Christopher Zoukis's Blog - Posts Tagged "supreme-court"
High Court to Weigh If Withheld Evidence Undoes Old Convictions
After the District of Columbia’s highest local court declined to act on the issue, the U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to review two cases challenging the convictions of seven young people in a horrific 1984 murder case, because prosecutors withheld evidence from defense lawyers that pointed to other suspects, or weakened government witnesses’ testimony.
The Supreme Court will take up Turner v. United States and Overton v. United States March 29. The appeals hold the potential to revamp standards for how courts should decide whether prosecutors’ failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to defense counsel, as required by the high court’s landmark 1963 decision in Brady v. Maryland, forces convictions to be reversed.
On Oct. 1, 1984, Catherine Fuller, a 48-year-old cleaning woman and mother of six, had started walking from her home in northeast Washington, D.C. to a local store when she came across a group of youths hanging out in a nearby park. A few hours later her body was found in an alley; she had been dragged into a garage, robbed, brutally beaten, stripped and sodomized with a metal pole.
Investigating the high-profile murder, DC police questioned hundreds of witnesses and eventually focused on a then-little known local gang, the Eighth and H Crew. After arresting 17 individuals, prosecutors eventually charged a dozen defendants, including one woman, with the robbery, assault and murder.
In a six-week trial late in 1985, two defendants turned state’s evidence, got deals on lesser charges, and implicated the others. The lone woman and another defendant were acquitted, but the remaining eight defendants were convicted and given lengthy sentences. One died in prison, another was released in 2010, but six are still behind bars. All have consistently denied being involved in the crime.
Seeking to overturn their convictions, the appellants point to several issues. The two defendants who accused them have since recanted, claiming they were pressured by police and provided information on the case for their statements. Appellants also claim prosecutors violated the Brady decision by failing to share with defense lawyers statements from witnesses about other suspicious actions people observed in the area about the time Catherine Fuller was attacked, or who had told others they took part in the attack.
Specifically, they noted that, besides various statements that could have undercut prosecution witnesses, prosecutors failed to disclose evidence on two alternative suspects who were in the neighborhood at the time and had records of violent robberies of middle-aged women.
In 2015, the D.C. Court of Appeals heard those arguments but decided there was “overwhelming” evidence for the defendants’ guilt and said their co-defendants’ recanting of accusations against them was “not worthy of belief.” To have their convictions overturned, the DC appeals court concluded, defendants would have to show there was a “reasonable probability” they would not have been convicted if their defense team had been given the withheld evidence.
The Supreme Court took the case to examine whether D.C. used the correct standard for determining when Brady violations require overturning convictions. The case has attracted considerable interest from both prosecutors and defense lawyer groups, due to the potentially far-reaching consequences of a change in the standard of review of Brady violations.
The Supreme Court will take up Turner v. United States and Overton v. United States March 29. The appeals hold the potential to revamp standards for how courts should decide whether prosecutors’ failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to defense counsel, as required by the high court’s landmark 1963 decision in Brady v. Maryland, forces convictions to be reversed.
On Oct. 1, 1984, Catherine Fuller, a 48-year-old cleaning woman and mother of six, had started walking from her home in northeast Washington, D.C. to a local store when she came across a group of youths hanging out in a nearby park. A few hours later her body was found in an alley; she had been dragged into a garage, robbed, brutally beaten, stripped and sodomized with a metal pole.
Investigating the high-profile murder, DC police questioned hundreds of witnesses and eventually focused on a then-little known local gang, the Eighth and H Crew. After arresting 17 individuals, prosecutors eventually charged a dozen defendants, including one woman, with the robbery, assault and murder.
In a six-week trial late in 1985, two defendants turned state’s evidence, got deals on lesser charges, and implicated the others. The lone woman and another defendant were acquitted, but the remaining eight defendants were convicted and given lengthy sentences. One died in prison, another was released in 2010, but six are still behind bars. All have consistently denied being involved in the crime.
Seeking to overturn their convictions, the appellants point to several issues. The two defendants who accused them have since recanted, claiming they were pressured by police and provided information on the case for their statements. Appellants also claim prosecutors violated the Brady decision by failing to share with defense lawyers statements from witnesses about other suspicious actions people observed in the area about the time Catherine Fuller was attacked, or who had told others they took part in the attack.
Specifically, they noted that, besides various statements that could have undercut prosecution witnesses, prosecutors failed to disclose evidence on two alternative suspects who were in the neighborhood at the time and had records of violent robberies of middle-aged women.
In 2015, the D.C. Court of Appeals heard those arguments but decided there was “overwhelming” evidence for the defendants’ guilt and said their co-defendants’ recanting of accusations against them was “not worthy of belief.” To have their convictions overturned, the DC appeals court concluded, defendants would have to show there was a “reasonable probability” they would not have been convicted if their defense team had been given the withheld evidence.
The Supreme Court took the case to examine whether D.C. used the correct standard for determining when Brady violations require overturning convictions. The case has attracted considerable interest from both prosecutors and defense lawyer groups, due to the potentially far-reaching consequences of a change in the standard of review of Brady violations.
High Court Splits on Whether Juror’s Racial Bias Merits New Trial
Dividing sharply by a 5-3 margin the U.S. Supreme Court issued a major new ruling March 6th that evidence of racial bias affecting a jury verdict may in some cases overcome longstanding rules shielding jury deliberations from court review.
In Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, Miguel Peña-Rodriguez had been convicted of sex offenses against two teenage girls, and unsuccessfully sought to persuade a Colorado trial court to give him a new trial, citing evidence from two jurors that another juror had made anti-Hispanic remarks about the defendant and a defense witness during jury deliberations.
The state court refused to overturn the verdict based on state evidence rules generally barring evidence of jury-room deliberations. But the Supreme Court, in a decision written by Justice Anthony Kennedy and joined by four liberal justices (Breyer, Ginsberg, Kagan and Sotomayor), reversed and sent the case back to the state court to reconsider the case in light of the testimony of the two jurors, who reported racially charged remarks.
Kennedy’s opinion began by noting traditional rules adopted by state and federal courts to prevent second-guessing of jury deliberations, but for the first time ruled that the court’s “imperative to purge racial prejudice” from the administration of justice might require creating an exception to the general rule against court review of how the jury reached its verdict.
In this case, lawyers for Peña-Rodriguez had obtained statements from two jurors that another juror, a former law enforcement officer, had voiced the view that Mexican men were almost always “guilty of being aggressive toward women and young girls” and believed “they could do whatever they wanted with women.”
Calling those statements “egregious” and “unmistakable in their reliance on racial bias,” Kennedy’s opinion said the trial court should have weighed whether the statements had violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. If so, a juror’s racist comments could justify overturning a verdict and ordering a new trial.
But three justices strongly dissented. A opinion written by Justice Samuel Alito and joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas called the majority opinion “well-intentioned,” but argued that opening up jury deliberations to later attack would create serious problems, including making jurors more guarded and less honest in their deliberations, subjecting jurors to harassment by convicted defendants seeking evidence of prejudice to support appeals, and making citizens less willing to serve on juries. Alito’s dissent charged the court’s majority “barely bothers” to address those serious policy issues.
The court’s majority opinion did not decide that Peña-Rodriguez will get a new trial, or even spell out in detail how the trial court should go about making that determination, beyond saying the trial judge should investigate, question the former jurors, and then decide whether a new trial is needed.
In fact, the majority opinion cautioned not every “offhand comment indicating racial bias or hostility” would justify overturning a verdict and ordering a new trial. Instead, to reach those results, the trial court must find the statements of at least one juror during deliberations showed overt racial bias that seriously called into doubt the fairness and impartiality of the jury’s deliberations by showing racial bias “was a significant motivating factor” of the conviction.
In Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, Miguel Peña-Rodriguez had been convicted of sex offenses against two teenage girls, and unsuccessfully sought to persuade a Colorado trial court to give him a new trial, citing evidence from two jurors that another juror had made anti-Hispanic remarks about the defendant and a defense witness during jury deliberations.
The state court refused to overturn the verdict based on state evidence rules generally barring evidence of jury-room deliberations. But the Supreme Court, in a decision written by Justice Anthony Kennedy and joined by four liberal justices (Breyer, Ginsberg, Kagan and Sotomayor), reversed and sent the case back to the state court to reconsider the case in light of the testimony of the two jurors, who reported racially charged remarks.
Kennedy’s opinion began by noting traditional rules adopted by state and federal courts to prevent second-guessing of jury deliberations, but for the first time ruled that the court’s “imperative to purge racial prejudice” from the administration of justice might require creating an exception to the general rule against court review of how the jury reached its verdict.
In this case, lawyers for Peña-Rodriguez had obtained statements from two jurors that another juror, a former law enforcement officer, had voiced the view that Mexican men were almost always “guilty of being aggressive toward women and young girls” and believed “they could do whatever they wanted with women.”
Calling those statements “egregious” and “unmistakable in their reliance on racial bias,” Kennedy’s opinion said the trial court should have weighed whether the statements had violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. If so, a juror’s racist comments could justify overturning a verdict and ordering a new trial.
But three justices strongly dissented. A opinion written by Justice Samuel Alito and joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas called the majority opinion “well-intentioned,” but argued that opening up jury deliberations to later attack would create serious problems, including making jurors more guarded and less honest in their deliberations, subjecting jurors to harassment by convicted defendants seeking evidence of prejudice to support appeals, and making citizens less willing to serve on juries. Alito’s dissent charged the court’s majority “barely bothers” to address those serious policy issues.
The court’s majority opinion did not decide that Peña-Rodriguez will get a new trial, or even spell out in detail how the trial court should go about making that determination, beyond saying the trial judge should investigate, question the former jurors, and then decide whether a new trial is needed.
In fact, the majority opinion cautioned not every “offhand comment indicating racial bias or hostility” would justify overturning a verdict and ordering a new trial. Instead, to reach those results, the trial court must find the statements of at least one juror during deliberations showed overt racial bias that seriously called into doubt the fairness and impartiality of the jury’s deliberations by showing racial bias “was a significant motivating factor” of the conviction.
Is a Defendant Claiming Mental Illness Entitled to an Expert Witness?
The U.S. Supreme Court recently heard a case (McWilliams v. Dunn) raising the issue of whether an indigent criminal defendant claiming mental illness is entitled to get an independent expert witness to assist the defense.
Over three decades ago, in December 1984, Patricia Reynolds, a convenience store clerk in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, was robbed, raped and murdered. Brought to trial for the crimes, James McWilliams, at his lawyer’s request, received a court-ordered psychiatric assessment, to examine his sanity, competency and any mitigating factors.
The testing was overseen by the state Department of Corrections, and a panel of three state-employed doctors reported McWilliams was competent to face trial, was not mentally ill at the time of the crimes, and was faking psychotic symptoms.
After McWilliams was found guilty, at the trial’s penalty phase prosecutors offered as expert witnesses two of the state doctors who had examined McWilliams and found him to be sane but feigning psychosis. The only witnesses for the defense were McWilliams and his mother, who spoke about childhood head injuries that they thought were linked to his various disorders, including chronic headaches, black-outs, hallucinations and memory problems.
The court also admitted a clinical psychologist’s report into evidence, which was done a few months before the crime spree, detailing psychiatric test results and concluding McWilliams probably had serious pathology. That psychologist did not appear when subpoenaed, however, and defense witnesses were unable to explain or discuss the report’s technical features. The jury called for the death penalty.
Before the sentencing hearing, McWilliams’ lawyer asked for more neurological and psychiatric testing; the court again ordered the state corrections department to oversee that. The psychologist in charge said organic impairment was possible, and suggested the court order further testing by a clinical neuropsychological specialist not employed by the state.
The court then named a specialist, who submitted a five-page report just two days before the sentencing hearing. McWilliams’ defense counsel didn’t receive all his client’s medical and psychiatric records from the state corrections system until the morning of that hearing.
Rejecting counsel’s request for more time to review the material, the court determined McWilliams was not psychotic, and any brain dysfunction he might have did not reach the level of a mitigating factor. In view of aggravating factors— a previous rape-robbery conviction, the brutal attack and execution-style shooting of Reynolds, and evidence McWilliams was malingering — the judge sentenced him to death by electrocution.
McWilliams’ lawyer next went to federal court, attacking the state's not providing an independent expert witness to review and explain the technical issues in a mental illness defense; he lost in federal district court and a split appellate panel.
To win, McWilliams must show not only that he needed an independent expert advisor-witness, but also that the state’s failure to provide one violated a clearly established constitutional requirement. The closest Supreme Court decision, a 1986 case finding Oklahoma wrongly withheld all psychiatric review from an indigent defendant whose mental health was a central issue, didn’t decide whether an independent expert was required, or it might be sufficient if the defendant were reviewed by state mental health experts, as McWilliams was.
At the April 24 hearing, however, some observers thought that swing vote Justice Anthony Kennedy may side with the court’s four liberal justices, and hand McWilliams a new review of his sentence.
Over three decades ago, in December 1984, Patricia Reynolds, a convenience store clerk in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, was robbed, raped and murdered. Brought to trial for the crimes, James McWilliams, at his lawyer’s request, received a court-ordered psychiatric assessment, to examine his sanity, competency and any mitigating factors.
The testing was overseen by the state Department of Corrections, and a panel of three state-employed doctors reported McWilliams was competent to face trial, was not mentally ill at the time of the crimes, and was faking psychotic symptoms.
After McWilliams was found guilty, at the trial’s penalty phase prosecutors offered as expert witnesses two of the state doctors who had examined McWilliams and found him to be sane but feigning psychosis. The only witnesses for the defense were McWilliams and his mother, who spoke about childhood head injuries that they thought were linked to his various disorders, including chronic headaches, black-outs, hallucinations and memory problems.
The court also admitted a clinical psychologist’s report into evidence, which was done a few months before the crime spree, detailing psychiatric test results and concluding McWilliams probably had serious pathology. That psychologist did not appear when subpoenaed, however, and defense witnesses were unable to explain or discuss the report’s technical features. The jury called for the death penalty.
Before the sentencing hearing, McWilliams’ lawyer asked for more neurological and psychiatric testing; the court again ordered the state corrections department to oversee that. The psychologist in charge said organic impairment was possible, and suggested the court order further testing by a clinical neuropsychological specialist not employed by the state.
The court then named a specialist, who submitted a five-page report just two days before the sentencing hearing. McWilliams’ defense counsel didn’t receive all his client’s medical and psychiatric records from the state corrections system until the morning of that hearing.
Rejecting counsel’s request for more time to review the material, the court determined McWilliams was not psychotic, and any brain dysfunction he might have did not reach the level of a mitigating factor. In view of aggravating factors— a previous rape-robbery conviction, the brutal attack and execution-style shooting of Reynolds, and evidence McWilliams was malingering — the judge sentenced him to death by electrocution.
McWilliams’ lawyer next went to federal court, attacking the state's not providing an independent expert witness to review and explain the technical issues in a mental illness defense; he lost in federal district court and a split appellate panel.
To win, McWilliams must show not only that he needed an independent expert advisor-witness, but also that the state’s failure to provide one violated a clearly established constitutional requirement. The closest Supreme Court decision, a 1986 case finding Oklahoma wrongly withheld all psychiatric review from an indigent defendant whose mental health was a central issue, didn’t decide whether an independent expert was required, or it might be sufficient if the defendant were reviewed by state mental health experts, as McWilliams was.
At the April 24 hearing, however, some observers thought that swing vote Justice Anthony Kennedy may side with the court’s four liberal justices, and hand McWilliams a new review of his sentence.
