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7. Can Truth survive radical historicization?
Hi Vip --What do you mean by radical historicization?
It seems that if it involves a question of truth, it would fall under the scope of epistemology.
i do not like that all discussion of "ontology" are deemed "metaphysical" (which means "after physics"). as a phenomenologist/empiricist, i hold a premise that there is ONLY physics (nothing beyond or "other" than physics). i do not agree that any ontological conversation need be considered "metaphysical" if said ontology never relies on anything other than physics. for instance, merleau-ponty's ontology never speaks of "other than physics". MP only talks of "this world/body" (in fact, this is why he's known as the philosophy that returned philosophy to the body). i do not agree that any ontological conversation need be called "metaphysical". i do not agree with this at all.if an ontology begins or relies on some (non)thing to which we have no evidence/access, then this IS metaphysical (religion/idealism).
Welcome, Einfuhlung, and thanks for the contribution...So...yes, I think I take your point; except that "metaphysics" shouldn't really be literally translated, since it does tend to lead people to exactly this way of differentiating "physics" from "metaphysics." Of course, the standard story: Aristotle's Metaphysics was an untitled collection of lecture notes filed in his complete works following the Physics (because the Physics is all about things subject to change, whereas Metaphysics is about the unchanging/eternal principles...). Not knowing what to call the work (and needing a title in order to keep track of it), an enterprising librarian gave the book the title "Ta Meta ta Physika," basically "The book after the Physics."
Of course, this would all be simply nit-picking and a pointless historical anecdote about library science if the literal translation didn't so often lead people to mis-characterize what constitutes a "metaphysical" subject/discussion/etc. Because if metaphysics is--more properly--construed as the branch of philosophy asking about the ultimate nature of reality (and the ultimate truths of existence), then it seems entirely uncontentious to call ontology a metaphysical discipline.
How does this all shake out in practice? Well, to take but one example: materialism vs. idealism. What is this debate? David-Hillel Ruben has argued that the decision between materialism and idealism is not an epistemological decision (i.e., not based on the consideration of evidence). I think we could equally ask with any phenomenological/ontological commitment you may have: is this an epistemological choice? Or does epistemology not step in too late, after some important decisions about what counts as evidence, etc., have already been made?
Or perhaps, more simply, an answer in the spirit of Derrida: I think that you are absolutely right to be critical of much metaphysics. However, be warned that the "jump outside" of metaphysics--the claim to be free of it--is the most perniciously metaphysical position of all!
well, i'm not a big derrida fan. i respect the man for his work, but i'm not a fan of the work. as martin dillon pointed out "post-hermeneutic skepticism (of which he tossed derrida in this group)stinks of god".of course, as a phenomenologist from the merleau-pontian vein, evidence only shows that there are no "ideals". "forms", "ideals", "absolutes" and "kingdom of ends" all equal the same thing, "no thing" or "non-things". now, ask what is a thing.
what IS a thing? this is a good question. what constitutes "thingness"? (i won't go into heidegger - i'll stick with merleau-ponty, arendt and nietzsche, but especially MP and A). call it pragmatism if you will, but with these thinkers, we know a thing is a thing (could be an event as well) because we witness it in a pluralistic setting. it's not "here's a thing". it's "WHOA! HERE'S A THING!" no value judgment. it's just you and i and the "thing" and our "witness" (see jim hatley's "the uncanny goodness of being edible to bears" - is kinda hard to find, but if push comes to shove, i have an early version of it in word format if anyone wants, it's not for sale anywhere, but it is a great piece of work).
for "thingness", most often, i will only allow for physics. if physics cannot account for it, then i see no good reason to consider it as probable (notice i didn't say possible). lack of evidence is not "good evidence" in favor of a thing. in fact, it becomes good evidence for said "thing" to NOT be the case. this is what i call "the very bad metaphysics" (god and forms and so forth).
epistemological aspects come AFTER. we can't know anything about a thing unless we've perceived the thing (either directly or indirectly through other phenomena like the "evidence" we have for the higgs boson, never seen one, but we see what we think is the effects of one).
I had a similar early experience over "metaphysics" because philosophical terms are confusing and often refer to the same thing. It took me awhile to realize that if something lay beyond the real, it was unreal, so it couldn't be demonstrated by concepts that apply to reality. That's a fancy way of saying ...However, I've now come to look at ontology as more or less synonymous with metaphysics. Is this correct?
I've never considered much whether phenomenology falls more properly under metaphysics or epistemology. To me, a phenomenal appearance is a real existent, as is the thing-in-itself. I've thought that detaching the two concepts has lead to speculations about some entelechy that isn't actually known to exist except in post-Kantian speculations. So the problem is to keep in perspective the relationship between a phenomenon and whatever gives rise to it.
Einfuhlung -- One point about "thingness" is the question of matter itself. If the new experiments at the Hadron Collider pan out, matter should be reducible to field interactions (is that correct?). If so, as far as we know, the dimensions of the universe might be the source of reality, as far as we've been able to trace it.
phenomenology is a school of thought, not a sub-branch of philosophy. more like "empiricism" or "rationalism" or "existentialism"...not like "epistemology" or "ethics" or "ontology".yes, many people think ontological conversations requires it to be metaphysical. i do not agree with this. if we only ground said ontology in THIS world, then i see no reason to label it metaphysics.
Perhaps radical historicization involves a question of whether history shapes reality - a sort of "the winners write history" take. As I'm seeing when I read Kuhn, there seems to be a suggestion that there is no reality outside of mental construct. That seems a worthy question.Or perhaps it just refers to the historical predominance of anti-realism then realism throughout the years.
many people think ontological conversations requires it to be metaphysicalYes, einfuhlung -- and moreover, it seems that the word "metaphysical" is frequently misunderstood to necessarily imply some supernatural essence.
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Perhaps radical historicization involves a question of whether history shapes reality
Hi C --
To put a really fine point on it, history doesn't exactly shape reality, but it does shape the perception of reality.
I don't think historicization necessarily implies some anti-realist viewpoint, though there may be some correlation. The trend I've been thinking about lately is the ahistorical nature of modern society, in which we find ourselves trapped in a permanent present by the surrounding culture. Do you think this phenomenon has come to shape the perception of reality more so than patricular kinds of historicization?
History doesn't exactly shape anything, i believe, but can be used as a guide in certain decision making, and yes history has affected modern society, but I wouldn't say that as individuals we are trapped in this developed culture, but though bred into it have the power to detach ourselves and develop our own individual cultures.
I think there is rational support for the opinion that history does shape reality and not just the perception of it, though I'm not sure I buy into it myself. But it must be said: how can we be sure there is an objective reality if we are only ever converging on it? I'm not quite following the line of history outside of the metaphysical ramifications, so if you could clarify your example, I'd find it very helpful.
Welcome to the thread, Thinker.
History plays a role in shaping reality to a point, hence my example of it affecting modern reality. My focus was one of the past affecting us as individuals. C, You said "I'm not sure I buy into it myself" is that in reference to history's relation to reality?
I was referring to the idea that reality is solely a mental construct, so yes in a way.
Do you agree with that idea?
If you are asking me, I will say that I can see the basis for it, though neither side is foundational for my own philosophical beliefs. The Stoics have an ontological view that parallels this in my eyes with regard to their stance on universals, and that is something that I find persuasive. But in direct answer, if I had to choose either way, I would say no, I don't agree.Do you have a stance either way, Bibliomantic?
To say, yes, would be far too anthropocentric for my taste, so I vote, no.
Hi C --If you're saying Kuhn is a solipsist, I don't know because I'm not familiar with his metaphysics. Come to think of it, I don't know which philosophers actually do assert metaphysical solipsism.
The only in-depth treatment I've seen of the question is in Being and Nothingness, where Sartre dedicates a subsection to "The Reefs of Solipsism."
But Sartre is mainly interested in a more narrow question: Can you prove the existence of other people -- that is, other subjectivities besides yourself? Sartre concludes that you cannot exactly "prove" other subjectivities really exist, but without that assumption the world makes no sense.
In any case, that chapter addressed a more narrow, epistemological problem. I don't know how a philosopher would go about demonstrating that reality itself was a mental construct, because a consciousness with nothing to be conscious of is absurd.
I don't believe Kuhn is known as a solipsist. In fact, I think solipsism is quite a far jump from what he actually purports. It is not the idea of the individual mentality, but an overall encompassment that includes science, history, and metaphysics with reference to scientific realism. Unfortunately, I can't go in depth without interjecting what would clearly be my own interpretation, since Kuhn does not directly state his metaphysical theory as far as I could see. I have read Sartre as well, and I see little to no connection between the two.I would say though that to say consciousness without an object would be, to put words in Kuhn's mouth, a product of theory-ladenness. Incidentally, the idea of theory-ladenness that Kuhn seems to support is one of his positions that leads me to think he is toying with the idea of reality as a mental construct. I think you would find upon looking into antirealism as well as constructivism several theories proposing reality as a mental construct in the manner that I was referring.
I can see this thread has been a bit quiet for some time so I would like to revive it by looking at the first question posed:1. Is reality best described as all there is?
I enjoy philosophy for this question. Of course I'm way too understudied to treat this question with profundity, but since no one has posted in here lately I'm going to go right ahead and think about this question.
If reality is how the human brain can understand its physical environment as well as its own existence then doesn't that by definition answer the question in the affirmative?
If there was something other, and the mind had no capabilities of understanding it then it would be all that could be. However, when I do approach the problem along these lines I realize that knowing the earth was round at one point was not a capability until the necessary technologies made it a reality. Does this mean that reality is everything that has potential?
Does that even make sense to say that reality is everything that is potential? This would render anything possible wouldn't it, and even more insulting it would presume humans were somehow the center of the universe, or would it? It would mean that humans are the center of reality but not the universe.
When I think about the initial question I can't help but think that question can not be answered along a point in the reality of human time but can only be answered by something outside of it, which is absurd, so i guess my final position would be reality is absurd and this absurdity must be removed for the question to be competently answered.
I don't know though, which is why I read about metaphysics.
If reality is how the human brain can understand its physical environment as well as its own existence then doesn't that by definition answer the question in the affirmative?That might provide explantions about the human brain or the way the human mind comes to know reality, but it doesn't yet get at what reality is in itself. Completing the sentence, "Reality is ..." is an occupation philosophers have attacked for some time, and from different ways.
Does that even make sense to say that reality is everything that is potential?
Potentiality can be a question for high level physics, sort of like the observation that mass and energy are interchangeable, and that therefore the universe can be described in terms of energy. But would the laws of physics be the correct tools to use for a broader description of reality?
If we were to say that everything in reality possesses potential, that would be describing something about reality. So the question would be how significant it is to say that.
Talking about the potential of reality, or of real existents, does make "potential" a human concept. But anything anyone says about reality could also fit that description. So the question come up what the relationship is between the human mind and reality. If all humans vanished suddenly, would whatever reality is vanish with them, or will it continue to exist independently of our minds?
I don't particularly think reality would exist independently of our minds as a reality (which humans understand as reality) in itself, but I see no reason to exclude the potentiality for reality of some other non-human percipient. So is this the question more precisely, is human reality all there is?
If we take away all the humans I do believe there is some reality by the empirical proof that humans interact with A reality, or some reality of some sort. I imagine a kind of potential reality, as in electricity has potential to conduct across certain surfaces which are conductive. There is a pole of induction for the energy, and another pole for its continued travel yet nothing when separated. Conscious reality must be something of this sort, where there is a potential for reality (like the electricity on one pole of the resistor), and then a conscious mind (like the resistor), and the engagement with reality as a living being (like the opposite pole which completes the circuit through a resistor).
In the analogy, the current flowing is the life within reality, but without such conductive properties there is nothing only potential.
While I may analogize this theory of reality in my own mind I certainly couldn't step out of my reality and measure the current flowing through it! But I suppose what I am trying to get at is reality must be something closer to energy rather than objective. If this energy transforms into matter then it is no longer a force to manifest reality, but becomes something of reality since we perceive matter as the constituents of reality.
Reality as a definition seems problematic. Here is the Wiki: "An individual observer's own subjective perception of that which is real" This is the most problematic definition ever since we have no external reality to supply our reality with outside observations into what can be counted as real.
What are some of the answers to this dilemma?
So is this the question more precisely, is human reality all there is?The question here is whether reality exists independently of humans.
In the analogy, the current flowing is the life within reality, but without such conductive properties there is nothing only potential.
Then would it be fair to say that consciousness is the way by which the potential aspects of an external reality are discerned or realized?
If this energy transforms into matter then it is no longer a force to manifest reality, but becomes something of reality since we perceive matter as the constituents of reality.
I agree that reality is more than matter. So if matter reduces to or derives from energy, then that energy is part of reality. If reality means that whatever is, is, then that definition is flexible enough to encompass any existent, including an energy or potential -- so long as those can be shown to exist.
What are some of the answers to this dilemma?
I think the wiki definition is wrong. There is an idea that the only thing that exists is our mental states. That's solipsism. But for wiki to represent solipsism as the standard definition of reality is mistaken.
Solipsism brings up another question. Do mental states, or more specifically, does consciousness of some sort, precede existence, or does existence precede consciousness?
Sartre, where he lays the groundwork for his existentialism, states explictly that existence precedes essence. By that, he means that a reality of existents (existing things) comes first, and only then does consciousness, or essence, emerge.
Of course, some non-existential philosophies hold that essence precedes existence. Many religious philosophies consider the primacy of consciousness (or essence) fundamental to a view of any reality that includes a transcendental agent such as God. But that doesn't mean a god has to be necessary to a transcendental outlook.
So two main ways to interpret reality have been defined by developments in philosophy. One school holds that essence is primary in reality, the other, that existence is primary.
Then would it be fair to say that consciousness is the way by which the potential aspects of an external reality are discerned or realized? I think it would be fair to say anything concerning metaphysics, but not fair to assert anything about metaphysics.
To address the statement, I couldn't fully agree. I have this notion that consciousness is created when reality is discerned.....I'm thinking more about what you are saying and yes you could say that, but to go back to my original intent with the response I started typing:
I feel as though consciousness is something that gets created out of potential reality and allows a human mind to realize the reality but it(consciousness) is not a causal factor of its own conscious state or awareness, or the potential either. I see the perception organ(brain, etc.) as one causal factor or potential pole and the lapse of space/time/matter as the other pole. Consciousness is necessitated out of the fact that a brain endures over time.
To go back to electricity for analogies sake, I can hold the negative pole in one hand, or the positive, but not both at the same time, for if I did I would be shocked. However, if I do shock myself I'll experience pain. This pain is of the same nature as consciousness, or conscious thought. I do not feel the pain until I complete the potential for pain by merging all the parts necessary for pain. The pain was not out there in existence waiting for me but an emergent property from its potential, (the exchange of electrons down the conductive line).
In this model the question seems like, where did pain come from and is pain all there is (when I get shocked at least)?
I'm not sure how to handle that question yet, but I am seduced by the idea that experiences should have an hierarchy. I want to reject this natural inclination but if I do it forces the need to think very differently about reality, metaphysics, and conscious experience at all.
Do you think humans are capable of accessing these questions?
I want to think so, because there have been examples of humans bending the norms of thought all throughout the history of science and philosophy.
The greater question is whether there is such a thing as an external reality at all. As Wittgenstein suggested, many cases of philosophical problems are merely grammatical issues. While I don't think that external reality is completely a grammatical issue, it's "existence" does certainly beg the question.John Dewey, for example in his book Experience and Nature, posited the world which was filled with untapped potential. As we bring that nature into a relationship with us, that which we have not known previously, we come to experience this. Thus there is a kind of reality of which we are cognizant and yet an untapped nature which we do not yet know. Although I may be conscious of this cup of coffee here, I do not yet know through experience what it tastes like or even whether it is hot enough for me. As I taste it I experience more about which it already is. Indeed it is the apprehending of objects which we come to delineate through our experience which defines the world with which we relate. We thus change our world through our greater or lesser experience of it, but we still have a potential world essentially which we have not categorized and thus experienced.
Rhonda wrote: "The greater question is whether there is such a thing as an external reality at all. As Wittgenstein suggested, many cases of philosophical problems are merely grammatical issues. While I don't t..."Bringing up Wittgenstein, do you think he left room for metaphysics by exposing what can be talked about and what can't. Creating something of a demarcation line from where our discussion is meaningful and where it is not. This "where it is not" demarcation line being the areas that can't be talked about but can, however I believe, can be thought about.
I suppose I'm getting at the possibility of developing a method for exploring that which we can't talk about by developing the mental tools and non-logical logic to explore that which is not the case.
I think I am trying to make room for the fact that everything can't just be a grammatical error if it seems so natural for us to make. Perhaps the tools of language and logic are just not sufficient. It appears the mere act for people to desire metaphysics, or better yet, intrinsically lean toward metaphysics suggests to me that there is something unique about metaphysics worth attempting to discuss/investigate.
Is it safe to say that something lies at the foundation of reality? To acknowledge this is the basis of the statements like "Existence exists" or "About reality it can be said that whatever is, is." The statements appear trivial, but that depends upon where in the chain of reasoning about metaphysics they're located.
Rhonda knows more about this and Wittgenstein than I, but I would think that what cannot be talked about cannot be thought about either, unless it's an immediate perception. So I wonder if logical positivism might provide part of the demarcation Brian mentions.
Besides cognition, people have emotions and sensations as well. When we talk about the non-logical, are we talking about emotional states or something else? As always, the distinction between what we experience and what's actually out there has to be maintained.
One point here is that language derives from whatever metaphysical state one proposes. Therefore, it cannot be foundational to that state, so I think it's true that reality can't just be a matter of language usage and nothing else. But ... linguistic analysis has had the attention of philosophers recently, and when you're holding a hammar, lots of things start looking like nails!
You bring up an interesting point, Brian, about speaking of a concept and, indeed, even the Positivists would have had to concede that it becomes real in some sense. Unfortunately they never could figure out what exactly some things meant, such as the ubiquitous statement, "The present king of France is bald." Perhaps they were delimiting themselves by merely restricting knowledge to that which applied to the scientific method.Indeed, many people throughout our history have had to wrestle with a new way osf speaking of things and I am constantly fascinated by this. The best example in modern times, I think, is that of Heidegger. While he claimed to have failed (at least in the sense that he did not write the second volume of Sein und Zeit) what he did was expand in a new direction what Husserl had begun (knowing that he really didn't truly begin this) and in so doing Heidegger found his own new way of speaking about new primitive concepts. A fine example of this is in Husserl's Cartesian Meditations which treats such novel concepts as the transcendental reduction, the epoché, eidetic reduction, and eidetic phenomenology.
In this way we may say that, at the same time, mankind is both discovering and yet inventing it also. It would be wrong to say that any concept is other than synthetic, a synthesis of other ideas and concepts, but perhaps that is the sole genius of philosophy, that we can and do borrow from one another and, in so doing, being careful to define our terms, create a new way of thinking and, consequently, reality.
Julia wrote: "It should be called infinity"Until you die.
if reality was infinite, then reality is one person's finite experience of that. What is it depends on what that person figures it out to be during that finite moment of life. If someone could answer the question what is it, then how would that person go about doing it, or better yet, what kind of person would that be indeed?
Reality is all there is and all there isn’t.One conflict I've seen is whether negative concepts pertain to reality or not. Personally, I think they do.
As to infinity, there has to be something first for there to be an infinity of, right? So reality, whatever else can be said of it, should be logically prior to infinity.
Tyler wrote:The trend I've been thinking about lately is the ahistorical nature of modern society, in which we find ourselves trapped in a permanent present by the surrounding culture.
Can you explain this to me? In particular, what does ahistorical nature mean?
Hi Katie --It means the past is, in effect, rendered irrelevant by modern society -- for example, by modern media. Consider the Vietnam war. It took up the nation's (America's) attention all day long for years and years, and when it ended it was agreed that the "lessons of Vietnam" had come at such a high cost they would never be forgotten.
Today, nobody remembers the Vietnam War or its lessons. That's a function of modern society. Television, in particular, has simply effaced any reminder of the war, as has the press. What we do rarely hear about it now doesn't reflect what was actually going on then.
The same holds for other historical events. Many and in some cases most Americans don't know when the American Revolution occurred, nor the Civil War, nor who we were fighting in World War II. They are unable to bring to mind even sketchily the environment in which any of these events took place.
This effacing of the past isn't deliberate. It's just that private media have no long-term collective concerns or intentions. This characteristic has seeped into our overall culture. How often do people you know talk about historical events? It doesn't happen much. The culture is hardened against it by the demanding presence of new things in the media, new controversies, scandals, wars and political intrigues that in their turn will vanish, sometimes within days, from the public mind.
The result is a modern culture with no perspective except that of the immediate present. I think that because of this, people in the modern world were and are lagely unable to comprehend or interpret the 9-11 attacks on the World Trade Center. The reaction to that attack has been purely ad hoc.
The same will be true for future events as long as the environment in which we receive information remains the same. At the end of the Vietnam War, whatever mistakes had been made, it did seem that the general public understood the lessons relatively clearly. That could no longer happen today.
Tyler, now this is a very interesting discussion! I love your answer, so many good points, my thoughts scatter all over the place. (I almost want to suggest moving it into separate topic.)Anyway, some thoughts...
The same holds for other historical events. Many and in some cases most Americans don't know when the American Revolution occurred, nor the Civil War, nor who we were fighting in World War II.
While I agree that Vietnam War is largely forgotten, I'm not sure that these three fall into the same category. These are taught in school. Actually, they're almost exclusively taught in history classes (in America). The problem here is that education in schools is degenerate.
On one hand I agree with pretty much everything you say, but on the other hand, I feel like it's a wrong or perhaps narrow perspective. About people and media...
The People... People would learn the lessons if they wanted to, but power and money is much more seductive. People who have authority are mostly the ones that want power. And they're smart, at least most of them (some have inherent leverage and few are lucky), they put their efforts in understanding how to get power. Maybe cunning is a good word.
Some intellectuals squeeze into the power range as well, but they're a minority there. You need very strong individuals (also intellectuals, who can also hold themselves together when they have power) to bring about changes. How many people fall into this category? You can count them on your fingers. Interestingly, these people are often idealists, a trend that I feel is unpopular today among intellectuals.
The media... Well, the popular media is focused on the majority, that's why it's popular anyway. And the majority is, and has always been!, non-intellectuals. The difference is that there's more, much more media today than ever before.
Footnote: by intellectuals I mean intelligentsia.
My thoughts are somewhat cramped right now, there's just too much to say about this. I would really like to get into this discussion more...
By the way, thanks for using ad hoc here, you reminded me to look it up. It's really a beautiful phrase!
Everyone's reality is different since everybody comes from a different world view, or life experiences.
Do you think there's a reality that's independent of each person's experience of it?
I think everyone has their own reality, from their own experiences. No two people share the same reality. I have experiences with my own siblings, and both of our views are entirely different. No, I don't think so.
1. Is reality best described as all there is? No.
2. Can reality be axiomatic -- that is, can it serve as the basis for deductions about the world around us?
No.
3. Does reality entail something above and beyond the natural world?
No.
4. Are questions about reality fundamental to other philosophical discussion?
No.
5. How does religion fit in with metaphysics?
It doesn't.
6. How have metaphysical questions been dealt with through history?
Badly.
Duffy wrote: "1. Is reality best described as all there is? No.
2. Can reality be axiomatic -- that is, can it serve as the basis for deductions about the world around us?
No.
3. Does reality entail someth..."
Duffy...uh...get up on the wrong side of the bed or something?
Tyler wrote: "Do you think there's a reality that's independent of each person's experience of it?"Tyler...the thread is so long I don't have time to read it. However, I will attempt to answer this question you posted. If my answer is redundant to many other posts, just ignore it. Here goes:
Yes. However, we have no access to it that will allow us to discuss it objectively.
Robert wrote: "Duffy wrote: "1. Is reality best described as all there is? No.
2. Can reality be axiomatic -- that is, can it serve as the basis for deductions about the world around us?
No.
3. Does reality..."
Just giving the best answers I could. If you want me to be a bit more expansive.
1) It's best not to try to describe all of reality. But, as far as it goes, "all there is" is no better than "everything that is the case" which in turn is no better than "what God knows".
2) As I understand it, an axiom is something we take to be true in order to build a logical system. Under anyone's understanding of "reality," whatever that is, it doesn't care whether we take it to be true or not. Furthermore, if we had direct access to reality in the first place, why would we need to use it to make deductions about "the world around us." Isn't that part of reality in the first place?
3) If we observed something that was supernatural, it would be natural, simply because we observed it. The whole idea of the supernatural is self-contradictory.
4) It's probably possible to force an ontological question into any philosophical discussion, but that doesn't mean it belongs there or has anything to do with it. I think its perfectly possible to do epistemology, for example, without resorting to metaphysics. Even simpler, I think its trivial to do some logic or set theory without raising any ontological question.
5) Religion depends upon faith and irrational belief. Metaphysics tries to be rational. So they don't fit together.
6) Read Hegel, or Heidegger, or even Aristotle. Metaphysics has led to more nonsense than any other branch of philosophy. Thus, I believe it has been done badly.
As to your own answer: if we have no access to it, then why is your answer yes instead of no. Here's something else you have no access to: I have a coat in my closet. Is it red?
Why wouldn't we have access to a objective reality? It seems sense perception is how that occurs quite naturally.
Hi Duffy --It's best not to try to describe all of reality.
Shouldn't we try?
As I understand it, an axiom is something we take to be true in order to build a logical system.
But we do take reality to be true. We draw conclusions about the natural world inductively from observation. I'm wondering if we could also look at it deductively as well. If we could, can we eliminate either the inductive or the deductive category from our reasoning and thus simplify it?
I think its perfectly possible to do epistemology, for example, without resorting to metaphysics. Even simpler, I think its trivial to do some logic or set theory without raising any ontological question.
I agree that we don't need ontology to talk about mathematics, but if epistemology has to do with how we come to know what we know, doesn't that entail that there has to be something to know about?
Metaphysics has led to more nonsense than any other branch of philosophy. Thus, I believe it has been done badly.
About that I agree. If we accept that there is a reality in the first place, then trying to reach beyond it or overexplain it doesn't give much additional information and risks nonsensical detours.
Tyler wrote: "Hi Duffy --It's best not to try to describe all of reality.
Shouldn't we try?
As I understand it, an axiom is something we take to be true in order to build a logical system.
But we..."
Try if you like. I wonder in what sense you are using the word "should" here? I certainly don't feel any moral obligation to try to describe reality.
But let me go a bit further. Descriptions, as I understand them, typically describe to things. And the word you are using "reality" also seems to presuppose that there is some "thing" that you are trying to get at. I think this is a mistake. Because you have a noun, you are assuming that there must be some object that corresponds to the noun. Based on this mistake, I think its better not to try to describe reality.
Instead, I would like to say that if you want to find out about reality, meditate. You won't ever get to a description.
On the second point - a thing is neither true nor false. Propositions are true or false. So I don't agree that we "take reality to be true." I think that's just a category mistake.
Duffy wrote: "Just giving the best answers I could. If you want me to be a bit more expansive......As to your own answer: if we have no access to it, then why is your answer yes instead of no. Here's something else you have no access to: I have a coat in my closet. Is it red? "
Thanks, Duffy. That answer was a great deal more interesting and helpful to the discussion than the previous one.
As to my answer, you have to read a bit more carefully. I did not say we have no access to it. I said that we have no access that would allow us to discuss it objectively.
The difference, by the way, lies in the "red" coat in your closet.
Tyler wrote: "Why wouldn't we have access to a objective reality? It seems sense perception is how that occurs quite naturally."See my response to Duffy.
Here's more on what I meant, Tyler. We do have access to reality - but that access does not allow us to discuss it objectively. Our discussions are necessarily subjective because the access to reality is always through the door of our own experience.
I don't know of any way to determine whether your experience and mine are the same. Therefore, in the end, the access is only subjective.
Robert wrote: "Duffy wrote: "Just giving the best answers I could. If you want me to be a bit more expansive......As to your own answer: if we have no access to it, then why is your answer yes instead of no. He..."
Give me an example of something which we have sufficient access to (not through our experience, since you insist that you can't know if our experiences are the same), so that we can discuss it objectively.
I'm afraid the distinction you are trying to draw leads to the conclusion that no-one can ever understand what anyone else is saying. (By the way, do you have any idea what I subjectively intended any of the words to mean in the above sentence? Or even in this question?)
Oh, and as for the closet I was talking about. I made it up. It exists only in my mind. You want to tell me what color the coat is now?
Duffy wrote: "Robert wrote: "Duffy wrote: "Just giving the best answers I could. If you want me to be a bit more expansive......As to your own answer: if we have no access to it, then why is your answer yes in..."
Sorry, Duffy but your opening request is nonsensical. Obviously, given my premise, the answer is nought - an empty set. There is no "something" that is accessed outside of experience.
About your second point - the way I think about it, you have to make a subdivision. On a common, everyday, practical level we can understand what each other is saying. We can at the pragmatic level of functioning in the world. However, at the essential level, I actually don't think our discourse can ever be completely in common. Words are only symbols for concepts. There is no way to know whether the concept in my mind is the same as yours. We can explore it together, and maybe reduce the variation, but it the end the ongoing discussion always ends in the same place. If you think about it, you will see that, taken far enough, subjects discussed beyond the pragmatic level always end in that place.
As to your final point, it was quite obvious that you made up the closet analogy...not sure why that was important to state. It exists only in your mind. However, whether it exists there, or it exists in reality, there is no way in the end to know that what you see and understand to be the concept "red" is what I see and understand that concept to be. Even if we examine it scientifically, and point out the various combinations of the color spectrum that can produce the various shades of what we call "red"...that reduces the variation in understanding but can never eliminate it.
Read Eliot's 4 quartets. He says it poetically.
Robert wrote: "Duffy wrote: "Robert wrote: "Duffy wrote: "Just giving the best answers I could. If you want me to be a bit more expansive......As to your own answer: if we have no access to it, then why is your..."
And yet, given all that, you still insist the answer to question 1 is yes. It seems to me that it would make absolutely no difference to anything whether the answer was yes or no. Reality, in your view, has become quite irrelevant. (By the way, this result doesn't trouble me at all.)
Oh, and I was lying when I said I made up the coat in my closet. My computer is in a bedroom next to a storage closet. In it, there are four coats, not counting suit jackets. When I later said I was making it up, I was just trying to isolate the point about "access."
Duffy wrote: "Robert wrote: "Duffy wrote: "Robert wrote: "Duffy wrote: "Just giving the best answers I could. If you want me to be a bit more expansive......As to your own answer: if we have no access to it, t..."
My answer to #1 is yes. I see no conflict. And I don't agree that it make's absolutely no difference. That's a logical leap, for me, that I ain't willing to make. So no...I don't think it is irrelevant at all, in my view. I think that if someone can NOT honestly define reality as "all that there is", I don't know where you go from there except to complete solipsism which, for me, is absurd and logically inconsistent.
On your coat - as I said, I don't think it matters even a wee bit whether you made it up or you didn't. I think the point remains the same.
What is metaphysics? It's the part of philosophy, sometimes called ontology, that deals with the nature of reality. It asks the question, "What is reality?"
So I'll ask that, too. What is it:
1. Is reality best described as all there is?
2. Can reality be axiomatic -- that is, can it serve as the basis for deductions about the world around us?
3. Does reality entail something above and beyond the natural world?
4. Are questions about reality fundamental to other philosophical discussion?
5. How does religion fit in with metaphysics?
6. How have metaphysical questions been dealt with through history?
So here are some of the questions in metaphysics, but by no means all. I'll add my own thoughts in as the thread develops.