THE WORLD WAR TWO GROUP discussion

Don't know if anybody else caught "Weather that changed history" last night, but they had a segment talking about bitter cold and the fog in the Ardennes and the Battle of the Bulge, with discussion from author Alex Kershaw.

Where else in WWII did weather play a decisive role?

D-Day certainly, weather factored into the planning and storms delayed the landing, plus a large storm destroyed some of the docks that were built and made resupply difficult for a bit. Leningrad, Moscow and the Soviet Union in general. during the seige of Lenigrad, the Soviets built supply lines over the frozen lakes. Heavy rains and mud slowed down the German advance into Russia as there were few improved roads. Snow and ice stopped them on the outskirts of Moscow and itself killed numbers of German soldiers who lacked winter clothing.

In the Pacific, it was "weather that didn't quite change history." Hirohito publicly preyed for a storm to come and destroy the American Fleet -- not too far fetched since two major typhoons had dispersed and/or destroyed Mongol invasion fleets in the 13th Century. He got them too.

A major typhoon caught Admiral Halsey's fleet and sank 3 destroyers and causing fires on an aircraft carrier. Nearly 800 men were killed.

However, the storm wasn't enough to destroy the American Fleet, so the Japanese began suicide attacks. The popular name for the attacks came from the name for the 13th Century storms, 'Divine Wind' or kamikaze.

I'm going for Operation Market Garden [September 1944] where the fog in England delayed the arrival of much needed troops and hardware to the beleagured men of the 1st Airborne Division.

Had the lifts happened as scheduled, the bridgehead could have been re-enforced. This could obviously have led to a completely different outcome of the battle and the war as the Allies would have been across the Rhine in September 1944.

More men and supplies wouldn't have hurt, but I'm not sure even that would have changed the tide at Arnem. The key was moving the ground attack forward and that just didn't happen. Not to mention they never secured the bridge.

The ground attack did move forward. Indeed it was on the opposite side of the Rhine in sufficient time to rescue 2,500 of the 10,000 troops landed there. My point is that without the adverse weather the troops that were eventually pulled out, would have arrived at the battle earler.

Therefore, instead of having to leave half of a brigade to hold LZ's and DZ's for these late arrivals, all troops could have been committed to the battle for the town. Therefore German troops woul've been diverted from attacking 2 Para at the bridge to repel the forces fighting their way into the city. This would have provided ample time to consider re-enforcing the bridgehead instead of pulling them out. Furthermore, more troops committed to the advance into the city would have meant more avenues/lines of attack, which would have thinned out the exposed German forces and led to another breakthrough.

Without the adverse weather [fog] it would also have meant that the Poles could've landed as scheduled and been used in an offensive role rather than to support the withdrawl.

There is alot more to this subject than can be dismissed with the wave of a hand. This battle was complex and, as with many battles throughout history, was decided by a few simple matters - some of which [such as the weather] no-one could control.

Well, having the ground attack arriving in sufficient time to rescue the remnants of 1st Airborne wasn't quite the timeline originally envisaged, or the mission. Not to mention the 1st Airborne had to withdraw from its position, the ground forces never linked up to the town. But while having additional para forces on hand couldn't have hurt, I just doubt it would have been decisive.

I'd say the battleplan was overly complex, overly dependent on the assumption that German morale was broken, and overly dependent on the dash and audacity of Montgomery. Everything had to go just right to make it work. And that rarely happens in the real world. More paras at the right place and time would have at least given them a better chance to succeed, something they never really had in actuality.

You know.. it's true that eve if everything had come together that success was still unlikely. the operation was more about personalities than anything else.

I'd never have thought anyone would've described Monty with "dash and audacity" though... Only joking.

Yes, indeed, the dash and audacity line was sarcasm, but that was what was needed in this battle for it to work at all.

Enjoyed the conversation though. things have been rather quiet on this front lately, too quiet.

John wrote: "I'm going for Operation Market Garden [September 1944] where the fog in England delayed the arrival of much needed troops and hardware to the beleagured men of the 1st Airborne Division.

Had the ..."

I do not think that even with all of the resources in place, the British Airborne would have been able to wrestle Arnhem from Bittrich's II SS Panzer Korps. The 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions with supportive infantry had the urban terrain advantage, and the long route for XXX Corps was a tenuous journey at best. The 101st and 82nd Airborne objectives were nullified due to the lack of heavier weapons and armored support. The entire operation was a blind man's gamble, due to bad intel, bad luck, and failed logistics.

Colin wrote: "John wrote: "I'm going for Operation Market Garden [September 1944] where the fog in England delayed the arrival of much needed troops and hardware to the beleagured men of the 1st Airborne Divisio..."

Interesting Colin; I'd agree that the route to Arnhem was teeth-grittingly narrow, and XXX Corps weren't exactly in a tearing rush; however the real killers of the operation were the delays at Son and Nijmegen* and the loss of the Arnhem rail bridge (I'm not sure that the Rhine ferry would have been a viable crossing against any sort of opposition). I'd also argue that the urban terrain advantage was actually split fairly evenly; it allowed the German army units (who made up the vast majority of the opposition at Arnhem, according to Kershaw and Buckingham) to put a block on the Para advance into the town, but Oosterbeek was prime defensive territory - Kershaw mentions a NATO study identifying it as ideal assault breaking terrain. How about had the Para's had access to credible support from 2TAF? Based on previous actions, a steady stream of Typhoons and Thunderbolts might have been a potential gamechanger.

*Nobody seems to give much thought to the logistical difficulties of shaking the assault units of XXX Corps out of line of march to carry the Waal bridge (yes, with infantry support from the 82nd, but they didn't roll straight up the road and onto the bridge approach).

Your point on TAF is a good one, and for open terrain operations it would have helped. But I think that, in the urban areas, it would have had little effect. It was just bad luck that Rundstedt placed the II SS PZK in Arnhem. Had they not been sent there I think that the mission would have been a success.