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Hi Folks, this is an interview with Fred Wagner, author of the above book, as well as the exhaustive Participants in the Battle of the Little Big Horn: A Biographical Dictionary of Sioux, Cheyenne and United States Military.

ROBB­–Hi Fred, Thanks for the interview. Can you sum up how “Custer’s Last Stand” was lost?  In your admirable book, The Strategy of Defeat at the Little Big Horn, you indicated George Armstrong Custer was not as culpable as some have claimed.

FREDERIC WAGNER–George Custer bears full responsibility for the defeat at the Little Big Horn (LBH).  That is a fact and it should not be disputed.  Anyone who does dispute it is wrong.

[image error]There was also a mindset prevalent in Indian fighting that was not 100% foolproof… and it certainly wasn’t on June 25, 1876.  The military was imbued with the false notion that Indians always ran when confronted by a large, disciplined force fighting as such, for that was not the way Indians fought and it was not a system Indians used to fight.

In addition, intelligence estimates of Indian size—and intentions—while fairly consistent, were wildly incorrect.

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And communication issues in those days prevented more up-to-date estimates from reaching the maneuver units in time.

In addition to all that, Custer and his officers—almost to a man—made egregious errors in reading signs of Indian encampments when they were at last discovered, and neither Custer nor his officers paid heed to the warnings of their Indian scouts regarding the numbers and the signs.

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This borders on a false equivalence.

So, while Custer made mistakes that day, some of them were caused by circumstances beyond his control; and others by an environment prevalent throughout the military of not really knowing your enemy.

There is also the issue of Custer obeying or disobeying the intent of his orders and that contributed to his defeat as well.

If blame is to be assessed, that issue clearly falls in Custer’s lap.

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ROBB–Many believe Custer was a fool.  How do you see the general?

WAGNER–George Custer was clearly no fool.  He was a bright, intelligent man, prone to severe risk-taking… that got him killed.

Like anyone, Custer had his flaws and he was a political animal who sometimes did not know how to direct his political efforts discretely: he was extremely outspoken and he played favorites, even though he could be pushed… and at times, was.

He was also rather fastidious and a strict disciplinarian… often too strict.

The man was no fool, however, and those who claim such are sorely mistaken.

[image error] Custer Battlefield

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ROBB–Wasn’t Custer considered one of the most brilliant cavalry commanders who fought in the Civil War?

WAGNER–Yes, he was.  He was a particular favorite of Phil Sheridan.

Custer was involved in the battle of Yellow Tavern that saw the death of the great Confederate cavalry commander, J. E. B. Stuart.

Prior to that, George Custer led an almost insane cavalry charge against far superior numbers of Stuart’s cavalry at what has become known as East Cavalry Field during the Gettysburg battle.

Some consider this feat a greater contribution to the Union victory than even the halting of Picket’s Charge.

[image error]Custer’s scouts meeting on the battleground, years after the battle

One of Custer’s great attributes was his habit of thoroughly reconnoitering his enemy before any action.

I do not believe Custer was ever defeated in any action where his proper reconnaissance took place before the action.  His defeats all occurred when that reconnaissance was lacking… for whatever reason.

ROBB–How many 7th Cavalry soldiers was Custer leading on June 25, 1876, not counting civilian employees or scouts?

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WAGNER–Custer’s command consisted of 607 officers and enlisted men. In addition to these soldiers he had an array of scouts, interpreters, and so-called quartermaster employees.

These consisted of the following: twenty-four Arikara scouts; six Crow scouts; four Dakota scouts; five civilian packers; and nine quartermaster employees and civilians, including two contract surgeons.

This gave him a total of 655 men.

ROBB–You suggest in the book that although Custer did split his forces on the fatal day (which you indicated was not necessarily bad tactics), thus only fighting with 210 men, even his full force could not have won that battle. Did I understand this correctly?

WAGNER–Yes, you did.  My estimates and research indicate a village population of just fewer than 9,000 souls.

Under normal circumstances there would be the usual ratio between men and women, but this camp was an exception.

Intelligence reports from the various agencies indicated a much higher proportion of single males leaving the agencies, the families remaining behind.

Again, my research shows 2,072 warriors were involved in one or both phases of the battle and that number does not include warriors who were unable to get involved because of the over-crowding on the battlefield…as odd as that may seem.

There are several Indians accounts claiming the field was so full of Indians and the dust and smoke so pervasive, Indians were inadvertently killing Indians.

Another thing to consider is the Indians took advantage of interior lines, meaning they simply emanated from a central location—their camp—either to handle the Reno attack from the south or the Custer threat from the north.

Some warriors were involved in only one phase, while others fought in both.

Custer’s splitting of his force was not as egregious as it sounds, providing he would be able to reunite those commands or provide mutual support between them.

Circumstances intruded prohibiting him from accomplishing either.

[image error]Custer and wife Elizabeth, Libby, and their servant

ROBB–Reno, Benteen and their men took refuge against the Indians on a hill, and were rescued when the Indians left. Didn’t the Sioux and Cheyenne leave because a 7th Cavalry column was approaching?

WAGNER–It was not a 7th Cavalry column approaching; it was four companies of the 2nd Cavalry and several companies of the 7th Infantry, all under the command of Brigadier General Alfred Terry (the department commander) and Colonel John Gibbon, the C.O. of the 7th Infantry.

Warriors—many dressed in the uniforms of Custer’s slain troops—confronted this force and essentially stared it down.

The Indians left because they had intended to leave, the village being so large the area they had camped in could no longer sustain them, i.e., grass for horses, scarcity of game, etc.

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Some historians and battle students attribute the departure to the threat of the Terry-Gibbon force, others to a lack of ammunition, but neither was the case in my opinion.

The Indians had recovered plenty of ammunition from Custer’s 210 men, as well as a great deal from the confrontation with George Crook eight days earlier, and they far outnumbered anything Terry could throw at them.

Terry had Gatling guns, but the Indians would not have known this and the weapons were never employed.

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ROBB–Why were so many Indians together at the LBH in June 1876? Is it true that was a one-time event?

WAGNER–It was theoretically a one-time event, though similar events had taken place in the past.

Some claim many Indians believed this gathering signified the death knell of their way of life, those prescient enough to see into the future, and the inexorable advance of white culture.

Others were there simply because they refused to go to the agencies and adopt a more sedentary way of life.

Those were the so-called winter roamers, the non-agency Indians.

The gathering was meant to be celebratory, though the Cheyenne had felt the sting of George Crook’s troops back in March.

Indian runners had also let the headmen know of the government’s requirement that all Indians and tribes be at their various agencies no later than the end of January 1876.

Obviously, this stricture was ignored.

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ROBB–Why didn’t Custer believe his scouts when they told him how many Indians were gathered at the LBH River?

WAGNER–No numbers were ever given by the scouts, though the interpreter Fred Gerard had told General Terry they were likely to meet some 4,000 warriors in one place or another.

When signs were finally found along the Rosebud Creek beginning on June 22, the 7th’s officers including George Custer misread them.

It is believed Gerard told Custer on the night of the 24th – 25th he would be meeting more than 3,000 warriors (according to Gerard’s own account), but Custer chose instead to believe intelligence estimates from the War Department and Bureau of Indian Affairs of only 800 warriors, possibly supplemented by his own estimate of 500 – 700 additional.

ROBB–Many people have studied the LBH and have theories about Custer’s officers and their role in the defeat.  Did Captain Frederick Benteen or Major Marcus Reno, and their negative feelings about Custer, contribute to the defeat?

WAGNER–Absolutely not.  All of that falls into the category of partisanship and not history.

It is true Benteen disliked Custer intensely, but Fred Benteen was one of the finest officers to have ever served in the U. S. Army.

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Even many of his detractors give him credit for that.

Benteen was clever, witty, charming, yet he had a dark side brought about by a number of circumstances, mostly involving family matters.

He could be irascible and nasty, and he clearly could hold a grudge.  His dislike of Custer was intense, but it did not affect his performance at the Little Big Horn and those who claim it did are sorely mistaken.

Benteen represented the height of military professionalism.

Reno was a different matter, though he too gets a bad rap for his performance at the Little Big Horn.

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He was not well liked; short and somewhat stout, the Ree called him “Man With the Dark Face” (visage usually sun- and wind-burned).

Initially, he was well received by George Custer who referred to him as a “good friend,” but that did not last long.

Reno is ofttimes accused of cowardice or drunkenness or both at the battle and neither is true.

He was placed in a completely untenable position, and is vilified for his performance in leaving the valley in the manner he did.

His orders are consistently misread by his detractors, adding to the disdain, and he is also criticized roundly for halting a charge into the village, an action that—if continued—would have led to an unmitigated disaster.

Reasons for his halting are patently clear, but conveniently ignored by his critics.  While not the most competent—and certainly not the most glorious—of individuals, Reno’s actions were, overall, adequate, and prior to his manner of retreat, actually quite good, quite competent.

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The fact of the matter is that while costly, Reno’s actions saved his command. Then again, that is another, forthcoming book.

ROBB–It seems to me, that many people form their conclusions regarding the LBH battle, and Custer, based on emotional or political opinions, not facts.  What do you think about that?

WAGNER–It is true.  George Custer, to this day, carries a certain aura, a certain panache.

The young blond general, a hero of the Civil War, the dashing cavalier in the outrageous uniform… and in many cases a certain stigma: a harsh disciplinarian, a man who played favorites, a rash risk-taker without regard for others, questionably honest, and so forth.

He is both beloved and vilified, but true life justifies neither extreme.

There is an element of truth in all that, but as with everything in our society, most people prefer to choose one side without regard for opposing attributes, good or bad… or worse, facts!

ROBB–In your book, you seemed to suggest others who were killed with the general, were actually killed in the gully behind Last Stand Hill, not on it. But if so, why were their bodies found on the hill?

WAGNER–Those killed on the other side of Last Stand Hill were, in all likelihood, F Company troopers who overran the hilltop.  Their bodies were—again, in all likelihood—found in the lower ground east of the hilltop.

There are at least two Indian accounts claiming these men ran over the hill.

Based on the situation, such an action appears quite reasonable.

George’s body was found about six feet from where the monument stands today… six feet to the southwest.

Tom’s body was found a little higher up.

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With the exception of a little evening out to level the monument, the hilltop is essentially the same as it was in 1876; obviously without the parking area, the monument, and the walkway and roadway.

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