Classics and the Western Canon discussion

I don't see an easy way to categorize or corral these sayings, so I will just throw out a few of my favorites and encourage you to do the same. At first glance they sound sharply ironic, like Oscar Wilde on a bad day, but on further consideration I think they make more sense.

But if I had to classify them I'd put them in the following groups:

1. Those that speak uneasy truths:

107. Once the decision has been made, close your ear even to the best counterargument: sign of a strong character. Thus an occasional will to stupidity.

2. Those that shock:

116. The great epochs of our life come when we gain the courage to rechristen our evil as what is best in us.

3. Those that I don't quite understand:

117. The will to overcome an affect is ultimately only the willl of another, or of several other, affects.

What is an affect? He describes the will (or one part of the will) in section 19 as an "affect of command." I'm not sure what this means.

4. Anything he has to say about women, which I have a hard time taking seriously.

What are your favorites? Which ones get on your nerves?

I thought that the following fits well into the thinking of Emil M. Cioran (in fact I think I remember reading him saying nearly the same saying word for word, but I don't remember which book he said it in), but I'm having trouble fitting it within N.'s system:

157. "The thought of suicide is a great consolation: by means of it one gets successfully through many a bad night."

I'll play! Here are my clippings from this chapter.

(I thought Zimmern's versions were a little stiff at times)

75. The degree and nature of a man’s sensuality extends to the highest altitudes of his spirit.
76. Under peaceful conditions the militant man attacks himself.

78. He who despises himself, nevertheless esteems himself thereby, as a despiser.

84. Woman learns how to hate in proportion as she—forgets how to charm.
85. The same emotions are in man and woman, but in different tempo, on that account man and woman never cease to misunderstand each other.
86. In the background of all their personal vanity, women themselves have still their impersonal scorn—for “woman.”

93. In affability there is no hatred of men, but precisely on that account a great deal too much contempt of men.
94. The maturity of man—that means, to have reacquired the seriousness that one had as a child at play.

104. Not their love of humanity, but the impotence of their love, prevents the Christians of today—burning us.
105. The pia fraus is still more repugnant to the taste (the “piety”) of the free spirit (the “pious man of knowledge”) than the impia fraus. Hence the profound lack of judgment, in comparison with the Church, characteristic of the type “free spirit”—as its non-freedom.

112. To him who feels himself preordained to contemplation and not to belief, all believers are too noisy and obtrusive; he guards against them.

114. The immense expectation with regard to sexual love, and the coyness in this expectation, spoils all the perspectives of women at the outset.
115. Where there is neither love nor hatred in the game, woman’s play is mediocre.

125. When we have to change an opinion about any one, we charge heavily to his account the inconvenience he thereby causes us.
126. A nation is a detour of nature to arrive at six or seven great men.—Yes, and then to get round them.

131. The sexes deceive themselves about each other: the reason is that in reality they honor and love only themselves (or their own ideal, to express it more agreeably). Thus man wishes woman to be peaceable: but in fact woman is essentially unpeaceable, like the cat, however well she may have assumed the peaceable demeanor.

143. Our vanity would like what we do best to pass precisely for what is most difficult to us.—Concerning the origin of many systems of morals.

146. He who fights with monsters should be careful lest he thereby become a monster. And if thou gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will also gaze into thee.

149. That which an age considers evil is usually an unseasonable echo of what was formerly considered good—the atavism of an old ideal.

154. Objection, evasion, joyous distrust, and love of irony are signs of health; everything absolute belongs to pathology.

164. Jesus said to his Jews: “The law was for servants;—love God as I love him, as his Son! What have we Sons of God to do with morals!”

MJD wrote: "157. "The thought of suicide is a great consolation: by means of it one gets successfully through many a bad night."."

I was reminded as well of Walker Percy in Lost in the Cosmos: The Last Self-Help Book:

“The difference between a non-suicide and an ex-suicide leaving the house for work, at eight o'clock on an ordinary morning:

The non-suicide is a little traveling suck of care, sucking care with him from the past and being sucked toward care in the future. His breath is high in his chest.

The ex-suicide opens his front door, sits down on the steps, and laughs. Since he has the option of being dead, he has nothing to lose by being alive. It is good to be alive. He goes to work because he doesn't have to.”

Thomas wrote: "I don't see an easy way to categorize or corral these sayings..."

I see that you like herding cats!

Can I quote Heidegger’s lecture?

These passages are for the most part not simple, incomplete fragments and fleeting observations; rather, they are carefully worked out "aphorisms," as Nietzsche's individual nota­tions are customarily called. But not every brief notation is automat­ically an aphorism, that is, an expression or saying which absolutely closes its borders to everything inessential and admits only what is essential. Nietzsche observes somewhere that it is his ambition to say in a brief aphorism what others in an entire book . . . do not say.

Ostensibly Nietzsche wrote these in personal letters (also from Heidegger’s lectures, not sure about authenticity though.)

From Sils Maria on September 2, 1884, to his friend and assistant Peter Cast:
Zarathustra retains only its entirely personal mean­ing, being my "book of edification and consolation"--otherwise, for Every­man, it is obscure and riddlesome and ridiculous.

To Overbeck, July 2, 1885:
I have dictated for two or three hours practically every day, but my "philos­ophy"-if I have the right to call it by the name of something that has maltreated me down to the very roots of my being-is no longer communi­cable, at least not in print.

So they are not random and incoherent, and yet Nietzsche doubt they are intelligible in print form. (Sounds like Socrates.)

Lia wrote: "Thomas wrote: "I don't see an easy way to categorize or corral these sayings..."

I see that you like herding cats!

Can I quote Heidegger’s lecture? These passages are for the most part not simpl..."

I wonder if we should believe the claims of Nietzsche (and Heidegger) about the deep hidden meaning in his works. Here's an alternative theory: they are the half-coherent ramblings of a particularly intelligent narcissist descending into schizophrenia.

Maybe he’s drunk and trying on masks.

https://m.imgur.com/2Cc96n5

Roger wrote: "Lia wrote: "Thomas wrote: "I don't see an easy way to categorize or corral these sayings..."

I see that you like herding cats!

Can I quote Heidegger’s lecture? These passages are for the most pa..."

I think that N.'s philosophical works should not be viewed as pure philosophy, but rather as literary-philosophy (for the record, I think that he missed his calling in writing philosophic-literature like Thus Spoke Zarathustra; I think he was better at writing in that genre). As such, I think that the kind of analysis that are usually used more for deconstructing and evaluating novels and poems should be used with N.'s philosophical works.

You’re no doubt aware Heidegger ended up becoming one of the first (or proto) “post-philosopher” who also turned to poetry (or maybe it wasn’t even a turn, he was into Holderlin early on.). TS Eliot was another who studied philosophy with very promising career prospect (offered tenure before he even graduates, just like Nietzsche, though N was a different department), but turned that down to write poetry.

Rorty was kind of like that too, but I think he probably turned from academic philosophy for other reasons.

Also, Heidegger’s comment on the reception of Nietzsche (this one cracks me up)

But for a long time it has been declaimed from chairs of philosophy in Germany that Nietzsche is not a rigorous thinker but a "poet­ philosopher." Nietzsche does not belong among the philosophers, who think only about abstract, shadowy affairs, far removed from life. If he is to be called a philosopher at all then he must be regarded as a "philosopher of life." That rubric, a perennial favorite, serves at the same time to nourish the suspicion that any other kind of philosophy is something for the dead, and is therefore at bottom dispensable. Such a view wholly coincides with the opinion of those who welcome in Nietzsche the "philosopher of life" who has at long last quashed ab­stract thought.

I suspect here "affect" is used in the old sense of an emotional response or feeling. That doesn't fully explain to me what he meant by calling will an "affect of command," but I think it suggests broadly that he is unimpressed with philosophical notions posing the will as a kind of autonomous choosing organ. Rather, will emerges from the same "affects" some would claim it arbitrates from above.

Hence, for example, this bit from 75 about sexuality reaching "up into the ultimate pinnacle of [man's] spirit."

As usual, I'm drawn first to his more intriguing analogies.

71. The sage as astronomer.—As long as you still experience the stars as something "above you" you lack the eye of knowledge.

91. So cold, so icy that one burns one's fingers on him! Every hand is startled when touching him.—And for that very reason some think he glows. [I don't know who he's referring to here, but I want to know.]

96. One should part from life as Odysseus parted from Nausicaa—blessing it rather than in love with it.

121. It was subtle of God to learn Greek when he wished to become an author—and not to learn it better. [This appears to be a delightful joke at the expense of Christianity.]

126. A people is a detour of nature to get to six or seven great men.—Yes, and then to get around them.

136. One seeks a midwife for his thoughts, another someone whom he can help: origin of a good conversation. [I pick this one out because the analogy comes straight from Plato's Symposium, a reference I did not expect.]

168. Christianity gave Eros poison to drink: he did not die of it but degenerated—into a vice.

171. In a man devoted to knowledge, pity seems almost ridiculous, like delicate hands on a cyclops. [Ridiculous perhaps—but is great compassion in the learned not at the same time lovely, as with Buddhist saints?]

Cphe wrote: "Affect, Is used to describe someone in a mental health assessment, i.e they have a "flat affect" meaning emotionless, without facial expression, mood etc"

I had to go to the OED for this one.

1a. The way in which one is is affected or disposed; mental state, mood, feeling, desire, intention.

b. inward disposition, feeling, as contrasted with external manifestation or action. Intent, intention...

c. Feeling, desire or appetite, as opposed to reason; passion, lust, evil-desire.

2. Disposition, temper, natural tendency

3. Feeling towards or in favour of; kind feeling, affection.

Rex wrote: "121. It was subtle of God to learn Greek when he wished to become an author—and not to learn it better. [This appears to be a delightful joke at the expense of Christianity.]"


I like this one as well. Koine Greek is a vernacular language, for the most part, and I'm sure Nietzsche was appalled by it. My first thought was of the Gospel According to Mark, which is, by classical standards, barely literate.

Cphe wrote: "Thomas,

What's the OED?"

The OED is the standard acronym of the "Oxford English Dictionary," launched in the nineteenth century as "A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles; Founded Mainly on the Materials Collected by The Philological Society" (aka NED), and -- initially informally -- re-branded under its publisher's name. For the dates and statistics, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oxford_...

It is the most comprehensive dictionary of English ever attempted, covering (in intent) every word on record as being used in English, traced back, where relevant, to the Old English or Middle English form, with extremely precise definitions presenting the historical (if possible) or logical development of meanings and their nuances.

By design it does NOT include historical/biographical information, on, e.g., Kings of England or Presidents of the United States, which is left for more encyclopedic, but much less detailed, desk dictionaries. Anyone who had a copy of the OED available was assumed, pretty safely, to have other reference material at hand, whereas a desk dictionary might be the only reference work in a home or office.

(It is unfortunate in some ways that the "Oxford" form of the name was adopted, since the acronym can be misunderstood as "The Old English" -- i.e., Anglo-Saxon -- Dictionary, but the original title quickly became obsolete over the decades spent amassing and organizing material. It could also be confused with the term "New English," referring to Modern English, on the analogy of New High German (as against Middle High German). However, some librarians I know like to refer to it as "Ned," instead of using a string of letters.)

Despite the approach of the original editors, it has also become the premier example in English of a descriptive dictionary, recording mistakes and variant spellings, instead of just laying down spelling rules and officially "correct" definitions -- some of the original editors, who thought English needed something prescriptive like that to keep up with European languages. (See the Wikipedia article for its predecessors and rivals for other languages, some of which I believe are considerably more authoritative/authoritarian.)

And some scientific and technical terms were omitted by principle in the first edition. Curiously, "appendicitis" was somehow included, which garnered a lot of favorable publicity for the dictionary when Edward VII's coronation had to be postponed, and it turned out to be the only reference work that contained the key word explaining why.

The raw material for the OED was originally collected by volunteers, copying quotations onto slips of paper, which then had to be sorted and filed. The occasional error crept in. And the wording of some of the definitions is questionable, reflecting the mind-set of an editor, rather than linguistic phenomena.

J.R.R. Tolkien, one of the editors employed after the First World War, in the late stages of the First Edition, mentions a mistake in the documentation of "Fairy" in his essay "On Fairy-Stories," and in "Farmer Giles of Ham" he makes fun of the definition of "Blunderbuss," which contains the assurance that it has been superseded in more "civilized" countries by more advanced firearms. (He attributes it to "the Four Wise Clerks of Oxenford," with reference to the early editors.)

(I don't know if that definition has been changed in the current on-line Third Edition, which is available only in a digital form, so that it can be rapidly up-dated when necessary, and not in a soon-to-be-obsolete printed edition.)

Thomas wrote: "Koine Greek is a vernacular language, for the most part, and I'm sure Nietzsche was appalled by it. My first thought was of the Gospel According to Mark, which is, by classical standards, barely literate."

Right. There were some exceptions, but most of the NT authors were not classically educated, and their stylistic and syntactic abilities ranged from rudimentary to atrocious. David Bentley Hart's recent translation of the NT tries to capture some of the bad grammar and lack of polish with fidelity.

96. One should part from life as Odysseus parted from Nausicaa—blessing it rather than in love with it.

This is the one aphorism I found appealing, but I found it very appealing.

What epigrams? Why interludes? Is this a musical?

Lia wrote: "What epigrams? Why interludes? Is this a musical?"
Nietzsche was a composer, you know.
Somebody told me he was a bad composer.

You can listen to his stuff on Youtube.

I wasn’t particularly impressed. I thought he plagerized Beethoven before I saw the comments, in which many others also said the same thing.

But then Nietzsche also had a weird thing for Beethoven ... metempsychosis or inheriting his resources in a different point in history or something.

About affects: TL;DR: I think affect for Nietzsche is something that empiricism or sciences tried to exile from their version of reality, and is something Nietzsche tries to put back into the equation.

Quote hunting: Nietzsche talked about affect a lot, repeatedly, in Part I:

§12 the path lies open for new versions and sophistications of the soul hypothesis – and concepts like the “mortal soul” and the “soul as subject-multiplicity” and the “soul as a society constructed out of drives and affects” want henceforth to have civil rights in the realm of science.

§19 the will is not just a complex of feeling and thinking; rather, it is fundamentally an affect: and specifically the affect of the command. What is called “freedom of the will” is essentially the affect of superiority with respect to something that must obey: “I am free, ‘it’ must obey”

§23 suppose somebody considers even the affects of hatred, envy, greed, and power-lust as the conditioning affects of life, as elements that fundamentally and essentially need to be present in the total economy of life, and consequently need to be enhanced where life is enhanced, – this person will suffer from such a train of thought as if from sea-sickness

Some brief mentions in Part II and III as well:

§36 Assuming that our world of desires and passions is the only thing “given”as real, that we cannot get down or up to any “reality” except the reality of our drives (since thinking is only a relation between these drives) – aren’t we allowed to make the attempt and pose the question as to whether something like this “given” isn’t enough to render the so-called mechanistic (and thus material) world comprehensible as well? I do not mean comprehensible as a deception, a “mere appearance,” a “representation” (in the sense of Berkeley and Schopenhauer); I mean it might allow us to understand the mechanistic world as belonging to the same plane of reality as our affects themselves –, as a primitive form of the world of affect, where everything is contained in a powerful unity before branching off and organizing itself in the organic process (and, of course, being softened and weakened –). We would be able to understand the mechanistic world as a kind of life of the drives, where all the organic functions (self-regulation, assimilation, nutrition, excretion, and metabolism) are still synthetically bound together – as a pre-form of life?


§46 They love as they hate, without nuance, into the depths, to the point of pain and sickness – their copious, hidden suffering makes them furious at the noble taste that seems to deny suffering. Skepticism about suffering (which is basically just an affectation of aristocratic morality) played no small role in the genesis of the last great slave revolt, which began with the French Revolution.

Lia wrote: "About affects: TL;DR: I think affect for Nietzsche is something that empiricism or sciences tried to exile from their version of reality, and is something Nietzsche tries to put back into the equat..."

Interesting, Lia. What does that last remark mean? Scepticism about suffering? Is that "let them eat brioche?," or the supposed humaneness of death by guillotine?

Christopher wrote: "What does that last remark mean? Scepticism about suffering? Is that “let them eat brioche?," or the supposed humaneness of death by guillotine?..."

Brioche? Try donuts. You approach the sugar-coated monstrosity thinking there is something promising, but then you get to the heart of it, and you find out there is — nothing.

Back on topic :p You know how Nietzsche famously mocked British Utilitarianism by saying ”Man does not strive for happiness; only the Englishman does that”? I think Nietzsche sees suffering as a valuable affect that belongs to the noble, the tragic, which the march towards “progress” and “modernity” tried to eradicate, or at least reduced to a black-and-white universal-bad with no nuance, no redeeming value (which is the slave-version of reality.) I suspect suffering itself isn’t the problem for Nietzsche; suffering for no reason (meaning) is. The cruelty reserved for this generation isn’t child-sacrifice or god-sacrifice or any kind of bodily suffering, it’s the suffering for nothing. They don’t believe suffering can bring about something worthy, they suspect all suffering is inherently awful.

Does anyone know the significance of there being a 65A and a 73A? I read these and my first thought is that 65A is a continuation or an addendum to 65, and the same with 73, but the connection doesn't seem obvious to me.

I think these paragraphs did not get numbered in the original edition, so that later editors had to give them an extra-serial designation.

Christopher wrote: "I think these paragraphs did not get numbered in the original edition, so that later editors had to give them an extra-serial designation."

Not to pick fight but I’d like to see a source ... I’ve seen some “esoteric” exegesis that focused on “secret” reading of these repetitions to ultimately decide BGE 150 as the “central” aphorism. I’m not saying I agree with (or understand) their ... um, numerology or hermeneutics, but if they (Lampert) took these numerical arrangements so seriouysly, I have a hard time seeing them as (later) editorial artifacts.

Lampert: (view spoiler)[Nietzsche’s answer may lie in what is arguably the central aphorism of Beyond Good and Evil (BGE 150) (Its literal “centrality” depends on counting twice the three aphorisms which repeat numbers [65, 73, 237], making 299 in all, and ignoring the fact that “150” is then 152.): “Around the hero everything turns to tragedy, around the demigod everything turns to satyr play: and around god everything turns to – what? perhaps to ‘world’ –? (hide spoiler)]

Nietzsche is (partly) an ink blot in which one sees what is already in one's head.

Bryan wrote: "Does anyone know the significance of there being a 65A and a 73A? I read these and my first thought is that 65A is a continuation or an addendum to 65, and the same with 73, but the connection does..."

As Walter Kaufmann (who is very attentive to such details) points out in a note in"Basic Writings," the first edition of the book had repeated numbers at these two points. These seem to be manuscript or typographical errors which got embedded in the printed text, and have no other significance.

Adjustments to the numbering were made in some later printings, without notice to the reader.

Kaufmann follows the practice of giving the repeated number an alpha-numeric designation, found in two later editions with good claims to accuracy, so as to maintain the over-all consecutive section numbering of the first edition.

He is critical of those who silently re-number everything from those points, since it makes comparison between editions a chore.

And he is rather caustic about one then-recent edition (by Schlechta), in which the editor boasted of following the first edition exactly, when the unremarked re-numbering of sections shows the opposite.

While referring to Kaufmann's edition for the footnote about the numbering, I notice at least one aphorism which he translated poorly:

"In music, the passions enjoy themselves."

106.

Vermöge der Musik geniessen sich die Leidenschaften selbst.

106. By means of music the very passions enjoy themselves.

(Zimmern- not much better.)

What N. is saying is that music makes even suffering a pleasure.
K's version sounds.. anodyne, platitudinous, pointless, whereas the German makes the whole aphorism a key to what Thomas and Lia were discussing- the naturalness of art.

Thanks for the explanations about the alpha-numeric paragraphs everyone. Trying to come up with possible ways that the 'A' aphorism was an elucidation or an expansion of the previous aphorism was leading me onto all kinds of flights of fancy.

As far as the aphorisms that stuck out to me were:

67: 'I did that,' says my memory. 'I could not have don't that,' says my pride, and remains inexorable. Eventually--the memory yields.

89: Dreadful experiences raise the question whether he who experiences them is not something dreadful also.

108: There is no such thing as moral phenomena, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena.

136. The one seeks an accoucheur for his thoughts, the other seeks someone whom he can assist: a good conversation thus originates.

143: Our vanity would like what we do best to pass precisely for what is most difficult to us. --Concerning the origin of many systems of morals.

146: He who fights with monsters should be careful lest he thereby become a monster. (I think this first half isn't recognized enough) And if thou gaze long into an abyss...

148: To seduce their neighbour to a favourable opinion, and afterwards to believe implicitly in this opinion of their neighbour--who can do this conjuring trick so well as women? (Though I do not think the distinction of who does this activity is defined by gender--I like the aphorism because I think it neatly captures an aspect of human nature)

175: One loves ultimately one's desires, not the thing desired.

179: The consequences of our actions seize us by the forelock, very indifferent to the fact that we have meanwhile 'reformed'.

183: I am affected, not because you have deceived me, but because I can no longer believe in you.'

A few others I thought were interesting were already mentioned.

When I read through this the first time, it seemed like N was talking about Vanity a lot, though when I went back and counted, there were only about half a dozen that specifically mentioned it.

I'm here, m'dears and appreciating the comments as always.

Reading Nietzsche tends to light a fire under me. Since starting this I have found new employment. Hopefully something more ideal. Thanks, Nietzsche. From part four:

97 What? A great man? I always see only the actor of his own ideal.

130 What a person is begins to betray itself when his talent declines- when he ceases to show what he can do. Talent is also finery; finery is also a hiding place.

He loses me a bit with the hiding place, but Nietzsche does love his masks.

He loses me a lot, actually. Glad we're in this together.

Lia wrote: "I’m not saying I agree with (or understand) their ... um, numerology or hermeneutics, but if they (Lampert) took these numerical arrangements so seriouysly, I have a hard time seeing them as (later) editorial artifacts. "

Why do I have the feeling that if Nietzsche were to read the exegetes on his esotericism that we would be gifted with yet another aphorism?

Ashley wrote: "I'm hear, m'dears and appreciating the comments as always.

Reading Nietzsche tends to light a fire under me. Since starting this I have found new employment. Hopefully something more ideal. Thanks, Nietzsche..."

Glad you're here, Ashley, and congratulations! I knew Nietzsche was good for something.

Christopher wrote: “What N. is saying is that music makes even suffering a pleasure.
K's version sounds.. anodyne, platitudinous, pointless...”

Wow, mind-blown! Thanks Chris, I’m not even kidding anymore, I really wish I could read German, I really am jealous. I feel like so much of Nietzsche is doing between aphorism (health, Hippocrates) and epigram (death?) and interludes (interruption) has to do with pacing, tempo, some kind of linguistic musicality, maybe even something like heroic couplets vs heroic hexameters vs elegiacs vs male or female caesura. Obviously all that are lost to me in translation. I’ve got this brilliant (*preens*) rabbit hole right here that I can’t dig into because I can’t speak German. >__<

Ashley wrote: "Reading Nietzsche tends to light a fire under me. Since starting this I have found new employment. Hopefully something more ideal. Thanks..."

Great news Ashley! I take it that it's a good kind of fire, not like pants-on-fire kind :p~

I remember being really triggered the first time I DNF BGE. I'm afraid I got "seduced" this time around, my current affective status is "really really impressed."

Hopefully I'm not the only one here liking it; I was starting to feel like a heretic :p

Cphe wrote: "159:

One MUST repay good and ill: but why just to the person who did us good and ill?

What happened to turn the other cheek?"

Turning the other cheek ends the cycle of violence. It sounds like Nietzsche celebrates that cycle, and wants to encourage it, not end it. (If I understand correctly the argument that this perpetuation is an "affirmation" of life. )

Cphe wrote: "159:

One MUST repay good and ill: but why just to the person who did us good and ill?

What happened to turn the other cheek?"

I suspect Nietzsche is alluding to Plato here (looking at the epigrams before, he's been talking about suicide, the tyrants, and now ... we have to repay good and bad, but ending with a question-mark.)

The most obvious candidate is obviously the death of Socrates and the call for Crito to repay his debt of gratitude to Apollo for ending his sickness ... I mean life.

But a more apt scene is probably the Republic where they debated what is justice, and Socrates through dialogue contemplated and evaluated a number of propositions, including Thrasymachus' power as justice theory, Polemarchus' theory of justice as doing good to friends and harming enemies , and Cephalus' justice as telling the truth and repaying debts.


I thought it's neat that Nietzsche's postscript on this is inclusive.