THE WORLD WAR TWO GROUP discussion

The October theme read is any book or books of your choice, including novels, that covers the Battle of El Alamein or Operation Torch in 1942.

This is US Army Command and General Staff College 101.

Pretty easy decision:

Operation Torch: The Allied Gamble to Invade North Africa by William B. Breuer

I'm going with this one as soon as I finish my current read:

Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein

Marc wrote: "I'm going with this one as soon as I finish my current read:

Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein"

That will most likely be my theme book as well Marc :)

Together We Stand: Turning the Tide in the West: North Africa, 1942-1943 - James Holland



This book looks afresh at the conflict in North Africa, focusing for the first time on the involvement of the U.S. there and the way this early collaboration between American and British and Commonwealth forces led to the defeat of the Axis powers in North Africa in May 1943.

KOMET wrote: "Together We Stand: Turning the Tide in the West: North Africa, 1942-1943 - James Holland

[bookcover:Together We Stand: Turning the Tide in the West: North Africa, 194..."

Read this earlier this year--excellent book! One of my favorites so far this year.

Hello! Does anyone have any suggestions/recommendations for novels/historical fiction for either the Battle of El Alamein or Operation Torch in 1942? Or any memoirs to recommend? Thank you.

BA wrote: "Hello! Does anyone have any suggestions/recommendations for novels/historical fiction for either the Battle of El Alamein or Operation Torch in 1942? Or any memoirs to recommend? Thank you."

A novel I read many years ago which might fit the bill is this one:

The Sands of Valor

Thank you, Marc! I appreciate the recommendation and will see if I can find it.

"Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein" - The author mentioned the large loss of supplies and vehicles during the British retreat to the El Alamein line:

"Estimates suggest as many as 782,403 shells and 12,827,000 rounds of small arms ammunition were destroyed, lost or captured during the retreat. When the Eighth Army reached the Alamein line, it had been bled almost dry of the supplies and ammunition it would need to fight a further battle."

Pendulum of War: Three Battles at El Alamein by Niall J.A. Barr

A History of the Mediterranean Air War, 1940-1945, Volume 3: Tunisia and the End in Africa, November 1942-1943 by Christopher Shores, Giovanni Massimello et al.



The North African campaign is something that I have read about and seen in documentaries over the past 4 decades. And as an aviation enthusiast (from the time I was 10 years old), I have developed a special interest in the air war aspect of the Second World War.

So, when I chanced upon this book, I knew I had to have it.

This particular volume "returns to November 1942 to explain the background to the first major Anglo-American venture – Operation Torch, the invasion of French North Africa. It deals with the fratricidal combats which followed the initial landings in Morocco and Algeria for several days. It then considers the efforts made – unsuccessfully in the event – to reach northern Tunisia before the Germans and Italians could get there to forestall the possibility of an attack from the west on the rear of the Afrika Korps forces, then beginning their retreat from El Alamein.

"The six months of hard fighting which followed as the Allies built up the strength of their joint air forces and gradually wrested control of the skies from the Axis, are covered in detail.

"Then from 1 April 1943, the continuing story of the Western Desert Air Force is told from the point at which Volume 2 ended, as it advanced from the east to join hands with the units in the west. Now also described are the arrivals over the front of American pilots and crews, the P-38 Lightning, the Spitfire IX and the B-17 Flying Fortress – and of the much-feared Focke-Wulf FW 190.

"The aerial activities over Tunisia became one of the focal turning points of World War II, yet this is frequently overlooked by historians. As before, the air-sea activities, the reconnaissance flights and the growing day and night bomber offensives form a major part of this volume. The mastery of the whole African coastline of the southern Mediterranean by the Allies prepared the way for the invasions of the European territories on the other side of this critical sea during 1943..."

Marc wrote: "A novel I read many years ago which might fit the bill is this one:"


I just found a copy of this book and look forward to reading it for the Oct/Nov read. Thanks for taking the time to recommend it, Marc. Much appreciated.

I hope you enjoy it BA, keep us all posted.

BA wrote: "Marc wrote: "A novel I read many years ago which might fit the bill is this one:"


I just found a copy of this book and look forward to reading it for the Oc..."

Glad to help! Hope you enjoy it!

"Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein" - Some interesting information on the American supplied M3 Grant tank to the Eighth Army:

"However, the very speed of the M3 programme led to real difficulties for the Eighth Army in attempting to use, modify and repair American tanks thousands of miles from the factories producing them. Even before the Grant went into action, British ordnance experts had discovered numerous flaws in it. Perhaps the most important was that the American M72 armour-piercing shell fired by the Grant's 75mm gun was little use against German armour. The archaic steel shot simply shattered against German face-hardened plate armour. British ordnance experts hit upon an ingenious solution to give the Grant's main gun a much better performance. The British had captured large stocks of German 75mm armour-piercing rounds, and these were used to 'cap' the American explosive charge. It was found that these composite rounds fitted perfectly, and, thanks to the hardened German steel projectile, gave very good penetration results against German armour plate. Thus, ironically, the Grant tanks that went into action at Gazala in May 1942 were firing British designed composite German/American ammunition from an American modification of a French gun. Unfortunately, during the retreat from Gazala, the large stocks of composite ammunition, which had absorbed much time and effort in their production, were captured. This meant that the Grant tanks in action at Alamein were forced to use the much inferior American ammunition, which limited their combat effectiveness."

Also of note:

" ... Yet it was not for nothing that the officers and men who crewed the Grant tanks called them 'ELH', or 'Egypt's Last Hope'."

Detailed article on the Grant Tank (including details of the modified 75mm shells used):
https://warspot.net/466-lee-and-grant...

'Aussie Rick' wrote: ""Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein" - Some interesting information on the American supplied M3 Grant tank to the Eighth Army:

"However, the very speed of the M3 programme led to rea..."

I like the line drawings. The entire production run of the Lee/Grant tank was only 18 months. It was a stopgap.

It was indeed MR9, but still a lifesaver for the Eighth Army.

"Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein" - Another story about the British retreat to the El Alamein line:

"Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Richardson was sent to find out how Lieutenant-General Willoughby Norrie planned to hold the Alamein position. Norrie had been sent back with 30 Corps Headquarters to prepare the Alamein defences in the short time available. Richarson arrived at Norrie's headquarters and spoke to him: 'Alamein position?' said Norrie. 'There isn't any position. We need sixteen divisions to hold this line.' Norrie had every reason to be pessimistic. The reports of journalists, on the contrary, were unreasonably optimistic. This caused a predictable reaction amongst the troops:

When the Riflemen heard the suave voice of the BBC announcer reporting that the Eight Army had reached the Alamein 'Line', they looked around at the empty desert, indistinguishable from the miles of sand to east and west, and commented only as Riflemen can.

There was no 'line' at Alamein on 1 July, only a widely scattered series of boxes."

Pendulum of War: Three Battles at El Alamein by Niall J.A. Barr

'Aussie Rick' wrote: ""Thus, ironically, the Grant tanks that went into action at Gazala in May 1942 were firing British designed composite German/American ammunition from an American modification of a French gun...."

Those were some interesting facts AR.

"Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein" - A bit more information of interest on those early battles at El Alamein:

"Throughout these attacks and counterattacks since 10 July, the infantry of Eighth Army had fought with the support of their artillery. Every artillery battery had fired thousands of rounds, often on successive days. For example, 2/12 Australian Field Regiment fired 2,236 rounds on 10 July and 2,164 rounds on 14 July with 'normal rate' expenditure on the less demanding days. The constant demands for fire support had called for 'superhuman efforts' from the gunners, and they never failed to lay down the fire needed.

Although the Axis soldiers facing the Eighth Army believed that, compared with their straitened circumstances, the British had inexhaustible supplies of ammunition, in fact the vast expenditure of 25-pounder ammunition was causing a crisis for the quartermasters of Eighth Army. Without the liberal use of its now concentrated artillery fire Eighth Army would not be able to continue its defence or mount an offensive.

While Auchinleck admitted to Brooke late in July that 'we are using a terrible amount of 25 pdr ammo but that cannot be helped' that was not the view of the quartermasters who had to satisfy the voracious needs of Eighth Army. By 12 July 30 Corps were estimating a daily expenditure of 41,000 rounds of 25-pounder ammunition which represented 100 rounds per gun per day. Had this rate of expenditure continued, the entire stock of 25-pounder ammunition held in the Middle East would have been consumed in 10 or 11 days. By 14 July a memo had to be issued on ammunition expenditure that warned:

'In view of the losses of stocks of ammunition of all natures between GAZALA and ALAMEIN and the heavy expenditure during operations, it is of the utmost importance that sniping and indiscriminate shooting at unimportant or ill-defined targets should be rigorously controlled.'

In future, it was proposed to limit despatches to Eighth Army to just 15,000 rounds of 25-pounder ammunition each day which was completely inadequate for the demand. The problem was that on 15 July there were only 197,379 rounds in Egypt with another 418,000 en route from Palestine. Another 512,000 rounds were on their way by sea but would not reach Suez until later in the month. Shortages of small-arms ammunition, including the Besa machine gun fitted in British tanks and the Thompson submachine gun, were even more acute. This aspect of the July fighting has been overlooked; the Eighth Army simply did not have the reserves of ammunition, let alone the troops, to mount a sustained attempt to break the Panzerarmee."

25 pounder Field Gun Mk 2 gun, Q.F.:
https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C24...

http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/...

'Aussie Rick' wrote: ""Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein" - A bit more information of interest on those early battles at El Alamein:..."

Logistics...hurts the brain. What a massive problem to solve.

Indeed Mike!

The raid on Dieppe receives a lot of coverage in my book. The Allies are trying to develop tactics for assault landings. An account of one observer:

High above the carnage being inflicted on the invaders, the clear blue sky over Dieppe appeared to have gone mad. The greatest aerial battle since the 1940 Battle of Britain was raging between the Royal Air Force and the Luftwaffe. Among the thousands watching the aerial extravaganza was the U.S. Lieutenant Colonel Loren B. Hillsinger, who had come along as an observer on the destroyer Berkeley. Like other Americans in Jubilee, Hillsinger had never been under fire, and he was fascinated by the pyrotechnics and the sounds of battle around and above him.

Colonel Hillsinger was wearing a pair of Peel tank boots which he just had made and of which he was quite proud. Standing on the bridge, he looked up just in time to see a JU-88, which had been riddled by Spitfire machine guns, jettison its bombs. One of the bombs struck the Berkeley and blew Hillsinger off the bridge, severing his foot. He applied a tourniquet, fashioned from his handkerchief and necktie, to his leg. Looking down toward the water, he saw his coveted new boot with his foot inside it bobbing about. Cursing in disgust, he unlaced the other boot and pitched it into the water after the first.

Operation Torch: The Allied Gamble to Invade North Africa by William B. Breuer

Great story Mike, I couldn't help but chuckle about Colonel Hillsinger's lovely boots while at the same time feeling sorry for the loss of his foot.

The end of the raid on Dieppe sees a British destroyer carrying an overload of wounded men back. American general Lucian Truscott is aboard as an observer:

Recrossing the English Channel, Fernie was a grim vessel. She had taken aboard so many wounded that blood-caked, bandaged men were lving shoulder to shoulder on decks, in wardrooms, in cabins, and even in the galley. There were not enough pharmacist’s mates or medical supplies aboard to provide more than first aid, nor was there enough morphine to ease the pain of grievously wounded and dying men.

General Truscott picked his way through the bloody disarray of men, agonizing because he was powerless to help relieve their misery. Almost unconsciously, Truscott took out his sack of Bull Durham tobacco to roll a cigarette. As he lit it, one wounded British youth lying on the deck called out, “I say, old fellow, you wouldna have another ’un about ya, wouldya now?”

Truscott crouched and placed the cigarette in the youth’s mouth. He saw that the boy had been badly wounded in the stomach, but an opiate injected by a medic had temporarily relieved his suffering. Now the American general became aware that other eager eyes were staring at him, so until the Bull Durham sack was empty, General Truscott rolled and lit cigarettes for wounded men.

Operation Torch: The Allied Gamble to Invade North Africa

Mike wrote: "The end of the raid on Dieppe sees a British destroyer carrying an overload of wounded men back. American general Lucian Truscott is aboard as an observer:

Recrossing the English Channel, Fernie ..."

I don't recall ever reading a bad word about Truscott. I've read his:

The Twilight of the U.S. Cavalry.

Another great post Mike, Truscott sounds like a pretty decent general!

Mike just made me order a copy of this book; "The Last Cavalryman: The Life of General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr." by Harvey Ferguson. You all heard him entice me into purchasing a book on General Truscott!

The Last Cavalryman: The Life of General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr. by Harvey Ferguson

'Aussie Rick' wrote: "Mike just made me order a copy of this book; "The Last Cavalryman: The Life of General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr." by Harvey Ferguson. You all heard him entice me into purchasing a book on General Tru..."

I've read that, AR. Not bad.

Good to hear MR9, helps justify my purchase :)

'Aussie Rick' wrote: "Mike just made me order a copy of this book; "The Last Cavalryman: The Life of General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr." by Harvey Ferguson. You all heard him entice me into purchasing a book on General Tru..."

I did? Must have been a very subtle suggestion. Well, I hope it measures up AR.

'Aussie Rick' wrote: "Mike just made me order a copy of this book; "The Last Cavalryman: The Life of General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr." by Harvey Ferguson. You all heard him entice me into purchasing a book on General Tru..."

AR: As I recall Ferguson’s book opens with an account of Truscott’s speech at the Nettuno Military Cemetery in Italy. On Memorial Day 1945, Truscott was sent to represent President Truman at a ceremony of honor. Truscott mounted the stage before a crowd of dignitaries. To the surprise of all, he turned his back on the audience and addressed his remarks to the graves of the dead. No text exists of the speech, but cartoonist Bill Mauldin was present:

The general’s remarks were brief and extemporaneous,” the artist wrote. “He apologized to the dead men for their presence here. He said everybody tells leaders it is not their fault that men get killed in war, but that every leader knows in his heart this is not altogether true.”

Rough voice rising over the graves, Truscott said he hoped anyone interred there through any mistake of his would forgive him, but knew this was asking a lot. He said he would not speak of “glorious dead” because he didn’t see any glory in getting killed in your late teens or early twenties. He promised that if he ever ran into anybody, especially old men, who thought death in battle glorious, he would straighten them out; it was the least he could do.

Mauldin went on: “It was the most moving gesture I ever saw.”

Excellent post MR9!

Mike, I've heard people refer to you as the book whisperer 😂😂😂

Manray9 wrote: "As I recall Ferguson’s book opens with an account of Truscott’s speech at the Nettuno Military Cemetery in Italy. On Memorial Day 1945, Truscott was sent to represent President Truman at a ceremony of honor. Truscott mounted the stage before a crowd of dignitaries. To the surprise of all, he turned his back on the audience and addressed his remarks to the graves of the dead..."

A very moving account MR9. I will share that with my two sons. When I was stationed in Italy, they used to go up to the cemetery every year to help clean up as a project of the Cub Scouts.

Someone had a great idea for the night-time invasion of French-held North Africa. Set off a giant firework with the red, white and blue American Flag. That should stop any French firing at those friendly Americans for sure....maybe not:

Inside adjacent Arzew where Darby’s Rangers had landed, the sound of heavy gunfire echoed through the night as Colonel Greer tried desperately to bring order out of near chaos. As the harassed combat team leader was talking on a walkie-talkie, he was approached by a sergeant who wanted to know if it was time to fire the Rube Goldberg mortar. Preoccupied with the scrambled condition of his units, Greer snapped, “Okay, but take the damned thing somewhere away from here before you shoot it!”

With two companions, the sergeant lugged the heavy device only 50 yards away. Moments later there was a loud boom, followed by a brilliant pyrotechnic display in red, white, and blue in the sky over Colonel Greer’s command post, which was out in the open. The flaming American flag was a beautiful sight to behold, dangling majestically 200 feet in the air.

All hell broke loose. French defenders had not known where the invaders had come ashore and had not found a specific target at which to shoot. Now machine gun tracers streamed past Colonel Greer and his command group, and mortars pounded the CP. For a long time Greer and his staff were stretched out with noses pressed into the sand.

Operation Torch: The Allied Gamble to Invade North Africa by William B. Breuer

Here is an account of two brave men and a very unusual way to fire a weapon:

But in approximate company strength, the Americans entered a small collection of buildings known as Cactus Village and were met by a torrent of fire from elements of the Moroccan 1st Infantry Regiment.

French 75s poured fire into American ranks, and then three Renault tanks began clanking toward the beleaguered Go-Devils. Already decimated by casualties and a large number of stragglers, without tanks or artillery support, Dilley’s men began scrambling piecemeal for the rear. In the face of heavy fire by advancing Moroccan infantrymen, Lieutenant Dushane and Corporal Czar rushed to a nearby antitank gun which the French had abandoned after removing part of its breech. Czar aimed the antitank gun at the hostile force and Dushane set it off repeatedly by firing a bullet from his tommy gun at the percussion cap at the base of each shell.

Now the attackers concentrated their fire on Dushane and Czar, but the two Americans continued to shoot the gun. They knocked out a tank and caused the accompanying infantry to waver, then to halt. Lieutenant Dushane was aiming his tommy gun at the base of a shell when a French bullet struck him in the head. He toppled over dead. Corporal Czar, unable to shoot the antitank gun alone, crawled away under a hail of fire.

https://valor.militarytimes.com/hero/...

Operation Torch: The Allied Gamble to Invade North Africa

Two excellent posts Mike. That is one hell of a way to fire an anti-tank gun! I'm not too sure if I'd be keen to try it. A well-deserved Distinguished Service Cross for Lieutenant Dushane.

Mike wrote: "Here is an account of two brave men and a very unusual way to fire a weapon:

But in approximate company strength, the Americans entered a small collection of buildings known as Cactus Village and ..."

Gutsy.

"Buisness In Great Waters" ; since the summer I've been increasingly interested in the interactions between events and campaigns, here's John Terraine's take on TORCH and it's effects on the tonnage war:

The great decision taken at the ARCADIA conference, to concentrate Allied strength on the defeat of' 'Germany first’ evolved during the course of the year into a set of broad 'plans' which were actually no more than statements of' intention, under the code-names ROUNDUP, BOLERO and SLEDGEHAMMER. The centrepiece of these was ROUNDUP, the direct assault on Hitler’s 'Fortress Europe':
This was first envisaged as taking place in 1943 It would be proceeded by a massive buildup of US forces in the United Kingdom, codename BOLERO. But if, as then seemed more than likely, the Soviet Union should show signs of crumbling under the heavy blows that rained upon her, it was thought that it might be necessary to mount a desperate diversionary cross-Channel attack in 1942, SLEDGEHAMMER. One by one all these propositions were ruled out.
The arguments which arose out of this fact caused much ill-feeling (some of it ineradicable) between British and American planners and leaders, and contentions which continue to inspire the historiography of the period to this day. And the fact itself, of course, profoundly affected the further course of the war; it meant that the great operation envisaged in the concept of ROUNDUP, ultimately called OVERLORD, would not take place until 1944. The military, political and social consequences of that arc inexpressible except as a virtually inexhaustible series of speculations, a massive array of 'ifs’ which compel some consideration in appropriate places (of which this is not one) but do not often reward it with greater enlightenment. The second fact, arising directly out of the first, is that instead of any SLEDGEHAMMER in 1942, and regardless of the likely effect upon ROUNDUP, the Allies embarked upon a landing in French North Africa under the codename of GYMNAST (or SUPER-GYMNAST), later changed to TORCH.
It is well established now that this change of strategy was more welcome in Britain than, with one enormous exception, in America. Churchill and the British Chiefs of staff had from the beginning grave trepidations about an opposed landing in north-western Europe (with all its evil connotations, for Churchill, of the Gallipoli landings in 1915) and a continental campaign against the still very powerful German Army. And as the year wore on, with what seemed an inexorable sequence of disasters in all theatres — loss of all Burma, bringing the Japanese threat to the borders of India in the north, and their landing on Guadalcanal in the south, threatening Australia; heavy losses to the Mediterranean Fleet in attempting to resupply Malta in August; the fall of Tobruk and Rommel’s advance into Egypt; the PQ17 catastrophe and the renewal of the campaign on the Atlantic trade routes the British leaders increasingly viewed a major operation across the Channel as an invitation to ruin. Yet the desirability of engaging the Germans as hard as possible somewhere was obvious — the more so when their 1942 offensive in Russia carried them right into the Caucasus, seemingly threatening the whole Middle East as far as Persia (Iran). The result was what Americans have always been inclined to dismiss as 'peripheral strategy' — with the one single exception of President Roosevelt who, from the first, took the view that the main thing was to get American ground and air forces into battle with the Germans at the earliest possible date. North-west Europe would clearly have been the best place, but North Africa was definitely better than nowhere at all. Furthermore, Roosevelt, like many other Americans, was sure that Vichy France was far less hostile to the USA than to Britain, and there was a tempting prospect of bringing a substantial French element back to the Allied cause by the 'liberation' of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. For these and other less important reasons he was prepared to take

one of the few strategic decisions of the war in which the President overrode the counsel of his military advisers.

There is no doubt that all this was important background to the piecemeal abandonment of the strategy first intended at ARCADIA. But increasingly the foreground was occupied by more urgent matters. As we have seen, from the very beginning of any serious detailed planning of any project, the Allied staffs had discovered that 'shortage Of shipping imposed an absolute ban'. That was before the 'roll of drums' and the massacre of American shipping along the coastal lanes. By mid-year the position had become calamitous; a sinking rate of 4,147,406 tons in six months obviously threatened to cancel out any possible increment from American productivity. The shipping shortage loomed all TORCH planning, and the further drain imposed by that operation proved to be a serious matter indeed, especially when the campaign in North Africa unexpectedly dragged on well into May, 1943. The British planners were perhaps most at fault (if only because Britain was most concerned); they had estimated that an average of sixty-six ships per month would be required to support TORCH, but the reality turned out to be 106 ships per month - a very large increase. The result was a sharp fall in imports into Britain, with industry cutting into its reserves of raw materials and even the threat of unemployment. Living standards, already painfully lowered, faced the probability of further cuts. Indeed, it was this haunting shortage of shipping that gave TORCH its chief appeal to some British leaders; the CIGS, General Brooke, was a firm believer in the pressing necessity of clearing the Mediterranean which, he urged, would save a million tons of shipping —and 'to clear the Mediterranean, North Africa must first be cleared.' According to his biographer, Sir David Fraser, this absorption with the shipping problem made 'the free passage of the Mediterranean the keystone of Alanbrooke's strategic philosophy. Such were the contradictory impulses evoked by the campaign in North Africa which opened on the night of 7-8 November.
Nor was shipping the only example of contradictory impulses. In January, 1942, before the 'roll of drums' began to sound, flushed with offensive enthusiasm, the Americans agreed to begin the mass-production of landing craft for their own as well as for British use. This involved an act of conversion in the USN, which had previously been sceptical about the need for such vessels; the missionary agents were the Japanese, now thrusting into the Pacific, and who would one day have to be dislodged by amphibious operations even more powerful than their own. so priorities for labour, steel and engines in America were allocated to landing craft in early 1942, and this, says Roskill,

certainly contributed greatly to the continuing weakness of our Atlantic escorts, and to the heavy shipping losses we suffered at this time

It contributed also, Of course, to the USN's great difficulties in creating an effective convoy system in home waters, and to the increasing unreality of an offensive in north-west Europe in 1942. When Dönitz's 'drums' beat out the measure of the truth, the priorities Were altered. it was then recognized that the crying need was escort vessels and according to Robert E. Sherwood landing craft dropped to tenth place in the Navy's Ship-building Precedence List, Then, when the decision to carry out TORCH was taken in July, the pendulum swung back again:

By October, just before the North African landings, [landing craft] had gone up to second place, preceded only by aircraft carriers, but the next month they dropped to twelfth place.

So once more we see how much Allied offensive strategy was at the mercy of the U-boats, whose depredations, unless stopped, could cut at its very roots.
For the first TORCH landings over 350 ships were required, 102 of them sailing direct from America for the Casablanca area to land an all-American force under General George S. Patton. An AngloAmerican landing at Oran and an all-British landing at Algiers required a further armada of over 250 ships sailing from British ports. Admiral Cunningham, C-in-C Mediterranean, who was responsible for the safe arrival of these huge numbers, later wrote:

The defence for the 'Torch' convoys was marshalled in strength. But no imaginable defence could altogether have warded off the concentrated attacks of thirty to forty U-boats. The procession of large convoys converging on the Straits of Gibraltar passed close enough to submarine concentrations; but it is the almost incredible fact that they were not attacked and sustained no casualties.

This was, indeed, an 'almost incredible fact', explicable only by one sentence in Dönitz's memoirs:

The Allied landing in North Africa was quite unexpected by the Axis Powers.

Very informative post Jonny, thanks for taking the time to share those details with the group.

"Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein" - The 51st (Highland) Division was a new unit to the Desert War and was allowed a few months to acclimatise and training before being thrown into battle. It began its acclimatisation at Qassassin and Mena camps:

"The necessity of dispersing the troops in the desert as a precaution led to one distinctive problem for the division. The divisional headquarters piper had to mount the tailboard of a lorry and be driven round the dispersed bivouacs to pipe the morning reveille. Once the troops had become acclimatised, the division was moved up to El Hammam where the work and training became more intense. During September, each battalion of the division served in the front line with the 9th Australian Division. This enabled each unit to receive some front line experience and learn from the Australian veterans.

Wimberley was impressed with the Australian's ability as soldiers but when he first visited them he found that the soldiers were 'all half naked and burnt brown as berries. They took a bit of getting used to. I was dressed as a General and they treated me in the most "matey" way.' Wimberley sent a stiff memo around his division emphasising the fact that although his division should 'copy the Australians and do our level best to absorb all they can teach us' for the officers and men he would not tolerate similar standards of discipline in his division. There is no doubt that the Scottish soldiers were initially:

startled by their apparent lack of discipline. The Aussie soldiers - uniform [of] boots and shorts - referred to their officers by their first or even nick-names, an unheard of liberty to Seaforth ears. But there was little doubt about their military efficiency.

At the same time, the Australians were astonished to learn that Scottish soldiers had to salute their officers even when in action! However, when the Scottish battalions went into the line with the Australians they learned the craft of desert warfare and patrolling from masters. 51st (Highland) Division certainly never adopted the habits of the Australians but a string bond of mutual respect grew up between the two divisions and the inexperienced Scottish units were given the best possible training."

The 51st Highland Division at El Alamein:
https://51hd.co.uk/history/battle_of_...

"Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein" - I've read about this before but it's still amazing to read these numbers again:

"The German engineers had recent experience of how difficult it could be to gap minefields under fire. To this end, Colonel Hecker, the Panzerarmee's Chief Engineer, had overseen the laying of 445,358 mines. German and Italian engineers laid 249,849 anti-tank mines and 14,509 anti-personnel mines from 5 July to 20 October while 181,000 mines in captured British minefields around Deir el Shein and Bab el Qattara were incorporated into the defences. A further 180,000 British mines from captured dumps had been relaid along the front. No other army had incorporated so many mines into its defence up to this point in the war."

Cairo seeks international help to clear millions of land mines:
https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/...

"Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein" - The 51st (Highland) during Operation Lightfoot:

"In the northern lane, 5th Black Watch reached the red line at midnight after taking 'Montrose' under intense machine-gun fire. The unit suffered heavy casualties and piper Duncan McIntyre died while playing the regimental march 'Hieland Laddie'. He was found the next morning with his pipes still under his arm and his fingers 'rigid on the chanter'."

Duncan McIntyre and El Alamein:
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-x...

"Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein" - Back with the Australians of the 2/48th Infantry Battalion, who are still attacking the German and Italian defensive positions:

" ... During this fighting, when the company was held up, Private Percy Gratwick charged an enemy machine-gun post and killed its crew. He then ran forward again and killed a mortar crew before himself being killed by machine-gun fire. Gratwick's action enabled the company to consolidate its position and won him a posthumous Victoria Cross."

Private Percy Gratwick V.C.:
https://anzacportal.dva.gov.au/biogra...

'Aussie Rick' wrote: ""Private Percy Gratwick V.C.:..."

Brave man, old enough to be the father of many of his comrades. Determined to serve!

Good point Mike, he was pretty old for an infantry soldier.

"Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein" - The author had this to say about the famous action at 'Snipe':

"Eventually, after spending the evening fearing that the position would finally be overrun by German infantry, the battalion pulled out, taking one six-pounder and the breechblocks of all the other guns back with them. 2nd Rifle Brigade and 239th Anti-tank Battery had just fought one of the most celebrated anti-tank actions of the war. During one day of constant danger and exertion, they had destroyed at least 32 enemy tanks and knocked out 15 to 20 more, which were later recovered, at a cost of 14 killed, 44 wounded and one missing. Briggs, Lumsden and Montgomery were naturally delighted. The action at 'Snipe' is generally viewed as an heroic action by a single battalion nut, although 2nd Rifle Brigade was isolated, it did not fight alone. The panzers had already been attacked from the air by the time they reached them. In fact, though it might have been impolitic to note it at the time, 2nd Rifle Brigade had just fought a very successful 'battlegroup' action along the lines that the 'old' Eighth Army had developed during July. 'Snipe' was simply the brightest and best example of Eighth Army's now fully developed method of anti-tank defence, the same as had been used by Robcol on 2 July, 433rd Battery on 16th July and 1st Rifle Brigade at Alam Halfa. None of this should detract from the remarkable performance of the battalion, or course; the entire combat on 27 October demonstrated that Eighth Army was now able to outfight its opponent."

Ordeal at Outpost Snipe: Defiant Stand at El Alamein:
https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/art...

'Aussie Rick' wrote: ""Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein" - The author had this to say about the famous action at 'Snipe':

"Eventually, after spending the evening fearing that the position would finally ..."

Excellent picture. Is the Warfare History Network subscription worth it?

I've never subscribed Mike. I used to have a few military magazine subscriptions but let them all drop in favour of books :)