THE WORLD WAR TWO GROUP discussion

This thread is for discussion and comment of a buddy read on the book; The Fleet at Flood Tide. It is open for comment to all interested group members.

I found this information from the start of chapter 2 quite interesting:

"Though strategy is always a function of geography, it is a seldom-noted fact of the Pacific campaign that the best path across the Central Pacific was prescribed not by physical geography and the location of the enemy's bases, but by anemology, the science of winds. Islands were assets in direct proportion to their utility as air bases, and air bases had value only if their runways aligned with the east-northeasterly trade winds. As one of the Pacific Fleet's masters of amphibious warfare, Rear Admiral Harry W, Hill, would observe, such islands 'could almost be counted on the fingers of two hands. These, naturally, the Japs had developed as bases, and there were no more! So when we moved across the Pacific, and needed an air base, there was no alternative. We simply had to take one away from the Japs. It's just that simple, and so badly misunderstood by so many historians'."

Rick. I was going to insert the exact same excerpt today. That information was worth the price of the book (a hardcover I bought while walking through the airport for $35).

Aaah, great minds think alike :)

'Aussie Rick' wrote: "air bases had value only if their runways aligned with the east-northeasterly trade winds...."

Such an obvious characteristic and yet I had never heard that as a factor in selecting the targets. Going to have to get the book.

I also found this account from the first chapter interesting as well. It was after the surface action at Truk, involving Japanese sailors from a sunk destroyer in the water:

"There were perhaps sixty sailors in the water. Almost all of the swimmers refused to cooperate, fighting all efforts to get them on board. Some vigorous persuasion got six of them to change their minds. After they were rescued and the whaleboat was hoisted back on board, Eller decided the fate of the majority by way of cold military logic. 'In view of the probable rescue of survivors by the Japanese and their return to further action, and of their refusal to be rescued by ship's boat or lines, three depth charges set on depth fifty feet were dropped in the survivor area to destroy them'.

Spruance did not personally exult in any of this, but he did order his hips to hoist their largest ensigns, known as 'victory flags,' as they finished circling the stronghold. If his pursuit of a heavy metal battle line fantasy proved to be quixotic, giving way to the brutish reality of a messily conducted mercy killing, so be it. Philosophers' ideals about 'proportionality in killing' were starting to seem quaint. This had long ago ceased to be a gentleman's war."

Mike wrote: "'Aussie Rick' wrote: "air bases had value only if their runways aligned with the east-northeasterly trade winds...."

Such an obvious characteristic and yet I had never heard that as a factor in selecting the targets. Going to have to get the book. "

It does seem quite obvious but I don't recall ever having read about that factor previously in any of my books on the Pacific.

'Aussie Rick' wrote: "I found this information from the start of chapter 2 quite interesting:

"Though strategy is always a function of geography, it is a seldom-noted fact of the Pacific campaign that the best path acr..."

Interesting, that goes a long way to explaining why attacks took place where they did, in spite of the enemy presence.
Thanks for sharing.

You got to love how Hornfischer brings history to life. In Chapter 5 he describes the difficulty that the Japanese Army was having at reinforcing the island garrison on Saipan but as he put it "the U.S. Submarine wolf packs roamed at will, the sea lanes to the Marianas."

"The Sakito Maru, bound for Saipan with the 18th Regiment was sunk and a Guam based transport was damaged [by the trout]. Of the 4,000 men in the regiment only 1,720 made it ashore and a third of them were hospital cases."

"In the first week of June US subs struck Japanese convoys.... The Pintado and Shark sank three large cargo ships with terrible losses to the embarked soldiery. The Japanese Navy’s failure to safeguard the army’s passage to the Marianas aggravated tensions between Nagumo and Lieutenant General Yoshitsugu Saito commander of the army’s 43rd Division.... One of Saito’s 43rd regiments, the 118th, arrived at Garapan at less than half strength. At sea, even the most battle hardened regiment was as helpless as a cruise ship full of tourists. All the air forces available to Admiral Nimitz couldn’t have done as much in 3 days against a division of soldiers entrenched ashore as Lockwood’s wolf packs did in 3 hours against their transports afloat."

"Cargo ships bringing in construction supplies fared no better."

according to Clay Blair's Silent Victory the US Submariners made up 2% of the US Navy but they accounted for 55% of Japans maritime losses. Read more if you like:Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan

In chapter 6 USN aviators did a number on Japanese shipping. Hellcats sank several ships with just strafing runs using their .50 Caliber machine guns. One started a ship ablaze by dropping his auxiliary tank.

At any rate few Japanese reinforcements made it to Saipan and the ones who did were often without equipment. An Imperial Army General officer lamented to Nagumo that unless the soldiers have cement, barbed wire, rebar and lumber they can do nothing but sit with folded arms. The situation for the Japanese was unbearable.

Chapter 5 was indeed quite interesting. I noticed that one of the Japanese survivors from the American submarine attacks was Captain Sakae Oba. Quite a few years back I read a pretty interesting book on his experiences:

Oba, The Last Samurai: Saipan 1944 45 by Don Jones

Plus they later made a movie about him:

https://www.amazon.com/Samurai-Taihei...

I liked this quote from instructions given to the crews of the amphibious landing craft (chapter 2):

" ... You will have your own guns aboard your own craft, and that craft will be armor plated. You will attempt to catch the enemy by surprise. All this is simple common sense. Your job is to get live men over there - not to land corpses."

Some more interesting information from chapter 6 in regards to ground strafing:

"Antiaircraft guns were the thorniest targets of all. Not only were they inclined to defend themselves, but destroying them required tremendous accuracy. The Navy's number crunchers had worked it all out. The odds against a dive-bomber pilot's directly hitting a gun revetment twenty-five feet in diameter was three hundred to one. The odds fell to six hundred to one in glide-bombing attacks, and ten thousand to one via level bombing from high altitude. The advent of wing-mounted rockets improved a pilot's chance of a hit to twenty-one to one. The Navy discovered a law of diminishing returns with larger ordnance: A five-hundred-pound bomb had to land within twenty feet to disable a gun in a revetment; a two-thousand-pounder had to hit within thirty feet. Smaller bombs had much to recommend them. 'For even a thirty percent chance of making a direct hit on one of the guns in a two-gun emplacement, a hundred bombs must be dropped via dive bombing, and a hundred thirty-five in glide-bombing. The only practicable way of achieving anything like this concentration is by the use of smaller bombs.' Temporary suppression - neutralization as opposed to outright destruction - was the most realistic goal of any air attack. That end, the Navy found, was most reliably achieved with a few hundred .50 calibre rounds from an unladen Hellcat on a strafing run."

'Aussie Rick' wrote: "Some more interesting information from chapter 6 in regards to ground strafing:

"Antiaircraft guns were the thorniest targets of all. Not only were they inclined to defend themselves, but destroyi..."

I wonder how the USN arrived at these stats? From what I've seen of BDA, even in the modern high tech era, I question such.

Not too sure how they came to those stats MR9.

Im on a plane trying to type on my I-phone so beware of typos but here goes:
Page 91 - Marines dupe Spruance and Turner into getting ships for a reserve Battalion. Marine General Holland Smith's chief of staff concocted a scheme to run a lightly armed battalion up some mountain on Saipan to end the battle early. This was a ruse to make the navy find more transports for the invasion fleet so the Marines could add another reserve battalion. It was a complete ruse between Erskine and Smith. It was sold to Turner and Spruance as a way to shorten the campaign. All along Smith would act the skeptic. The Marines understood that the Navy wanted to limit their exposure of providing cover for an invasion fleet. This could possibly get the Navy off the hook faster (remember Guadalcanal and Fletcher?). The ruse worked and at the last minute Smith said that he couldn't sleep over the risk. But guess what? The Marines got the transports for another ready reserve battalion.

Kind of interesting.

I read that as well, interesting the length the Marines had to go to to get the Navy to help them win the war :)

Smart thinking on the Marines part I suppose.

I always find these types of figures in regards to naval bombardments amazing but in reality the results didn't always seem to justify the expenditure:

"Though the barrage was prodigious - 2,400 sixteen-inch and 12,500 five-inch shells - the high muzzle velocity and the flat trajectory of their fire made it difficult for them to hit targets situated on anything other than a coastline or a forward slope."

Part II starts out with a curious couple of pages about the B29 Superfortress and a man named Tibbets who was ordered to fly test flights at high altitude of the new bomber. The new plane had several flaws that were not worked out and it was decided to move forward with production anyway. The test pilot discovered that at 30,000 feet it was very difficult to maneuver a fully loaded plane and there was a tendency to stall. If the five .50 caliber machine guns were removed the plane could maneuver much better. Tibbets proved in war games at high altitude that he could turn much more tightly than a P-47. He could simply turn and the P-47 would fly right past the plane.

I wonder who Tibbits was? They said he fought against the Germans already.

In the next few paragraphs we learn about one of the first strategic bombing missions against Japan from B-29s stationed in Chengdu China and it was a flub. Not one bomb struck the target and 7 B-29s were lost. This raid demonstrated that Operation Matterhorn was a logistical nightmare.
"The army Air Forces calculated that it would take a force of twenty-eight air groups bomb groups, each with twenty-eight B-29s, flying five missions a month for six months to reduce Japan to a point of surrender.... But each of those groups would would need two-hundred B-24 Liberators as transports....A total of four thousand B-24s would be needed to support the campaign.... Three out of every four of supplies shipped to Calcutta would go toward maintaining the air bridge, not supplying the B-29s at the point of the spear.

This was why the Navy had invaded the Marianas. Strategic bombing from China was a logistical nightmare.

'Aussie Rick' wrote: "I always find these types of figures in regards to naval bombardments amazing but in reality the results didn't always seem to justify the expenditure:

"Though the barrage was prodigious - 2,400 s..."

Naval guns are designed for anti-ship fire. At relatively short ranges, the trajectories are flat. Plunging fire can be achieved, but only at longer ranges. The Bismarck fired on HMS Hood from over 18,000 yards (nine nautical miles). It was plunging fire that broke Hood.

Good points there MR9, they were doing a task they were not designed for and I'm sure the Marines hitting the beach were thankful for every little bit of iron that landed on the Japanese positions!

Sweetwilliam wrote: "Part II starts out with a curious couple of pages about the B29 Superfortress and a man named Tibbets who was ordered to fly test flights at high altitude of the new bomber. The new plane had sever..."

I also found that information on the logistical requirements to support a USAAF bombing mission from China quite interesting and helps to explain the decision making for the Central Pacific campaign.

One of my favourite books on the Atomic missions was this title:

War's End: An Eyewitness Account of America's Last Atomic Mission by Charles W. Sweeney

Thanks for the book recommendations. I am going to read the one about the Japanese officer who surrendered well after the war. There was a few paragraphs about a Japanese soldier who held out on Saipan or Guam until the 70s in Toll's the Conquering Tide. I was born in 62 and I remember my dad bringing home a book from the library about a Japanese Soldier who hid on Guam or Saipan and recently surrendered. At age 12 or so I read that book.

I am fascinated by the Japanese fighting man and their willingness to sacrifice all. My emotions are mixed because, while I admire the code, I hate them for how they treated civilians and POWs. I was disgusted by how they treated those Navel Aviators in the book. However, rest assured, they got theirs.

Sweetwilliam wrote: "Part II starts out with a curious couple of pages about the B29 Superfortress and a man named Tibbets who was ordered to fly test flights at high altitude of the new bomber. The new plane had sever..."

Oh no one special. He is one of the pilots that dropped an Atomic bomb on Japan.

Oh shoot DJ. I am sitting in a beach bar in Fort Lauderdale laughing my A&$ off. Got me on that one!

Sweetwilliam wrote: "Oh shoot DJ. I am sitting in a beach bar in Fort Lauderdale laughing my A&$ off. Got me on that one!"

Sometimes it really is all in the phrasing. LOL.

I guess the author figured he did not need an intro. Maybe I ought to start with the book that Rick suggested about the bomb. This was like a Jay Leno Jay-walking for the WWII section.

LOL. To be honest not knowing who an individual is for the most part is understandable. Just to much war to know everything about it.
For instance I know Tibbets was one of the pilots who dropped an Atomic bomb on Japan, but I couldn't tell you which one off the top of my head or who the other pilot was. Not my cuppa as Auz might say. LOL.

I've read this account previously in Patrick O'Donnell's book; First SEALs. Its in regards to their commander Draper Kauffman:

"The UDT commander's many gifts did not include sharp eyesight. He was significantly shortsighted, in fact, so his buddy Page served as his seeing eye. But Page was colour-blind. As they motored in, Page told Kauffman what he was looking at and Kauffman told him what color it was. That become the running joke, but it was true,"

First SEALs: The Untold Story of the Forging of America's Most Elite Unit by Patrick K. O'Donnell

Draper Kauffman:
http://sealfit.com/kauffmans-naked-wa...

I enjoyed this account from the first landings on Saipan:

"As the 1/25 faltered, its leading waves pinned down and picked apart, some of their amtracs turned around and fled without unloading their ammunition, mortars, or machine guns. The Marines often mistrusted the Navy, but as a partner in arms they considered the Army equally dubious. To many a Marine, fairly or otherwise, the Army LVT crews were doubly suspect as drivers of watercraft who took paychecks from a rival service. As he was going over the side, a Marine remarked to an amtrac driver, 'So you're just gonna drop us off and get the hell out of here, huh?' The driver, Merlin Fontenot of New Orleans, replied in his Cajun fiddler's brogue, 'That's right. We're going to get the hell out of here and go get some more of you boys and bring them right back on in!' And he did, and did again."

I thought the followoing was very interesting: On pages 100-101, Hornfischer writes about a disagreement that Mitscher and Spruance had about how to handle the carriers during the campaign. Spruance had rejected the recommendation of Mitscher to move the carriers westward. He said the job of the carriers is to provide cover for Turner's invasion fleet. Hornfischer explains that this decsion weighed heavy on the mind of Spruance. Hornfischer explains that Spruance's victory at Midway had come with recrimination.

He goes on to say that "Far from making him [Spruance] a star in the eyes of his peers, it stoked their envy and second guessing."

It seems that Admiral Pye and the War College had analyzed the Battle of Midway and severely criticized Spruance for the way he handled his carriers. Spruance ordered the carriers to withdraw to the East the night of June 4th. Apparently, the NWC thought that Spruance should have continued westward during the night so that the USN could have renewed the attack the next morning. The NWC's assessment had been forwarded "with a heavy handed endorsement by Ernie King to Nimitz - that the study stated Spruance's withdraw to the east was the wrong decision."

Spruance had asked Layton if he had gathered any intelligence to rebut this criticism.

"...the JICPOA boss [Layton] produced captured Japanese charts showing that had Spruance done what the War College mandarins wanted, he would have run straight into the teeth of the Combined Fleet's heavy surface forces at night. It would have been a grievous mistake."

Spruance told Layton to take the intelligence up to Nimitz. He was vindicated and a weight had been removed from his shoulders.

This is the first time I have ever heard any criticism of Spruance or the USN over the results of Midway. Wasn't Pye the timid interim commander at Pearl Harbor after Husband Kimmel? Didn't he order Fletcher to withdraw and not launch an attack of Japanese carriers at Wake? I thought I read this in Lundstrom's First Team?

I hate to hear about men fighting at the front while having to defend their rear from jealous desk jockeys.

Fleet just showed up on my hold list at the library - it won't be here in time for the buddy read, but hopefully it will be in soon :)

I'll keep this thread open for a while Happy so you can post whenever you get started. I think you will enjoy the book.

I'm sure I will - I've liked everything else of his that I've read. His Ship of Ghosts: The Story of the USS Houston, FDR's Legendary Lost Cruiser, and the Epic Saga of Her Survivors is excellent!

Happy - run and get it. I'll slow down a bit. This is fun. I need to go back through D1. Hornfischer is...well, Hornfischer. My favorite author right now. Fascinating.

I'm trying to figure out which book of his I liked best. I think I am leaning towards Neptune's Inferno over the Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors.

I think I've read all of his books - there isn't a bad read among them!

How about this terrible description of what happened to some of the crew on Japanese carrier Shokaku, damaged, sinking and on fire after an aerial onslaught by US Navy aircraft:

"The great momentum of the water shifting laterally through large compartments belowdecks reached a critical point. Up-ending the ship, it caused the crew on the flight deck to fall over and begin sliding forward, many of them to drop through an open elevator to their death in the inferno below."

Pretty impressive defensive firepower from the US fleet under Japanese air attack:

" ... The South Dakota simple shredded the air: 859 five-inch shells, nearly ten thousand 40 mm shells, and more than eleven thousand 20 mm shells. The Alabama and Indiana added four hundred five-inchers apiece. A handful of the Indiana's 4,654 40 mm shells were fired at a torpedo plane astern. More than a few of them curved into the graceful form of the cruiser San Francisco, wounding two. 'Regrettable, but could not be avoided,' was the cold verdict of the battleship's captain. 'An enemy plane was making an attack on this ship, and it was essential that it be taken under fire ... All planes that actually approached this ship in a position to attack were destroyed,' he claimed. The Indiana in turn had five of her crew wounded by other ships' gunfire. The extent of the blizzard of fire thrown skyward was suggested by the air-burst fragments covering the Hudson's decks from stem to stern. The destroyer also took a direct hit on the bridge from a five-inch shell, killing two and wounding six."

'Aussie Rick' wrote: "Pretty impressive defensive firepower from the US fleet under Japanese air attack:

" ... The South Dakota simple shredded the air: 859 five-inch shells, nearly ten thousand 40 mm shells, and more ..."

Incredible volume of fire yet kamikazes still made it through. Always thought there would be many casualties from other ship's fire.

Considering the amount of lead in the air, especially when you watch that old WW2 footage, I am amazed that there wasn't more friendly fire casualties.

Sweetwilliam wrote: "This is the first time I have ever heard any criticism of Spruance or the USN over the results of Midway. Wasn't Pye the timid interim commander at Pearl Harbor after Husband Kimmel? Didn't he order Fletcher to withdraw and not launch an attack of Japanese carriers at Wake? I thought I read this in Lundstrom's First Team?.."

Pye was the Battle Force commander at war's start, and interim Pacific Fleet commander. During Midway and for some time after, he commanded the remaining old battleships, removed to the West Coast.

He did order Fletcher to withdraw from Wake, but the Saratoga task force was closing to reinforce the island, not seeking carriers. There was no information that 2 Japanese carriers were nearby, the ones the Japanese considered the best-trained, so it turned out to have been a fortunate decision. That's kind of ironic, considering the judgement you refer to above.

Parshall and Tully reinforced Layton's opinion in Shattered Sword; Nagumo was heading right for Spruance's task force, intent on a night torpedo attack.

Pye and Fletcher usually get called "timid" by later-war naval aviators, but they had few assets to work with, and not much for backup, early in the war. It's easy to gamble when it's not your money. I have no information on Pye's attitude or motive towards Spruance in the NWC report, I can only speculate that he was feeling aggressive after being beached.

Just read about this pretty amazing Marine, Guy Gabaldon, and his efforts to save the lives of Japanese soldiers and civilians on Saipan.

Guy Gabaldon:
https://www.warhistoryonline.com/feat...


Interview with Guy Gabaldon:
http://www.wtj.com/articles/gabaldon/

The author has started talking about the Japanese defenders and civilians not surrendering to American forces on Saipan and the stories the Japanese military told to instil fear into the women and children:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eDUy0...
(warning some footage may be graphic in nature)

I've never read a description like this of the results of a naval gun action against Japanese shore batteries at Tinian:

"As the dead were taken off, the crew turned to the task of cleanup. 'Some of the men, what remained of them, were shoveled into buckets and heaved over the side of the ship.' It was a grim chore to wash down the boat deck. 'It was of particular interest to recall the fact that during all of the excitement of being hit, firing at the enemy, seeing mangled bodies and wounded shipmates, no one exhibited any hysterical reactions or maniacal tendencies, nor was there unnecessary shouting at one another,' the medical officer wrote."

I found this statement by Admiral Nimitz in regards to the fighting at Saipan pretty interesting as well:

"As Nimitz wrote, 'The enemy met the assault operations with pointless bravery, inhuman tenacity, infiltration, cave fighting, and the will to lose hard'."

Lee wrote: "Sweetwilliam wrote: "This is the first time I have ever heard any criticism of Spruance or the USN over the results of Midway. Wasn't Pye the timid interim commander at Pearl Harbor after Husband K..."

There are some who point to the fact that Fletcher lost the Lexington as his major fall from grace.

It was a ship that had been commanded at one time by King. Not a forgiving soul.

Some more amazing figures from the landings on the Marianas:

" ... Their amphibious team had delivered most of six divisions to the Marianas and fired some twenty-seven thousand tons of naval ordnance in their support, including more than sixteen thousand rounds from battleships, forty-three thousand from cruisers, and nearly a quarter million from shipboard five-inch batteries."

I've read this story before but still find it funny. It's in regards to the nuclear physicists working at the air base with Paul Tibbets on the Manhattan Project and how he told his enquiring wife that they were sanitary engineers as a cover story so as not to arouse suspicion:

"He came back to the house one day to find that she had corralled one of these Ph.D.s from the Manhattan Project to unplug a bathroom drain. 'He was a good sport,' Tibbets wrote, 'and took care of the problem, for which his advanced degree in physics did not necessarily qualify him. He and I laughed about it later'."

'Aussie Rick' wrote: "I've read this story before but still find it funny. It's in regards to the nuclear physicists working at the air base with Paul Tibbets on the Manhattan Project and how he told his enquiring wife ..."

Always a good idea to have a few skills outside of your career field. LOL

How about the fierce and desperate fighting on or near the beaches? In Chapter 12 we learn about the largest tank attack by the Japanese against the Americans of the war to date. The Japanese committed the majority of their remaining 44 tanks.

"Concentrated fire from Marine howitzers killed or scattered much of the infantry riding or running along with Goto's tanks but the armor still rolled....Rollens' men left their foxholes and ran forward. From ranges of less than 75 yards, they did lethal work, often at ranges so close that the concussions of their own hits knocked them down. As Rollens stood in a foxhole at his Company B command post, a tank came right at him. He stood and raised his carbine to launch a grenade...a Japanese bullet hit the grenade square-on, detonating it....the light of star shells reveled that 3 dozen Japanese tanks had already jumped off and were inside danger-close radius of the American positions."

A Marine commented that "...by that time the tanks started following us and their officers were chasing us with their sabers."

"As Goto's tanks penetrated Marine lines 'the battle evolved into a madhouse of noise, tracers, and flashing light,'...with fire of rifles, the chatter of Browning Automatic Rifles, the pop of canister rounds and the rush of bazookas."

Hornfischer describes that Marine PFCs with Bazookas knocked out most of the tanks. A Marine even jammed a log into the bogie wheels of a tank making it go in circles. When the tank commander opened his hatch to see what was a matter a Marine dropped a grenade in the turret and it erupted like a volcano.

There were many first person anecdotes about the Japanese tank attack in chapter 12. It was worth reading a few times.