Classics and the Western Canon discussion

(Due to a commitment I have later in the week I am posting the final week of Spinoza a couple days early.)

After describing the ways in which humans are enslaved by the passions in Part Four, Spinoza shows us the way out in Part Five, "Of Human Freedom." It's a different kind of freedom, because of course we are still bound to the infinite chain of causality that defines us. We can't change that, but we can change the way we think about it, starting with how we think about the emotions. This is the kind of freedom that comes with knowledge. We aren't bound to act the way we feel; we are free to act according to our nature and reason.

Spinoza's recipe for doing this is to first separate the emotion from the cause and join it to another thought. Removing the cause simplifies it and allows us to focus on the feeling itself. Spinoza claims that a passion ceases to be a passion when we have a "clear and distinct idea of it." When we understand emotion for what it is on its own, we can take power over it. (As opposed to focusing on the cause of an emotion, in which case we are the passive subject of the emotion that the cause is making us feel.) Spinoza says that in this way we turn a passive affect into an active power. Once we are free of the affects, "we have the power of ordering and connecting the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect." (5P10) We free ourselves from the inadequate ideas of the affects and act on the adequate ideas of reason instead. Basically, we then have the power to feel the way we want to feel or not feel.

This sounds easier said than done! Is there a better explanation for how the mind can turn a passive affect into an active power?

But it gets more challenging still. In P14 Spinoza says that we have the power to relate our imagination and all of our affects to the idea of God. What does this mean?

The following propositions of Book Five look back to Part One, as they concern our relation to God. It's pretty wild stuff, starting with 5P23, "The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal." In some sense we "feel" eternal insofar as we have an understanding of the infinite. (5P23) But how can finite human minds understand anything of the infinite? Spinoza suggests that this is possible through the third kind of knowledge, intuitive knowledge. (Which he described at 2P40 as "the kind of knowing that proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things.")

This is tough stuff, but I think he's saying that insofar as the mind can grasp the essence of things "under a species of eternity," it is capable of understanding that little piece of God that is in it. Intuition is one of the ways the mind can grasp this, because intuition is conditioned on eternity. (P31) This understanding puts the mind on a path to the "intellectual love of God". Inasmuch as the human mind has an adequate idea of God via intuition, man loves God and God loves man. And in this lies "our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom."

If you've made it to the end of the Ethics, I would love to hear your take on this. And if you haven't, I understand why. The Euclidean approach may make the book more logically sound, but it doesn't make it very approachable. Nevertheless, it's an amazing achievement, and I'll be thinking about Spinoza for some time.

As we wrap up our discussion of this very challenging book, does anyone have thoughts on Spinoza's idea of God? (Substance-Nature-God, I should say). Is he an atheist? A pantheist? Something else entirely?

Can the metaphysics of Part One and the second half of Part Five be discounted, or at least segregated from the rest of the book, if we like the practical aspect of the Ethics but do not subscribe to the notion of an infinite being?

A few days ago, I've read Frankl's Man’s Search for Meaning. Spinoza's name didn't come until late in the book, but Frankl gave clear explanation that his Ethics could be a powerful tool in the struggle to preserve personhood. Particularly he pointed out the 5P3, and dedicate a chapter for it.

Despite just finishing Spinoza's book, I was astonished by this interpretation: I would never think of Ethics in this way. My understanding of the book was very different: no real-life value, no practical application, weird ontology. But now it is as very different book.

I think it's certainly possible to find practical applications of Spinoza's propositions without subscribing to his ontology. 5P3 is a good example of that. Understanding a passion for what it is, an affection that comes from outside us, helps us to understand it as a thing we can take control over and manage just like the other things life throws at us. Having this power gives us freedom from passions and allows us to make our own decisions, rather than reacting thoughtlessly to things as they happen to us.

We don't necessarily have to believe in Spinoza's monism or determinism to apply this. I think it's also possible that his ontological foundations were built in order to support this conclusion. But at the same time, his foundation is logically consistent, and he doesn't qualify or discount the very strange place his logic takes him in the second half of Book 5, so there's nothing dishonest about it. It's a magnificent thought experiment, and like all thought experiments its shortcomings are as revealing as what it it succeeds in demonstrating.

For some thoughts on the possible application of Spinoza's Ethics in guiding one in life, I suggest taking a look at Isaac Bashevis Singer's story, "The Spinoza of Market Street".

How can we reconcile these two propositions?

PROPOSITION 17 God is without passive emotions, and he is not affected with any emotion of pleasure or pain.
Corollary
Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate anyone. For God (preceding Pr.) is not affected with any emotion of pleasure or pain, and consequently (Def. of Emotions 6 and 7) he neither loves nor hates anyone.

and:

PROPOSITION 35 God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love.

I am guessing that the difference is that the emotions in P17 are passive emotions and infinite intellectual love is active emotion. But I remain puzzled why P35 is necessary. If we talk of Nature alone, P17 is acceptable and P35 is n/a. Why is P35 important?

A passive emotion is one that is created in you by another. For instance, someone's beauty can make you feel love. Your love is a passive emotion. Love and hate are both passive emotions. No power outside of God can change God, so God is without passive emotions.

Since God neither loves nor hates anyone, it's sensible to wonder what sort of love God feels. That is answered by P35. Spinoza also specifies in P35 that God's love is intellectual. Clearly God cannot experience any physical emotions.

David wrote: "PROPOSITION 35 God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love.

I am guessing that the difference is that the emotions in P17 are passive emotions and infinite intellectual love is active emotion. But I remain puzzled why P35 is necessary. If we talk of Nature alone, P17 is acceptable and P35 is n/a. Why is P35 important?"


I'm not sure if P35 is necessary, but he seems to think that it follows logically from what came before. I find the second half of Book 5 quite mystifying, but fun to puzzle over.

In P35 infinite intellectual love is something entirely different from love in the normal sense, and I don't think it's something that we can really understand as finite mortal beings. Intellectual love is based on intuition (P32), which is automatically pleasurable. He says that joy arises from this, which i can understand, and it sort of goes along with his idea that love is joy accompanied by an external cause (understanding that God is his own cause) but I don't know how he can say that God feels joy exactly. It doesn't even seem like "love" is the correct term for what a self-causing infinite perfection feels, or does. It seems a bit of a reach.

"Love" and "joy" apply to God not as being the same feelings we humans feel. It is an attempt to try to express to us humans God's attributes by putting them in terms humans can understand.

It's an attempt, and an honest one I think, but it seems to me more poetic than geometrical. Spinoza claims that we have some limited access to the eternal "under a species of eternity," and this too I think is more poetic than logical. Which doesn't make it untrue, but it doesn't assure me in the way that a mathematical proof does.

Ultimately I think Spinoza is unable to resolve the finite with the infinite, and this inablility blossoms in the second part of Book 5. He relies on the nature of intuition to make his argument, which is really fascinating because there is something magical about intuition. It's a strange move after all of the carefully reasoned propositions that lead up to it. But it doesn't seem intellectually dishonest -- it feels like an "attempt," as you say. An attempt to know God, which of course Spinoza knows is impossible for us. Yet he goes there anyway.

David wrote: "PROPOSITION 17 God is without passive emotions, and he is not affected with any emotion of pleasure or pain."

Just to point out that vocabulary and ideas are consistent with Richard de Fournival's prose dialogue "Consaus d'amours", mid-13th c. treatise on love reflecting the classificatory efforts of contemporary Scholastic. The first part consists of a detailed taxonomy of love: the first distinction is between "amour espirituel" and "amour temporel"; the latter originates either from "natural force" or from "the heart's will"; the heart's will is either "simple" or "rooted"... By the 13th century there's a strong tradition of philosophical works on the subject.

Fed wrote: "Just to point out that vocabulary and ideas are consistent with Richard de Fournival's prose dialogue "Consaus d'amours"

Thanks Fed, I am not familiar with your references, but I do see echos of the idea expressed in De Rerum Natura 14 centuries earlier.

For it is inherent in the very nature of the gods that they should enjoy immortal life in perfect peace, far removed and separated from our world; free from all distress, free from peril, fully self-sufficient, independent [650] of us, they are not influenced by worthy conduct nor touched by anger.
Lucretius; Ferguson Smith, Martin. On the Nature of Things . Hackett Publishing. Kindle Edition.

Like Lecretius, Spinoza rejects the traditional views in favor of a non-personal, non-interventionist deity; viewing the divine as a detached, self-sufficient entity that operates according to its own nature; neither influencing nor is influenced by human affairs. Both philosophies seem to offer relief from the fears and superstitions that traditional views become corrupted with.

Thomas wrote: "It's an attempt, and an honest one I think, but it seems to me more poetic than geometrical. . .to know God, which of course Spinoza knows is impossible for us. Yet he goes there anyway."

Thinking about Spinoza's P35, only deepens the seriousness of the consequences. Religions often create the most harm when they claim to know the will or love of God, implying divine approval or disapproval, whether it’s something as seemingly benign as Spinoza’s assertion or as extreme as divine command theory. But when we consider Nature alone, it appears indifferent, neither passively nor actively/intellectually caring. So, I struggle to see how God, equated with Nature, isn't similarly indifferent.

David wrote: "But when we consider Nature alone, it appears indifferent, neither passively nor actively/intellectually caring."

Although unsure about the meaning you give to "Nature" here (yours, Spinoza's, Darwin's?), I still think one might argue that genetics (including instincts) are the way nature "actively cares" about the existent. Of course the personification makes little sense. I disagree with your negative portrait of religions: on that line, I suppose you could equally argue that democracy (or science), given its obvious shortcomings and side-effects, is dangerous. Besides, democracy and science often claim a superior (normative) status, not unlike religions have been doing sometimes in history.

David wrote: " But when we consider Nature alone, it appears indifferent, neither passively nor actively/intellectually caring. So, I struggle to see how God, equated with Nature, isn't similarly indifferent"

This is why I find the term "love" in P35 so inappropriate -- it suggests that God cares, when there is nothing in the Ethics to indicate that God feels anything at all. God is free of affects. God doesn't even exist in time. The "love" that he feels is purely intellectual, which to me sounds entirely theoretical, as does the second half of Book 5 in general.

But in any case the only "will of God" to which Spinoza can appeal is one based on science and reason (and his "self-evident" definitions, of course.) Spinoza's God/Nature doesn't care about finite human beings, but finite human beings love God because God is perfect, and as we strive to understand and live in accordance with this perfection we experience joy.

For reference, a short extract from Aquinas' extensive discussion of God's love (Summa theologiae, Pars I):

• Question 19, Objection 1.
It seems that there is not will in God.

I answer that, There is will in God, as there is intellect: since will follows upon intellect.

• Question 20, Objection 1.
It seems that love does not exist in God. For in God there are no passions. Now love is a passion. Therefore love is not in God.

I answer that, We must needs assert that in God there is love: because love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty. [...] Now it has been shown that will is in God, and hence we must attribute love to Him.

Fed wrote: "I disagree with your negative portrait of religions::

Isn't that part of the point of Spinoza's work? Spinoza's philosophy challenges this manipulation of theocratic regimes, where religious and political power often merge, leading to abusive control and suppression of intellectual freedom of which he was very much a victim.

My personal impression is that Spinoza is moved by a desire to identify and correct misinterpretations of the scripture, without radically questioning the use of religions altogether. I find this position becomes particularly explicit in other works where he specifically discusses the correct way to interpret the Bible (read in the light of the New Testament), its authority and that of the interpretative tradition of the church. I quoted from these works earlier in this same book discussion.

The more general degree of discomfort in relation with religion that I personally gather from some contributions to this discussion – all perfectly legitimate – seems to me to belong to a different level.

The overall outcome of this book discussion prompted me to re-read Robert Hutchins' "The Great Conversation". I could remembered there were a couple of paragraphs arguing that literary works usually deemed too difficult for the general public – science and philosophy volumes of the collection – may be accessible to everyone. I thought the participation to this discussion (compared to others) seems to suggest otherwise. Is the great conversation between general reader and specialist a realistic possibility? Are these texts our canon, or we simply wear them on Sundays?

Fed wrote: "The overall outcome of this book discussion prompted me to re-read Robert Hutchins' "The Great Conversation". I could remembered there were a couple of paragraphs arguing that literary works usually deemed too difficult for the general public – science and philosophy volumes of the collection – may be accessible to everyone. I thought the participation to this discussion (compared to others) seems to suggest otherwise."

I have to disagree. Spinoza strikes me as having gone to great pains to lay out his thinking in such a way that the common man can follow him. This work was deliberately aimed at readers who were not specialists, although perhaps modern specialists have sought to make it seem as though it is intended solely for academics such as themselves.

With regard to use of the word 'love', this is a word whose definitions are notoriously equivocal. Compare, for example, the sentence 'I love apples' with the one in discussion here, 'God loves mankind'. All they suggest is that some item out of others has been selected for particular care and attention.

Donnally wrote: "I have to disagree. [...] With regard to use of the word 'love', this is a word whose definitions are notoriously equivocal."

In this case, I'm just too glad to hear you disagree. But we possibly agree on the impression that this work might be offering new perspectives on love. Not entirely new, really, as they are well represented even within canonical Christian thought, but certainly a somewhat more abstract definition compared to daily uses of the word. In particular, the mere fact that the real exists (or wants to exist; the role of will as expression of cogitation) – compared to the alternative – seems to be defined as love. If we expect to find the caring love of the mother for her child or of the pet owner for their dog, we'll be disappointed and say that this is not real love.

On a related subject, I think it's been claimed through this conversation both that Spinoza's thought is deterministic, and that God/Nature doesn't care at all about human beings. I'm sure there are ways to combine these two perspectives, but they instinctively strike me as incompatible or generally mutually exclusive.

On the canon. On one hand the attribution of canonic value to a corpus of texts has been happening so often in history – literally at every new generation – that it can be regarded as an instinct. On the other hand, it can look like the equally recurring practice of finding ancient, notable ancestors for one's own family or social group – the myth of origins, combined to that of the golden age.

Fed wrote: "My personal impression is that Spinoza is moved by a desire to identify and correct misinterpretations of the scripture, without radically questioning the use of religions altogether."

If Spinoza does this in Ethics, it is only implicitly. I did not see mention of a single scripture. An example of a book that does identify problem scripture is The Age of Reason by Thomas Paine, who seems to go page by page through the Bible pointing out the issues.

In Ethics, instead of arguing point by point, scripture by scripture, Spinoza starts with a God that could not possibly be the loving, personal, all powerful, all knowing God of Abraham negating the scriptures entirely all at once, stripping them of divine authority; relegating them to human invention.

Fed wrote: "On a related subject, I think it's been claimed through this conversation both that Spinoza's thought is deterministic, and that God/Nature doesn't care at all about human beings. I'm sure there are ways to combine these two perspectives, but they instinctively strike me as incompatible or generally mutually exclusive."

Could you explain how you see them as mutually exclusive? Spinoza holds precisely the opposite of course. God/Nature does not act for an end, and the welfare of human beings is not at all a matter of concern. God has no concern at all, for anything really. Concern for the world would suggest that God has the ability to alter what is necessary, but in God there is nothing that is not necessary. All is perfect and all is determined. Or so his argument goes.

Donnally wrote: "Spinoza strikes me as having gone to great pains to lay out his thinking in such a way that the common man can follow him. This work was deliberately aimed at readers who were not specialists, although perhaps modern specialists have sought to make it seem as though it is intended solely for academics such as themselves..."

The Ethics seems to stand all on its own, with the exception of Euclid and mathematics. Even the doctrines it seems to borrow from, like the ontological argument, are argued as if they were new. There are echoes of Plato and Aristotle, and probably others that escape my notice as a non-specialist, but it doesn't rely on any of them. That's remarkable in itself. It almost puts it out of reach of the Great Conversation, inasmuch as it doesn't address or rely on prior schools of thought, and modern readers don't need to have any prior training to understand it. Not that it's an easy road to go down; this independence from tradition may actually make it more difficult.

I think Spinoza's Ethics is well deserving of inclusion in Great Conversation for several reasons:

1. Radical view of God and nature: Spinoza's identification of God with Nature challenges traditional religious views, offering a perspective that reshapes our understanding of divinity and the universe.

2. Rational ethics: His ethics are based on reason rather than divine commandments, providing a secular framework for morality that influenced Enlightenment thinkers and modern philosophy.

3. Impact on enlightenment and modern thought: Spinoza's ideas laid the groundwork for secularism, rationalism, and the emphasis on individual freedom, expecially freedom from orthodox religion.

4. Metaphysics and epistemology: Spinoza’s systematic exploration of reality, mind, and knowledge remains a critical part of philosophical discourse.

5. Invitation to critique religious authority: By advocating for intellectual freedom and challenging the dogmatic authority of religious institutions, Spinoza’s work resonates with movements striving for separation of church and state.

Finally, and perhaps most of all, despite the challenges in reading Ethics, an adequate understanding is within reach of everyone willing to put in the time and effort. Its depth and the far-reaching implications of nearly every proposition ensure endless topics of discussion cementing its place in the Great Conversation, as we have demonstrated here; only scratching the surface.

Thomas wrote: "The Ethics seems to stand all on its own, with the exception of Euclid and mathematics."

«Literature is made up not only of individual works but of libraries, systems in which various eras and traditions organize "canonical" and "apocryphal" texts. Within these systems each work is different from how it would be if it were isolated or placed in another library. A library can have a closed catalog or tend to become the universal library but always expanding around a core of "canonical" books. And it is where the center of gravity resides that differentiates one library from another, even more than the catalog. The ideal library I tend toward is one that gravitates outward, toward "apocryphal" books, in the etymological sense of the word, that is, "hidden" books. Literature is the search for the book hidden far away, which changes the value of known books; it is the tension toward the new apocryphal text to be found or invented.»

— Italo Calvino: Literature as a projection of desire; 1969

David wrote: "In Ethics, instead of arguing point by point, scripture by scripture, Spinoza starts with a God that could not possibly be the loving, personal, all powerful, all knowing God of Abraham negating the scriptures entirely all at once, stripping them of divine authority; relegating them to human invention...."

Dave -- I am uncertain what you are saying with your phrases in this sentence -- I find I can read them in at least two ways that seem, at least in first blush, to be contradictory. (Who is doing the negating and stripping? Abraham? Spinoza? God? --- One way of trying to articulate my confusion and the possibilities I read as posited.)

Lily wrote: "Dave -- I am uncertain what you are saying. . ."

Spinoza does not engage in a direct, scripture-by-scripture critique in Ethics like Thomas Paine does in The Age of Reason. For example, Paine points out inconsistencies and implausibilities with Genesis 1 & 2, Noah's Ark, Book of Jonah, virgin births, resurrection, atonement, etc., undermining the bible's credibility suggesting it is more suitable as mythology than a work of divine origin and authority.*

In contrast, Spinoza's Ethics offers a redefinition of God that breaks with traditional religious conceptions foregoing the need to explicitly reference or debate specific biblical passages. Spinoza's definition of God is equated with Nature, is impersonal, not all-knowing or all-powerful, and is certainly not the loving, interventionist God of Abrahamic faiths. By starting from a different foundation, a God that is synonymous with Nature and follows necessary laws, Spinoza bypasses the scriptures all-together making them irrelevant to his philosophy, and effectively stripping them of divine origin and authority.

*Since my first post on this subject I have become aware that Spinoza did critique scripture in his work The Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (TTP) or Theologico-Political Treatise.

Two extracts from Alexander Douglas's 2022 review of "Spinoza’s Religion: A New Reading of the Ethics" by Clare Carlisle (Princeton University Press, 2021). Full text available online.

«Carlisle’s project also involves exploring Spinoza’s relationship with Christianity, providing arguments for “locating the Ethics within the Latinate lineage of Christian thought”. It is strange to me that there hasn’t been more interest among scholars on the Christian influences on Spinoza, who after all consistently refers to Jesus not by name, as he easily could have, but as “Christus”—the Christ. This is not to say that Spinoza was a Christian. Nor is it to downplay the importance of the Jewish tradition in which he was raised—an influence that has been thoroughly studied. It is only to note that his writings are shot through with undeniably Christian themes, and Carlisle is one of few scholars unwilling to ignore them or explain them away.»

«Carlisle goes against the majority of Spinoza’s interpreters in refusing to read his famous phrase, “Deus sive Natura”, as entailing a strict identity between God and nature. She notes how this proposed identity prompts some readers, Nadler for instance, to reduce Spinoza’s position to a thinly-disguised atheist naturalism: there is only the natural world, misleadingly called “Deus”. Carlisle builds a textual case against this, with justification: Edwin Curley has explained that Spinoza’s use of “sive” is much more complicated than is often assumed. For her, the relation between God and the natural world, expressed in “Deus sive Natura”, is not one of strict identity but rather the paradoxical hybrid of identity and difference expressed by “being-in”. Many readers who see Spinoza as an arch “rationalist” can’t bear the thought that such paradoxical concepts could feature in his thinking, but they might consider the possibility that their own notions of what is “rational” are in need of expansion.»

I liked Carlisle's book on Kierkegaard, and I've read the first few chapters of this one. Her argument that "Deus sive Natura" does not mean God and Nature are identical is quite good, and I think she is right about that. She claims that Spinoza is a "pan-en-theist" rather than a theist (by which I think she means someone who believes in a transcendental God) or a pantheist. She tries to argue that Spinoza's God is not strictly immanent, as Spinoza never uses the word "transcendent" and it's perfectly possible for a transcendent God to also be immanent. following Aquinas. She suggests that natura naturans is an alternate name for God, and that natura naturata is *in* God. But I think the second half of Book 5 shows the trouble that Spinoza has with natura naturans and the infinite in general, and trying to pin him down on his views there is going to be very difficult.

But this is far from being anything close to Christian theology. She discusses the ontological argument, which originates with St. Anselm, but there is nothing particularly Christian about that argument. She does make the very interesting claim that 17th century churches would have fared better against Enlightenment thinkers if they had embraced Spinoza rather than Descartes, and that is a thought definitely worth exploring!

I am curious about what a Venn diagram of Deus sive Natura, Natura Naturans, and Natura Naturata looks like. What exactly differentiates God from Nature or nature?

Deus has no boundaries, so a Venn diagram would not work exactly, but it would be pretty simple diagram if we overlook that for a moment. Just one circle inside another, with Deus in the outer and Nature in the inner. The outer circle (Deus) would include Natura Naturans, though the outer circle is infinitely large and contains much more than Natura Naturans besides. The inner circIe encompasses Natura Naturata, which is a finite expression of Natura Naturans. All of which is in Deus, one way or another.

I think the point that Carlisle is arguing is that Deus is bigger than Nature, but all of Nature is in God. She cites a lovely phrase that she attributes to a former teacher: "Not me, not other than me."

In short, what differentiates God from Nature is infinity.

Thomas wrote: "In short, what differentiates God from Nature is infinity."

If I'm understanding this correctly, the infinity that differentiates God from nature in Spinoza’s philosophy is that God (and Natura Naturans) contains an infinite number of attributes beyond our perception, which we cannot have evidence of, in addition to Thought and Extension, the two attributes we can perceive the finite mental and physical worlds we experience.

Spinoza’s God is bound by deterministic Natural Law—the principles governing the universe. Does this mean that rather than being supernatural (in the sense of existing outside or above nature), God is super natural (in the sense of encompassing all of Nature’s infinite aspects)? Does Spinoza's view, Natural Law refers to the broader, deterministic order of reality, while natural law typically refers to specific physical laws we observe in the world?

That sounds pretty close to me, as far as I understand it anyway, with one clarification: Carlisle thinks Spinoza would say that God as super natural does not necessarily rule out God as supernatural. God is both. There is much to God that is beyond mortal ken (the supernatural), but what we can understand of God is super natural.

And then there's that stuff about intuition and intellectual love and knowing things "sub specie eternitatis" which Spinoza says gives us some kind of access to the infinite.... that part I'm still really fuzzy on, but he seems to think that this is a way that we can understand God in a way that sounds very supernatural to me.

I think Spinoza is very clear that God is not supernatural in any real sense and to me it seems Carlisle's idea is analogous to Arthur C. Clarke's Third Law:

Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.
Profiles of the Future (revised edition, 1973)

This of course suggests that something that appears to be supernatural or magical might actually just be the result of advanced knowledge or technology that is beyond the current understanding of the observer.

@29Thomas wrote: "She does make the very interesting claim that 17th century churches would have fared better against Enlightenment thinkers if they had embraced Spinoza rather than Descartes, and that is a thought definitely worth exploring!..."

I am more or less re-engaging with the discussion here. One of my own reactions has been that I now may be interested in reading Descartes' Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy ??? (Will comment later on where reading Spinoza's Ethics has so far actually taken my own reading/listening path. In the meantime, I am enjoying the engagement of the various "voices" here!)

David wrote: "I think Spinoza is very clear that God is not supernatural in any real sense and to me it seems Carlisle's idea is analogous to Arthur C. Clarke's Third Law:Any sufficiently advanced technology is ..."

This sounds like an argument based on ignorance -- since there are phenomena we don't understand, there must be a "God" behiind them, like the wizard of Oz. I don't think Spinoza (or Carlisle) is saying that exactly. Spinoza's conception of God relies on the ontological argument, which is simple but requires the concept of infinity as a real thing. The terms "infinity" (in space) and "eternity" (in time) might themselves be interchangeable for God. Both of these include Nature as material and durational, which are specific instances of God, but much else besides.

This introduces another problem, however. Infinity and the finite are not commensurable. (I want to call Spinoza's God "everything," but that makes it sound like there is a limit to God, when there can't be.) So assuming that we can first accept that infinity is a real thing, then we have to describe how the finite world can exist within something that does not admit of definition. This is actually why I think Spinoza is a theist. I think this requires an act of faith, and the more I think about it, the belief in infinity and eternity as real is the only way that Book V can make any sense.