Classics and the Western Canon discussion

IN WHAT RESPECTS THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IS SUPERIOR TO THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATES

This chapter can be summed up in a few words. Two principal dangers threaten the existence of democracies: The complete subjugation of the legislative power to the will of the electorate. The concentration in the legislative power of all the other powers of government. The men who framed the constitutions of the states encouraged the growth of these dangers. Those who framed the constitution of the Union did what they could to make them less formidable.

In support of this conclusion he offers these arguments.
1. The Federal Constitution was derived after most of the state constitutions and learned from them.
2. The main reason the Federal Constitution is better is because of the men themselves that drew it up. Not wanting to lose the liberty just gained in the War of Independence they. . .
a. Recognized that good intentions as well as the whims of the people are sometimes mistaken the framers introduced ways of stabilizing the government. T quotes the wisdom of Alexander Hamilton from Federalist 71:

“When occasions present themselves, in which the interests of the people are at variance with their inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom they have appointed to be the guardians of those interests, to withstand the temporary delusion, in order to give them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate reflection. Instances might be cited in which a conduct of this kind has saved the people from very fatal consequences of their own mistakes, and has procured lasting monuments of their gratitude to the men who had courage and magnanimity enough to serve them at the peril of their displeasure.”

b. To increase the stability and wisdom of the two houses of congress they lengthened the terms of the two legislative branches and had different eligibility and election rules for senators. (Note: the 17th Amendment provided for the direct election of senators in 1913)
c. Gave the president a 4 year term with “full powers” to act, compared to state governors who had little power and a short term of only a year.
d. Gave the judicial branch more independence with lifetime appointments.

Was this enough structure around the sovereignty of the people to preserve stability?

WHAT DISTINGUISHES THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FROM ALL OTHER FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS

Tocqueville sums up his answers to this question when he states the Federal government does not govern the states as much as it governs the individuals of all states. This idea, no doubt still had some hurdles to clear, but otherwise seems to be a brilliant solution:

In America, the subjects of the Union are not states but ordinary citizens. When the Union wants to levy a tax, it addresses itself not to the government of Massachusetts but to each of the state’s inhabitants. Previous federal governments confronted peoples; the Union confronts individuals. Its strength is not borrowed but drawn from within. It has its own administrators, its own courts, its own law enforcement officers, and its own army.

ON THE ADVANTAGES OF THE FEDERAL SYSTEM IN GENERAL, AND ITS SPECIAL UTILITY FOR AMERICA
Tocqueville suggests small nations enjoy more liberties and happiness while larger nations enjoy greater power encouraging development and prosperity. He then asserts that the American Federal system allows the United states to enjoy the freedom and happiness of a small nation but the respect of a large one.

I found this statement an interesting one to manipulate the variables of and come up with different outcomes:

If all nations were small and none were large, humanity would surely be freer and happier. But one cannot prevent the existence of great nations.

David wrote: "c. Gave the president a 4 year term with “full powers” to act, compared to state governors who had little power and a short term of only a year.
d. Gave the judicial branch more independence with lifetime appointments.

Was this enough structure around the sovereignty of the people to preserve stability? "

I will not repeat all I posts about how marvellously stable it proved to be, but instead point out some features praised by de Tocqueville, but seem to provoke more tension than stability.

First, all executive power vested in the president, without, at least constitutionally, independent authorities which would subordinate only to Congress. It might work in the 19th century, but today with more complex and powerful executive branch than ever, it seems odd. And from the beginning of the 20th century, you have provided independence to some executive institution, though the constitutionality of such independence is often under question, AFAIK.

Second, lifelong justices of the Supreme Court. Without any predictable rotation and with its enormous power, this could not but lead to crises and these crises should arise in the time when the nation is already in a crisis.

WHY THE FEDERAL SYSTEM IS NOT WITHIN THE REACH OF ALL PEOPLES, AND WHY THE ANGLO-AMERICANS WERE ABLE TO ADOPT IT

In answering this question, Tocqueville provides several reasons but emphasizes the homogeneous nature of its population, its geographical isolation and lack of great wars to fear.

One fact about the United States admirably facilitates the existence of the federal government. Not only do the various states share almost the same interests, origin, and language, but they are also civilized to the same degree, so that it is usually easy for them to come to agreement. . .the country’s geographical situation afforded additional opportunities to which primary credit for the adoption and persistence of the federal system must be ascribed. The most important of all the actions that bring the existence of a people to the world’s attention is war. In war, a people acts as a single individual toward foreign peoples: it fights for its very existence. . . The great good fortune of the United States is therefore not to have hit upon a federal constitution that enables it to endure a great war but rather to be so situated that it need not fear such a war.

History has shown the U.S. is not immune from great wars in an ever shrinking world. Hopefully being civilized enough and to the same degree will compensate for a growing diversity of interests, origins, and languages will be enough to keep the Federal system alive.

VOL 1, PART 2
WHY IT IS STRICTLY ACCURATE TO SAY THAT IN THE UNITED STATES IT IS THE PEOPLE WHO GOVERN
1. The people choose directly the representatives who make the laws.
2. The people make up juries to judge those that break the laws.
3. The majority rules in the people's name.

Hence it is really the people who rule, and even though the form of government is representative, it is clear that there can be no durable obstacles capable of preventing the opinions, prejudices, interests, and even passions of the people from making their influence felt on the daily direction of society.

PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES
Tocqueville distinguishes the difference between regional factionalism and political parties and then between minor political parties driven by temporal self-interest and great political parties driven, at least outwardly, by principle. He tells us of the Federal party which sought to limit the sovereignty of the people under a strong federal constitution, and the opposing Republican party standing on the principle of liberty. Tocqueville is thankful that the Federalists won the first round and stabilized the country before the Republicans took over. Now (1830’s) he presents another paradox in suggesting there are only minor parties made up of material interests and the great variety of public opinions but secretly behind them all are still the opposing principles of aristocratic-like tendency desiring to limit the use of public power in some way and a Democratic desire to extend it. It is interesting to note the regional differences between the manufacturing North and the agrarian South only get a small mention here. Does Tocqueville does not see the same secret principles behind these regional differences as he does in considering parties?

VESTIGES OF THE ARISTOCRATIC PARTY IN THE UNITED STATES
Tocqueville suggests the wealthy with their privileges are aristocratic in nature but put on a deceitful democratic front. He then shows he is not above stereotyping when he compares the wealthy in America to European Jews that outwardly hide their wealth to avoid scorn and disfavor. T also suggests the truth of this assertion would be revealed if Democracy would ever fall back to a monarchy in which the wealthy are in T's opinion, would be desirous of controlling. Finally he suggests that political parties use both newspapers and associations to pursue their causes.

I am somewhat surprised that Tocqueville seems to have missed, and does not discuss here, the characteristic disinterest the founders and early presidents felt was necessary to lead.

Chapter 3 ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN THE UNITED STATES
Tocqueville seems a bit reluctant to accept freedom of the press as a necessity as a good.

I confess that I do not feel toward the freedom of the press that complete and instantaneous love that one grants to things that by their very nature are supremely good. I love it out of consideration for the evils that it prevents far more than for the good that it does.

Despite his opinion he feels there are unsurmountable difficulties in restricting a free press and that a free press is a necessary condition of a Democracy:

In a country where the dogma of popular sovereignty ostensibly reigns, censorship is not merely dangerous but monstrously absurd. If each individual is granted the right to govern society, one has to presume that he also possesses the ability to choose among the various opinions that agitate his contemporaries and to appreciate the various facts that may guide his judgment. Popular sovereignty and freedom of the press are therefore entirely consistent.

Another paradox is suggested that the influence of newspapers is curbed by creating more newspapers, which is the case in America because newspapers are not restricted, easy to setup, and require fewer readers to make them profitable because of all of the advertisements. The result of this is:

In the United States, each individual newspaper has little power, but the power of the periodical press in general is second only to that of the people.

I wonder what Tocqueville would think of the internet? There are many likeable quotes in this work and I found myself smiling at the profundities nearing the end of this chapter in support of so many newspapers with so many opinions that some will believe without knowing why, and some will not know precisely what they ought to believe, and others are thrown into doubt and may change their minds.

I am surprised that Tocqueville did not bring up the importance of a well educated population here to help them more wisely process the resulting overload of information from a free press, something that Jefferson thought crucial to democracy.

Chapter 4 ON POLITICAL ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Tocqueville sums up the necessity of the unlimited freedom of association in America as an indispensable danger to stand against an even greater danger:

In our own time, freedom of association has become a necessary guarantee against the tyranny of the majority. . .The minority needs to bring all its moral force to bear on the material power that oppresses it. Thus one danger is set against another more redoubtable still. The omnipotence of the majority in my view poses so great a peril to the American republics that the use of dangerous means to limit it seems to me still to be a good thing.

I guess before the US Constitutions, large states were either Federal, and acted only on and through the component states, or were National, and its parts were mere provinces with governments appointed from the center. So the US government is mixed Federal and National in character, with sovereignty divided between the States and the National governments, each being sovereign it its own defined sphere. But wherever there is a conflict, the Constitution provides that the National government is supreme. AdT seems to think that it has worked out pretty well, but perhaps only because there is no nearby enemy to stress the system.

Patrice wrote: "i was surprised by T comment that everyone in america had the same religion which should have united them. i always think of america as the place people ran to because they did not have a single re..."

He was probably comparing the US to Russia or China or the Ottoman Empire, which were all much more religiously diverse.

Patrice wrote: "interesting, i think of those countries as religiously homogeneous."

Russia included Catholics in the west, Lutherans in the northwest, and Muslims in the south, as well as many Jews and the majority Orthodox. China included Confucians, Buddhists, Taoists, and Muslims, The Ottomans ruled large populations of Greek Orthodox, Egyptian Copts, Sephardic Jews, and both Shiite and Sunni Muslims.

David wrote: "I wonder what Tocqueville would think of the internet? ...

I am surprised that Tocqueville did not bring up the importance of a well educated population here to help them more wisely process the resulting overload of information from a free press, something that Jefferson thought crucial to democracy.


An unlimited freedom of press and a surplus of information may be a double-edged blade in democracy. I like how T. expressed the slippery slope between the complete independence and total subservience of thought. Sometimes T. seems to even lean on to supporting the aristocracy as being more favorable to the acutal freedom of press. Isn't he warning against the possibility of censorship arising in democracy under the name of the freedom of press in the end of this chapter?

Also, he mentioned in the note that "There are few despotic countries where censorship does not concern the form rather than the substance of thought. But in America there are subjects that cannot be touched upon in any way." What subjects could he be referring to?

In chapter 4 I love how he comments on the irony of human society: "sometimes extreme liberty corrects the abuses of liberty, and extreme democracy prevents the dangers of democracy."

Borum wrote: "Also, he mentioned in the note that "There are few despotic countries where censorship does not concern the form rather than the substance of thought. But in America there are subjects that cannot be touched upon in any way." What subjects could he be referring to? "

That is intriguing! I wonder, too what sort of subjects would have been taboo back then?

Curious too that he thinks despots censor the form rather than the content. I'm not sure I agree with that, now or then.

I enjoyed how he talked about freedom of press. As well when he talked about freedom of association prevents secret societies. I guess that the conspiracy theorists should know that.

Rafael wrote: "I enjoyed how he talked about freedom of press. As well when he talked about freedom of association prevents secret societies. I guess that the conspiracy theorists should know that."

And that, while he sees it as a necessary evil, at least the freedom of association acts as a mitigating factor against the "tyranny of the majority".

I think the Founders' idea was that the people would vote for electors, not actual candidates for president. Then the electors would meet in the state capitals and you'd get 13 deliberations by 13 separate bodies on who would be a good president. It never worked that way, because people voted for electors who would pledge to vote for the right guy, not electors who would consider deeply and choose wisely. The Electoral College just never worked as intended. It was just a bad, unworkable idea, whatever its unintended benefits.

Patrice wrote: "i think when he talks about how limited the presidents power is he is talking about another america. the federal government has grown so huge since then. all of our entitlements, interference in ed..."

As I am reading The Federalist Papers, it seems that at least this part of Founders feared not the creeping centralisation of power, but the Union would gradually lose power to the states. De Tocqueville had the same view on the dynamic of the federation.

And I think the presidency became so powerful not only due to centralisation but also due to the global trend of executive empowerment. And since the historical accident, all executive power in the US is vested in the president so SCOTUS cannot be a weak office. Even if we assumed more lose federation the executive power in the Union would be more concentrated than in the states.

Roger wrote: "I think the Founders' idea was that the people would vote for electors, not actual candidates for president. Then the electors would meet in the state capitals and you'd get 13 deliberations by 13 ..."

De Tocqueville in his representation of the presidency followed the Founders, he thought of it as a counterweight to the populism of legislature. However, he saw that the presidential office already subdued by populism no less and maybe even more than Congress.

Alexey wrote: "And I think the presidency became so powerful not only due to centralisation but also due to the global trend of executive empowerment."

Excellent point.

In his discussion of the Electoral College, it's interesting that Tocqueville does not acknowledge that it gave Southern slave-holding states a distinct advantage due to the three-fifths clause. Slaves did not count in a direct election, but they gave southern states more electors -- under the first census Virginia received six more House seats and six more electors than Pennsylvania, which had roughly the same free population. 10 of the first 12 presidents owned slaves and supported slavery.

Tocqueville's explanation of the expediency and judiciousness of the Electoral College make some sense, but it's strange that he doesn't note that it was also a concession to slavery in the South.

Patrice wrote: "i don’t understand. could you explain? at the time america was formed countries were ruled by kings."

The question should concern my post but I did not understand it. I have not said anything about other countries, except that there was a global trend in 19th - 20th centuries to empower the executive branch.

Thomas wrote: "In his discussion of the Electoral College, it's interesting that Tocqueville does not acknowledge that it gave Southern slave-holding states a distinct advantage due to the three-fifths clause. Sl..."

It is always portrayed as a concession to slavery in the South - but was not slaveholders a majority in the Constitutional convention? I think that only 5 of 13 states were free-states. Maybe it was consension to the North that just three-fifth would be counted?

Alexey wrote: "It is always portrayed as a concession to slavery in the South - but was not slaveholders a majority in the Constitutional convention? I think that only 5 of 13 states were free-states. Maybe it was consension to the North that just three-fifth would be counted? "

The 3/5ths compromise originated as a taxation issue. It would not have benefited the South to count all slaves along with free persons for taxation purposes, so slave-owning state had to balance their representation interests along with their taxation interests. Perhaps it would be better to call it a "compromise," as it usually is, rather than a concession.

Thomas wrote: "Alexey wrote: "It is always portrayed as a concession to slavery in the South - but was not slaveholders a majority in the Constitutional convention? I think that only 5 of 13 states were free-stat..."

Thank you, now understand.

Patrice wrote: "Alexey, i was referring to the global trend of executive empowerment. could you clarify? thanks."

Patrice, I mean a tendency in the previous two century, particularly in the last 100 years, to transfer power from parliaments to executives. Executive branch throughout the world assumed a crucial role in lawmaking, parliaments deligated a vast regulatory power to governments and civil services. It is executive agencies and other offices that involved in day to day life of the people to a greater extent than ever. And I do not talk about the so-called administrative resource, which may be used to stuff both legislative and judicial branch with loyal members.

For more apocalyptic view The New Despotism

I found T's more general observations about ideas and public opinion quite telling.

"An idea that is clear and precise even though false will have greater power in the world than an idea that is true but complex."

"When an idea, whether just or unreasonable, takes possession of the American mind, nothing is more difficult than to get rid of it."

I would add that these observations apply to all nations, not just the American.

Followup to previous comments on freedom of the press:
T discussion of freedom of the press is measured. He recognizes its abuses, considers censorship, but ultimately concludes that its role is so essential to American democracy that its benefits outweigh its downside.

"In order to reap the priceless goods that derive from freedom of the press, one must learn to accept the inevitable evils that it breeds."

He seems to be saying that sensationalism, misleading and even false news, slander, baiting, are the price we pay in the interest of a free and unfettered press as a check on power. The press are not always neutral and rigorously fact-based. More often they advocate from a certain perspective or for a point of view. For instance, at times the press have been cheerleaders for war, at other times advocates of peace. It often supports the status quo, but can at other times demand change.

Historically, freedom of the press has come under attack; if not for the First Amendment, I suspect we would not still have it. But is it truly a good thing, glaring warts and all? As Borum notes at 14, "An unlimited freedom of press and a surplus of information may be a double-edged blade in democracy." The media today are far different than in the 18th century. Should or can the same principle of freedom of the press apply today?

Gary wrote: "I found T's more general observations about ideas and public opinion quite telling....."

And, at least for me, part of what make DIA hard to discuss, at least serially. At times, I feel as if I am reading aphorisms ("a terse and often ingenious formulation of a truth or sentiment") or historical myths ("a story ... at least partially traditional, that ostensibly relates historical events usually of such character as to serve to explain some practice, belief, institution, or natural phenomenon...) that T then, as some brilliant debater in a dorm room of like minds, proceeds to revolve, like mysterious obelisks, interpreting the possible cuneiform meanings of the inscriptions. All (most?) brilliant warnings to beware of the consequences that can follow from any given principle.

To this point, much seems more driven by idea and observation, than by data or comparisons of analogous situations.

Gary wrote: "Freedom of the press has come under attack frequently in American history. If not for the First Amendment, I suspect we would not have it. But is it truly a good thing, warts and all? As Borum notes at 14, "An unlimited freedom of press and a surplus of information may be a double-edged blade in democracy."..."

This is a good example to me of difficulties in reading and discussing DIA serially. One of the observations that has been made about the book is that T seldom documents the sources that led him to a particular conclusion. However, enough of his drafts, journals, letters, ...., are available that scholars and readers able to devote the time have been able to trace the evolution of much of his thought. Freedom of the press is apparently one of those topics -- one to which T will return in his 1940 volume, some five years later. Spoiler alert: (view spoiler)[ Supposedly he comes back much more firmly on the side of the importance of freedom of the press, despite the dangers it imposes. Like much of T (and Madison), a key issue remains balances of power. John C. Spencer, a life-long friend T created in upstate New York on his travels, probably played a key role in the evolution of T's thought. Today, we also face many questions that have since appeared, including, but certainly not limited to, those associated with technology of forms and with ubiquity versus lack thereof in distribution. (hide spoiler)]

Gary wrote: "An idea that is clear and precise even though false will have greater power in the world than an idea that is true but complex.""

Aha. Perhaps Jonathan Swift had that in mind when he wrote, "Falsehood flies, and the truth comes limping after it," And many people, including Mark Twain and Winston Churchill, are credited with some variation of "A lie will get halfway round the world before the truth has time to put its pants on."

Michele wrote: "Gary wrote: "An idea that is clear and precise even though false will have greater power in the world than an idea that is true but complex.""

Aha. Perhaps Jonathan Swift had that in mind when he ..."

Great quotes! The speed gap is not just between falsehood and truth. I think we're prone to pore over discussions of trite and meaningless gossip (whether true or not) than delve deeply into more complicated and serious issues. I bet that the top google searches are mostly about celebrities, game scores or shopping. Media complicity with the government is suspected in Korea and probably other countries as well that the government occasionally leaks these celebrity scandals to cover up the 'real' issues or shady dealings of the government.

Borum wrote: "probably other countries as well that the government occasionally leaks these celebrity scandals to cover up the 'real' issues or shady dealings of the government. "

Since when are you informed about Brazilian politics? haha Since January when the elected president and his family gets in trouble, like them involved with criminals there's a celebrity or a issue released in the media. The timing is perfect.

Lily wrote: "... much seems more driven by idea and observation, than by data or comparisons of analogous situations."

Lily makes a really good point here. But I have to wonder if any early 19th century sociological commentaries were data-based. As for analogous situations, in some instances T tries to compare an aspect of American government to European nations. That said, I agree with her that T's commentary is driven primarily by deductive reasoning supplemented by limited personal observation. I wonder if this is the point she is making when she compares him to "some brilliant debater in a dorm room of like minds..."

Gary wrote: "...But I have to wonder if any early 19th century sociological commentaries were data-based. ..."

Oh, Gary, I agree with that doubt! Still, it is part of what makes DIA both fascinating and frustrating amidst current sociological studies. (I'll post a couple of articles on equality in the background section in a day or two that may [or may not?] sort of illustrate some of the differences in one's 21st century expectations.)

I am probably unfair when I liken T to those surrounding themselves with like minds -- his drafts, notes and correspondence seem to indicate he often finalized his text only after testing it against the fine minds to whom his (aristocratic) background gave him access, whether his father Hervé, Beaumont, Kergorlay, Spencer, or others within his circle of intimates, as well as against his broad reading of both contemporary and classical writers, including his teacher Guizot (at Metz? -- I can't seem to confirm that this moment). He apparently asked contacts both in America and in France to supply him brief essays about specific areas. I have the sense of encountering the writing of a young mind which is attempting to establish its owner towards his career, a mind both with a sense of where it wants to lead fellow countrymen and yet well aware of the dangers of any hardened position. (In that tinderbox that was French politics during those years and even given T's family history, he himself ended up imprisoned for a short time in 1851 after a coup by Louis-Napoleon.)

More on data:
I suspect that T was aware of the deductive nature of his argument. In Chapter 5 he comments on the use and misuse of statistics.

(view spoiler)[I submit T acknowledges the absence of hard data in his work. He argues that in the absence of "rigorously accurate calculation" statistics [i. e. data] can mislead rather than enlighten.

"When statistics are not based on rigorously accurate calculations, they mislead rather than guide. The mind is easily taken in by the false air of exactitude that even aberrant statistics retain and calmly accepts errors it sees cloaked in mathematical terms."

(hide spoiler)]

Gary wrote: "When statistics are not based on rigorously accurate calculations, they mislead rather than guide."

So, so true. And the issue is not always even the rigor or the accuracy. Look at the current issues surrounding the controversy likely to reach the Supreme Court on how to conduct the Census.

Still philosophers like Hume and paradigms on repeatability put forth in the practice of science have (probably?) taken humankind to a different relationships with observation and statistics than in the days of Alexis. Even though most of us still relate to that infamous Mark Twain quotation: "There are three kinds of liars: liars, damned liars, and statisticians." Or, "Figures don't lie, but liars figure."

Patrice wrote: "so small countries are happier? i had never thought of this. is el salvador happier than brazil? or does he mean only democracies?"

Maybe when all other things are equal. Uruguay is pretty happy, from what I hear. So are Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Denmark, Norway--the smaller countries of western Europe.

I think there is some consensus that Tocqueville does not support his arguments with much "evidence", i.e., numbers, stats, more typical examples, etc., as much as he supports it with political theory of the day from whatever sources.

What do you think are his strongest arguments so far, and why? Which are his weakest?

If we remember that arguments based on his own observations makes them anecdotal at best, or someone else's private opinion which is hearsay, are any of his arguments reliable?

I guess the question I would have is, reliable for what? I think you are right when you say that T's work is like an opinion piece--some of it seems questionable, and many of the conditions he comments on have changed over time, but I approached this simply as a man of his times, probably more aware of the world than not, who was trying to give his countrymen an idea of how things worked in America. As such, it's been an interesting snapshot of the times for me

Bryan wrote: "I guess the question I would have is, reliable for what? ..."

I quite agree. While it concerns me sometimes when it feels to me as if DIA is one of the sources of "myths" (in the sense of tropes widely assumed to encapsulate "truths") about American democracy, at the same time I am deeply impressed by this young man's careful bringing to French intelligentsia and politics the possibilities and limitations of democracy, freedom, equality, and other institutions and practices of government at a time when so much was or recently had been in turmoil in France. And many of the memories were personal, or at least familial. The boldness, the courage, the daring so carefully, cautiously formulated so as to inform and (hopefully?) move his own country.

I think of this against Lafayette's role in bringing American experiences back into French politics. I find myself contrasting it with what is happening with Brexit in the U.K. How do you move a nation from one position to another in the presence of not only national concerns but of relations with neighbor nations?

I have listened (not carefully) to Fukuyama's The Origins of Political Order. Now I find myself wanting to return to it and to go on to his Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy. (I have the Audible version in my library, but haven't gotten to it.)

Lily wrote: "Bryan wrote: "I guess the question I would have is, reliable for what? ..."

I quite agree. While it concerns me sometimes when it feels to me as if DIA is one of the sources of "myths" (in the sense of tropes widely assumed to encapsulate "truths") about American democracy, ..."

I'd like to consider for a moment Lily's suggestion of "myth" as an aspect of T's narrative. I take it as a given that Americans buy into a whole series of myths about democracy and America. I think it's fair to say that DiA, at the very least, echos some of these foundational myths. Lily goes on to question whether DiA is also the source of some of these myths. I'm going out on a limb here, but I for one would answer in the affirmative. T's well-considered comparison of American governance and society with European nations, is a new-for-its-time analysis and T was not reticent about drawing conclusions and integrating them into DiA; but because DiA has been the sourcebook for much political speechifying and writing over the years, I submit that it's impossible to untangle pre-DiA from post-DiA mythifying.

David wrote: "I think there is some consensus that Tocqueville does not support his arguments with much "evidence", i.e., numbers, stats, more typical examples, etc., as much as he supports it with political the..."

After reading DiA thus far, I have come to think of him not as a political scientist, but as a kind of political philosopher. His analysis begins with political philosophy then current in Europe, and from there he arrives deductively at certain observations and conclusions. These are based loosely on his own experiences in France, on his experiences during his brief time in America, and on dialog with other thinkers. I do not intend to minimize his marginalize his thinking. There is a good deal of value here even without data.

Gary wrote: "After reading DiA thus far, I have come to think of him not as a political scientist, but as a kind of political philosopher...."

Yes--that's how it appears to me as well. The myth question is one that would probably take some in-depth research, but tentatively I would say that T did propel some of these narratives, though I'm not sure how he could have done any different. Another way of looking at his writing could be as an anthropologist--recording the way Americans thought about themselves in this period, along with the examination of the political system.

Ah - philosophy. It reminds me of this "condensed internet version" of a Margaret Thatcher quote:

Europe was created by history. America was created by philosophy.

It is condensed from this:

Americans and Europeans alike sometimes forget how unique is the United States of America. No other nation has been created so swiftly and successfully. No other nation has been built upon an idea—the idea of liberty. No other nation has so successfully combined people of different races and nations within a single culture. Both the founding fathers of the United States and successive waves of immigrants to your country were determined to create a new identity. Whether in flight from persecution or from poverty, the huddled masses have, with few exceptions, welcomed American values, the American way of life and American opportunities. And America herself has bound them to her with powerful bonds of patriotism and pride.

The European nations are not and can never be like this. They are the product of history and not of philosophy. You can construct a nation on an idea; but you cannot reconstruct a nation on the basis of one.

Margaret Thatcher: Speech at Hoover Institution Lunch. Washington D.C., March 8, 1991. https://www.margaretthatcher.org/docu...

If America was created by philosophy, perhaps the best way to understand America is philosophically.