Classics and the Western Canon discussion

Now that Nietzsche has demolished the prejudices of the philosophers, it's time to take a look at the new boss: the Free Spirit.

Rather than building upon an insincere foundation of certainty, Nietzsche celebrates the thinker who cheerfully forgoes this trouble. Rather than relaxing with comfortable certainties, the Free Spirit is the one who studies the "average man" and is disgusted by these "loafers and cobweb-spinners of the spirit." The Free Spirit is outside of and superior to this.

The price of living as an exalted free spirit is to be misunderstood, to be a non-conformist and an outsider. He spends several pages describing the growth of the individual, and he suggests that this growth is mirrored in history. First there was the pre-moral period, in which the value of an action was judged by its consequences. Next, the moral period, which valued the origin or intention of an action rather than the consequences. And today we "immoralists" stand at the threshhold of the 'extra-moral' period, which holds that "intention is merely a sign and symptom that still requires interpretation." (I take this to mean that one must look for psychological reasons for the moral man's actions -- he can't honestly intend to sacrifice himself. He must be looking for some kind of advantage that he doesn't explicitly recognize.)

Morality is therefore something to be overcome. The motives of altruism and self-denial must be questioned as a kind of herd-mentality. The existence of Good and Evil is a unprovable inference, so we should employ extra-moral thinking that is based instead upon drives and the will to power, and he argues in section 36 that even the material world can be understood in these terms. (Some pre-Socratic philosophers would agree!)

Then there's some stuff about masks and profundity. I guess he's saying that the independent free spirit must wear a mask to be understood by the herd because he is too special to be understood conventionally... Two questions occur to me at this point: 1. What happens when one free spirit meets another? Do they understand or recognize each other, or do they see through each other's masks? And 2. Who is Nietzsche writing for? Does he expect to be understood?

The Free Spirit sees clearly into "what is" -- yet "what is" seems to be a subjective matter. "My judgment is my judgment : no one else is easily entitled to it..." How does this affect communication, I wonder...? Or is the free spirit beyond communication?

The Free Spirit rises above the "levelers" who strive for the "universal green-pasture happiness of the herd, with security, lack of danger, comfort, and an easier life for everyone..."

Is anyone buying this?

Admirable attempt to make sense of all this, Thomas. I'm not buying it so far, but then maybe I'm still a lowly turtle or a frog stood beside the great flow of the Ganges. It seems to me that Nietzsche, in this section, is largely venting his frustration at being misunderstood.

As ever though, there were some clever psychological insights and sections I tentatively agreed with, i.e. #43 where he talks of the difficulty of a community ever agreeing on a common good: "The term contradicts itself: whatever can be common always has little value. In the end it must be as it is and always has been: great things remain for the great, abysses for the profound, nuances and shudders for the refined, and, in brief, all that is rare for the rare."

It was quite the rousing finale too.

Sometimes when I read this I wonder if Nietzsche isn't the reincarnation of Thrasymachus from Plato's Republic. Thrasymachus's definition of justice looks very much like Nietzsche's idea of morality. To the powerful go the spoils. They even get to define what virtues are. And to hell with the loafers. At least this is how I read Nietzsche.

Nietzsche strikes me as an extremist and absolutist and also a fraud. He intentionally ignores the better parts of the human species in order to legitimize his will to power.

Dave wrote: "Admirable attempt to make sense of all this, Thomas. I'm not buying it so far, but then maybe I'm still a lowly turtle or a frog stood beside the great flow of the Ganges. It seems to me that Nietz..."

Thanks, Dave. It seems Nietzsche has a built-in excuse ready if I'm misinterpreting anything (which I'm sure I am.)

Xan Shadowflutter wrote: "Sometimes when I read this I wonder if Nietzsche isn't the reincarnation of Thrasymachus from Plato's Republic. Thrasymachus's definition of justice looks very much like Nietzsche's idea of moralit..."

I'm not sure if it's intentional, but there seems to be a Republic reference in Section 26 where Nietzsche talks about the elite man "going down" to study the average man. To me, this sounds like an echo of the first line of the Republic and its symbolic first word "Katebên", (meaning "I went down",) and the journey of the philosopher king from the world of pure being and forms down to the world of shadows and everyday life.

So far, I'm seeing Nietzsche as the dark side of Socrates, the cynical and negative side that takes apart his opponents arguments. The "choice man" starts at the top of Diotoma's ladder, as if he were born there to look down on all the peons. He tells us nothing yet about what the superior person does from this position of power, except criticize and sneer. And preen a bit.

Thomas wrote: "I'm not sure if it's intentional, but there seems to be a Republic reference in Section 26..."

You are probably correct. Plato was simultaneously a target of Nietzsche's jibes (for his dualism) and a model for his literary qualities (which, as a classical philologist, Nietzsche was well placed to appreciate, although his failing eyesight made work in that field increasingly difficult).

And, of course, Nietzsche has a lot to say about Socrates, from his early philological writings to "Birth of Tragedy" (where he represents a cultural force in conflict with both Apollo and Dionysus) and again in his later works. (I'm not sure if Socrates shows up much in the intervening aphoristic volumes, only one of which I've read in full, and that not recently.)

Walter Kaufmann's "Nietzsche" devotes Chapter Thirteen to "Nietzsche's Attitude Towards Socrates," which I really need to re-read. In early editions, it had the contrarian title of "Nietzsche's Admiration for Socrates," but Kaufmann found that too many readers were seeing only the title, and missing the fact that it dealt with both positive and negative views in Nietzsche's writings. (I suspect that Kaufmann may have been reading Nietzsche's late views into some of his earlier writings, and finds more consistency than is really there, but that is a somewhat different issue.)

I should point out that Nietzsche's Socrates (in any of its versions) is not the pure Platonic vintage, but a blend with the portraits of other classical sources, most notably Socrates' other literary pupil, Xenophon.*

This accounts for a number of instances in which Nietzsche's view of Socrates is inconsistent with the standard Platonic version, a divergence sometimes regarded as erroneous, or at least entirely idiosyncratic.

*Besides the historical works concerning the well-known account of the Persian Expedition pf the 10,000 Greek mercenaries ("Anabasis") and the final years and aftermath of the Peloponnesian War ("Hellenica"), Xenophon also wrote Socratic dialogues (the "Memorabilia") and his own version of an "Apology of Socrates to the Jury."

Xan Shadowflutter wrote: "Sometimes when I read this I wonder if Nietzsche isn't the reincarnation of Thrasymachus from Plato's Republic. Thrasymachus's definition of justice looks very much like Nietzsche's idea of moralit..."

I'm mostly following Kaufmann's analysis on this, and he may be wrong. But I don't think that Nietzsche is here dealing with what morality *is* or even should be. He is trying to describe, or diagnose, the various sources and attitudes that underlie existing moral standards, all of which he distrusts for one reason or another, and to a greater or lesser degree.

He is most frequently critical of what he considers "slave morality," and especially the hypocritical versions of it he saw all around him in contemporary Europe.

But he also has some harsh words for the alternative "master morality" -- which is what is often practiced, e.g. in international politics, but under various masks. Thrasymachus is at least honest about his approach, even if the honesty is reserved for a select few.

But following up on that takes us to "The Genealogy of Morals/Morality," his next work, and from there to the penultimate (approximately) work of his final year of writing, "Twilight of the Idols," in which he has additional negative things to say about various manifestations of "master morality," too.

Ian wrote: "I'm mostly following Kaufmann's analysis on this, and he may be wrong. But I don't think that Nietzsche is here dealing with what morality *is* or even should be. He is trying to describe, or diagnose, the various sources and attitudes that underlie existing moral standards, all of which he distrusts for one reason or another, and to a greater or lesser degree."

I agree Trasymachus is honest. More people think the way he thinks than would let on, and I suspect it was a rather prevalent view among ancient Greek aristocrats and oligarchs.

As to what Nietzsche is about here, at least in part, I would point to section 30 and his discussion of books. Paraphrasing, there are books that serve as nourishment to a higher kind of man that would serve as poison to a lower one.

He ends the discussion with the following statement:

The stink of small people clings to books made for the whole world.

Nietzsche intends provocation almost always, but that's a striking sentence even when taking that into account -- "the stink of small people" -- and it's just the kind of thing I can envision Thrasymachus saying. This may not be about morality or justice, but it looks to me like an attitude that would fit comfortably into a certain kind of morality. And these stinky little people look and feel like the people he accuses of clinging to slave morality.

I can't locate my notes, but my understanding is that Thrasymachus wasn't presenting his belief in justice, what he was doing was crafting a rhetorical response as counter-attack to what Socrates was doing (also rhetorically, dishonestly).

I know I'm being vague, I wish I could find my notes (*shakes tiny fist at the pile of mess that I call notes.) But given that view of Thrasymachus, it's an apt analogy to Nietzsche here -- I suspect he's posturing to cajole, to seduce, rather than merely delivering contents.

I'm receptive to this chapter, because I read it as addressing TO free spirits, or to the next generation aspiring to be free: go and be free, but not against life. Rise above the mob, but not at the cost of exile or bitter resentment. I read him as mocking those who martyr for "truth," who allowed the will to truth to turn them resentful and poisonous. I read this as an exultation to be the kind of free-spirits that love life, that properly retain their sense of humor, who do not let their will drive them into bitter self-isolation.

Of course I'm receptive to this because I see myself as guilty. It's so easy to block all the people I don't want to listen to on social media. Put on a pair of noise canceling Bose headphone when protesters are getting in my face, reduce other people into caricature, thinking myself on some higher ground not wasting time on the idiotic sheeples who follow a political trend or ideology I disagree with. If Kant were to tell me I must engage as a categorical imperative, I'd roll my eyes and tell him "you're not my dad." The way Nietzsche jocoseriously presents this *seduces* me to his way of thinking, even if I disagree with some of his pomposity, and I'm mostly not sure what he's actually saying or arguing.

Thomas wrote: “ there seems to be a Republic reference in Section 26 where Nietzsche talks about the elite man "going down" to study the average man. To me, this sounds like an echo of the first line of the Republic and its symbolic first word "Katebên", (meaning "I went down",) and the journey of the philosopher king from the world of pure being and forms down to the world of shadows and everyday life...”

I haven’t decided on this yet, but Nietzsche seems to have a thing for “heroic” character — and there’s a long tradition of tragic hero going through the baptism of katabasis. Zarathustra, for example, which Nietzsche wrote between GS and BGE, “descends” among humankind. And the last chapter of GS is titled “Incipit Tragodia” (Let the tragedy begin.)

Maybe Nietzsche thinks philosophers who wear the masks of tragic heroes must also incorporate the comedic ass in their program for comedic relief. Descend, but laugh as well!

Thank you for sharing such a personal story, Patrice!

I would like to thank everyone else as well, because you're all making this an easier, more enjoyable experience given your interpretations. I've been meaning to read Beyond Good and Evil for years and it's because of this group that I'm finally doing it. I finished Part One today and started Part Two. This is my first Nietzsche and I'm certain I would have felt more intimidated and confused without these discussions. Know that I appreciate it!

You know how, after giving an account of Epicurus’ view of Platonists as Dionysiokolakes (some kind of mask-wearing dramatists) in §7, an ass intrudes in §8?

Maybe a tragedy is finally progressing towards its last throes, so that a new species of philosophers are ready to emerge? Maybe that’s why the ass shows up after Epicurus. Nietzsche is presenting the history of western philosophy as a mask-wearing tragedies-and-satyr combo:

From (end of) §25:

The martyrdom of the philosopher, his “sacrifice for the sake of truth,” forces into the light whatever of the agitator and actor lurks in him; and if one has so far contemplated him only with artistic curiosity, with regard to many a philosopher it is easy to understand the dangerous desire to see him also in his degeneration (degenerated into a “martyr,” into a stage- and platform-bawler). Only, that it is necessary with such a desire to be clear what spectacle one will see in any case—merely a satyr play, merely an epilogue farce, merely the continued proof that the long, real tragedy is at an end, assuming that every philosophy was in its genesis a long tragedy.

Lia wrote: "I'm receptive to this chapter, because I read it as addressing TO free spirits, or to the next generation aspiring to be free: go and be free, but not against life. Rise above the mob, but not at the cost of exile or bitter resentment. .."

It is a strangely cheerful outlook, since the consequence is a kind of self-exile. Nevertheless, I can understand how marvelous it must be for him to be freed from the bonds of convention, or dogma, or whatever it is that the herd believes. On the other hand, I think the notion of a "herd" that marches in lock step is a convention as well. Nietzsche needs that convention as a foil for his "free spirit," but that convention is also a fantasy. It's human nature to believe in something and to make common cause, but it's also human nature to disagree and splinter. I think he's oversimplifying "the herd." and dogma, in order to make his case.

Thomas wrote: “I can understand how marvelous it must be for him to be freed from the bonds of convention, or dogma, or whatever it is that the herd believes. On the other hand, I think the notion of a "herd" that marches in lock step is a convention as well. Nietzsche needs that convention as a foil for his "free spirit," but that convention is also a fantasy.”

Maybe he’s just advising next-generation philosophers who endeavor to challenge some of the most cherished fictions to come prepared, so they don’t turn into the next Martyr-Bruno or Hemlock-Socrates. (Even goody-two-shoes Aristotle fled the polis. Maybe no human community is safe for philosophers?)

Herd being thoroughly conventional is a good point though, N would be falling for the same trap he’s criticizing if he is in fact against opposites, or against fiction.

Hypothetically, to be charitable: maybe Nietzsche is not 100% dismissive towards “the herd,” and the herd/free-spirit are not polar-opposites but a continuum. The kind of free-spirits that don’t turn into Brunos and Socrates are the ones who know how to wear a mask well, embrace life-giving fiction, and make the crowd laugh instead of rage...

Thomas wrote: ".Rather than relaxing with comfortable certainties, the Free Spirit is the one who studies the "average man" and is disgusted by these "loafers and cobweb-spinners of the spirit.".."

Are you thinking that "these loafers and cobweb-spinners" refers to the average man? I may be mis-reading?? My take was that N here is still talking about and to would-be philosophers.

I gave pause at N's 26 closing sentence: "And no one LIES so much as the indignant man." Not that all indignant men lie, or that they lie all the time... but to be aware of the possibility of lies from them. N says the indignant "may" stand morally higher. Is it possible/ more likely that they "may" slant their remarks, lying, from "self-righteousness." How does N's thoughts on the value of un-truths then factor?

And....now I'm suspicious (Am I cynical?) of those who have trained themselves to maintain a non-indignant appearance. Because they know such an appearance gives more credence to their words.

Lia wrote: "Hypothetically, to be charitable: maybe Nietzsche is not 100% dismissive towards “the herd,” and the herd/free-spirit are not polar-opposites but a continuum. "

How kind of you, to be charitable. I have a feeling he will make you pay for that. :)

But it is a good point, since he is willing to admit "gradations" of ignorance (ignoring for the moment that this implies there is a standard of truth against which to compare these gradations.)

Adelle wrote: "Are you thinking that "these loafers and cobweb-spinners" refers to the average man? I may be mis-reading??"

I don't think you're misreading -- not every average man is a philosopher. I'm just making the connection between them, insofar as the average man is a follower of the loafer and cobweb-spinner. I'm not sure if Nietzsche makes this connection explicitly though. It's hard to keep his slurs straight sometimes.

Thomas wrote: "Hard to keep straight.
..."

It is indeed.

Section 28. The Germans. "Everything staid, sluggish, ponderously solemn, all long-winded and boring...."

Um....Didn't Nietzsche write in German?

Cobweb-spinners are spiders, right? Like, spinners of tales, Ovidian metaphor for (female) story tellers, Ariadne, skilled girl unfairly silenced by Athena.

Maybe it’s not necessarily a slur... (I see the ledger is piling up. I look forward to settling this with Nietzsche!)

Thomas wrote: "I don't think you're misreading -- not every average man is a philosopher. I'm just making the connection between them, insofar as the average man is a follower of the loafer and cobweb-spinner..."

In the first edition of an earlier book, "The Gay Science" [Die Fröliche Wissenschaft, 1882] section 193, Nietzsche already remarked that "Kant wanted to prove in a way that would dumbfound the 'common man' that the 'common man' was right" (Kaufmann translation).

Nietzsche (who expected the reader to know his earlier books) seems to be arguing that the "loafer and cobweb-spinner" (presumably the German Idealist) reflects, and systematizes, the common opinion, so that the two reinforce each other. But I may be reading too much into the connection.

Adelle wrote: "Section 28. The Germans. "Everything staid, sluggish, ponderously solemn, all long-winded and boring...."

Um....Didn't Nietzsche write in German?"

Yes, but with occasional Latin and French words inserted. He did talk about “our new language” in §4.

Maybe he’s implying that “new language” that needs to be parsed differently.

Adelle wrote: "Section 28. The Germans. "Everything staid, sluggish, ponderously solemn, all long-winded and boring...."

Um....Didn't Nietzsche write in German?"

Nietzsche rarely has anything good to say about German writers -- he is even a critic of Goethe's prose, and Goethe was one of his few heroes.

In fact, Nietzsche rarely has anything good to say about the Germans in general (along with women and the English).

He liked to think he was of Polish ancestry, and presented himself as another Copernicus, setting the image of the world in the right order. (His family actually seems to have been entirely from Saxony.)

At one point he suggests that the fall of the Roman Empire was due to the intermarriage of the aristocracy with inferior stock -- specifically, the ancient Germans.

Of course, elsewhere he denies that the modern Germans have any particular connection with the ancient tribes.

Thomas wrote: "Rather than building upon an insincere foundation of certainty, Nietzsche celebrates the thinker who cheerfully forgoes this trouble. Rather than relaxing with comfortable certainties, the Free Spirit is the one who studies the "average man" and is disgusted by these "loafers and cobweb-spinners of the spirit." The Free Spirit is outside of and superior to this. "


So far, I can't see how any of this moves us beyond good and evil, or how it moves us from truth to uncertainty. His language, though he seems to contradict himself at points (which would be consistent with the whole "there is no truth" thing), constantly uses the words "higher", "noble", "subtle truth", etc He seems CERTAIN that his way is higher???

Lia wrote: " I read this as an exultation to be the kind of free-spirits that love life, that properly retain their sense of humor, who do not let their will drive them into bitter self-isolation.

I thought he was saying that it was sort of the destiny of free spirits to be misunderstood and isolated??

Genni wrote: "I thought he was saying that it was sort of the destiny of free spirits to be misunderstood and isolated?? ..."

I think he's mocking those who over-value "truth" (which might turn out to be mere fiction) so much they end up being martyred. He ask his readers not to mourn them, but to laugh, because they're merely buffoons, asses on stage as spectacles.

I think for Nietzsche, there's "good solitude" that is sought willingly, and "martyr" solitude as a result of not being able to engage their nay-sayers, their communities, those who object to their ideas. That would be Spinoza and Bruno, the "compulsory recluses" and "vengeance-seekers" and "poison brewers," who practice dysfunctional moral indignation that got them nowhere.

I think Nietzsche wants this "new species" of philosophers to not take themselves that seriously, learn to laugh and make others laugh, and get beyond that moral indignation.

For chapters 25 and 26 I am put in mind of two things. For chapter 25, O sancta simplicitas (blessed simplicity)! prompts me to recall the now cliché idea from, Thomas Gray's 1742 poem, "Ode on a Distant Prospect of Eton College":

Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise.”

While the sentiment may hold water, ignorance seems an undesirable choice. For one, choosing ignorance would deny any chance of a will to power from dealing with the situation. But Regardless of the effectiveness of the ignorance strategy, Nietzsche gets a few demerits here for lack of originality.

For chapter 26 I am put in mind of the show, Adam Ruins Everything (see YouTube/Netflix) about a man who is deemed too annoying to be stuck with because he exposes all of the comfortable lies and misconceptions people have adopted concerning whatever the topic of the week is, be it pets/animals (hunters pay for the bulk of animal conservation programs), personal hygiene (Listerine started as a floor cleaner), credit card security (doesn't really exist), etc. In the end it is usually conceded that knowing is better and than not knowing, even if no change is brought about, but they are still annoyed with the host. The truth is inconvenient, hmm, sounds like a good title for a book or movie. . .

Let's say I accept there's no pure truth and all "truth" claims are to some degree fictions (i.e. modified by human motives beyond will to truth.)

Accepting that ^ itself is a "truth" (impure one, obviously), i.e. for truth-agnostics, for people uncommitted to absolute existence of absolute, pure truth -- is there significant difference or even opposition between the will to ignorance and will to truth?

Nietzsche is obviously very large and contains many multitudes.

Do I contradict myself?
Very well then I contradict myself,
(I am large, I contain multitudes.)
~Walt Whitman, Song of Myself

I've only read this section over once, so I'm not really prepared to make any statements about it, but there were a couple things I was thinking about when reading it--

I read Thomas' intro before reading the actual chapter, and it kind of put me on my guard--I really like some of the points I felt Nietzsche was making in chapter 1, but whenever I sense there is a point in the philosophy (whoever's philosophy) where there are the 'elite' and there are the 'common', I get a little worried. I probably had this uppermost in my mind while reading the chapter. I still think it's easily warped into a justification for any number of horrible outcomes, but it occurred to me that N is never saying (at least I didn't pick up on it) that there is a natural separation between average men and serious minds. In other words, no one is necessarily born average, and there is not a natural born elite. I don't know what Nietzsche believed, but I think this could be read as there is a difference between people who strive for knowledge and people who don't. N even quotes Stendhal, "Pour etre bon philosophe, il faut etre sec, clair, sans illusion. Un banquier, qui a fait fortune, a un partie du caractere requis pour fair des decouvertes in philosophie, c'est-a-dire pour voir clair dan ce qui est.' Which, if my French lessons haven't failed me, says, 'In order to be a good philosopher, it is necessary to be dry, clear, without illusion. A banker, who has made his fortune, has an element of the required character to make discoveries in philosophy, that is to say, to see clearly into what is." So it would seem to me that N. is implying that anyone has the aptitude to rise above.

Perhaps the same abuses would still arise from this distinction (or maybe it is no distinction at all), but I have no doubt in my mind that there are people who are capable of learning and improving, but have absolutely no interest in doing so, even if the benefits are clear. I don't have to judge some mythical 'herd' or 'mob' to see that this is true.

Another thing that I thought about was his discussion on masks. I interpreted that section differently--a thinker along the lines of what N is advancing would be a mask to other people whether he wanted to or not--his actions and ideas would be interpreted by them in a conventional way regardless of what they really meant. I think back to Moby Dick and Stubb, who took in Ahab's abuse ('Down dog and kennel!) and rationalized it until it made sense to him, even though Ahab was plainly in the wrong. Ahab had no intention of masking his feelings toward Stubb, but Stubb hung the mask on Ahab anyway.

I also like the section about how, to paraphrase, 'adversity make us stronger.' No one grows without it.

Well, I'd like to take up "the banker, who has made a fortune." How did he do that? By buying low and selling high, which, as everyone knows is easy to say and hard to do, but generally indicates a perception opposite that of the herd.

Christopher wrote: "Well, I'd like to take up "the banker, who has made a fortune." How did he do that? By buying low and selling high, which, as everyone knows is easy to say and hard to do, but generally indicates a..."

I suppose that's true--I read 'banker' and I thought maybe Stendhal's conception of a banker would be the epitome of the bourgeoisie, c'est-a-dire, the opposite of a philosopher.

Bryan wrote: “it occurred to me that N is never saying (at least I didn't pick up on it) that there is a natural separation between average men and serious minds. In other words, no one is necessarily born average, and there is not a natural born elite. I don't know what Nietzsche believed, but I think this could be read as there is a difference between people who strive for knowledge and people who don't. N even quotes Stendhal... A banker, who has made his fortune, has an element of the required character to make discoveries in philosophy, that is to say, to see clearly into what is." So it would seem to me that N. is implying that anyone has the aptitude to rise above. ”


I think I more or less agree with you that Nietzsche isn’t talking about “natural” or “born” elites, and I might be splitting hair here, but the only minor objection I have is to characterize that as “serious” minds. If anything, it seems Nietzsche is mocking those who took their philosophy and “truth” too seriously. He even explicitly states laughter is the appropriate response to their spectacle.

What he’s characterizing is “free-spirit”, whatever free-spirits are, they’re probably not very serous, and especially not morally serious. Nor are they particularly happy or unhappy.

This is really random and not particularly insightful or anything, but

“Independence is for the very few; it is a privilege of the strong. And whoever attempts it even with the best right but without inner constraint proves that he is probably not only strong, but also daring to the point of recklessness. He enters into a labyrinth, he multiplies a thousandfold the dangers which life brings with it in any case, not the least of which is that no one can see how and where he loses his way, becomes lonely, and is torn piecemeal by some minotaur of conscience.”

This reminds me of a certain unwashed bard who by choice plunged himself into some kind of labyrinth, and had to confront a certain Simon (anagram for Minos) who may or may not stand for his conscience that tries to pull him down, as he crafted arts to let him fly by these nets.

Back on topic, it seems a more concrete shape or direction of BGE emerged in §32, in which Nietzsche gave a very, very brief outline (genealogy?) of pre-moral → moral → extra-moral flow. And by §42, he introduces “a new species of philosophers”.

This seems to clarify the Title (BEYOND GOOD and EVIL) and subtitle (Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future).

We are going Beyond morality temporally. Humanity is growing out of its youth into maturity, and taking another look at itself. Nietzsche is predicting another reversal: the first attempt to “know thyself” took us from pre-moral to moral; and the second self-examination takes us from moral to extra-moral. He’s not advocating for people to become immoral, he’s doing historical philosophy, narrating human development, describing a kind of refinement from the the black and white morality/ opposite thinking.

Note that in Section 32, the change from "pre-moral" to "moral" occurs ten thousand years ago--long before any period Nietzsche or anyone else has any real knowledge of. And the second change, form "moral" to "extra-moral" is just getting started and really lies in the future. So it seems that the "moral" world is the only one that is real; the others are products of Nietzsche's imagination.

I don't think it's important if a hard line divides the higher from the lower or if it occurs organically. N is still overly captivated by the schism (that may be nothing more than a product of his own mind). And then there is that sentence I previously quoted that books written for everyone have the STINK of the common man all over them. Perhaps Nietzsche isolated himself too much?

Nietzsche starts Part II off by accusing us of living counterfeit lives to maintain a fiction of freedom, safety, heartiness, and merriment. In other words everyone wants a parade and cotton candy, and the only way to achieve such happiness is to live a lie. NOT!! I suppose N. thinks its the truth we are running away from. But he hasn't as of yet offered much of an argument to support this claim. Nietzsche is the Asserter in Chief.

Is he speaking of only philosophers? I didn't think so. I think he has broadened his target zone in this chapter.

The problem I find in Nietzsche's rants is extremism. He see's imperfections in our characters and relationships, which we all have, and then intentionally and fraudulently (I think) magnifies them into super importance. He knows very well they are not the end all, be all he pretends them to be. But his Will to Power, I think, depends on us believing they are super-important, even defining, thus the fraudulent inflation.

We are social animals. We live together and do better together than we do living and acting alone. If we were as defective as he claims -- living false lives, lying to ourselves, denying the truth, consuming ourselves with self-interest -- society wouldn't work. But it does work.

David wrote: "

Do I contradict myself?
Very well then I contradict myself,
(I am large, I contain multitudes.)
~Walt Whitman, Song of Myself"

A sentence uttered makes a world appear
Where all things happen as they say they do;
We doubt the speaker, not the words we hear;
Words have no words for words that are not true.

-- W,H. Auden

Xan Shadowflutter wrote: "I suppose N. thinks its the truth we are running away from. But he hasn't as of yet offered much of an argument to support this claim. Nietzsche is the Asserter in Chief.

Is he speaking of only philosophers? I didn't think so. I think he has broadened his target zone in this chapter. "

I think Nietzsche believes that the truth is no more than "seeing clearly what is." It' so obvious that even a banker sees it. And rather than discoverers of truth, moral philosophers are propagandists or truth-sellers whose aim is not to enlighten but to promote themselves. He doesn't seem to have anything positive to say about profundity -- after reading section 40 on profundity and masks, I'm still confused -- but "profundity" for him seems to be a ruse. "Great things remain for the great, abysses for the profound..."

The "new philosopher" --the "attempter" -- doesn't really care about truth in a conventional sense. The new "truth" is subjective, uncommon, and free. I'm not sure what this means exactly, but it seems to me that it doesn't bode well for society as a whole.

Xan Shadowflutter wrote: "Nietzsche starts Part II off by accusing us of living counterfeit lives to maintain a fiction of freedom, safety, heartiness, and merriment. In other words everyone wants a parade and cotton candy, and the only way to achieve such happiness is to live a lie. "

I'm not saying you are wrong, one never knows how to read Nietzsche. But I admit I got the exact opposite interpretation: false believes are essential to human lives, for a period of time people value "Truth" so much they were willing to become isolated for it, ostracized for it, martyr for it. But Nietzsche seems to scorn the attachment to truth itself, it's not falsity he's mocking -- it's the fact that people died for "The Truth" which turns out to be fiction anyway.

I think Nietzsche is saying communities craft different ways of evaluating social responsibility, ways of accommodating each others, depending on their development. I think that's where the pre-moral/ moral/ extra-moral shift comes in. Before Platonism/ Christianity, people decide what is good or bad by deciding what is beneficial to their own in-group. Platonism modified Athenians to the point where they are receptive to Christian moralizing, so that people judge what is good or bad based on what is "moral," believing in some kind of green pasteur where the lambs and the lions can peacefully coexist without a struggle. Extra-moral, he predicts, will have different ways of evaluating, after the belief in Christianity / Platonism comes to an end. As much as he rages against Plato, I suspect he's also following his footstep, trying to change people's taste, judgments, proclivities through "education," through arts. The point is not to choose isolation over falsehood, he's not even against falsehood (by that I mean myths, fictions, arts.) The point is to identify the pivotal point of change in history of thoughts, and appoint philosophers the task of shaping the sensibilities and values of the next epoch -- kind of like the Philosopher King?

From §44

In a word (but a bad one): they belong to the levelers, these misnamed “free spirits” – as eloquent and prolifically scribbling slaves of the democratic taste and its “modern ideas.” They are all people without solitude, without their own solitude, clumsy, solid folks whose courage and honest decency cannot be denied – it’s just that they are un-free and ridiculously superficial, particularly given their basic tendency to think that all human misery and wrongdoing is caused by traditional social structures: which lands truth happily on its head! What they want to strive for with all their might is the universal, green pasture happiness of the herd, with security, safety, contentment, and an easier life for all. Their two most well-sung songs and doctrines are called: “equal rights” and “sympathy for all that suffers” – and they view suffering itself as something that needs to be abolished. We, who are quite the reverse, have kept an eye and a conscience open to the question of where and how the plant “man” has grown the strongest, and we think that this has always happened under conditions that are quite the reverse. We think that the danger of the human condition has first had to grow to terrible heights, its power to invent and dissimulate (its “spirit” –) has had to develop under prolonged pressure and compulsion into something refined and daring, its life-will has had to be intensified to an unconditional power- will. We think that harshness, violence, slavery, danger in the streets and in the heart, concealment, Stoicism, the art of experiment, and devilry of every sort; that everything evil, terrible, tyrannical, predatory, and snakelike in humanity serves just as well as its opposite to enhance the species “humanity.” But to say this much is to not say enough, and, in any event, this is the point we have reached with our speaking and our silence, at the other end of all modern ideology and herd desires: perhaps as their antipodes? Is it any wonder that we “free spirits” are not exactly the most communicative spirits? That we do not want to fully reveal what a spirit might free himself from and what he will then perhaps be driven towards? And as to the dangerous formula “beyond good and evil,” it serves to protect us, at least from being mistaken for something else.

The way I read this — those people who called themselves free-spirits — the ones who died for the truth, who cried out for equality and humanism, green pasteur for all — those are misnamed. Their decency made them un-free. The “free spirits” that Nietzsche invites (seduces?) his readers to become are the reverse, they can accept everything evil, terrible, tyrannical, predatory, and snakelike as legitimately part of humanity. They don’t just embrace what is decent, they embrace everything that is life-giving. This isn’t about truth-assertion though, I think this is a judgment of taste — that is, his free-spirits that are not bound (i.e. unfree) by moral prejudice will refine their judgment of taste and not be repulsed by the dark side of humanity.

Reminds me of what Poldy Bloom said about water… He isn’t a card-carrying heartless a-hole, he simply appreciates the dark side along with the humane.

Also,

Silent, thoughtful, alert he stands on guard, his fingers at his lips ...

I think Joyce knows a thing or two about using silence and secrecy to fit in but also be different.

So Nietzsche says that "slavery . . . serves . . . to enhance the species 'humanity.'” Should we not be horrified by this?

I don't know, Roger. I feel like what we have now -- capitalism, unlivable minimum wage, military conscription, factory farm, using money to make poor people in poor countries "consent" to deal with our resource exploitation, pollution, waste disposals etc ... that's basically slavery by another name. However much we change the name to make the fiction more palatable, at the end of the day we continue to live with the same kind of exploitation.

Anecdotally, Nietzsche himself was fairly compassionate, to animals, and exceptionally respectful to women, despite what he wrote. It seems, he's advocating a clear-eye acceptance of reality of human nature, of the dark side, as an image, an understanding of what human is. He's not necessarily arguing we should abuse others.

Hegel said the master-slave dialectic was the origin of human consciousness.

And Nietzsche also wrote quite a bit about different concepts of morality based on master vs slave position. I.e. each human existence generate their own fiction, their own value-system, their own strategies.

Lia wrote: "The “free spirits” that Nietzsche invites (seduces?) his readers to become are the reverse, they can accept everything evil, terrible, tyrannical, predatory, and snakelike as legitimately part of humanity...."

Not just accept everything evil but it serves just as well as its opposite to enhance the species “humanity."


So evil is as effective as good is in enhancing humanity? That is possible only if there is no morality. Right?

There is no moral component to what he is saying, and I have a problem with that. When he says beyond good and evil, he means beyond morality. Morality, a quaint artifact of a defective world? He's right when he calls it a dangerous idea.

Is there another interpretation?

BTW, is that Walter Kaufmann boldly splitting infinitives in his Nietzsche translation?

Xan Shadowflutter wrote: "There is no moral component to what he is saying, and I have a problem with that. When he says beyond good and evil, he means beyond morality. Morality, a quaint artifact of a defective world? He's right when he calls it a dangerous idea...."

I suspect that's probably why he keeps hinting at this esoteric/ exoteric reading. A "free-thinker" must not shout to the whole world what he really thinks.

Not a few people have argued he's not out right saying what he really literally means, N is not shy about this "esoteric" hermeneutics hinting. I frankly don't know how to read N either. I'm groping in the dark and I'm completely prepared to be wrong.

As I've said before, my first encounter with Nietzsche was when I studied Modernism. I basically believe (at least so I was taught) high modernists were the artistic response to Nietzsche's call -- the likes of TS Eliot, Joyce, Ezra Pound, DH Lawrence, etc etc. While their Nietzschean strand seem clear, they each responded very differently. Ezra Pound and Eliot's politics are very different than Joyce's, for example. But basically, I think it's fair to say that they all accept the call to embrace, artistically portray, the dark side as life-giving. (And we know how well that ended for Ezra Pound.)