -like- this world-disclosure - it just syncs with me at this historic moment." It is also the -only- shot we've got to get past "ontology-as-chasing-our-anthropomorphic-shadows-across-the-cosmos."

Wow! You guys can talk at length about this! Lol

Yes, some people love the talk. There's a term for such folks as us... Starts with "wind," ends with "bag."

:-)

Fortunr, you make some good points, but when you say that Kant did not appreciate the fundamental import of mathematics, OR understand the scientific method, you are really revealing your own ignorance. In fact, Kant's work is fueled by a deep desire to understand precisely that, the scientific method, and how it makes knowledge possible. He -assumes- we have scientific knowledge, and then asks after the "transcendental principles" that make such knowledge possible. He sidesteps the whole skeptical-relativist question of -whether- we do have knowledge. I think that is a good thing. Nietzscheans didn't, and preferred to close us in a mind bubble instead. Kant was wiser. Don't question your lifeline; just work with it.

Elena wrote: "Fortunr, you make some good points, but when you say that Kant did not appreciate the fundamental import of mathematics, OR understand the scientific method, you are really revealing your own ignor..."
Hi Elena, I wished I had your confidence in my own position, but I have learned that things are much more complex than they look at the surface... the fact that Kant's work is fueled by a deep desire to understand the scientific method does not mean that he fully understood it. There is a big difference between desire and real understanding. Actually, at the time the scientific method was not really fully developed yet, so I really struggle to understand your claim that he did understand it... And I am not alone in this position, actually other philosophers evolved the same critique of the Kantian position. According to Kant, the intimacy we have with our categories is absolute and universal; we are born with them and we die with them. Yet if this is the case, most children should have a basic grasp of geometry at the age of 2. Some would argue that they do. Perhaps they have a grasp of geometry-like implications, but I argue that most 2-year-olds, who aren't prodigies, can't pass a 9th grade geometry quiz. Why? Because they have not yet LEARNED the terms in which geometric discussion is spoken. I do not think (as I have explained in other posts) this idea of a priori knowledge is a given that is unquestionable; we might want to work with it as a working assumption in order to progress the discussion, but I think we should be aware of the dangers in doing so.
And we should define exactly what these concepts are in order to make sure that we are on the same wavelength: for example I have serious issues with assuming space as such as priori concept (as I have highlighted in another post). Kant also stated that we can know "a priori" the characteristics of space and time - I hope I do not need to get into details to demonstrate that this point is plainly wrong (again, Kant was basing his ideas on Euclidean geometry, which is not the correct approach as demonstrated by Relativity).
Kant's claim that geometry is, in fact, a priori synthetic knowledge of space was challenged when mathematicians in the last century constructed non-Euclidean geometries -- consistent geometrical systems based on axioms which differ slightly from Euclid's. (Before this time Euclidean geometry was the only geometry and no other was considered to be possible.) Einstein's theory of general relativity demonstrated that empirical space is non-Euclidean, and this development made it clear, according to Rudolf Carnap, that we must "distinguish between pure or mathematical geometry and physical geometry. . .Mathematical geometry holds indeed a priori, as Kant asserted, but only because it is analytic. Physical geometry is indeed synthetic; but it is based on experience and hence does not hold a priori."

And, to add more fuel to the discussion, I would also like to question what I think is the original sin of philosophical thought, and of which Kant is also not fully innocent (when dealing with a-priori concepts in relation to mathematical thinking): the underlying idea that human understanding is a process that proceed linearly and sequentially, starting from a set of intuitively-defined, a priori "concepts" or axioms, and from which, deductively, everything else is derived. This might have been the case for geometry and some mathematics at the time of Kant (where Euclidean geometry was the only available at the time, based as it was on a set of "self-evident" axioms), but it is definitely not the case with modern science. The scientific method, on the other hand, proceeds mostly on the basis of INDUCTIVE reasoning, and in doing so it does not start from fully-defined, cast-in-stone, "a-priori" axioms or concepts - even the contents of most basic concepts such as time and space (which some may think are the most natural example of a-priori elements) are actually a RESULT of the application of the scientific method, not a starting point.
What I am saying is that, while science must necessarily start from some initial concepts, at the end of the day such concepts are just seen as a rough starting point, a placeholder, an ASSUMPTION, something that is progressively revisited, re-negotiated and improved at the light of experimental results and resulting theories. The very concepts of space and time, as such, have been profoundly changed as a results of the latest scientific developments, so I do question what of these concepts is something really a priori... sometimes I have real difficulty thinking of such concepts as much more than placeholders or preliminary assumptions. I tend to see them an output of the human process of understanding rather than an input.. or better something that is cyclically improved and reviewed as part of the never-ending looping process of scientific progress... make assumptions, use and test these assumptions, improve these assumptions and use these improved assumptions to go for another cycle, in a process that is "circular", not linear.
I am not saying that nothing is a priori, I am just strongly cautioning against potentially naïve approach to this particular point...

...So I am afraid I really feel the urge to disagree with your point that Kant has been corroborated by modern physics. His considering the a priori forms of mind as the starting point for subsequent investigation, whilst undoubtedly a milestone in the history of philosophy, actually is not necessarily fully compatible with modern scientific thinking and method and it can be quite dangerous, if taken without due consideration to the fact that the worldview and the methodological context in which he operated is obsolete.
On the other hand, what I think we should be considering is the fact that science sometimes is not fully aware of the implicit conceptual categories that are employed in the course of the investigation of reality, and the cognitive limitations due to the architecture of our sensory and intellectual apparatus. And, as you correctly said, sometimes "without heavy conceptual rewiring, scientific advance is be possible" - very well said, but conceptual rewiring itself is also DRIVEN by experimental results and scientific investigation, or even forced by it; it has not been a TOP-DOWN, metaphysical investigation-driven process. Where science has sometimes struggled was in not being fully aware that this conceptual rewiring was necessary as a result of particular advances in knowledge. For example, still now scientists are debating around the so called "Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics", whereby the disagreement is at least as much at conceptual level as it is at a more "technical" level.
In my humble opinion, reality is one, regardless of how we investigate it, and where science has come up with a mathematically consistent theory experimentally proven, this should be used as a starting point for any subsequent investigation; when it comes to concepts that are fundamental in the physical investigation of reality (such as space and time) the starting point should not be some mythical a priori concept based on metaphysics speculation. I am not saying that philosophical investigation does not have a place, actually it does have a fundamental place; and philosophy, for as long as it is anchored on the results of scientific investigation (where its results are relevant to the item being discussed), does have a very important role to play.

Fortunr:

I want to reply in more detail to your last response, but for now suffice to say that in your thoughtful criticisms of Kant I think you nevertheless are overlooking a meaningful distinction between what Wilfred Sellars' called "the scientific image" versus "the manifest (experiential) image" of reality. And perhaps a methodological difference between the philosophical and scientific approaches to questions like 'what is time? what are the most basic features of time?'.

Sellars' point, upon which recent philosopher of science Bas Van Fraassen has extrapolated nicely in his updated version of Kantian Empiricism, is that "the scientific image" of reality constructed by the special sciences has been straying further and further from analogy to human experience. This trend raises the stakes and tension even higher in the debate between "scientific realists" and "scientific constructivists" like Van Frassen, who argue that scientific theories are nothing more than models and utilities, useful to human prediction of phenomena, but guaranteeing no mirroring of reality in-itself. A theory is tool, useful for predicting events, but not a mirror of reality. Constructivist demonstrate this in the possibility of different causal theories being useful to predicting the same experiential results. You can come up with different ideas of what is 'behind the curtain', but in the end, not matter what cause or story you ascribe behind the phenomena, the scientific question is only whether the theory proves useful to prediction in some respect -- and usefulness in prediction is relative to the uses being sought by the scientist!

Again, lack of self-reflexivity here is a huge danger regarding the questions What are we seeking to find? and Why are we seeking it? when we begin an investigation.

Philosophy can more surely say the ultimate point of inquiry is to understand ourselves, whereas science is varied and often confused between its own notions of 'pure' versus 'practical' considerations.

In this light, returning to Kant, he anticipated this problem over 200 years ago, that there would be a divergence precisely here between 'finite human, empirical experience' and the 'constructions of reason'. Thus Kant's a priori arguments are not intended simply to support the sciences, but to remind us that the phenomenological beginnings of human experience -- such as are the center of Heidegger's phenomenology of Dasein, for example -- involve certain basic a priori conditions of existence, before we go far out into constructing complex scientific theories and predictive models with the aid of mathematics and reason. Thus we may be able to transform our way of 'imaging' reality by means of scientific methods, but this may cause us to overlook the most basic experience of the human condition.

Again, ask a speculative question like 'to God's point of view, or for Nature In Itself, does the world really have any temporal direction at all? Perhaps we can imagine not. We could come up with scientific theories, constructions of reason, to say no, that the 'direction' and 'successions' of events perceived by normal human perceptions must be false appearances, the normal, unscientific people are deceived by their lack of scientific education, whereas by science we have now gone beyond basic perception to how the universe is in itself.

This is precisely the non-sense and confusion Kant was trying to set up a critical apparatus for checking against. In the Critique of Pure Reason it is the section on Transcendental Dialectics where Kant argues such positions as "the universe had a beginning" versus "the universe did not have a beginning" are equally arguable and supportable through certain rational formulations and assumptions. His point was that whenever reason and science extend too far beyond finite human experience, they can create illusions that one has somehow transcended certain basic conditions of experience.

This is suspect when you talk of 'how science thinks of time now', e.g., in terms of entropy, which implies the idea that the most legitimate criterion for defining time will be 'how science thinks of it now'. This has the effect of making it appear that science has completely de-legitimized "the manifest image" of the world -- the sun still rises in the east and sets in the west, the earth still looms larger than any other planet, even though our scientific models lead to contradiction and undermining of such manifest features of experience. Philosophy is concerned with this contradiction.

Philosophy is different in goal and method, the a priori method of Kant, used by nearly all post-Kantian continental philosophers in some manner or another, is intended to get at the features of human experience that are *the basic conditions of possibility* for science to occur at all, the conditions for any instances of science, no matter what science comes up with. It is an investigation of ourselves as science-doers, not of the objects of our sciences per se.

This also explains the divergence between analytic and phenomenological philosophy in the 20th-century. Phenomenologists see analytic philosophers as having too often made philosophy the subservient 'under-laborer to natural science', i.e., assuming from the beginning that the goal and methods of philosophy are to support natural science, whatever natural science is doing. This was Quine's explicit position, even if his philosophy was problematic for science. In contrast, phenomenological philosophy assumes a goal and methods for understanding ourselves. That's why it's favored in the humanities and humanistic social sciences.

Tom wrote: "Fortunr:

I want to reply in more detail to your last response, but for now suffice to say that in your thoughtful criticisms of Kant I think you nevertheless are overlooking a meaningful distincti..."
Hi Tom, thanks for your post which has given me some serious food for thought. Van Frassen position is very interesting and challenging, but I would strongly disagree with some of his statements: when he says, as per your post, "You can come up with different ideas of what is 'behind the curtain', but in the end, not matter what cause or story you ascribe behind the phenomena, the scientific question is only whether the theory proves useful to prediction in some respect -- and usefulness in prediction is relative to the uses being sought by the scientist", in reality the recent history of modern science (and even of "classical" science prior to this) has been very different to this: in several instances new discoveries have come out AGAINST what was actually being sought after. Some scientists did not even believe the results of their own experiments. And new theories were developed as a result of experiments that were conducted to demonstrate completely different theories. The scientists who discovered the Cosmic Background Radiation initially thought that the "incorrect" experimental data was simply caused by pigeon dung being deposited on their apparatus! And both Heisenberg and Schroedinger did not believe the implications of their own discoveries for quite some time. When you run an experiment to try and solve a particular scientific question, more often than not you are actually pushed into completely different directions and questions by Nature itself. And the scientific method is designed to cope with this.
And I would also strongly object to the definition of science as primarily direct to something "useful to human prediction of phenomena" - science is first and foremost an investigation about the fundamental nature of reality, I can guarantee you that almost every scientist will tell you this, and will have very strong views on this, and accurate predictability of natural phenomena is not the main or immediate objective of science, it is just one of the criteria used by the modern scientific method to validate a specific theory.
Another very interesting point that you raised is when you mention "this has the effect of making it appear that science has completely de-legitimized "the manifest image" of the world -- the sun still rises in the east and sets in the west, the earth still looms larger than any other planet, even though our scientific models lead to contradiction and undermining of such manifest features of experience": I think you might have possibly posed this issue in terms that look to me a little bit extreme - I do not think that modern science has de-legitimized "in toto" the manifest image of the world, but I think that it has tried to explain it in terms of the relationship between the natural phenomena and our sensory experience and intuitive conceptual reasoning, necessarily highlighting the limitations of the latter in doing so. And science does not claim that the sensory experience and our intuitive/classical conceptual framework are "wrong", but simply that they are a rough, liveable, approximation of the fundamental nature of the Universe, for as long as we limit our analysis at human scale level. Unfortunately, though, nature, at its most fundamental level, IS different to what we intuitively perceive as "reality", there is no way around it. And the fascinating thing is that, with science and mathematics, humankind managed to "transcend" the limitations of our intuitive apparatus and discover some fundamental laws of nature that are still now bothering our instinctual perception of reality.
On the other hand, you correctly highlighted that philosophy is different in goal and method from science, and I fully agree with this - and actually it is a pity that the scientific community has not fully realized that part of the available philosophical toolkit might be really very useful to the scientific investigation itself. There is unfortunately some parochial attitudes and close-mindedness in some circles in both the scientific and philosophical community that have prevented this marriage from happening. And unfortunately, as I have seen proof even recently, there is in parts of the philosophical community a lack of understanding of the principles of the modern scientific method and thinking.
Your point about "getting at the features of human experience that are *the basic conditions of possibility* for science to occur at all, the conditions for any instances of science, no matter what science comes up with. It is an investigation of ourselves as science-doers, not of the objects of our sciences per se." is very interesting: and I think this point worth expanding for as long as we clearly define the contents of this particular item of discussion; and I personally find quite compelling your description of the different approach between the analytic and phenomenological philosophy (and I think you will probably have already guessed what my position in this particular debate would be...).

This is a fascinating and high quality debate that you are having. I agree with Tom to the extent that all scientific concepts are an abstraction in some fundamental sense from our lived reality. Perhaps I can nudge you back to a discussion of time, because I think this is where the issues are crystallized. Our lived existence has to be seen morally, not scientifically, with consideration for our history and our futures, and it is only because we are aware of ourselves as continuous beings in time that we acknowledge history as more than the sum total of isolated events, which contain no value in themselves. History goes towards making us what we are.

When a physicist defines speed to be the rate of change of position with respect to time, the term “time” refers to “physical” time, which is just a convention like "clock time", not time itself. The importance of physical time is that it is opposed to subjective time or “psychological time”. During our sleep we have an awareness of the passage of time, and wake knowing we have slept for one night, but after being under a general anaesthetic there is no sense of how long we have been unconscious. In this case, psychological time is said to have stopped, but can we go so far as to conclude from these observations that subjective time is unreal? Other features of time are not fully encompassed by physical time. For example, the direction of time, or “time’s arrow” represents a problem for physicists. In macroscopic processes such as entropy, all fundamental microscopic processes are time-reversible, yet causation implies that an event can only be caused by a preceding one. Although Hume thought that there is nothing metaphysically deep about causes preceding their effects, it is fundamental to our awareness as “beings in time”.

Yes, Kant had a conception of space derived from Euclidian geometry, and we now know that Euclidean geometry is just one of several useful geometries that have been advanced, such as Lobatchevsky or Riemann geometry. But, as Poincare pointed out, we have not completely discarded Euclidian geometry. There is no crucial experiment that can decide between Euclidian and non-Euclidian geometry. These are just different ways of imposing a framework on the empirical world. Relativity builds on classical mechanics and has to satisfy it. So while Kant was wrong on the details, his crucial insight is that scientific concepts are all dependent on some framework or other – that they cannot transcend all possible categories. Even the new discoveries that we make in science have to be fitted into a conceptual scheme for them to be any use.

Andrew wrote: "This is a fascinating and high quality debate that you are having. I agree with Tom to the extent that all scientific concepts are an abstraction in some fundamental sense from our lived reality. P..."
HI Andrew, thanks for your post, it contains several very important, interesting and challenging points and I feel it is moving the discussion to a higher level of depth.
I do see your point of view and I think you are correct in trying to nudge the discussion towards the more moral, subjective conception of time, which so far (and this is mostly MY fault) has been focussed more on the "objective", scientific side.
And your statement "When a physicist defines speed to be the rate of change of position with respect to time, the term “time” refers to “physical” time, which is just a convention like "clock time", not time itself. The importance of physical time is that it is opposed to subjective time or “psychological time”." this is a statement to which very few people will raise any objections.
On the other hand, without further hijacking the discussion towards scientific issues, I would beg to differ on the specific issue of classical mechanics: you said that relativity builds on classical mechanics and has to satisfy it; actually it is the other way round: quantum mechanics and relativity ARE the fundamental laws (until we find something even more fundamental such as quantum gravity), and classical physics is just an approximation of such laws, only applicable to the subset of conditions when we are not dealing with relativistic speeds or with subatomic distances: only when the dimensions of the system being observed greatly exceed the Planck constant, and only when we are not dealing with relativistic speeds or significant gravitational fields, the "classical" physical laws can be meaningfully used, but only as an approximation of reality. There are no different sets of laws (classical versus modern), there is just a set of laws which can be approximated in particular circumstances by ignoring elements that, at macroscopic level, can be considered negligible. Most interestingly, scientists have been recently experimentally proving that significant quantum behaviours, so far expected to be limited only at atomic/subatomic level, are now observed at levels where you would have expected classical laws to be a good approximations of reality. So much for the accuracy of classical laws...
With regards to Euclidean geometry, if we assume that Einstein's relativity is correct in the definition of the space time continuum as a 4-dimensional objects, Euclidean geometry is problematic. There are articles of scientists actually proposing a different view, and trying to reconcile Euclidean geometry with relativity, and there are scientists who are trying to reject the fundamental approach of relativity itself, but the mainstream position is still (for now) that relativity as originally detailed by Einstein, and quantum mechanics, are the best approximations yet available to the fundamental description of Nature.
So I would not necessarily agree that they all are just different ways of describing Nature: at the end of the day mathematical consistency and experimental results do discriminate between some of such views. The range of applicability of classical physics is therefore clearly limited.
I was very pleased that you also highlighted a fascinating issue: "In macroscopic processes such as entropy, all fundamental microscopic processes are time-reversible, yet causation implies that an event can only be caused by a preceding one." We are really getting here into the core of Quantum Mechanics here, but I think we need to clarify this point as it is very frequently raised, even in scientific publications. In quantum mechanics, microscopic time reversibility is assumed true by some scientists because the "Schrödinger equation" describing the evolution of the system is time reversible. But the Schrödinger equation only describes the deterministic time evolution of the PROBABILITIES of various quantum events only, not of the actual events! And when an actual "event" occurs and it is observed, the resulting collapse of the wave function is a time-irreversible event. Please refer to this site for a treatment of this issue from a scientific/philosophical perspective http://www.informationphilosopher.com.... But I must also admit that the issue of time reversibility is still being debated within the scientific community.
And I must also add that even one of the most treasured "classical" concepts such as causality must be significantly revised as a result of quantum mechanics: for example there is no specific cause or "trigger" to the decay of a radioactive element, you can not predict when it will happen, it is all only governed by probability functions that evolve with time. And maybe we need to revert more to an Aristotelian concept of potentiality rather than keep using a traditional, classical, deterministic and mechanistic view of causality (such as was the case at the times of Kant).
To complete, I agree fully with you that Kant's "crucial insight is that scientific concepts are all dependent on some framework or other – that they cannot transcend all possible categories. Even the new discoveries that we make in science have to be fitted into a conceptual scheme for them to be any use." - I agree with this : all I am saying is that the conceptual scheme itself is part and object of the scientific investigation; it is an output as well as an input, challenged and reviewed and modified as a result of the scientific investigation. It is true that even the new discoveries that we make in science have to be fitted into a conceptual scheme for them to be any use, but this conceptual scheme itself can be significantly revised as a result.

Andrew wrote: "This is a fascinating and high quality debate that you are having. I agree with Tom to the extent that all scientific concepts are an abstraction in some fundamental sense from our lived reality. P..."
Something I would also like to add, just to expose some of my not fully-formed thoughts on the more "subjective" view of time.
The way I personally see time, as perceived by our human mind, is:
- Time is in our mind the refresh rate of conscious thinking (so our perceiving of time may be dependent on the rate at which our "significant" mental events are generated and processed in our mind). This is why our "subjective" time rate can be quite different to the "objective" time rate.
- Time is perceived by our mind as an arrow because our mind has been "conditioned" (culturally ? as a result of evolutionary events?) to "recognise" a transition from a low entropy state (ordered system) to a high entropy state (less ordered system). This is probably why our conception of time, whilst sometimes de-coupled from the "objective" rate of the physical time (as per point above) nevertheless is normally aligned to the "direction" of the physical time.
- Our perception of time is inextricably linked to our intuitive concept of "causality". This also derives from the point above.

As you can see, my personal approach to the conception of time is to "ground" the subjective experience of time on an explanation of why it differs from the "objective" definition of time.
Just some initial points on which I would love to see the reactions, objections of you guys....

My own hunch, for what it's worth, is that only something like a unified understanding of the "physics of life" and of the "physics of mind" could really satisfy the question of time. This perspective is only as good as the anthropic principle is, of course. So far, physics has only managed to deal with "nature lifeless" and nature desubjectified. IMO, we've so far used the magic lantern of the mind as a queer sort of projection device, positing all kinds of laws and patterns on the walls around it, but never dealing with the thing in the center of it all and understanding how it really fits into the pattern. And considering the current layering of reality into distinct subject matters, one tackled by physics, the other by chemistry and biology, and still another by psychology, followed by history - we may be a long way from accomplishing such an integrating scientific perspective. One can but wonder what it would be like, having a clear understanding of the nature of the embedding of mind within the biophysical continuum, as well as how mind relates to the rest of reality in all its various hypostases.

Thus, I do very much support the "pure science" point of view, although for me, purity of any kind (and this means conceptual purity, no less than any other) is more of a passionately held ideal, a lodestar for inquiry. Our commitment to knowledge was from the start a moral commitment, pragmatically justified, I agree. Think how Socrates taught that the root of evil is ignorance and that knowledge would enlighten us -ethically-, or how Plato identified the highest object and source of knowledge to be none other than the form of the Good: from the start, we intuited the moral impetus of our intellectual quest.

Still, I have to agree with Kant that even though reason sets up goals for us that we can never possibly fully attain - such as, perhaps, an all-integrating scientific perspective, along with a truly "pure" science" - these goals are part of our human inheritance. Letting go of these goals is spiritual amputation (if it weren't also impossible). We must pursue them even with full knowledge of our finitude and the incompleteness it dooms us to.

I agree with Tom and Andrew that phenomenology and the humanist perspective must retain a certain primacy at least within philosophy, regardless of whether science as a whole wishes to reject the human perspective. This is because wisdom, the end of philosophy, could never possibly be achieved from a "view from nowhere." Wisdom is ours; it has to do with the meaning of human self-realization, and with an understanding of the human world and how we are to inhabit said world. Still, I would not discredit the Naturwissenschaft project, even when it comes to understanding ourselves and human-time. As psychologists point out, introspection is not the best way to understand our own minds as it is plagued by the same limitations of perspective that our common-sense intuitions of our environment show. The psychologically incisive concepts are not necessarily the most intuitive ones. In fact, if we can be so deceived by the nature of our world, we have even more vested in self-deception. The empirical perspective, while necessarily limited in that it tries to "objectify" subjectivity, is nonetheless a valuable tool for self-understanding. Cognitive science is likely to teach us much about the limitations of our a priori notions of time, in the future.

This is my two cents'. I am sorry for not positing anything very decisive on the nature of time. I personally think we've not (yet) achieved the state of knowledge from which anyone can really make substantial choices in picking their pet theory. To me, it seems there are far, far too many pieces missing from the picture - most importantly, ourselves, and not just the human species, but life, life as it fits into the physical continuum. Andrew and Tom have already pointed out the seriousness of this omission as it relates to psychological and historical time. Instead, I hoped to put forward a few considerations about where people might look to find what I would understand to be an adequate notion of time.

Elena wrote: "My own hunch, for what it's worth, is that only something like a unified understanding of the "physics of life" and of the "physics of mind" could really satisfy the question of time. This perspect..."
Hi Elena,
thanks for your post, I seriously wish I could have expressed some of my views in the same compelling manner as you. I found it very nicely written. I agree almost entirely with it, with a couple of exceptions, one being that I would not put things necessarily in terms of "primacy" (when you mentioned that "I agree with Tom and Andrew that phenomenology and the humanist perspective must retain a certain primacy at least within philosophy"): in my personal point of view, it would not be a question of primacy of one perspective over the other, but more a question of "grounding" our human/psychological perspective of time on what is (currently) the "best" approximation of the objective concept of time, and trying to understand to what extent and why they differ from each other. At the end of the day, we are (also) physical things moving in a physical world, perceiving a reaction in a physical world, and a study of time that is not "grounded" on the physical reality might run the risk of being a purely theoretical exercise... just my very personal perspective...
you are also saying that you hoped to put forward a few considerations about where people might look to find what you would understand to be an adequate notion of time: I would be very interested in that.

Hi Fortunr, thank you for the kind reply. Actually, that was the post that was meant to "put forward a few considerations about where people might look to find what (I) would understand to be an adequate notion of time"! So to clarify, I would say that when physics manages to dish up a theory of the universe that satisfies the anthropic principle, and thus accounts for bio-time as well as psychological-time, we can have a basis upon which to more meaningfully discuss time-in-general. Cognitive science can further provide empirical material for a transcendental inquiry into the a priori conditions of our human time experience. The big limitation of Kant's transcendental inquiry into categories such as time was not only that he was limited by the scope of yesterday's science, but even more gravely, that he lacked a human science to base his analyses on. Hence, his transcendental inquiry had to be purely logical/introspective. I find this is not sufficient. Now that we know a great deal about our minds through the various human sciences, we can delve deeper into the structure of the a priori conditions. Such a delving into the limits and blindspots imposed by our conceptual apparatus can help illuminate the scientific process itself, and render it more self-reflexive in its broader physical speculations.

OK thanks Elena for your clarification.

On a side issues, I was wondering if any of you more "philosophically inclined" guys have any books you can recommend, addressing in a structured and explicit way the conception of time from a philosophical perspective, as defined by the different schools of thought?
As this item has always fascinated me (probably because I have never gotten to terms with my own mortality) what I have done was to painfully go through many primary and secondary sources, starting from the Presocratics down to the recent modern philosophers), and tried to painfully piece together something like a philosophical history of the conception of time. I know that dealing with time as an item separated from the overall worldview of the individual philosophers can be methodologically incorrect, but I was wondering if there is some source that focuses in particular on this item....

Just googled it:

http://www.amazon.com/The-Philosophy-...

Sounds good.

Cheers.

Fortunr wrote: "Andrew wrote: "This is a fascinating and high quality debate that you are having. I agree with Tom to the extent that all scientific concepts are an abstraction in some fundamental sense from our l..."
Just to expand my points about how contra-intuitive, and against the classical model, the laws of modern physics are, I would like to make some examples:
- the basic concept of conservation of "matter" was of course destroyed by relativity (the famous equation E = mc squared)
- even considering the above, the basic concept that you can't create "things" out of nothing has been destroyed as well. It has been experimentally proven that the so called space "vacuum" itself is a seething mass of quantum fluctuations that continuously create and destroy "particles" out of nothing for as long as the Heisenberg Indetermination Principle is respected. Some serious physicists are even postulating that the creation of the Universe itself might have been a result of a quantum fluctuation. And for example when a particle "decays" as a result of the weak interaction, this happens as a result of the system "borrowing" from the vacuum the necessary mass to create a W or Z bosom, and then quickly returning this mass to the vacuum once the interaction is complete. And this is experimentally proven and without it the Sun would not "burn" in the way it does and life would not have been possible.
- the very basic concept of matter has been completely changed; the so-called particle-wave duality, experimentally proven, makes it clear that this concept is to be completely revisited as well
- even the concept of mass has been completely changed, mass not being a characteristics of particles "per se", but being generated as a result of the interaction of "particles" with the field generated by the Higgs Boson, as experimentally proven
- actually the very concept of "particles" (as very small "balls of matter") as we imagine them is not correct
- I have already mentioned the very concept of causality, which has to be revisited as Nature, at its very core, is probabilistic, as experimentally proven.
- And the concept of probability itself in classical physics is very different to the concept in modern quantum physics - in classical physics an event is probabilistic only empirically (deriving from the fact that we do not know the value of all variables, but in theory we could) while an event in quantum physics is probabilistic at ITS VERY NATURE (even with the most accurate instrumentation in the world, you can't theoretically predict a specific event, but only its probability)
- and the very concept of the "thing-in-itself" is also very problematic; the properties of the physical object that we investigate are not something that exist independently, but they depend, they get instantiated (through collapse of the wave function) as a result of the interaction with the macroscopic apparatus with which we investigate it. An example is the double slit experiment, another example is the phenomenon of entanglement, where two entangled photons, for example, must be seen as a single quantum system and maintain a defined relationship even if they are at the opposite side of the Universe.
- and I could mention even much weirder, but experimentally proven) phenomena which are against the classical model. The Zeno effect is pretty mind-boggling, for example: an unstable particle, if observed continuously, will never decay !! One can "freeze" the evolution of the system by measuring it frequently enough in its (known) initial state.
- and I even did not start with other concepts completely at odds with the basic classical framework of classical physics, like the quantum superposition of states etc....

My apology for chiming in after the
"final note" :), but I have some burning questions for both Tom and Fortunr.

Fortunr: You mentioned a couple of times that the Aristotelian view may be right after all, what exactly did you have in mind?

Tom: Could you give a brief overview of the "Geisteswissenschaften" conception of time?

I have a decent understanding of the scientific methodology, but it remains a mystery to me how modern philosophers evaluate the quality and validity of their work. For instance, how do they know that their conception of time is not rubbish?

You people have given me a lot to chew over, and, if permitted, I can babble on a lot more about time(in another post). Elena, I agree that we need to find an accommodation between phenomenology and science, and we will get nowhere by reducing mind to science. Our ethics, art, poetry and history are just too important to be marginalised because they supposedly have no bearing on the world of facts or 'states of affairs'. We should be confident enough to assert that these subjects deal with reality itself through the power of imagination, a faculty of ours that is as vital in science as it is in art. In the end we certainly are not 'just' physical systems, and I would say, like you (and Nagel) the 'view from nowhere' is an absurdity. I respect science immensely (indeed I am a scientist myself), but I also have a lot of sympathy with naïve realism and feel my hackles rising when I hear philosophy supplanted by speculations from quantum physics. The debate between Einstein and Bohr over the meaning of quantum mechanics still rages. (I am broadly sympathetic to the Copenhagen Interpretation, but do not think our intuitive ideas about causation need revising in its light).

I do not disagree with you Fortuna about classical physics being superseded by quantum physics and relativity, but this is not quite what I was trying to get at – perhaps I didn’t make myself clear. At very large and small scales, classical physics is clearly false, but my understanding is that all fundamental physical laws are composed of an axiomatic part and an empirical part. The axiomatic part e.g. law of conservation or geometrical system, is a-priori and cannot be falsified by experiment. Physicists have empirical assumptions in laws, e.g. that light travels in straight lines, which can be overturned instead. You claim that ‘conservation of matter was destroyed by relativity’, but you also admit that physicists are very unsure about what ‘matter’ is. Most of the fundamental physical laws are mathematical consequences of various symmetries, and Noether's theorem connects any conservation law to certain symmetry, so you cannot justifiably ignore conservation without ignoring symmetry.

Andrew wrote: "You people have given me a lot to chew over, and, if permitted, I can babble on a lot more about time(in another post). Elena, I agree that we need to find an accommodation between phenomenology an..."
Hi Andrew, many thanks for your comment. Your statement "Our ethics, art, poetry and history are just too important to be marginalised because they supposedly have no bearing on the world of facts or 'states of affairs'. We should be confident enough to assert that these subjects deal with reality itself through the power of imagination, a faculty of ours that is as vital in science as it is in art." is something that beautifully expresses in a very compelling way that our human condition and our relationship with reality is not exclusively limited to the "objective" world (actually I copied it into my notebook of statements worth remembering!). But, in my opinion, it should also be always "grounded" on our understanding of physical reality, even if of course it should not be limited by it.
I would like to add to your statement that concepts such as "beauty" are applicable to the scientific endeavour as much as to the humanities. Paul Dirac himself is famous for quoting that one of the drivers and criteria of his mathematical and scientific discoveries was beauty. I am pleased that you mentioned Noether's theorem: whoever comes across it for the first time without feeling the beauty of such theorem has no heart. And the same would apply to Euler's formula. And the ancient Greeks did have an appreciation of the relationship between symmetry, mathematics, beauty and proportion, something that I think we have partially lost in the modern world.
Having said that, I beg to differ with you on this: you said that "The axiomatic part e.g. law of conservation or geometrical system, is a-priori and cannot be falsified by experiment" - actually my personal strong view on this (also expressed by Dirac, Heisenberg, Schroedinger and Pauli) is that there is no such a thing as the axiomatic part as opposed by the experimental part - the "axioms" themselves might be a starting point for a formulation of a new theory, but they can (and have been) challenged as a result of experimentation. You correctly highlighted symmetries, and this is absolutely correct: actually most of the progress in quantum physics and the Standard Model itself do rely very heavily on the concept of symmetry.
But current conservation laws, as a result of symmetries identified so far, are quite different to what were the conservation laws deemed valid by classical physics - yes something is conserved, but this something is substantially different to what was the thinking at the time. The fundamental symmetry of nature is a combination of charge conjugation (C), parity (P) and time reversal (T) combined; this is considered to be the fundamental symmetry operation, as all physical particles and interactions appear to be invariant under this combination (so far). Called CPT invariance, this symmetry is something very different to what the classical concept of symmetry and conservation were.
I strongly personally think that, considering the history of scientific discovery, NOTHING should be ever considered beyond refutation, even the most sacred axioms or principles - we do not even know if some axioms are really "axioms" or just "assumptions". What is the difference between an axiom and an assumption ? Before the advent of modern science, one might have thought that the teleological conception of Nature was the correct one, the fundamental "axiom", a priori concept being that every substance tended towards the fulfilment of its potentiality. Only mathematical consistency and experimental verification can ultimately confirm the validity of a statement, may it be an axiom, an assumption, a theory... and even this "confirmation" is always temporary.
Also another big conceptual difference to the classical worldview is that even these conservation laws are BREACHED within the indeterminacy boundaries defined by the Heisenberg determination principles. Too many scientists do not fully appreciate the real consequences of such principle, and what it actually ultimately means in terms of the probabilistic nature of the fundamental laws of Nature.
One of the surprising results of quantum physics is that if a physical event is not specifically forbidden by a quantum rule, than it can and will happen. While this may strange, it is a direct result of the uncertainty principle. Things that are strict laws in the macroscopic world, such as the conversion of mass and energy, can be broken for as long as the breach is within the Heisenberg indeterminacy. The violation of conservation laws led to the one of the greatest breakthroughs of the early 20th century, the understanding of radioactivity decay (fission) and the source of the power in stars (fusion).
And since quantum events do NOT have a "cause", this also means that ALL possible quantum events must and will happen. Everything that CAN happen DOES happen in Quantum mechanics, the only difference being the associated probability. The traditional concept of causality fits very uncomfortably with this, to say the least...
But probably we are entering here an entirely separate discussion...

Nemo wrote: "My apology for chiming in after the
"final note" :), but I have some burning questions for both Tom and Fortunr.

Hi Nemo, thanks for entering this discussion.
I did mention a couple of time that, funnily enough (I found it quite funny, as the Aristotelian views on the physical world have been generally considered, since the Renaissance, hopelessly outdated, and have been systematically trashed by the scientific community since the 17th century), some Aristotelian conceptions might be not so wrong after all:
- Aristotle argued against the possibility of space conceived as an empty vacuum devoid of everything and without characteristics of its own. It has been experimentally proven that space itself is not empty (it is a seething mess of particles popping in and out of existence within the limits of the Heisenberg Indetermination Principle). And space itself does have characteristics of its own, almost like if it was a kind of "substance" (ether-like): space bends, curves, it extends dynamically (the so called improperly named "dark energy"), it interacts with mass and energy as per Relativity theory
- the principle of causality itself, as defined by classical physics (one specific "event" determining the "subsequent" event), has been challenged by some findings of quantum physics and by the fundamentally probabilistic nature of Nature. There is, for example, not a specific event that triggers the decay of a particle at a particular time, it all happens as a result of a probability function that evolves with time. It is the "potentiality" of the particle, as expressed by its probability function, that is the "trigger", not a specific event. Quantum events do NOT have a "cause" (in the traditional meaning): this also means that ALL possible quantum events must and will happen. Everything that CAN happen DOES happen in Quantum mechanics, the only difference being the associated probability. "Potentiality" as expressed by Aristotle is something that comes to mind...

Of course this does not mean that "Aristotle was right" - of course his statements must be put in an historical context and they were not based on any scientific theory in the modern sense of the word...

Nemo wrote: "My apology for chiming in after the
"final note" :), but I have some burning questions for both Tom and Fortunr.

Hi Nemo, I share and feel passionately about your point re: (scientific) grounding of some of the modern philosophical conceptions. This is a methodological point that I have raised in several occasions on several blogs.
On the other hand, I do feel that philosophy has a LOT to say about these items....

Fortunr wrote: "Andrew wrote: "You people have given me a lot to chew over, and, if permitted, I can babble on a lot more about time(in another post). Elena, I agree that we need to find an accommodation between p..."
There is actually one thing that is almost dogmatically considered an a priori axiom: not a particular geometry, not a particular geometrical axiom, not a particular theory, but "pure mathematical consistency" as a "conditio sine qua non" for the demonstrability of any physical theory.
This was brilliantly described in the "Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences" article published in 1960 by the physicist Eugene Wigner. In the paper, Wigner observed that the mathematical structure of a physical theory often points the way to further advances in that theory and even to empirical predictions (as it happened for example with Dirac's formulations of relativistic quantum mechanics, which REQUIRED antimatter well before it was discovered). Wigner sums up his argument by saying that "the enormous usefulness of mathematics in the natural sciences is something bordering on the mysterious and that there is no rational explanation for it." He also says: "The miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither understand nor deserve. We should be grateful for it.".

It is actually a profound puzzle that on the one hand pure mathematical truths seem to have a compelling inevitability, but on the other hand the source of their "truthfulness" remains elusive.
That 3+2 = 5 has always been true, and that no further development of abstract pure mathematics has ever "unproven" a previous theorem, is something that mesmerizes me every time I think about it. Galileo stated that mathematics is the language of Nature - maybe he was right.
Did we humans "invent" mathematics, or (as I feel in my mathematical neoPlatonism, in this essentially agreeing with Roger Penrose's thinking and with the hidden Platonism of many mathematicians), are mathematical entities timeless, abstract entities independent of us, and that they are the essence of our Universe, and that we just discover not invent mathematics?
On the more radical side, the mathematical universe hypothesis (MUH), also known as the Ultimate Ensemble, is a speculative "theory of everything" (TOE) proposed by the theoretical physicist, Max Tegmark, that states that that not only do all mathematical objects exist, but nothing else does, and that all structures that exist mathematically also exist physically.

Without going to these extreme views, what is amazing is that NO experimentally proven theory is mathematically inconsistent... and this "axiom" if you wish (that of mathematically consistency) is THE hidden axiom that I do not think any scientist would even think about seriously challenging.
Just some more personal thoughts.....

"Andrew wrote: "You people have given me a lot to chew over, and, if permitted, I can babble on a lot more about time(in another post). Elena, I agree that we need to find an accommodation between p..."
Sorry I also forgot to mention that changes in the scientific understanding of Nature may get in the future even more game-changing than ever: the new great unification theories (so called "theories of everything") that are now being proposed in order to unify relativity and quantum theory are even more revolutionary and "existing conceptual framework-shattering" than relativity and quantum physics combined. If string theory for example gets ever verified, we would be talking about at least 10 (yes ten) space-time dimensions. Some string theories (like the so called "bosonic" variant) even include 26 (yes 26!!) dimensions. And this is only one examples...

Fortunr wrote: "Nemo wrote: "My apology for chiming in after the
"final note" :), but I have some burning questions for both Tom and Fortunr.

Hi Nemo, I share and feel passionately about your point re: (scientifi..."

Hi Fortunr, have you ever considered becoming a writer? You have a knack for elucidating complex concepts, almost Feynman-like. :)

I subscribe to the ancient Greeks' view that philosophy consists of natural philosophy (science), ethics and logic, and that beauty, goodness and truth are One. It just so happened that I had been reading Plotinus lately, and it's fascinating how his conceptions of art and beauty have been reiterated and proven by many artists, and his treatises on matter and mass seem to me to anticipate Quantum Physics, although it is likely that I'm interpreting the former in light of the latter.

Nemo wrote: "Fortunr wrote: "Nemo wrote: "My apology for chiming in after the
"final note" :), but I have some burning questions for both Tom and Fortunr.

Hi Nemo, I share and feel passionately about your poin..."

Hi Nemo, many thanks for your kind comments!
I am thoroughly enjoying this discussion about time because, as you can see, the calibre of the individuals participating in it is quite high and I am personally learning a lot from the different perspective of these people. Pity that we could not all physically sit on the same table and enjoy a more interactive discussion...

Nemo wrote: "Fortunr wrote: "Nemo wrote: "My apology for chiming in after the
"final note" :), but I have some burning questions for both Tom and Fortunr.
Hi Nemo, on a side more personal issue I must say that I fully share your fascination with Plotinus (I can tell you that, as a result of reading Plotinus, I spent some sleepless nights getting to grips with the beauty of his philosophical system).