Classics and the Western Canon discussion

Spinoza's Preface to Part 3 points to the universality of the laws of nature, and this extends to human nature. Affects (such as emotions like love, hate, anger, etc.) all have their source in certain causes and properties, just like any other natural processes, and are subject to the laws of nature. The Preface sounds a bit defensive because he is going to deny that the mind has any influence over this. We'd like to think that we do things because they are good, or the right thing to do, and refrain from some things because they are evil. Spinoza denies this. From what has preceded in the Ethics, this makes sense. The preceding parts demonstrate that the mind, as an idea, is an entirely separate attribute from the body that suffers affects.

He goes on to state this explicitly in 3P2: "The body cannot determine the mind to thinking and the mind cannot determine the body to motion, to rest..." He goes on to say that "no one as yet has come to know the structures of the body so accurately that he could explain its functions," and in parallel fashion, that "no one knows how or by what means the mind moves the body." Does this seem right to you? From the previous material we know that the mind is the idea of the body, but now it appears that the body is a mystery to the mind. How are we supposed to understand this?

If I am hungry, does my mind propel my body to the kitchen to make a sandwich? Or is something else in control?

Maybe there is a clue in 3P10 to 3P13, where he argues that an idea that excludes the existence of our body cannot be in our mind, and that ideas that increase or diminish the body's power of acting also increase or diminish the mind's power of thinking.

How do the mind and the body connect for Spinoza?

Thomas wrote: "How do the mind and the body connect for Spinoza?"

This was tough to wrap my head around, but I will give it a shot. In short, the mind and body are connected insofar as they are part of the same substance. I think due to the degree of determinism Spinoza has set, the mind and body must act independently without causal influence on each other. If the mind perceived it was hungry and moved the body to the kitchen it would seem to be evidence of free will because the mind would be free to think all kinds of thoughts to move the body in all kinds of ways. For example, it is commonly held today that beliefs drive actions. Spinoza's separation of mind/body also seems in conflict with a previous example of placing my hand on a host stove causing the mind to perceive pain, or at least the idea of it.

The closest analogy to this I can think of would be a computer. The software (mind) and hardware (body) are different expressions of computer system (substance). The software doesn't move the hardware. When the hardware performs and action, like running a program, the software displays the results (ideas) on the screen, but the analogy breaks down because displaying things on a screen is a software driven physical response.

If I understand it correctly, Spinoza gets around this problem by use of conatus: that each thing exemplifies an inherent tendency towards self-preservation through its own essence. While the mind perceives the body's becoming hungry and going to the kitchen to make a sandwich as ideas, it is the body itself that has learned to do this - by what faculty other than the mind the body "learns" this habit I cannot say but Spinoza uses conatus. A question I have then is memory part of the body? Apparently conatus extends to inanimate things as well, like rocks. The essence of a rock is hardness, which inherently preserves it from being destroyed by external forces.

For now I cannot clearly see why the mind/body cannot cause events in each other. Determinism could still be left intact if the ideas of the mind are created as part of its deterministic nature and the body's reaction to the mind's thoughts were deterministically driven choices within the probability of its nature.

I have the feeling that Spinoza did not arrive at his ideas in the manner that he explicates them. In other words, he did not start from the most basic principles and then derive his conclusions from them. He had certain insights and then constructed a logical apparatus to make these insights appear to be indisputable. I think that is what makes his logic so confounding at least when first encountered.

I think what he is getting at here is that we think we do the things we do because they are right, but in fact we think they are right because they are the things we do.

Donnally wrote: "I think what he is getting at here is that we think we do the things we do because they are right, but in fact we think they are right because they are the things we do."

The Scholium from PIII,P9 agrees with that assessment:

It is clear from the above considerations that we do not endeavor, will, seek after or desire because we judge a thing to be good. On the contrary, we judge a thing to be good because we endeavor, will, seek after and desire it.

Is conatus the summum bonum of Spinoza's Philosophy. Without some other summum bonum how will Spinoza defend his philosophy from charges of selfish hedonism?

How are these two propositions reconciled?

PROPOSITION III.2 The body cannot determine the mind to think, nor can the mind determine the body to motion or rest, or to anything else (if there is anything else).

with

PROPOSITION III.12 The mind, as far as it can, endeavors to think of those things that increase or assist the body’s power of activity.

These propositions seem contradictory. How can the mind assist the body without being an agent of change or influence?

I'll see if I can retrieve one of the alleys I have been down that may shed some light on seeming to address the contradiction. It was some fairly recent work on what, if any, feedback from the body may influence the how/what the mind thinks. That seemed obvious to me, going into the reading. But the implication I read was that the mind apparently has been assumed/observed to "think" independently of the body. Thus, if thoughts have an impact on the body, (I am running out of the words I want) is it analogous to software "driving" hardware?

https://www.scientificamerican.com/ar...

I keep losing entries tonight. But the above article, while not the one I hoped to retrieve, does shed a bit of history on the evolution of knowledge on the relationship of feedback between body and "pure" conceptual thought. One might extrapolate that independence of mind/brain/thought from body was considered even more separate in Spinoza's day?

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epist...

Another side trip, but I found this interesting for the discussion of how particular relationships may be embedded in some languages and not in others. My mind made an analogy with the thought/body relationship here -- don't know if its a valid analogy.

David wrote: "How are these two propositions reconciled?
PROPOSITION III.2 The body cannot determine the mind to think, nor can the mind determine the body to motion or rest, or to anything else (if there is a..."

The computer analogy is a good one, but there is the problem you already identified. A computer must still have an interface with the physical world. Lily's example is also good. I'm reminded of the studies that have been done on the brains of monks in deep meditation that show actual neurological changes. But I think Spinoza would describe these as physical processes -- the brain is a physical organ responsible for a lot of other physiological actions, including appetites and mental concentration.

Even competing appetites or desires can be accounted for by Spinoza's theory of affects -- a recovering addict may still have the urge to use drugs or alcohol, but the effects on his body are so debilitating that the affects of sobriety overrule the urge to use drugs. I suppose it's rare for addicts to recover from substance abuse on the basis of reason alone. On the contrary, the most effective therapy seems to involve group support and the belief in a "higher power" that is able to help them. (Which makes me wonder if Spinoza thinks that conventional religion, mythology, "positive thinking" etc., are brain tricks that have nothing to do with the mind.)

What about laughter?

David wrote: "The Scholium from PIII,P9 agrees with that assessment:
It is clear from the above considerations that we do not endeavor, will, seek after or desire because we judge a thing to be good. On the contrary, we judge a thing to be good because we endeavor, will, seek after and desire it."

Precisely. Spinoza has built up this whole logical edifice in order to prove this, but he has failed to prove this point.

Personally, I think I might have lost interest in this conversation as the goal seems to be either to wrong Spinoza or to boil his complex thought down to something (or rather to nothing) even before his words are understood or even read fully.

Donnally wrote: "Precisely. Spinoza has built up this whole logical edifice in order to prove this, but he has failed to prove this point."

Where do you think Spinoza's argument breaks down? Personally, I find it challenging to argue against or come up with counterexamples to his proposition.

Consider what Spinoza means when he says we "judge a thing to be good because we endeavor, will, seek after, and desire it." Can you think of everyday examples where this might apply?

For instance, does a person desire a particular food because they judge it to be good, or do they judge it to be good because they desire it?

If our judgments were independent of our desires, wouldn't there be more uniformity in what people consider good? How do individual differences in judgment arise?

If we assume Spinoza's proposition is incorrect, how do we explain how our judgments about what is good change over time based on our desires and experiences?

Consider the resistance to the idea of pleasure as the summum bonum in Utilitarianism and its defense. For example, eating a rice cake might be unpleasant, but the long-term desire for health (conatus) can outweigh the short-term desire to avoid the unpleasant taste. Similarly, enduring the pain of a tooth extraction is a short-term pain for long-term health benefits.

For the umpteenth time, I've lost an attempted post! For right now I'm not going to try to reconstruct. (In the future, I will copy a response to my own files before posting here, at least until seems to be resolved,) In the meantime, I will only challenge Fed to continue to engage in the conversations here in ways that will drag out what he may be seeking in his participation.

I lost an attempted post again! For the moment, I'll just try saying, if you haven't read the (entire?) Wikipedia post on Spinoza, consider doing so. I am finding it another point of reference to read against other views.

Fed wrote: "Personally, I think I might have lost interest in this conversation as the goal seems to be either to wrong Spinoza or to boil his complex thought down to something (or rather to nothing) even befo..."

Sorry you've lost interest. I disagree that the goal here is to "wrong Spinoza,." We're doing our best to understand the text of the Ethics, and we're all willing to listen to anyone who wishes to present a reasonable argument, particularly if it is based on the text that we're reading.

Donnally wrote: "David wrote: "The Scholium from PIII,P9 agrees with that assessment:

It is clear from the above considerations that we do not endeavor, will, seek after or desire because we judge a thing to be good. On the contrary, we judge a thing to be good because we endeavor, will, seek after and desire it..."

I think Spinoza's argument works, but it rests on assumptions that we're unaccustomed to. The good and evil referenced in the scholium in 3P9 have to do with desire, which is appetite "together with consciousness of the appetite."

How does the mind, which is entirely separate from the body, become conscious of its appetites? The mind is conscious of itself through ideas of the body's affections. (2P23: "The mind does not know itself , except insofar as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the body".)

The mind doesn't actually do anything in the physical world. If an appetite is "good," it isn't because the mind has made a judgement about a sandwich being good, it's because the body wants to preserve itself. We call that good, but it isn't because there is an "adequate" idea in the mind of the goodness of sandwiches. I'm not sure if there is an idea for The Good at all, actually. This line of thinking seems to raise the question of whether anything is really good or evil in itself. This is an excellent way of approaching the problem of subjective judgment, inasmuch as it removes it altogether.

The biggest obstacle for me is getting past the idea that the mind is operating in a totally different sphere than the body. It seems that for Spinoza almost all human activity is driven by the body. I find this hard to accept, but it certainly leads to some interesting conclusions, and some fascinating observations.

Thomas wrote: "The biggest obstacle for me is getting past the idea that the mind is operating in a totally different sphere than the body. "

I have come to understand that Spinoza posits that the body and mind reflect each other’s states due to their parallel existence, not because one directly causes the other in an efficient causal sense.

The analogy I have found that best helped me understand this is as follows:

Consider two synchronized clocks showing the same time. The movement of the hands on one clock does not cause the movement of the hands on the other, but they both reflect the same underlying time.

Similarly, in Spinoza's view, the body's state and the mind's state are synchronized and reflect the same underlying conatus, but they do not cause each other.

David wrote: "Donnally wrote: "Precisely. Spinoza has built up this whole logical edifice in order to prove this, but he has failed to prove this point."

Where do you think Spinoza's argument breaks down? Perso..."

I wasn't saying I disagreed with the point Spinoza was making. Actually, I think it's an astonishing insight. What I felt was that Spinoza's method of argumentation was intended to make it look as though the point had been proven, when I couldn't see that. Maybe I'm incorrect; I need to review Part III.

I'm also struck by the idea that the body and the mind exist in separate worlds. The body's senses are in what might be called the actual world, while we are also living simultaneously in what might be called the world of words, which exists in our mind. To put it in terms of cognitive psychology perhaps this is the distinction between sensation and perception. I may have absorbed this notion from Spinoza without realizing that was what he was saying. I find Spinoza's writing very dense and often impenetrable, but at the same time I think he's getting through to me. Maybe it's because I'm reading the Elwes translation.

Sorry if this post seems unnecessarily confused.

This one set off my Utilitarian detector:

PROPOSITION 29 We also endeavor to do whatever we imagine men[2] to regard with pleasure, and on the other hand we shun doing whatever we imagine men to regard with aversion.

I found the note an interesting one:

[2] Here, and in what follows, by ‘men’ I understand men for whom we have felt no emotion. [Spinoza]

Is this necessary to reduce bias or favoritism? Who are these men we have no emotion for? The "greatest number" [of men], perhaps, mankind? Is conformity to social norms a determinant of what we should or should not do?

I should probably start listening to the Universe. I just lost another post to careless shifting to another page to capture some additional bit of information!

Anyway, this time let me see if I can reconstruct a bit. First, my approach to trying to understand Spinoza has been very different than others of you posting here. I started with recognizing I wasn't going to satisfied with believing I could comprehend Cartesian logic. (I was trained in engineering physics, spent my life in the computing world, yet have never been able to give myself a satisfactorily cogent understanding of Euclidean geometry -- beyond today being able to shudder at the political reality of Texas lawmaking.)

So I've tried stepping back a bit into the "history" of philosophy. Even noted some commentary on Raphael's "School of Athens," where Plato turns his hand upward as if to welcome the insight of his "Forms" and Aristotle directs his hand downward -- here can his fulcrum have traction? From there, I seem to be meandering from the disciplines of medieval scholasticism to the aphorism of Descartes to the community-ostracism (cherem) of Spinoza, with little side-trips along the way. Not at all certain any adequate hopes of understanding Spinoza will be accomplished, but I am grateful for the observations shared here.

As a sidebar, let me comment that I have stumbled upon the work of Ervin Laszlo; David Lorimer. Not sure where to put them yet, but spent much of one night and a couple of subsequent diversions listening to their The Great Upshift: Humanity's Coming Advance Toward Peace and Harmony on the Planet. Ethics relevant? Politically relevant? Sham?

Lily wrote: "irst, my approach to trying to understand Spinoza has been very different than others of you posting here."

Hi Lily,

It sounds like you’ve explored everything about the text but the text itself. 😁

I think you might be overthinking it a bit. The logic and analytical skills from our scientific and computing backgrounds should be quite adequate to grasp Spinoza’s work with some satisfying effort. The toughest part is coming to terms with Spinoza’s unique terminology, which can have multiple or non-standard meanings and is used inconsistently by various translators. My Hackett edition has a helpful dictionary of terms in the introduction.

Spinoza, Baruch. Ethics: with The Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters (Hackett Classics). Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Kindle Edition.

Why don't you post some propositions or arguments from the text that you're struggling with, and we can work through them together?

David wrote: Hi Lily, It sounds like you’ve explored everything about the text but the text itself. 😁."

Perhaps I can understand the reasons for your cynicism, but still know it is not appreciated.

Right now, I have no more idea on how to parse Spinoza's Cartesian arguments than I do how to respond to my Grandmother's view that her son lost over Guam would have lived if Hiroshima had occurred a few weeks earlier or that what happened in Pennsylvania today was totally independent of January 6.

But, I am following the pulling apart you and others are doing. And, yes, I have read the text I don't understand.

David wrote: "I found the note an interesting one:
[2] Here, and in what follows, by ‘men’ I understand men for whom we have felt no emotion. [Spinoza]
Is this necessary to reduce bias or favoritism? Who are these men we have no emotion for? The "greatest number" [of men], perhaps, mankind?."

It seems like many of the propositions regarding emotions involve a balancing act because there is more than one emotion involved, and emotions can compete with each other by association, as in P17. The proposition would look a little different if we already feel a certain way about the "men" in question.

The common denominator with emotions (or affections, I guess he would call them) seems to be the imagination. These emotions are all based on "inadequate" ideas, which might explain why they seem to be so fickle, or even childish sometimes.

Thomas wrote: "These emotions are all based on "inadequate" ideas, which might explain why they seem to be so fickle, or even childish sometimes...."

Wow! This is 2024 America. I'd love to understand all the experience and (scientific) observation that went into that sentence -- and then lay that up against what we believe would have been the meaning/language in the mid-1600's.

(Sorry, Thomas, I allowed David to shift me into a contentious mode of responding.)

A non-sequitur question -- who here is familiar with the work and writings of Dominic Crossan?

Lily wrote: "Perhaps I can understand the reasons for your cynicism, but still know it is not appreciated..."

Apologies for appearing cynical; that was not my intention. It was a clumsy way of expressing that it seems like you've put in a lot of effort on Spinoza and his work, and I empathize with your struggles and share your affinity for secondary sources.

My appreciation for Spinoza's arguments has grown tremendously as we work though it and I fully expect to go from a state of understanding less to understanding much more, though I must set aside his conflation with God.

It is a work of deductive reasoning which must be actively read with attention to (among other things):
1. Dependence on premises which must be true.
2. Assumption of premise truth.
3. Circular reasoning (Begging the question).
4. Over-reliance on Definitions (If Spinoza is not begging the question, then his over-reliance on definitions may be suspect).
5. Lack of empirical testability.
6. Potential for misleading conclusions
7. Black-and-White Thinking or difficulty in addressing probabilities.

There is the story about a professor that claims you can prove anything with a false premise. A student asks, "If 1 = 0, then prove your the pope". The professor responds, "Add 1 to both sides of the equation: then we have 2 = 1. The set containing just me and the Pope has 2 members. But 2 = 1, so it has only 1 member; therefore, I am the Pope."

Some of the initial propositions in Ethics made me think of this story which illustrates how false premises can lead to absurd conclusions. However, It is crucial to note Spinoza's identification of God with Nature relies on carefully defined premise and not demonstrably false ones. This leads one to examine the argument for circular reasoning or over-reliance on definition.

While Karl Popper argued that scientific arguments must be falsifiable to be considered scientifically valid, and Christopher Hitchens argued, "What can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence." will encourage empiricists to think critically, I do find it challenging to keep in mind Ethics is not a scientific work. I do acknowledge that Spinoza’s metaphysical premises support a very rigorous logical coherence within his philosophical system, so far. And it is a relief to find a system that stands in sharp contrast with other systems that rely on "Mysterious ways".

David wrote: ...

Nice narrative, (Well, maybe not the Pope story.) Thx.

Besides all the studies of brain/body interactions (psychology of learning as a secondary field of study for a short time and ongoing as an interest), my associations in recent years with writers have made me aware in different ways with the communication of thought and experience since those early days along stream banks or around fires in the dark, as danger was thwarted and speech/languages evolved. But not sure how much, if any, of that is applicable to the thought and assumptions of Spinoza.

Lily wrote: "(Sorry, Thomas, I allowed David to shift me into a contentious mode of responding.).."

I'm all in favor of good-natured contentiousness. Hard questions and passionate arguments are fun, and sometimes they can make us better thinkers. Maybe even better people. For example, what would society look like if everyone took this proposition seriously:

3P43: "Hate is increased by being returned, but can be destroyed by love."

I feel like I've heard that somewhere before... speaking of which, I have read some John Dominic Crossan. Not a lot, but I'm interested in the historical Jesus, so his work has come up a bit.

David wrote: "t is a work of deductive reasoning which must be actively read with attention to (among other things):
1. Dependence on premises which must be true.
2. Assumption of premise truth.
3. Circular reasoning (Begging the question).
4. Over-reliance on Definitions (If Spinoza is not begging the question, then his over-reliance on definitions may be suspect).
5. Lack of empirical testability.
6. Potential for misleading conclusions
7. Black-and-White Thinking or difficulty in addressing probabilities.."

Would these considerations also apply to Euclid?

Thomas wrote: "David wrote: "t is a work of deductive reasoning which must be actively read with attention to (among other things):
1. Dependence on premises which must be true.
2. Assumption of premise truth.
3....
Would these considerations also apply to Euclid?"

I think, with the exceptions of 5 & 7, they would.

I think 5 is also true for Euclid: has anybody seen mathematical point or parallel lines in reality? Geometry (and not necessarily Euclidean one) is a method for empirical science not an empirical science itself.

And I think 7 is true as well for Euclid -- everything that follows from his definitions, axioms, and postulates is necessary. To use Spinoza's favorite example, it is necessary that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. There is no probability of it being otherwise. And Spinoza's work doesn't allow for probability either, except perhaps from the finite perspective, our perspective, with our finite limitations. Certainly from the infinite perspective, all existence is necessary and could be no other way than the way it is.

Interestingly, if this difference between empirical science and system depending on axioms was actualised for Spinoza, if he deliberately chose geometry or it was stil understood as true science?

Alexey wrote: "Interestingly, if this difference between empirical science and system depending on axioms was actualised for Spinoza, if he deliberately chose geometry or it was stil understood as true science?"

I am getting very good at destroying my own posts! I go to add something and lose what I intended to include.

Let me go top of the head for the moment -- I perceive that Spinoza viewed the logic he applied as the "gold standard" of knowledge, even if what is "knowledge" has defied human comprehension.

Now, let me try to share a little bit of where I have been wandering -- which may or may not seem relevant to the rest of you.

From Wikipedia on Cartesianism: "Cartesians view the mind as being wholly separate from the corporeal body. Sensation and the perception of reality are thought to be the source of untruth and illusions, with the only reliable truths to be had in the existence of a metaphysical mind. Such a mind can perhaps interact with a physical body, but it does not exist in the body, nor even in the same physical plane as the body. The question of how mind and body interact would be a persistent difficulty for Descartes and his followers, with different Cartesians providing different answers.[8]"

Then, I go to Cartesian Doubt and find:

"Descartes is often regarded as the first thinker to emphasize the use of reason to develop the natural sciences.[2] For him, philosophy was a thinking system that embodied all knowledge.[3]"

(Not obvious to me the significance of "that embodied all knowledge." Does the qualifier expand or limit the core statement?}

"Descartes' method of hyperbolic doubt included:[8]: 67–70 

Accepting only information you know is true
Breaking down these truths into smaller units
Solving the simple problems first
Making complete lists of further problems
Hyperbolic doubt means having the tendency to doubt, since it is an extreme or exaggerated form of doubt.[9]: 115  Knowledge in the Cartesian sense means to know something beyond not merely all reasonable doubt, but all possible doubt."

I falter here -- clearly our perceptions in 2024 are not that the mind is separable from the body. (Even the earlier work I cited elsewhere indicates how much empirical observation is deepening the interconnections.) But, I am not sure if/just how these qualifications are relevant to a closed system of logic between (true) assumptions and conclusions, such as Spinoza seems to be logically spinning.

For fun, besides clambering back through the history of medieval (and earlier) thought systems, I find Spinoza incentive to watch for Brian Greene's events. As when I sat in at one of the World Science Festival sessions in NYC and listened to the man who had the floor discuss where he felt he needed to take his work, almost as if asking those present for suggestions/guidance. I remember one of Greene's guests on a You-tube discussion pointing out the "progress" humankind has made in understanding across the time frames of just ... Copernicus, Newton, Einstein, ... And the impacts of our outer space explorations..

(I'll key up this one on time for later; don't have "time" to watch it this afternoon, but since our friend Spinoza spins his view, I'll post here, for myself, if no one else ,,, should be a link to ....something or another in Ethics...?)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TAhbF...

Alexey wrote: "Interestingly, if this difference between empirical science and system depending on axioms was actualised for Spinoza, if he deliberately chose geometry or it was stil understood as true science?"

Isn't geometry still true science? I suspect Spinoza chose it as a model for his system because each step in a geometrical proof follows necessarily from the step before. The weakest part of his system are its foundations, which he believes are self-evident, so they don't need to be proven.

Thomas wrote: "The weakest part of his system are its foundations, which he believes are self-evident, so they don't need to be proven."

In mathematics, axioms are implicit in most theories, to the point that they enter the definition of theory (1). I find Spinoza's effort to acknowledge, establish and phrase the existence of the axioms which – knowingly or unknowingly to us – underlay our opinions a genuine act of intellectual honesty. I'm starting to think that the correct name for this effort might be axiomatisation (2), and I will take the time to further investigate this personal impression. In other words, I'm wondering whether what is being understood by the modern, general reader as deductions from axioms should not be regarded instead as the standard way to present and verify the validity of an axiomatisation. We watch a set of axioms interact – this is done by deriving necessary statements from them – and we see how the results compare with our innate perceptions and understanding of reality. Spinoza has been doing this for at least twelve years before finalising his observations in a fixed set of selected, reasoned axioms and then feeling ready to publish his findings. He might have observed the interactions of, and the consequences descending from different sets of axioms and eventually judged – based on the works of his predecessors and discussions with his contemporaries – that the system presented in Ethics allows the best description of reality (existence) as he understood it. Ethics itself is offered to the public, which implies submission to the reader's judgement and to further debate towards to understanding of reality.

(1) «In mathematics and logic, an axiomatic system is any set of primitive notions and axioms to logically derive theorems. A theory is a consistent, relatively-self-contained body of knowledge which usually contains an axiomatic system and all its derived theorems.» — Wikipedia > Axiomatic system

(2) «In mathematics, axiomatization is the process of taking a body of knowledge and working backwards towards its axioms. It is the formulation of a system of statements (i.e. axioms) that relate a number of primitive terms — in order that a consistent body of propositions may be derived deductively from these statements. Thereafter, the proof of any proposition should be, in principle, traceable back to these axioms.» – Wikipedia > Axiomatic system > Axiomatic method

Thomas wrote: "Alexey wrote: "Isn't geometry still true science?"

I am baffled with the number of 'sciences' philosophers, and scientists alike, have suggested, so I use my primitive version of Popper's definition, 'true science' is the empirical science, i.e. its hypothesis can be proved false by empirical evidence. From this point of view, geometry is not a science, and since it works with ideal objects, in my primitive understanding, it should be classified as philosophy or religion. The last word came from reading Spinoza.

As many times discussed here, he made great efforts to ensure his axioms are not arbitrary but grounded. Doing this, he had to conflate them with religious statements, which made me think that every axiomatic system with pretence to describe the real word is indeed religious. Even if the author, unlike Spinoza, try to make it looks irreligious.

Just one of many thoughts come out of reading Ethics.

Alexey wrote: "From this point of view, geometry is not a science, and since it works with ideal objects, in my primitive understanding, it should be classified as philosophy or religion. ..."

Well, is Euclidean geometry "true science"? Is mathematics "true science"? Or simply tools for explicating empirical science. (As has already been pointed out, humankind has never/cannot empirically observe parallel lines of infinite length, but yet how much powerful understanding has emerged from that hypothesis/assumption? And then what happened to the mathematics when the assumption was removed -- we are still learning. Is that logic? Analysis? Mathematics? Science? What do/should we treat as the primitives -- a term I'm not certain I can define to a level beyond all reasonable doubt. (Analogous to those bloody not-so parallel parallel lines?)

Alexey wrote: "From this point of view, geometry is not a science, and since it works with ideal objects, in my primitive understanding, it should be classified as philosophy or religion. The last word came from reading Spinoza.."

I love this thought! The foundational beliefs of geometry are indeed ideal, and to some extent a matter of faith, though I'm not sure if faith alone amounts to religion. But for any structure of thought to stand it must rest on some sort of foundation, and the definitions provide this foundation. Empiricism can take over from there; if the foundational definitions are not sound, experience will tell.

It seems to me that putting first the understanding of Ethics in its context could give better results. Our understanding and definition(s) of "science" came into existence two hundred years later (*), and scanning the past in order to check whether earlier disciplines and literary works match one of our several contemporary definitions of science ignores a multitude of alternative ways to see and define knowledge, and flattens the complexity of the object we observe – including its original cultural environment – by reducing the investigation to a yes/no answer.

Isaac Newton's "Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica" (1687) is a good reminder of the terminology in use at the time Ethics was conceived and published: "natural philosophy".

1. Is Ethics a work of natural philosophy?
1a. Is Ethics a study of causes and, as such, a work of natural philosophy?
2. How was ethics (lower case) generally classified in Spinoza's times? Was it "moral philosophy"?
3. Where/when was the "geometrical method" used before Spinoza's Ethics?

In this historical context, a literary work would belong to natural philosophy because of its subject, not because of the method adopted.

In this historical context, reference to and use of the geometrical method is not a claim of "scientificity" or a claim/guarantee of bulletproof correctness. Most likely, it is synonym of "by recourse to axioms".

(*) «Modern meanings of the terms science and scientists date only to the 19th century. Before that, science was a synonym for knowledge or study, in keeping with its Latin origin. The term gained its modern meaning when experimental science and the scientific method became a specialized branch of study apart from natural philosophy, especially since William Whewell, a natural philosopher from the University of Cambridge, proposed the term "scientist" in 1834 to replace such terms as "cultivators of science" and "natural philosopher".» — Wikipedia > Natural philosophy

That clarifies context a lot. On the one hand, it's what I expected, on the other, he wrote after Descartes and, particularly, after Bacon, so the context could be different.

Given my background and training, it is hard for me to think of mathematics other than as a part of science. Particularly since so much what has been identified empirically was predicted by the math, so that the "empirical side" of science went looking for what was predicted and found it.

As I have rooted around the "transitions of thinking," one of the things that has struck me has been the seeming awe before/in the context of "discovering" the ability of "pure thinking" to predict/describe the world -- and almost a sense this was an ability with an existence independent of the person possessing it. Some of the words I encountered suggested this 'ability' became associated with the concept of a soul -- something so ethereal and powerful and self possessing that certainly that aspect of human reality must transcend/last beyond death. A little different slant to "soul" than I recall having encountered before. Almost a lack of (self) understanding of the inter-connectivity of heart and mind (blood and brain).

I've been coming back to your notes multiple times, Lily, and can relate to most of them in a personal way; thank you for sharing.

Lily wrote: "...so much what has been identified empirically was predicted by the math..."

I suppose this might have to do with the nature of knowledge, which knowledge needs to be preceded by awareness: we see (recognise, define, measure) only what we can already postulate; so much so that, historically (including present day: theories that haven't been superseded [yet] seem pretty rare), we've been able to observe – in sciences and in religions likewise – what we wanted to see. We "comprehend" something – I imply the Latin word – only once we've made room for it.

Donnally wrote: "...He had certain insights and then constructed a logical apparatus to make these insights appear to be indisputable. I think that is what makes his logic so confounding at least when first encountered...."

Thx for your insight. I was truly surprised as I moved into the sections where Spinoza writes about characteristics and interactions of emotions. I felt like I had moved more into the realms of Jonathan Haidt, Marshall B. Rosenberg, even perhaps Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More Than IQ, rather than remaining within logic that transcended humanness, encompassing existence itself. I have rather enjoyed these sections and the intellectual rigor (?) that Spinoza brings to the topics at hand, even when I become unsure of their relationship to "reason."

Thomas wrote: " The weakest part of his system are its foundations, which he believes are self-evident, so they don't need to be proven."

I am probably being lazy here, but is there anyone here who can collect into one short post what they perceive to be Spinoza's self-evident "foundations"? (I perceive "existence" as one of them... Descartes 'I think therefore I am.'")

That's a tall order, but I think the main difference between Descartes and Spinoza is that for Spinoza Being does not follow from thinking or consciousness. For Spinoza, Thinking and Being are aspects of the same thing, and that thing causes itself, which means it is eternal and infinite. He calls that thing Substance (or God, or Nature.) His self-evident foundation is that all being proceeds from this one self-causing infinite and eternal Substance, and that it proceeds in a rational manner.

The finite world as we know it is a reflection of that infinite Substance, and as finite beings we are part of that reflection. It is only a partial reflection, and it is fragmented and distorted because we are finite beings, but we can clarify the reflection via reason. I think that's Spinoza's project in the Ethics -- to clarify that reflection so we may understand how our finitude is composed (i.e. our true nature as human beings.)

Lily wrote: "but is there anyone here who can collect into one short post what they perceive to be Spinoza's self-evident "foundations"

He appears to derive everything from his first 8 definitions and 7 axioms. Monism (one substance) and determinism.

David wrote: "He appears to derive everything from his first 8 definitions and 7 axioms. Monism (one substance) and determinism."

Do you have those already as a post here, or is that an exercise I need to go try to drag out of my kindle (Sometimes I don't know why I read anything on a kindle, rather than on paper or by listening....). Except is fun in the later chapters to highlight and insert comments/questions on Spinoza.....