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Andrew
May 07, 2023 07:01PM

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"Her grandfather, the painter Lev Linde, emigrated in 1920 from Moscow to New York with his wife Eva and his son Adam."
Is my sister calendar tripe ?










I recall in one of Plato's works he notes how a young boy who is basically good will be naive and confused when dealing with the evil or bad intentions in others since the..."
Thanks, Manny! I posted my review with just a general reference to Plato's statement.

I recall in one of Plato's works he notes how a young boy who is basically good will be naive and confused when dealing with the evil or bad intentions in others since the young boy wil..."
Hi Glenn! I can't identify the Platonic source either. Though oddly enough, there was a very similar passage in the book Germany - What Next? (1939) - the author was explaining Hitler's favorite propaganda technique, the Big Lie. Topical stuff.

I recall in one of Plato's works he notes how a young boy who is basically good will be naive and confused when dealing with the evil or bad intentions in others since the young boy will project his goodness onto others and doesn't understand how or why people can act in a way that is hurtful or harmful to others. Do you recall where this is found and in what dialogue? Thanks.
Glenn

www.engadget.com/2017/09/06/george-or..."
Nice! But I would have been more surprised if I hadn't read How to Do Things With Videogames .


Example: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eXPKg... (satirical video he made about journalism)

So far, I've only read newspapers and Cet Amour-là (which I ain't enjoying right now)."
I'd recommend Le petit prince and the series Ainsi va la vie. Great stuff!

So far, I've only read newspapers and Cet Amour-là (which I ain't enjoying right now).

This is unprecedented - http://money.cnn.com/2017/02/24/media...
why aren't people seriously concerned ? - why hasn't Trump been impeached yet ? Deep inside, Trump is a fascist - it is time the world took notice and do something about it.



Make sure you're an interesting character, then you won't get written out early."
Well, I've always strived to be interesting, but what if my author ENJOYS killing off the interesting people and keeping the boring ones alive? (BTW, it was Trump's inauguration that convinced me I'm in a story.)

Make sure you're an interesting character, then you won't get written out early.


Thank you Ted, I have been thinking I ought to write a few comments... it's been a terribly busy week! The match is indeed more interesting than some people were saying it would be...


Anyway, in case you are not familiar, Milan Kundera outlines how, when it comes to novels, the rule is the most perceptive readers are not from the novelist's home country and those readers are reading the author in translation. I wrote a reveiw of Kundera's book where I mentioned this. https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...

https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...
Thanks also to Simon for participating on this thread.

I don't think this follows. First, Cezanne may 'just decide' he owes a debt and be wrong about it. So there is no debt. And secondly, if deciding that there is a debt is sufficient for the existence of a debt, that suggests that the debt is created by the decision, not by the utterance of the expression "I owe you...". "
I agree that this is the crux of it. As you say, the statement "I owe you..." usually describes the existence of an obligation which has arisen for other reasons. But the Cezanne example is interesting precisely because (as Glenn originally pointed out) it at least suggests the possibility of a performative reading.
So first, is it plausible in this situation that Cezanne could have been mistaken? Can Bernard reply "Non, monsieur, you do not owe me anything"? There's no doubt that this would be staggeringly rude, but the question is whether it even makes sense. Maybe it does... but if it makes sense, does it actually have its literal meaning? It seems to have the value of decisively repudiating their friendship by rejecting the deep promise Cezanne has offered, and it feels (at least to me) that Bernard would just be playing with words, refusing to understand what Cezanne actually intended. I'm not convinced that Cezanne really can be mistaken.
Second, if it's the decision that creates the obligation rather than the utterance, would it have been possible for Cezanne to think to himself "I've decided that I owe Bernard the truth in painting, but I won't tell anyone"? It seems to me that he could quite reasonably have thought this. But even if he never does speak the words, the mere act of thinking them could be considered as a promise he makes to himself, in which case it is arguably a kind of performative.
So perhaps the real questions are a) whether it's possible for an obligation to arise merely by thinking to oneself "I have the following obligation", b) if this should be considered a performative. I don't know! It certainly is an interesting example.

And thanks, Manny, for getting back with me.
He now had to do it, or his honour as an artist would be impugned. And maybe he made the statement precisely for that reason, so as to force himself to deliver when otherwise he might have found it too difficult, ------ On the level of psychology, as you note, this type of promise is made by people all the time. From my own experience, in the arts all the time, for sure -- a statement an artist, writer, musician or performer makes publicly to prod themselves to get their creative juices flowing.

I don't think this follows. First, Cezanne may 'just decide' he owes a debt and be wrong about it. So there is no debt. And secondly, if deciding that there is a debt is sufficient for the existence of a debt, that suggests that the debt is created by the decision, not by the utterance of the expression "I owe you...".
It just doesn't seem part of the point or function of the language of obligation that saying that one has an obligation is itself creative of obligations. Promising is the way to create obligations performatively. But obligations themselves are created by all sorts of different things: promises, past favors, familial relations, legal standings, commands from those in authority, etc. The language of obligation extends to all these cases, and the natural function of "I owe... " or "I am obliged" is just to describe the existence of an obligation that derives from one of those sources. In fact, it would be very odd if "I owe... " or "I am obliged" were performative, since it would leave us with no simple way to express the existence of an obligation in general.

La phrase Je vous dois la vérité en peinture, et je vous la dirai a été écrite par Cézanne peu avant sa mort, dans une lettre à Emile Bernard datée du 23 octobre 1905. Il s'agissait d'un courrier privé, qui n'était évidemment pas destiné à une large diffusion. Et pourtant la phrase est devenue célèbre. Elle est constamment citée par les philosophes et les historiens de l'art.

My intuitions are a bit confused, since you expect in both cases that there would be a reason for saying it, and here there doesn't appear to be a reason - the person in question is behaving erratically. I wonder what the legal position is?
So the critical question is whether statements of the form "I owe you X" must always report on a state of affairs that has arisen for other reasons (clearly, they do at least some of the time), or whether they can create a state of indebtedness merely by being uttered, and hence be a kind of promise. If you choose the first alternative, then when someone felicitously says "I owe you X", there must always be a reason why they are indebted, so it always makes sense to say "Why?" I'm trying to think whether this is true!
It seems to me that this is exactly what makes the Cezanne example interesting: Cezanne says he owes Emile Bernard the truth in painting. Is it clear that Bernard can then ask why? If he can, then it's not a performative, and maybe this is reasonable; maybe Cezanne must explain and say that it's because Bernard has inspired him in some way, and he must return the favor. But it also seems possible for Cezanne to say that there is no reason, he has just decided that he owes him this debt. In which case it seems to be a performative... and will there not be other, similar cases?


If I promise to pay you $10, which does create an obligation for me to pay you, and you want to remove that obligation, you say something like "I release (or free) you from your promise." You don't say "No you don't promise me." Now suppose I promise to pay, creating an obligation, and you release me. I forget that you have released me and say "Oh I owe you $10." I'm acknowledging the existence of the obligation created by the promise. You say "no you don't." You're not releasing me from the obligation; you're reminding me that you have released me from the promise and that there is therefore no existing obligation.
Or consider the case where you spontaneously do me a big big favor and I say, "Wow, man, I really owe you!" Again, surely I am just recognizing an obligation to you that was created not by my utterance but by your doing me the big favor?
I just don't see how, except perhaps in unusual circumstances (where using the language is a way of making a promise), an utterance of the form "I owe you X" itself creates any obligation.

I certainly won't deny that there are many cases where you can say "I owe you $10" and not incur an obligation. As you point out, if there already is an debt, you're just acknowledging it by saying that, not creating a new debt. But if there is no debt, and you say this, isn't it different? I say I need a bottle of wine, and you give it to me, and I say "I owe you $10" - don't my words create the debt, even though you might immediately cancel it by saying that you're happy to do me a favor? And it sounds like the Cezanne case is in this class.

Anyhow, in this book Derrida ..."
This seems much too quick to me. I don't think "I owe you X" is generally a performative at all. It *might* be used as a way of saying "I promise to give you X" but that is certainly not its main use. Just think of how natural it would be to say "I owe you $10" and for you to reply "No, you paid me already," or "No, you don't owe me anything. I was doing you a favor." The truth-conditions for "I owe you X" are that there is an already existing obligation for me to give you X.

Anyhow, in this book Derrida turns to an am..."
Wow, that's an interesting example. You've kind of made me want to read what Derrida had to say about it.
If you believe in the theory of performatives, and I think most people do these days, any seriously intended statement of the form "I owe you X" places you in a state of indebtedness and by virtue of that changes the nature of your relationships to the people affected, and hence your social reality. That's just what it means to say "I owe you X". So it seems to me that if Cezanne was serious (and perhaps this is the thing that's least clear), then he must have changed the social reality by saying "I owe you the truth in painting and will tell it to you". He now had to do it, or his honour as an artist would be impugned. And maybe he made the statement precisely for that reason, so as to force himself to deliver when otherwise he might have found it too difficult,
It is not in fact so unusual for people to make vows of this kind in order to strengthen their resolve, though normally the stakes are lower.

Anyhow, in this book Derrida turns to an ambiguous statement, the one where Cezanne wrote his friend that he owed him the truth in painting and will tell it to him.
As I understand, this type of statement or speech act is referred to as a performance utterance, a statement that does something, like a minister telling a couple he will pronounce them husband and wife on Saturday. I also have read that a performative utterances are sentences that also change the social reality they are describing. So, my question: Is Cezanne changing the social reality with his statement "I owe you the truth in painting and will tell it to you?" In other words, is Cezanne's statement a performance statement in this sense? --- Thanks. Any help most appreciated
Glenn