Classics and the Western Canon discussion

I'm back, but will take some time to get caught up. Meanwhile, here's the thread for discussion of Book 4.

Some may perhaps think it strange that we say that wicked men, who form the majority of men, do not exist; but that is how it is. I am not trying to deny the wickedness of the wicked; what I do deny is that their existence is absolute and complete existence... A thing exists when it keeps its proper place and preserves its own nature. Anything which departs from this ceases to exist, because its existence depends on the preservation of its nature. Book 4, Prose 2

So what do you all think about Philosophy's conclusion that evil does not exist?

Thomas wrote: "Some may perhaps think it strange that we say that wicked men, who form the majority of men, do not exist; but that is how it is. I am not trying to deny the wickedness of the wicked; what I do den..."

I have to admit that I have trouble wrapping my head around that one. It is a bit contradictory to acknowledge that there is wickedness in the world and in the very same breath deny the very existence of evil.

I think for this argument to work one must define exactly what thier definition of existence is. Philosophy cannot claim that there are no incidents of evil within the physcial world. So exactly what does Philosophy mean when she speaks of existence and non existence?

Does this relate back to her early arguments to Boethius about the need of seeking happiness in spite of his physcial circumstances and discounting all forms of happiness that are granted by life and thus gifted by fortune.

And in this same way is Philosophy stating that the physcial world is completely irrelevant and of no consequence? So whatever happens in the physcial world and whatever men do in the physcial world means nothing?

As previously Philosophy argues that to obtain true happiness one must seek it within God and in thier knowledge and faith in God and so in this vein evil can be said not to exist becasue it is outside of God, and if they physical world itself is nothing, and all that matters is God and thus Boethius can find happiness by turning completely to God and realizing the material tangible world is of no importance and should have no bearing upon him.

Thomas wrote: "Some may perhaps think it strange that we say that wicked men, who form the majority of men, do not exist; but that is how it is. I am not trying to deny the wickedness of the wicked; what I do den..."
What Boethius is saying seems similar to Augustine's view of evil as "privation"-- a lack of good being where good being ought to be. To the extent that people are evil, they are participating in "non-being" rather than being. I believe these ideas have their roots in neo-Platonism, which influenced both Augustine and Boethius. I don't find this a very persuasive account of moral evil.

Silver wrote: "And in this same way is Philosophy stating that the physcial world is completely irrelevant and of no consequence? So whatever happens in the physcial world and whatever men do in the physcial world means nothing? ..."

It's not that the physical world is of no consequence, but that whatever is of consequence or substance in this world is preserved through eternity even though the physical world may pass away.

To use an analogy. Our best friends and loved ones may go through many changes. They may grow fat, become sick, get promoted, become bankrupt, or move to another city/country. If our friendship is of substance, it would not be affected by these changes at all. If the soul is immortal, then death is nothing more than a journey to a far away country. "Love is as strong as death", if not stronger.

Nemo wrote: It's not that the physical world is of no consequence, but that whatever is of consequence or substance in this world is preserved through eternity even though the physical world may pass away.
."

But this idea does not support the claim that evil does not exist. If one accepts that there is wickedness in the world, and people who do wicked things, than the only way to validate the argument that evil does not exist is by discounting the physical world.

If one accepts the physical world and that what happens within the physical world does matter, than how does the idea that evil does not exist still stand?

Silver wrote: "If one accepts the physical world and that what happens within the physical world does matter, than how does the idea that evil does not exist still stand? ..."

I think we need a definition of "evil" before discussing whether or not evil "exists", i.e., of substance. :)

Patrice wrote: What is a man? If you define all men as entities who seek the good, then someone who does not seek the good cannot be a man. It's like "I think therefore I am". Instead "I seek the good, therefore I am a man." If I don't seek the good, then I am an animal, not a man.

But that does not discount the existence of evil in itself. Philosophy does not say that man cannot be evil, or that evil men do not exist or cannot exist, she says "evil does not exist"

If a man walked up to someone and stabbed them in the back for no reason. One could say they are not man, that a man could not commit such an act. But that does not change or undo the very act itself.

An evil thought was still born, and an evil action carried out upon that thought.

I suppose one could argue that if the moment a person commits an act of evil they no longer become a man, and if they are thus rendered an animal thier actions cannot be counted as good or evil becaue animals are incapable of either goodness or evil actions.

But that seems a bit convoluted.

Nemo wrote: "To use an analogy. Our best friends and loved ones may go through many changes. They may grow fat, become sick, get promoted, become bankrupt, or move to another city/country. If our friendship is of substance, it would not be affected by these changes at all. "

I think Philosophy is using Platonic terminology, so this analogy is quite apt. Plato differentiates the world of Becoming from the world of Being. Things that become are in constant flux, always changing, in the continual process of generation or degeneration that marks the natural world. But how can we say that something is if it is never the same thing from one moment to the next? In this sense the natural world doesn't "exist." On the other hand, ideas (Platonic forms or eidei) exist eternally and without change.

The problem I have with this scenario is that I have never been able to figure out how the ideal world can interact with the natural one. Clearly we inhabit the natural world -- nothing is eternal in this world -- and we are pursuing the ideal one as a goal. But we can never reach the ideal, at least in this world. I think this is something we take as everyday common sense, so when Philosophy says evil doesn't exist it sounds somewhat absurd. It doesn't exist in an ideal world, but it does exist in our world, the everyday world of becoming.

Patrice wrote: "OK, I'll try again. I re-read a part of book IV, not the whole, but this is what came to mind. Wiener, Schwarzenegger, etc. Supposedly powerful men who want to do good things. But they followed..."

Yes I understood that basic concept, and I have to say that in a way I agree with Philosophy in her assessment that those whom do act out wickedly are not truly happy and are more miserable than the victims of thier wickedness may be, becasue they the wicked can never obtain happiness as long as they continue to seek out doing wicked things. I can agree with that when I consider people in my own personal experiences who act spitefully are who are weak and becoe corrupt. I don't think they are very happy individuals, and I think thier actions in part are becasue they are not fulfilled by thier greed and pettiness and so they do lash out against others in spite out of envy and jealousy and thier own incompetence.

But I have to disagree with Philosophy about how we should take pity and show mercy to these individuals. Even if I can agree that they are truly unhappy and suffer the most for thier own bad deeds, I still think they deserve punishment all the same. And I am just not big enough of a person to feel sorry for them.

But as you mentioned the modernism of Philosophy's thought, in the way in which we do not speak of evil much in this day and age in relation to human actions, it seems to me that that denial of evil is not particularly "Christian" as particuarly in early Christianity it seems that there was a very strong belief in an actual, and literal manifestation of evil and I do not think most Christianity would concur that there is in fact no evil.

Patrice wrote: "I think Boethius seems to have one foot in the pagan world and one in the Christian.
It seems to me (and I'm no expert) that when he's speaking as "philosophy" he's speaking as Plato/Aristotle, not..."

I would agree that there seems to be a mixing of both. Some of the things said do seem to be undeniably Christian. The speech and poem about the uselessness of hate being one of them. And the need to look to God for happiness.

But there are things which seem to stray a bit from Christianity.

Thomas wrote: "when Philosophy says evil doesn't exist it sounds somewhat absurd. It doesn't exist in an ideal world, but it does exist in our world ..."

It'd help if we could come up with a working definition of "evil" first. There's no point discussing whether evil exists if we can't define or describe it.

Patrice wrote: "OK, I'll try again. I re-read a part of book IV, not the whole, but this is what came to mind. Wiener, Schwarzenegger, etc. Supposedly powerful men who want to do good things... They want power but they are "weak" because they don't have the self-control to go after the good."

Isn't Philosophy's argument a bit odd though? It seems to go like this:

1. Supreme Goodness can do no evil.
2. Supreme Goodness is supremely powerful.
3. Human beings who do evil are therefore less powerful.

Does this follow? It seems to me that human beings are less powerful by virtue of being human, not necessarily because they do evil (or because they are not perfectly good.)

She goes on to say that all forms of power are goods worth pursuing, but since the power to do evil is not a good, doing so makes one less powerful.

It seems to me that these arguments all depend on the unity of goodness and power. This is fine if goodness and power are truly the same thing, as Philosophy has argued they are in the ideal state. Is is fair or reasonable to assume this in a non-ideal universe? Was the executioner really less "powerful" when he bludgeoned poor Boethius to death? Don't we need to make some distinctions?

Thomas wrote: "Patrice wrote: "OK, I'll try again. I re-read a part of book IV, not the whole, but this is what came to mind. Wiener, Schwarzenegger, etc. Supposedly powerful men who want to do good things... ..."

I totally get what you are seeing here and my initial instinct was to think the same way. But I think I can see what Philosophy is trying to insinuate . That does not mean I all together agree with what Philosophy says or that it is "right" but I can understand Philosophy's point of view in this argument.

According to Philosophy Boethius would ultimately be the more powerful of the two, because of the fact that while the executioner may have greater physical power over Boethius, spiritually he is weaker than Boethius.

Philosophy is trying to teach Boethius the way to true and ultimate happiness so that even while this horrible thing is being done to him, he will not truly be suffering as much as the one doing it to him. The physical pain and suffering can be seen as one of fortunes fickle acts, but Boethius can achieve a greater happiness for himself.

But his tormentor will never obtain or know that happiness and so he will be rendered wretched and suffering far more, and in far greater ways than Boethius will. In this way Boethius is mower powerful for having obtained true and ultimate happiness and goodness.

Patrice wrote: "But the executioner is totally powerless isn't he? He's following orders. To me he is one of the indifferent people. Societies have created ways to protect the executioner from the horror of his..."

The executioner always has the power to choose not to be an executioner.

In regards to the afterlife there is no sense given within the text thus far which makes any actual references to the afterlife that I can see.

I suppose the fact that God is spoken of implies an existence in heaven, but I do not think Philosophy actually directly speaks of such a thing or makes references towards it.

Silver wrote: "Philosophy is trying to teach Boethius the way to true and ultimate happiness so that even while this horrible thing is being done to him, he will not truly be suffering as much as the one doing it to him. The physical pain and suffering can be seen as one of fortunes fickle acts, but Boethius can achieve a greater happiness for himself. "

I think this is right on, as far as what Boethius is doing here. He is offering an escape to a different world, which in the position of a man unjustly punished is certainly a consolation. But I would like to see an argument that is founded on something better than an ideal world which exists only in the mind, or the soul, or wherever it is. This is a religious argument, and it works as a religious argument. But I'm not convinced by it as a philosophical argument.

Patrice wrote: "As an aside, I read that Boethius was killed by having wet leather straps put on his head.
As the leather dried it crushed his skull. Did you read he was bludgeoned?"

Oy. In his introduction, Watts says he was "cruelly tortured and bludgeoned to death."

Thomas wrote: "Silver wrote: "This is a religious argument, and it works as a religious argument. But I'm not convinced by it as a philosophical argument..."

Aren't a lot of Philosophical arguments tied directly in with religion?

I think I may have a better understanding of what Philosophy means by the "evil does not exist statement"

According to Philosophy, the reason why evil does not exist, from what I gather is because it is the natural desire of all men to want to seek happiness and the only way to archive happiness is through the goodness of God, and thus no man would seek out evil because evil will not bring him happiness.

Wickedness than is born not from men seeking out to do evil but rather it comes from mans attempts to do good and seek happiness, and in his quest for happiness he becomes led astray and falls into the trap of fortune. Being fooled by the happiness which fortune brings them they loose their way to achieving truer happiness. But because fortune cannot bring them the happiness they really seek they continue down their path of wickedness trying to fulfill their needs for happiness.

Thus evil does not exist because man would not with intention make the choice to do evil because it would go against his nature to willingly turn away from happiness.

Silver wrote: "Thomas wrote: "Silver wrote: "This is a religious argument, and it works as a religious argument. But I'm not convinced by it as a philosophical argument..."

Aren't a lot of Philosophical argume..."

Yes, they are, especially if the philosophy is idealistic in nature. But I would be happier if Philosophy spoke of God rather than the Good. They are equivalent, but I would find the argument more palatable if she acknowledged the role of faith rather than making the idealistic perfect Good an entity founded on reason alone.

Chapter 3, line 39: " . . . for if, as we concluded a little earlier, evil is nothing, it is obvious that wicked men have no power, because they can perform only evil deeds."

How is this not pure baloney? We've talked ourselves into restricting "power" to mean "power to do good," then concluded that wicked men have no power. Does this not violate common sense and everyday experience? Maybe wicked men (qua wicked) can only do wicked things, destructive things, things that destroy without creating, but that's still a kind of power, isn't it?

Roger wrote: "Maybe wicked men (qua wicked) can only do wicked things, destructive things, things that destroy without creating, but that's still a kind of power, isn't it? ..."

The power to destroy is a kind of power, but it is not the power of evil man, but the power of man in general. All men have it. Perhaps it's better to put the question this way: Do evil men have more power than good men? The same question is asked in Plato's Republic, "Is injustice more powerful than justice?"

If we define power as the the ability to effect changes in things to fulfill one's own purpose, and if we accept that all men, good or evil, desire happiness, then evil man does not have power, because he cannot change things in a way that would enable him to achieve happiness that is self-sufficient and permanent.

Any thoughts about Philosophy's take on Providence and Fate? I was hoping she would arrive at something as nuanced as Milton's God in Paradise Lost:

They therefore as to right belong'd,
So were created, nor can justly accuse
Thir maker, or thir making, or thir Fate,
As if Predestination over-rul'd
Thir will, disposed by absolute Decree
Or high foreknowledge; they themselves decreed
Thir own revolt, not I: if I foreknew,
Foreknowledge had no influence on their fault,
Which had no less prov'd certain unforeknown. Book 3, 116.

Is this much different from Philosophy's explanation of fate and providence in Bk 4, part 6?

One of the troubling things for me is that Philosophy seems to say that men are not qualified to be judges of good and evil. Given all that has preceded regarding the Good, this is surprising.

No doubt your objection will be that it is impossible for there to be a more unjust confusion than when the fortunes of good men and bad alike continually vary between adversity and prosperity. And I shall ask you if men have such soundness of mind as to be infallible in their judgement of who is good and who is bad. No, human judgements class in this matter.

She goes on to say that only God can know these things, and that He "applies to him whatever (fate) He knows is suitable. This, then, is the outstanding wonder of the order of fate; a knowing God acts and ignorant men look on with wonder at his actions."

If I understand this correctly, it doesn't matter what we know or don't know, what we choose or how we judge the good and the bad. Fate, as an instrument of God, will set us straight. Even when we think we're doing well, we may not be, and we can expect to be corrected in a way that appears unjust.

I think I like Milton's version better. :)

Thomas wrote: "Any thoughts about Philosophy's take on Providence and Fate? I was hoping she would arrive at something as nuanced as Milton's God in Paradise Lost: ...

Foreknowledge had no influence on their fault,
Which had no less prov'd certain unforeknown.

I haven't read Paradise Lost (it's Voltaire's fault). Could you interpret that last verse?

To my mind, Boethius reconciles free will with divine foreknowledge in exactly the same way that Milton does, though the former uses philosophical analysis and the latter poetical imagination. In fact, I wonder a bit that Boethius dwells on the problem so much, devoting his entire last book to it. It's an important point in philosophy and theology, but it has little to do with the "consolation" that philosophy can offer to the unfortunate.

Nemo wrote: "Thomas wrote: "Any thoughts about Philosophy's take on Providence and Fate? I was hoping she would arrive at something as nuanced as Milton's God in Paradise Lost: ...

Foreknowledge had no influen..."

I too had reservations concerning PL. (Blame Virginia Woolf) But, when I was forced to read it (by this group), I was really glad that I did. It a ripping yarn which makes you think.

Roger wrote: "To my mind, Boethius reconciles free will with divine foreknowledge in exactly the same way that Milton does, though the former uses philosophical analysis and the latter poetical imagination. In ..."

I just started the last book and realize now I've jumped the gun with this question. It's really something for the Book V discussion.

Nemo wrote: "Thomas wrote: "Any thoughts about Philosophy's take on Providence and Fate? I was hoping she would arrive at something as nuanced as Milton's God in Paradise Lost: ...

Foreknowledge had no influen..."

Milton's separates God's omniscience from man's free will. He knows beforehand that Adam and Eve will transgress, but that doesn't mean that they don't make the decision to do so of their own free will.

Philosophy in Book 4 doesn't deny man's free will, but her Providence seems to work almost mechanistically. Just actions are as likely to have painful consequences as unjust ones are to have pleasant consequences -- it just depends on how Providence has mapped it out. I guess understanding this is supposed to give the victim of injustice some kind of solace.

Vikz wrote: "I too had reservations concerning PL. (Blame Virginia Woolf) But, when I was forced to read it (by this group), I was really glad that I did. It a ripping yarn which makes you think..."

What was Woolf's criticism of Paradise Lost?

Nemo wrote: "Vikz wrote: "I too had reservations concerning PL. (Blame Virginia Woolf) But, when I was forced to read it (by this group), I was really glad that I did. It a ripping yarn which makes you think......"

If I get this right, it was something to do with it being too didactic, too persuasive and therefore dangerous. Bloomburyites were agnostic or atheist. So, it's no surprise that she distrusted this book http://youtu.be/R0AcfjEGw_k

Patrice wrote: "My computer died. Writing this from library.
Hmmm, Is this "just"? A perfectly good and expensive computer went up in smoke!"

Well, it doesn't seem just, but it's all for the best! (I hope it was still under warranty. Maybe that can be your consolation.)

Patrice wrote: "My computer died. Writing this from library.
Hmmm, Is this "just"? A perfectly good and expensive computer went up in smoke!"

For dust they are, to dust they shall return. :) It's too bad these things cannot be recycled yet.

Patrice wrote: "My computer died. Writing this from library.
Hmmm, Is this "just"? A perfectly good and expensive computer went up in smoke!"

See what happens when you try and gain happiness from external sources ;-)