The History Book Club discussion

This is the thread for the discussion of FEDERALIST. NO 16.

We skipped to 69 but we are back to 16.

This paper is titled The Same Subject Continued:
The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union - From the New York Packet. Tuesday, December 4, 1787.

This paper was written by Alexander Hamilton.

by Alexander Hamilton

We will always continue to move on; but please also feel free to get caught up and post any of your thoughts on this paper and/or on any of the other papers which were assigned from weeks past.

There is a ton of stuff to discuss about Federalist Papers 1 - 15 even though we are opening up discussion on the next paper today and we are selecting some papers that are apropos to the current climate.

Please feel free to post on any of the other 15 previous essays that we have worked very hard on - Federalist 1 - 15. And then try your hand at Federalist 69. The essays make for very interesting reading.

Links to 16:

http://federali.st/16

You can also listen to them being read orally to you:

Federalist 16 audio:

LibraVox

https://ia804604.us.archive.org/17/it...


Notes:

It is always a tremendous help when you quote specifically from the book itself and reference the chapter and page numbers when responding. The text itself helps folks know what you are referencing and makes things clear.

Citations:

If an author or book is mentioned other than the book and author being discussed, citations must be included according to our guidelines. Also, when citing other sources, please provide credit where credit is due and/or the link. There is no need to re-cite the author and the book we are discussing however.

Here is the link to the thread titled Mechanics of the Board which will help you with the citations and how to do them.

http://www.goodreads.com/topic/show/2...

Also, the citation thread:

https://www.goodreads.com/topic/show/...

Glossary

Remember there is a glossary thread where ancillary information is placed by the moderator. This is also a thread where additional information can be placed by the group members regarding the subject matter being discussed.

Here is the link:

https://www.goodreads.com/topic/show/...

Introduction:

https://www.goodreads.com/topic/show/...

And so we begin:

To the People of the State of New York:

THE tendency of the principle of legislation for States, or communities, in their political capacities, as it has been exemplified by the experiment we have made of it, is equally attested by the events which have befallen all other governments of the confederate kind, of which we have any account, in exact proportion to its prevalence in those systems. The confirmations of this fact will be worthy of a distinct and particular examination. I shall content myself with barely observing here, that of all the confederacies of antiquity, which history has handed down to us, the Lycian and Achaean leagues, as far as there remain vestiges of them, appear to have been most free from the fetters of that mistaken principle, and were accordingly those which have best deserved, and have most liberally received, the applauding suffrages of political writers. (1)

This exceptionable principle may, as truly as emphatically, be styled the parent of anarchy: It has been seen that delinquencies in the members of the Union are its natural and necessary offspring; and that whenever they happen, the only constitutional remedy is force, and the immediate effect of the use of it, civil war. (2)

It remains to inquire how far so odious an engine of government, in its application to us, would even be capable of answering its end. If there should not be a large army constantly at the disposal of the national government it would either not be able to employ force at all, or, when this could be done, it would amount to a war between parts of the Confederacy concerning the infractions of a league, in which the strongest combination would be most likely to prevail, whether it consisted of those who supported or of those who resisted the general authority. It would rarely happen that the delinquency to be redressed would be confined to a single member, and if there were more than one who had neglected their duty, similarity of situation would induce them to unite for common defense. Independent of this motive of sympathy, if a large and influential State should happen to be the aggressing member, it would commonly have weight enough with its neighbors to win over some of them as associates to its cause. Specious arguments of danger to the common liberty could easily be contrived; plausible excuses for the deficiencies of the party could, without difficulty, be invented to alarm the apprehensions, inflame the passions, and conciliate the good-will, even of those States which were not chargeable with any violation or omission of duty. This would be the more likely to take place, as the delinquencies of the larger members might be expected sometimes to proceed from an ambitious premeditation in their rulers, with a view to getting rid of all external control upon their designs of personal aggrandizement; the better to effect which it is presumable they would tamper beforehand with leading individuals in the adjacent States. If associates could not be found at home, recourse would be had to the aid of foreign powers, who would seldom be disinclined to encouraging the dissensions of a Confederacy, from the firm union of which they had so much to fear. When the sword is once drawn, the passions of men observe no bounds of moderation. The suggestions of wounded pride, the instigations of irritated resentment, would be apt to carry the States against which the arms of the Union were exerted, to any extremes necessary to avenge the affront or to avoid the disgrace of submission. The first war of this kind would probably terminate in a dissolution of the Union. (3)

Hamilton highlights in the first three paragraphs - the Lycian and Achaean leagues.

Hamilton in Federalist 15, 16, and 17 develops the theme that no national government could endure unless it had jurisdiction over the individuals in the states rather than over the states in their corporate capacities. He does not trust the "passions of men" and he believes that this would dissolve the Union. And what is needed is a strong national force to subdue these "instigations of wounded pride". Obviously both Madison and Hamilton in these three papers are pointing out the inadequacies of the Articles of Confederation.

During the Revolutionary war, he feared dissensions among the members of the Confederation. Stating that the republics of the Greek leagues as well as the Swiss cantons were continually at war with each other in spite of the vicinity of foreign powers,

Hamilton warned that the danger of interstate tensions was considerably greater in America, due to the absence of strong neighbors. He was concerned about disputes over state boundaries, and regretted that the prospects of future tranquility were not flattering

Source for the above: Gradesaver

Hamilton returns to the argument begun in the last paper that the laws passed by Federal Government must apply to the individual citizens and not just to the States.

All examples of leagues (like that formed under the Articles of Confederation) from antiquity have failed.

Even the best of these, the Lycian and the Archaean leagues which were confederations of cities or regions failed when the only constitutional remedy for delinquencies among the members was force with the effect of civil war.

As an aside, the Lycian League of 168 BC was apparently a model for our form of representation in the House where the number of representatives is proportional based on the population of the individual States.

Source for the above: Teaparty.911

A fun review of this paper:

https://youtu.be/sgfU4JSuw_E

And here is an article which was referenced:

Gummere, Richard M. “The Classical Ancestry of the United States Constitution.” American Quarterly 14, no. 1 (1962): 3–18. https://doi.org/10.2307/2710223.

What are your thoughts so far regarding FEDERALIST. NO. 16?

The question was brought up in the video - was the US headed for anarchy in 1787?

Another question could be with the deep political divides in this country and deep rooted factionalism - would Hamilton and Madison be worried that the the US is headed towards anarchy now?

Please when responding reference a specific Federalist Paper and specific quotes.

Interesting article - Federalist 16 - The Seeds of Nullification

Link: https://tenthamendmentcenter.com/2015...

Source: The Tenth Amendment Center

Great comment by Harry when he read Federalist 16 which I am carrying over:

I have just completed reading and putting some study in No.16, in my effort to catch up with the group. The arguements here against the exsisting confederacy presented are again the ones of the ancient world (Lycian and Achean )failed, that the present government cannot enforce it's will directly on the people as the state governments stand in the way while not giving good cause for their stand, and to enforce federal legislation on these states would require a standing army which Hamilton says would be constantly in conflict with the states leading to what he refers to as "military despotism".

Being a southerner reading this, and No.15; I reflect on the attempted departure from the union some 75 years in the future of the southern states. In a confederacy you can go, in a republican democracy you can't.

The Federalist Papers

Mark Dimunation talked about The Federalist Papers. The collection of 85 essays by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay were written in 1787-88 to encourage the states to ratify the United States Constitution. The Federalist Papers continue to be cited in legislative and legal proceedings.

This was a Constitution Week noon gallery talk for the “Creating the United States” exhibition in the Southwest Gallery of the Library of Congress.

Link: https://www.c-span.org/video/?295458-...

Source: C-Span

From the Vaults - the Library of Congress

Link: https://youtu.be/soXZPL7KSzs

In this segment of From the Vaults in the Rare Book and Special Collections Division, Mark Dimunation discusses the history of the Federalist Papers, a series of 85 essays written by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison between October 1787 and May 1788. The Federalist Papers were written and published to urge New Yorkers to ratify the proposed United States Constitution, which was drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787. To learn more about this historic document, visit Federalist Papers: Primary Documents in American History on the Library of Congress website.

For transcript and more information, visit https://www.loc.gov/item/webcast-10208

Unpacking each of the 85 founding essays would be a dubious trek. But highlighting the top 21 is a Mission POSSIBLE. Herein lies our errand – equip students of government with a quick 21-step review of the “ingenious apparatus” of the American government as seen through the lens of the Federalist Papers.

Link: https://youtu.be/NPcyHAySOo8

Source: Youtube

Questions to ponder:

1. Are we currently prone to a natural death due to internal division? Yes or no? And why do you feel this way?

2. Do we have a strong independent judiciary? Explain your response.

3, In today's world do we have a need for a large army? Why or why not?

4. When Hamilton spoke to George Washington about his concerns, could he possibly have envisioned the current set of circumstances - why or why not?

5. Would Hamilton and Madison be pleased with the above or the current state of the country? Why or why not?

6. Are the states jealous of each other? Or does the strong centralized government put all of that to rest?

7. Are you a proponent of a strong centralized government or having more power given to the states? Choose one and explain your reasoning citing from the papers.

And so we continue:

This may be considered as the violent death of the Confederacy. Its more natural death is what we now seem to be on the point of experiencing, if the federal system be not speedily renovated in a more substantial form. It is not probable, considering the genius of this country, that the complying States would often be inclined to support the authority of the Union by engaging in a war against the non-complying States. They would always be more ready to pursue the milder course of putting themselves upon an equal footing with the delinquent members by an imitation of their example. And the guilt of all would thus become the security of all. Our past experience has exhibited the operation of this spirit in its full light. There would, in fact, be an insuperable difficulty in ascertaining when force could with propriety be employed. In the article of pecuniary contribution, which would be the most usual source of delinquency, it would often be impossible to decide whether it had proceeded from disinclination or inability. The pretense of the latter would always be at hand. And the case must be very flagrant in which its fallacy could be detected with sufficient certainty to justify the harsh expedient of compulsion. It is easy to see that this problem alone, as often as it should occur, would open a wide field for the exercise of factious views, of partiality, and of oppression, in the majority that happened to prevail in the national council. ¶ 4

It seems to require no pains to prove that the States ought not to prefer a national Constitution which could only be kept in motion by the instrumentality of a large army continually on foot to execute the ordinary requisitions or decrees of the government. And yet this is the plain alternative involved by those who wish to deny it the power of extending its operations to individuals. Such a scheme, if practicable at all, would instantly degenerate into a military despotism; but it will be found in every light impracticable. The resources of the Union would not be equal to the maintenance of an army considerable enough to confine the larger States within the limits of their duty; nor would the means ever be furnished of forming such an army in the first instance. Whoever considers the populousness and strength of several of these States singly at the present juncture, and looks forward to what they will become, even at the distance of half a century, will at once dismiss as idle and visionary any scheme which aims at regulating their movements by laws to operate upon them in their collective capacities, and to be executed by a coercion applicable to them in the same capacities. A project of this kind is little less romantic than the monster-taming spirit which is attributed to the fabulous heroes and demi-gods of antiquity. ¶ 5

Even in those confederacies which have been composed of members smaller than many of our counties, the principle of legislation for sovereign States, supported by military coercion, has never been found effectual. It has rarely been attempted to be employed, but against the weaker members; and in most instances attempts to coerce the refractory and disobedient have been the signals of bloody wars, in which one half of the confederacy has displayed its banners against the other half. ¶ 6