Philosophy discussion

Hi Everyone --

Here's a question from Chris concerning free will.



Chris:

Hey guys, great to follow along here. I was wondering what you thought of freedom or free will as not existing? I don't mean because of destiny or a God's will, but because of the sum total of everything that's going on right now.

For example, say I want to take the day off of work today and go fishing, and ultimately, that's what I do. Was I able to go fishing because of my freedom to do so, or was it determined by a number of occurances that go back to before I was even born?

Maybe we have about as much freedom as the people we consider to be oppressed?

Hi Chris --

This is an interesting question. Right now I'm reading a book (The Book of Disquiet) whose author writes from a deterministic point of view. So we see in it how life is experienced by someone who dismisses free will as an illusion.

The first thing to do is look at what's in front of our eyes. We see people acting freely all the time, and we actually experience our own decisions as being free acts of ours.

But then comes the scientific fact of a material universe. Within our universe, everything has a cause. So our free acts must also have causes, right? And if that's the case, they aren't really free, are they? They were caused, as you say, by previous states.

So we have two opposite points of view that appear equally balanced. Adding God into the equation won't help us here, either. For if God knows everything, then he knew Adam and Eve would choose to eat the apple. But if He knew it already, then how could Adam and Eve have really chosen to do so? Yet the doctine of Original Sin says they did choose. So now we're back to square one!

I'd like to hear which side people take on this issue. Either way you choose, you have to account for the other side. If you accept determinism, you have to explain why we think we have free will. If you accept free will, you have to account for the principle of cause and effect.

I also have a couple of other questions. First, is there some way to square this circle, to say that free will doesn't really contradict determinism? And second, is this issue even real? Is there something missing from both arguments that might turn the whole dilemma into a non-issue?

Okay, what do other posters think about this?

While determinism may make some sense from the deity's point of view, because he exists outside of space and time, it does not follow that we can see the same things in our personal lives as determined. Thus I argue (with those who associate some sort of self-contradiction with determinism and free will) that they are ill defining the scope of their understanding at all.
While determinism may be that which was determined according to God, (which in other words means that he knows how things turn out) it is not the same thing as a mortal not being able to make our open choices.

However, in regards to free will, I cite Dante in saying that there is no such thing because absolutely free will would leave us perfectly in the center between two options, unable to choose. Thus perfectly free will, if it exists, is only a paradigm of heaven.
Instead it seems true that our options, whether it is of appetite or reason, always seem to have a personal benefit for oneself. Indeed, if there were no benefit, then one might have no reason to choose and thus could not.
But man believes him (or her) self in having a kind of power over his/her reason. Indeed we do this in order to survive as well as to otherwise please ourselves. If we had no power over our reason, which is to say possessing and using our reasoning ability, then we would either be, following the lines in a play written by another or following some sort of animal instinct which has developed to the extent that it feeds on itself. Since reason in people follows basically the same basic principles and tenets but remains relatively diverse in its conclusions or interpretations, it is difficult to understand how the latter should be so.
Determinism can surely exist, but it is something like the tree falling in the forest, suggesting a kind of straw man which actually knows what that determinism is. While I understand the Biblical precepts for a belief in determinism, I cannot see that this makes any sense from a human’s point of view that cannot possibly merge something having been determined in his or her life with his or her ability to make simple decisions.

I've taken a number of courses in psychology, neurology, and cognitive science, and I've never seen a single mechanism that I'd feel comfortable calling free nor anything that seemed to interact with something free.

What's the thing that's free, why do we suspect that it exists, is it atomic or composed of parts, and how does it interact with the standard physical world? Those seem like fundamental questions to answer before we can find tests to choose between free will and determinism. As it stands, free will seems like such a radical departure from everything we're moderately sure about that I don't think it's earned a spot on the playing field.

Tyler wrote: If you accept determinism, you have to explain why we think we have free will.

Isn't that like saying "If you accept heliocentrism, you have to explain why it looks like the sun orbits the Earth?"

Hi Rhonda --

While I understand the Biblical precepts for a belief in determinism, I cannot see that this makes any sense from a human’s point of view

I think that's the flaw with Original Sin. The Final Judgment, one would think, ought to be a secular affair as well if it ever occurs. After all, if man acts freely, should he not be judged by a human standard rather than a divine one?

One early Christian philosopher I read, Boethius, puts both determinism and free will in the secular sphere, which means the God can know ahead of time (because He's eternal -- beyond time) what we will do, yet we for our parts live in a world that's both determined and free. Now there's a clever way to have both choice and predestination. But it still brings us back to the question of who's to judge human actions, and it raises other questions about the nature of God.

...absolutely free will would leave us perfectly in the center between two options

I don't know if Dante is right about this. Can anyone really be exactly at a midpoint between two choices? There is an incalculable subjectivity that applies in human choices. Also, I wonder if the absence of an "absolutely" free will justifies the conclusion that, therefore, no free will exists.

If we had no power over our reason [...:] then we would either be following the lines in a play written by another or following some sort of animal instinct which has developed to the extent that it feeds on itself. Since reason in people follows basically the same basic principles and tenets but remains relatively diverse in its conclusions or interpretations, it is difficult to understand how the latter should be so.

What a clean line of reasoning! I like it -- I agree. The diverse results of human reasoning really must count as evidence that our reasoning is not simply some sort of outgrowth of animal instinct. I cannot think of a counter-argument to this.

Hi Bart --

Isn't that like saying "If you accept heliocentrism, you have to explain why it looks like the sun orbits the Earth?"

Yes. If you cannot state the opposing side to your argument, you might not understand your own side as well as you think you do. Moreover, being able to state both sides of a dispute prevents you from arguing against a staw man.

This is not a law carved in stone: you might not have to do it in the sciences or mathematics. But in philosophy it's good practice, and doing so strengthens your own argument immeasurably. Because of the subjective nature of human controversies, it helps cut down on misunderstandings.

Of course, in the case of heliocentrism, there hasn't really been two sides to the issue for awhile. But if I lived 400 years ago, I would have made sure to "save the phenomenon" (as it's called) of the apparent motion of the sun before going forward with a heliocentric argument.



What's the thing that's free, why do we suspect that it exists, is it atomic or composed of parts ...

Good questions. What exactly are we talking about? Free will of what?

Okay, I'd say the free will of people. That must mean some sort of "freedom" in their conscious decisions. So do we agree we're talking about free will in relation to human consciousness?

...and how does it interact with the standard physical world?

Would it be right to rephrase this: What's the relation between consciousness and the physical world?

That brings up an important question: What is consciousness, anyway? Is it physical? Can it be anything besides part of the physical world? Unless we can answer that, we can't yet say how determinism factors in.

No, I specifically meant interact, not just some ambiguous relation. How does information pass between the free thing to the brain? That's the rub. I've never seen an answer or even evidence that such a thing is indeed happening. If we can't answer such a basic question about inputs and outputs, then I don't know how we can hope to discuss the black box itself.

On saving the phenomenon, my apologies for the smugness. What is it exactly we're trying to save? That's what I'm trying to understand. I've asked questions in the hope of avoiding strawmen because every version of free will I've encountered has seemed incoherent and counterintuitive to me. My apologies if I do build a strawman on the way, but if I do, know that I'm hoping someone will knock it down.

On defining consciousness, I'd rather not deal with such unwieldy and contentious concepts until we have the basic mechanics down. Why don't we stick to a more specific cognitive subsystem?

EDIT: Changed a few word choices for clarity.

What is it exactly we're trying to save? That's what I'm trying to understand. I've asked questions in the hope of avoiding strawmen because every version of free will I've encountered has seemed incoherent and counterintuitive to me.

What it is you’d be trying to save, or account for, are the versions of free will you’ve encountered. And to do this you need do no more than state what they are. From there you can explain what about each is incoherent or counterintuitive.

A simple version of the free will argument is that free will is inherent in human actions because we plainly observe it in ourselves and others. Every minute each person chooses between one course of action or another and decides one thing or other.

Abstract concepts, “choice,” “decision,” and “responsibility,” would indeed be incoherent without actual free agency. Yet it’s hard to see how these concepts can be false, or how an everyday phenomenon can be counterintuitive. But all I can do is guess that this is a free will argument you’ve encountered, and unless I knew it to be so, I’d risk missing your point entirely.



How does information pass between the free thing to the brain? That's the rub. I've never seen an answer or even evidence that such a thing is indeed happening.

Where does the brain normally get its inputs from? Generally, sense perception. But from that fact are we right to conclude that the brain therefore gets no input from its own states? After all, even sense perception means nothing until a brain state has somehow evaluated it.

Neurology can explain the physical manifestations of brain states, but I don’t see how it can explain the states themselves. If we don’t know how information passes from a “free” thing to the brain, neither do we know how the brain “determines” a mental state. And it remains that these states, free or not, are readily observable. So the question of inputs and outputs of the black box appears to be independent of whether free will or determinism applies to human activity.

Human sciences such as psychology deal with matters for which a grounding assumption of determinism often has limited value; their conclusions are then based only on the consensus of the practitioners in that field. The question of how the laws of physics apply to human studies is interdisciplinary, so philosophy, I think, is a necessary tool when considering the more subjective problems of the mind.

Excellent discussion though it does make me feel a bit intimidated to throw in my two cents.

As regarding free will and consciousness I recently finished a fascinating book on that very topic called "The Ego Tunnel" By Thomas Metzinger. It is all about phenomenology, the philosophy and study of human consciousness. I will avoid doing the book too many injustices by trying to explain what I think it to be about but a few points caught my attention that might be relevant to this discussion. The author believes that the ego is essentially a virtual self created by the brain because human consciousness needs a self-reference point in order to promote the survival of the body. It is possible to dissolve the ego and create the euphoric experience of being "at one with the universe" in a lab now. Though enjoyable, being lost in that experience is hardly conducive for normal day to day life.

I suppose what I am getting at is that maybe free will is that necessary self-generated illusion. A construct of the brain to give the human ego, the self-reference point, a multidimensional world in which it can function in.

So the question of inputs and outputs of the black box appears to be independent of whether free will or determinism applies to human activity.

I think you're blurring over some major differences. We know a good deal about individual modules and heuristics involved in visual processing, what input each receives from which other modules, and where their output is sent. The same for sound, memory, and language. We're not left simply staring at the sum of sense perceptions and being completely puzzled as to what the brain does with them.

I'm looking for an account of free will that's at least as predictively powerful as our current understanding of how the temporal and occipital lobes work together in interpreting an image.

A simple version of the free will argument is that free will is inherent in human actions because we plainly observe it in ourselves and others.

That's circular reasoning: "We know free will exists because we observe free will." I suppose I shouldn't have taken a swipe at other versions of free will. Rather than guess at simple arguments someone else might have heard, assume we've never heard of nor experienced free will. How would you explain it to us? How would we be able to recognize an agent with free will?

Abstract concepts, “choice,” “decision,” and “responsibility,” would indeed be incoherent without actual free agency. Yet it’s hard to see how these concepts can be false, or how an everyday phenomenon can be counterintuitive

How are they different from the squares in Adelson's checker shadow illusion? Why should we assume our innate understanding of cognition is accurate? Hans was getting at this in the post above.

Hi Hans --

I suppose what I am getting at is that maybe free will is that necessary self-generated illusion.

The necessity I can see, based on what you’ve said about Thomas Metzinger’s views. It seems that however the mind evolved, it did so in response to the needs of human survival. If I understand this correctly, the author is saying that consciousness existed first, then as a matter of evolution a self-awareness, or ego, evolved. So you’re distinguishing between consciousness and ego where I’m often just saying consciousness. Hence, this "primitive" consciousness might operate by necessity.

But the distinction is important. If free will existed, it would be part of the ego under this view.
Now my question would be about the ego. Why does the author think its function is strictly determined and that its apparent free will is just an illusion?

A great deal of philosophy examines the nature of self-awareness and what that implies. Among other things, it's here that our status as objective thinkers emerges, and that we are able to perform acts of introspection. Existential philosophy, in particular, argues that it's within this objectification that free will emerges.

Once an ego has been posited, then it becomes a property of consciousness, which itself is a property of the brain. That is, they are not material entities. My question, to put it another way, is whether the deterministic laws of physics still apply to non-material entities.

Hi Bart --

That's circular reasoning:"We know free will exists because we observe free will."

To say you know something because you observe it isn’t circular reasoning. Knowing and seeing aren’t the same thing.

Let’s say: P1-Free Will occurs if the agent’s choice could have been otherwise; P2- We observe people taking actions for which alternatives existed; C: Therefore, free will exists. C is not embedded in the premises, and the premises are disputable. So the argument doesn’t beg the question.

Why should we assume our innate understanding of cognition is accurate?

What do you mean by that? By cognition, are you referring to our (human) thinking process? The human mind is a product of evolution, so presumably it’s action has a life-preserving function. So to that extent, we should be able to trust our minds. I’m not sure if that’s what you mean, though.


We're not left simply staring at the sum of sense perceptions and being completely puzzled as to what the brain does with them.

To say that is not to say that neurology or various cognitive studies have provided an explanation of consciousness, or cognition, if that's the term you're using. Unless they elucidate the phenomenon of subjectivity, they cannot say consciousness, or cognition, is strictly determined by the same laws that apply in physics to material entities.


I'm looking for an account of free will that's at least as predictively powerful as our current understanding of how the temporal and occipital lobes work together in interpreting an image

I don’t believe human brain states, or cognition, or consciousness, are reducible to mental images or the sum of their sensory inputs. You seem to be saying that if free will were to apply to some facet of human consciousness (or cognition, or ego -- the terms are overlapping here), such as vision or hearing, then it must apply to every input that comprises it, including higher-up functions such as introspection.

I don’t think the mind can be reduced this way to its inputs, so that that if one facet is determined they're all determined, but I don't know how well I understand your point and I’m open to what you have to say about it.

Here is an passage from 'The Island' where the concept of 'free will' is dissected from a modern scientific perspective:

"But there is another side to god that I have not considered and it relates to the human experience, in particular, but not solely. A lion attacks a gazelle on the plains of Africa and kills it. It is acting according to instinct, and while we feel for the pain of the gazelle, we do not condemn the lion. If a man kills a gazelle we might accept it, if he were hungry, but we decry it, if he kills for pleasure. If he kills another human being, we cry foul, except in the extremes of war. We have an innate sense of justice built into us. This justice is premised on the concept of free will. If we are not acting under free will then justice doesn't apply to us. If we freely carry out an act then the strong arm of justice must apply. Those of us who live our lives within the narrow confines of just action are deemed virtuous. Because of our innate sense of justice, only the virtuous rest easy and can be happy. This is, in a sense, its own reward, but justice must be seen to be done, for even the virtuous to have a sense of justice. But in many cases justice is rarely carried through in this life, and that requires that it be done in a postulated afterlife. This gives rise to the need for a concept of god, who becomes a god of eternal justice. This is the god of Jews, Christians and Muslims, who is a god of punishment and reward. Has this god arisen in the same socio-evolutionary sense?
If we were all individuals living our lives in free will, without a sense of society or belonging then justice would have little import. The criminal is always a loner, and outside of society. Even when criminals band together, they invent their own justice system. It is usually brutal, and barbaric, but nonetheless a justice system. Human beings are societal animals. It comes from the safety in numbers of the early hunter-gatherer, social systems. Once a group of individuals come together, rules of conduct begin to emerge. To disobey these rules, brings the strong hand of justice down on the guilty.
But societies and groups live long beyond the lifetime of one individual, and develop histories. These histories sometimes display evidence of justice having missed its target, and not being done. If this were to pertain then the concept of justice would erode over time, and the group would decline in strength. The idea of justice carrying over after death was created. A whole mythology, of eternal life and a god who would dispense justice on those who had escaped their fate on earth, was created. The need for this god, became a fundamental of society.
This god of justice depends on the free will of his subjects. When the very religious Newton discovered his deterministic dynamical laws of motion, the concept of free will became challenged.
Newton's laws implied that, theoretically, if you knew the position and velocity of every particle in the universe, you could, admittedly with an infinite computing power requirement, calculate all future positions and velocities for all time. This left no scope for free will, and the religion, based on a god of justice, was in deep trouble. Newton, himself, was very troubled about this, and decided that the laws did not apply to the realm of the soul - as a way out of the dilemma. Luckily modern scientific theory has removed the dilemma, by exposing the limitations of Newton's paradigm. Quantum theory replaces strict determinism by a weird world where every outcome is possible, but only to a weighted probabilistic extent. All outcomes progress through space-time in a totally deterministic sense but when we look or observe for a particular outcome, what we find is totally unpredictable outside a probability range. In the modern way of looking at free will, you have free will in your solipsistic world, but that world is one of a multiverse of worlds where all outcomes take place separately. Is this any solace to the god of justice? I think not as free will is replaced by a sort of chance structure which, while making the future indeterminate, does not give you the freedom to do as you please.
Is all the world a stage? Are the lines already written down, and the props in place? The quantum drama is not one stage, but an infinity of stages, where our role changes from one to the other. In one, we may be the victim, while in the next, we may be the transgressor. So many stages, roles, cues! There must be a universal producer. For some he is god. For modern physicists, he is Schroedinger's equation of state wave evolution, and its intermittent reduction by observation, as the producer looks into a particular theatre, in an indeterministic probabilistic manner. There is no justice or free will in this world of many worlds, there is just chance. Maybe Einstein got it wrong. God is merely a dice thrower.
Does God throw his dice for all eternity - the infinity of time into the future. God and infinity are often associated in philosophical dialectic over the centuries. But it is not the mathematical form of infinity that has divine aspirations; it is the metaphysical infinity of wholeness, completeness, perfection, that is forever out of reach of human grasp. The cold mathematical infinity of numbers and parts has no beauty other than an awe for magnitude.

... justice is premised on the concept of free will. If we are not acting under free will then justice doesn't apply to us.

That would present a paradox for us if strict determinism is the truth of the human mind.

The article says a "sense" of justice evolved, took on a religious connotation, and nowadays lies within the domain of society. I like the progression, but it makes a subtle error in moving the concept from the individual to the group. Unless the group possesses a mind somehow, I don't see how this can be done except as metaphor. The explanation it gives could support either a free will argument or a deterministic one.

Either way, the question involves different starting points. Bart is starting with the brain to build up to whatever mental activity that brain might form, asking how the activity can be "free" when the rest of it clearly isn't.

I've approached it from the world of observed experience, pointing out a phenomenon that requires explaining. That is, how would we reduce the phenomenon to a determined state?

Hans is adding another point, that "consiousness" and "ego" are not the same thing and we should look for the answer there.

Hans appears to be close to where we actually are in the discussion. The distinction he makes points out that we still haven't decided what it is that's supposed to be either determined or free.

Are we talking about the brain only? Or brain states? Are we talking about cognition, and if so, what does that mean? Are we talking about consciousness, and if so, does it or does it not really exist?

Whatever the case, the idea of the ego, or whatever it comes to, seems implicated in the debate over free will.

Free will is not a solipsistic process - it entails the existence of others and the mutual interactions that can occur.
The solipsistic state is a prison with no degrees of freedom. The real world has infinite degrees of freedom that in their complexity translate into a type of 'free will' for each individual degree of freedom (even though this individual degree of freedom may be inextricably entangled with the infinitude of others - the determination being suitably obscured).

"Free Will vs Determinism" is a false setup. It's apples and oranges; it's like asking someone, "Which apples are better, the green Granny Smith apples, or the orange Valencia apples?"

We can DO what we want, but we can't WANT what we want.

That's the core of it.

We can decide whether to HAVE soup or salad with lunch, but we can't change which one we WANT -- our desires and preferences and urges are pre-programmed in at some level. Though it might be abstractly or ideally possible to somehow be aware of all these preset desires, it ultimately doesn't change anything... but nor does it affect the existence of our free will.

Our wills are free. Our natures are predetermined. Some may change their natures through intense and prolonged personal work, but this can only happen if it is in their nature (or perhaps in the influences of their environment) to do so.

Our wills are free. Our natures are predetermined. Two separate issues, only interacting superficially. It's a false dichotomy.

Would it be possible that if free will was in fact an illusion we would have no way of knowing it and so we could go on believing that we were free because we had to believe it was true? I agree with most of the comments here, about the pros of freewill. But wanting it or needing it to be true doesn't make it so.

A interesting quote from Alan Watts "We feel that our actions are voluntary when they follow a decision and involuntary when they happen without decision. But if a decision itself were voluntary every decision would have to be preceded by a decision to decide - An infinite regression which fortunately does not occur. Oddly enough, if we had to decided to decide, we would not be free to decide"

This is similar to Xeno's paradoxes. We find ourselves in a interesting predicament if we try to explain freewill as our ability to decide, because on some deep and fundamental we aren't deciding to decide, instead we end up just doing. Where is this coming from? Obviously we are not stuck in this infinite regression of decision making. But if we are to accept Freewill then we have to also allow and accept this frustrating contradiction.

The reasoning for freewill appears to be almost backwards. After making a decision then rationale or justification follows making it appear to have been a reasoned choice. But in fact it was the justification of the action that was reasoned, not the decision.

Consciousness precedes ego yes, but I don't think that consciousness deals with the issue of choice, it is simply awareness in its ultimate sense. The Ego is brain generated so as to focus consciousness through the body.

If we take it a step further then we could say that since the ego is essentially an artificial self-image that it has also created a virtual world of interpretation of the world through which it interacts and experiences. This is where freewill becomes the illusion. It is part of the ego's interpretive construct of the reality it believes it is perceiving.

The most perplexing question to me is what exactly is consciousness? We accept that it is awareness but what is exactly is that? Where is it coming from? Does the brain generate consciousness? If it does than can reality exist outside of consciousness or exist without a brain that perceives it?

This is the heart of where Freewill resides which takes us even further back into metaphysics. This is the outer boundaries of empiricism and appears to be one step beyond it, at least where science stands today. Conjecture is what we are left with.

Good post, Hans.

The point, to me, is that -- to whatever extent our choices are determined by a occurrences stretching infinitely into the past -- it's pretty much completely irrelevant.

What happened --> What we are --> What we do

It's like a group of birds who have developed genetically to be drawn to blackberries and blueberries. Then you study one bird, and watch as it chooses blackberries over blueberries. Why did it do that? Well, the preference for those two types of berries was developed over millennia of events that led to it. Yes, but why did that bird choose blackberries? Because those same events led to that specific bird having that preference.

Just because there are reasons for the preference, doesn't mean the bird isn't making a choice.

Also to consider: Post hoc, ergo propter hoc. Our perception and data-stream are FAR too limited to be of use in separating the relevant from the irrelevant.

Our WILL is free, our DESIRES are set -- even our desires to change our desires, which is possible. We can DO as we will, but we can't WANT as we will.

Hans wrote: "Does the brain generate consciousness?"

There does seem to be a world beyond our consciousness, one which we cannot control with our minds, and which repeatedly gives us predictable, repeatable data, even when we have not yet learned to understand it. This world seems to be deterministic because it can be understood and predicted in terms of causal relationships.

We can always ask "what if it isn't real, what if it is just the fever dream of the solipsist?", but this isn't really a valid question, it's just the skeptic's argument. It is not a testable hypothesis, nor would it change the observable facts of the universe.

The real question (as Tyler indicated) regarding Determinism vs. Free Will boils down to whether there can be any random or external influence on our universe as a system. As Bart notes, everything we have learned and observed so far has been causal and predictable, including the human brain, which can be understood as sum of its chemical and electrical components.

Some recent discoveries in Quantum Mechanics have indicated that, at a micro scale, the universe might operate in a more random, unpredictable way. However, it may simply be a complex system we do not yet understand. Even if it is random, the physical laws of the universe would seem to screen out any random effects before they reach the scale of physical matter.

If free will did exist, there would have to be strong evidence for it, strong enough to outweigh the evidence we have so far of a predictable, repeatable, causal, and ultimately, deterministic universe. There would have to be some explanation for how either randomness or outside influences could enter and affect our universe, which, as of yet, we do not have.

It's true that we do 'feel' a sense of our own will, and of the choices we make, but human intuition has more often been the foil of thought than its helpmeet. The scientific process is, after all, an attempt to remove personal bias from our view of the universe.

To say that we have true choice in an event presupposes that both outcomes were ever possible. After all, only one outcome actually occurs. You can only ever make one decision, so why do we assume that it would have been possible for us to have made the other decision?

Imagine holding a steel ball over the precipice of the Grand Canyon. You might think to yourself "when I release this ball, it could fall down, or it could shoot up into the sky". If when you release it, it falls, do you assume that was a choice on the ball's part? It merely conformed to the laws of reality, and until we have evidence to the contrary, we must assume that we are physical beings beholden to those same laws.

Just because you can imagine an outcome does not mean that it was ever truly possible. Our decision to have coffee in the morning might be no more free than a ball succumbing to gravity.

Yet that doesn't make us any less remarkable, nor outcomes less important. We do not feel ire that we are all necessarily attached to the causal chain of reproduction, nor does it make our existence any less meaningful.

Over time, we have evolved introspection because, in adapting to the physical world around us, introspection, like pain or endorphins or fur, is a persistent development by life to the circumstances and laws that shape it.

Our sense of having free will can change future outcomes, just as we were changed by previous events to believe we had it. We are not inert, we are of the continual process which birthed us.

I am reminded of a quote by Mark Twain: "I do not fear death. I had been dead for billions and billions of years before I was born, and had not suffered the slightest inconvenience from it."

Likewise, when we look back on our lives, we see all the decisions that we made, which are now unchangeable. Is it really that frightening to assume that they have always been unchangeable, and it is only our perspective that has shifted?

Unchangeable in a context that would only matter in the slightest if each of us had the scope and depth of awareness of some omnipresent and omnipotent deity.

False dichotomy, I say again, false dichotomy. And a false pairing at that.

I wasn't presenting Determinism and Free Will as a dichotomy, the dichotomy is between pure Determinism and a universe capable of non-determined events.

However, Free Will, if it defined as true choice, can only exist in a world where there are non-determined events, which produces the conflict between Determinism and the idea of Free Will.

Hence, if there is Free Will, there must also be some explanation for how an undetermined event could occur in a universe that is otherwise deterministic, causal, and predictable. Free Will cannot simply spring from nowhere, and the assertion that we feel we have choice is not a strong enough argument for the existence of choice.

The notion of the unchangeable matters in a deterministic world because it would allow for the illusion of choice, despite outcomes being fixed. At that point, the only reason we think we have Free Will is because we are incapable of comprehending something as complex as how causation determines human decision.

If there is Free Will, what is its source in an otherwise deterministic universe? And further, is evidence of the existence of Free Will capable of overcoming our present evidence of repeatable, causal determinism?

It merely conformed to the laws of reality, and until we have evidence to the contrary, we must assume that we are physical beings beholden to those same laws.

I'm new here. Having followed the thread, I feel to interject that I still see no evidence that we are beholden to such laws. Furthermore, I see no evidence to suggest that the law of gravity is in any way related to the question.

A human being's ability to desire (as has been pointed out above) and act against that desire is, as far as I can see, direct evidence that "will" exists.

Those instances when we act against instinct(desire) prove that will exists. Often, such acts of "will" are in direct contradiction with evolutionary favor. Human beings alone have the ability to starve themselves voluntarily, to blow themselves up, or to save the life of another at the risk of their own. Human beings alone have the ability to act against their biological drives. And, as Hans pointed out, Human beings alone have ego.

The autonomy resultant from the enactment of free will separates human beings from one another, thus creating the ego. The ego complex is responsible for the false sense of separateness mankind perceives. If man always acted on instinct, no real ego development would take place, and mankind would remain in a collective, undifferentiated state - very near the level of animal.

As human beings exercise the power of choice, they differentiate from their instinctual nature, the ego is strengthened and the human personality emerges. The emergence of culture, science, reason, creative impulses, and the power to think abstractly are all strong evidence that "will" exists.

Whether "will" is "free" or not is another question. Human beings, like all other aspects of the physical universe, are beholden to cause. As a human being exercises "will" and thus develop ego, ever increasing amounts of situations arise that have very little to do with natural evolutionary cause and effect. As ego develops and mankind moves away from the instincts, from our natural evolutionary programming, we are increasingly faced with new situations that increasingly call for the utilization of will. Each situation is a cause, and each of our responses is an effect. But there is no evidence to suggest that the actual response to a given cause is the only possible one. Perhaps some effects are more likely than others in a given situation, based on a given set of variables, but we cannot be beholden to the notion that each person acts in the only way his individual complexes are capable of. If that were so, what caused the differentiation in human beings in the first place? Why are we not more like chimpanzees - acting in the same way as every other member of our gender and species? The reason is because for some reason (one that can only be answered subjectively by metaphysical conjecture) we have egos - egos that came from our ability to make different decisions from one another.

All of that in mind, though, I find it probable that instances of "free will" manifestations are far less frequent than might be assumed. Usually, we are creatures of habit simply reacting to the stimuli in our environments. But at least some times in our growth and development- as individuals and as a race- free will has played it's part. It is the primary factor to our racial separation from other higher mammals, as well as the creation of our individual identities.

If there is Free Will, what is its source in an otherwise deterministic universe? And further, is evidence of the existence of Free Will capable of overcoming our present evidence of repeatable, causal determinism?

Evidence of free will does not need to overcome the eveidence of repeatable, causal determinism. Because In the case of the human being, there is no repeatable causal determinism. You can raise two human beings with the same circumstances, background and future trajectory, and they will come out differently. However, if you take two rats from the same litter and raise them identically, they will turn out identical. There is a difference between the deterministic state of the rats and the unpredictable state of human beigns. That difference is "free will." That is the false dichotomy. It is not a question of can one overcome the other. I, for one, am not arguing that rats have free will, nor that the universe is totally random. Obviously most things fall inline with pre-determined outcomes. Something in the human psyche, though, allows us the ability to act on a higher level - or at least a different level - than the natural laws and instincts born in us would dictate. That something is will.

What is the source or cause of it? That is a question better left to metaphysics and mysticism.

I'd like to see the data that suggests that animals are inherently deterministic while humans are not. The research I've read counteracts this. For example, in Seligman's 'Learned Helplessness' studies.

Seligman put dogs in rooms where the floor could be electrified, delivering a shock. There was a lever in the room, which for some dogs would shut off the shock. The test found that dogs whose lever could not turn off the shock learned to be helpless, and would not try to escape the shock even when the door was opened.

But, a small group of the dogs never stopped fighting, independent of whether they had been in the powerless group to begin with. This suggests that even in dogs, there are fundamental genetic differences between individuals.

Rats are more predictable because they are simplistic, but they still don't all respond to the same stimuli in the same ways, which is why experiments must still use large test groups to produce quantifiable results.

The Rats' relative simplicity makes them comparable to checkers, which has been solved by computers, and hence, is no longer a game. There is a best technique which will never result in a loss.

The human brain, on the other hand, might well be compared to chess, which is much more complicated. Yet, if we had computers powerful enough, data suggests that they could solve chess, finding an optimal solution and revoking its status as a game. Both are ultimately causal and predictable, given enough data and processing power.

Just because we do not yet have enough data to predict something does not mean that it is not predictable, and since all of our science and observations of the world are based on predictable, repeatable evidence, we must assume that our world is predictable and repeatable until confronted with strong evidence otherwise.

So far, the electrochemical explanation for the brain has proven correct. You can scan anyone's brain and see the same parts light up when they think on different topics. Anyone suffering damage to a certain part of the brain will suffer from the same symptoms and problems.

This would indicate that the brain is physically responsible for thought, not metaphysically. To bring in a metaphysical or mystical explanation would require that the circumstances suggested that one was necessary to understand the brain.

Remarkable theories require remarkable evidence, and the notion that some part of the universe is not ultimately causal and repeatable is remarkable. It would be a fundamental change from what we have learned so far, and from what our evidence points to.

There is evidence that, under similar circumstances and biological origins, human beings can be remarkably predictable. Twin studies have shown that adopted monozygotic twins, despite being raised a thousand miles apart by different families and never knowing of the other's existence, often end up working the same job, smoking the same brand of cigarette, married to strikingly-similar women, and with the same number of children, favorite foods, and hobbies.

This indication of the biological effect on human outcomes provides a strong argument for causation, and any environmental events producing differences in the twins would also be causal, as any externally modifying effects are.

The apparent possibility of different outcomes does not prove free will, since only one outcome ever occurs. The real question of free will is whether we could actually have chosen the other option, or whether, despite the existence of many options, we could only have chosen the one we did.

At this point, I have to assume that our choices are determined by a combination of our original biological state and of the environmental effects that have shaped us since then. This would make free will an illusion but, as I mentioned before, an evolutionarily useful and rational illusion.

All very interesting posts, interesting thoughts! Though again, I feel compelled to question the foundations of the debate a few levels down by challenging the idea that it's even a choice between free will and determinism. No one's really responding to my points -- perhaps I am being unclear?

Here are some interesting quotes from a piece that elucidates and details some of the points I'm making:

"The word 'determined' here is subtly but powerfully misleading and has contributed so much to the confusions of the free will versus determinism controversies."

"Your acts are certainly in accordance with the laws of nature, but to say they are determined by the laws of nature creates a totally misleading psychological image which is that your will could somehow be in conflict with the laws of nature and that the latter is somehow more powerful than you, and could 'determine' your acts whether you liked it or not."

"But it is simply impossible for your will to ever conflict with natural law. You and natural law are really one and the same."

"(If you determined not to obey the laws of nature,) Nothing could stop you. But there is no need to stop you, because you could not even start!"

"As Goethe very beautifully expressed it, 'In trying to oppose Nature, we are, in the very process of doing so, acting according to the laws of nature!' "

"Don't you see, that the so-called “laws of nature” are nothing more than a description of how in fact you and other beings DO act. They are merely a description of how you act, not a prescription of how you should act, not a power or force which compels or determines your acts. To be valid, a law of nature must take into account how in fact you do act, or, if you like, how you choose to act."

Read the full piece here:
http://www.newbanner.com/SecHumSCM/Is...

I tried to respond to you, but there is some speaking at cross-purposes, which we seem to be narrowing down and eradicating.

Nathan wrote: "(If you determined not to obey the laws of nature,) Nothing could stop you. But there is no need to stop you, because you could not even start!..."

This definition of Free Will seems to be quite deterministic in nature, and if that is how you define it, then I am in agreement with you. There would be no conflict between an inescapably causal definition of 'choice' and the concept of determination.

However, I would suggest that this is not the only definition of Free Will operating in this thread. For those who define it as something external to the causal chain of the universe (or 'laws of nature'), then there would be a conflict with Determinism.

Yes, I did note the response effort, Keely, thanks for that. =)

First of all, yes, definitions are a key element here. We should probably define terms to create a common ground, or several common grounds perhaps.

I disagree that the presented definition of Free Will is deterministic in nature -- that seems to be a rather inside-out perspective, and is I think the cause of the core misunderstanding about "Free Will vs. Determinism". But that's a relatively minor point.

Mainly, I don't think it's the definition of Free Will that's the issue here (though of course all definitions are important...). The definition that matters here is that of Determinism. One of the main points of the essay I linked to was to shift the all-too common flawed perspective on "causal chain" and "laws of nature", to let us see that it's not proscriptive, is descriptive.

But even more core than defining Determinism, I maintain, is the idea that Free Will operates in one context, and Determinism operates in another, and the two ultimately have very little to do with each other.

We can DO as we will, but we can't WANT as we will. But that's okay, because what would be the point if we could?

I looked through the article you linked, and it had a few interesting points, but mostly what I saw was the author kicking a straw man into the air again and again to amuse himself. I understand the Socratic homage, but not even Socrates depicted himself as a god.

I would have had a few more incisive questions to put to that author than his poor, bruised Meno did. But then, any argument looks good when the opponent is only there to set you up. I'll have to take another look at it.

It seems I was prematurely optimistic: we're less narrowing the gyre than simply circling. Maybe someone else can help us gain some mutual perspective.

Straw man? How so?

The "God" nomenclature was irrelevant to the points, just a stage setting. No one is depicting themselves as anything.

What questions would you have put?

What are your thoughts on Determinism as descriptive, rather than proscriptive?

Triangulation may indeed be the key...

I bowed out to keep the thread from being simply a back and forth between two people. Thanks everyone for adding to the conversation. I do want to comment on two things...

Tyler wrote: "Bart is starting with the brain to build up to whatever mental activity that brain might form, asking how the activity can be "free" when the rest of it clearly isn't. "

I think this is a fair summary on how I would personally approach questions of free will. But what I'm trying to get from proponents are definitions and methodologies for investigating free will that anyone can use regardless of whether they personally experience something they would call free will. For example...

Tyler wrote: "P1-Free Will occurs if the agent’s choice could have been otherwise"

This needs to be unpacked more. From an outsider's perspective, I fear a notion of free will is built into the definitions of agent and choice here. I don't know any definitions that would be commensurable with both free will and determinism.

(It could be noted, since quantum mechanics has already been brought up, that "could have been otherwise" also includes the purely random.)

Bart --

From an outsider's perspective, I fear a notion of free will is built into the definitions of agent and choice here. I don't know any definitions that would be commensurable with both free will and determinism.

We could change P1 to say -- P1: Free will means an action in question could have been other than what it was. That moves the problem to the status of the counterfactual, "could have been...", changing the problem from one of definitions to something more meaningful.


But what I'm trying to get from proponents are definitions and methodologies for investigating free will that anyone can use regardless of whether they personally experience something they would call free will.

Fair enough, and this brings us to a problem: whose methodologies and definitions? That is, what field of study is best suited to take up the question?

It is tempting to use the tools of biology for this purpose because the brain falls within its scope. The drawback is that brain states are not material existents. They are emergent properties of the brain.

Even if science were one day to elucidate every possible fact about the brain, no deductive line of reasoning would ever lead to the discovery of brain states. In order to study such states, then, one has to know in advance that they exist. Even in neurobiology, the dice are loaded on the question.

Thus, neurologists will never get from there to here using scientific methods. There can be no "outsider's perspective" on the subject. A philosopher, Thomas Nagel, wrote about this when he raised a similar question: what is it like to be a bat? Nobody human can ever know that. But if there's something it's like to be a bat, that subjectivity is also a fact of nature.

Nagel's point: There is no objective way to study subjective phenomena. Science cannot handle this issue, so the proper field by which to study it has to be philosophy.

The fact that I have subjective experiences is an observed fact, even if I'm the only one observing it. Logically, I can reason from my subjectivity to the existence of similar brain states in other people, although I can't prove it. Although it isn't scientific deduction, it is a valid form of reasoning.

In short, no discovery of science can wipe out an observed phenomenon. We aren't talking about free will here, only about brain states themselves. If these brain states can't even be deduced from material entities, how can neurobiology reach conclusions about dependent questions such the existence or non-existence of volition?

It's fair to conclude from this that whatever the definitions and methodologies for investigating free will that anyone can use turn out to be, they necessarily fall within the scope of philosophy, not science.

Hans --

But if a decision itself were voluntary every decision would have to be preceded by a decision to decide - An infinite regression which fortunately does not occur.

If we think about the development of the mind in terms of evolution, there could have been a "first" free act. It has been suggested that that first free act is the decision to focus attention on something as opposed to something else.



The most perplexing question to me is what exactly is consciousness?

One possible answer: Consciousness is the mental grasp of reality.

Richard --

I find it probable that instances of "free will" manifestations are far less frequent than might be assumed.

I agree that if there exists free will, this is likely. But I look at it a matter that psychology and sociology might be best able to handle, provided those fields conceded even the illusion of free will. The possiblity of a false dichotomy between free will and determinism might boil down to one of the degree to which supposed free will manifests itself.

Keely --

The apparent possibility of different outcomes does not prove free will, since only one outcome ever occurs. The real question of free will is whether we could actually have chosen the other option, or whether, despite the existence of many options, we could only have chosen the one we did.

You mention that free will might be an evolutionarily useful illusion, but if it evolved, would there not be something real about this capacity? I do wonder, also, if choosing could really occur outside the the causal chain. The complicating fact seems to be that thought is not a material entity. In any case, I agree that we all have differing perspectives on what "free will" comes to, and knowing that helps the discussions.

Nathan --

But even more core than defining Determinism, I maintain, is the idea that Free Will operates in one context, and Determinism operates in another, and the two ultimately have very little to do with each other.

We can DO as we will, but we can't WANT as we will. But that's okay, because what would be the point if we could?


I like your first point -- could we be comparing apples to oranges? But about the second, why can't it be said that We can WANT as we will, but we cannot Do as we will?

We seem to be approaching a fundamental impasse, which is nice, in that it marks a point of understanding, if only an understanding of insurmountable differences.

Tyler wrote: "Even if science were one day to elucidate every possible fact about the brain, no deductive line of reasoning would ever lead to the discovery of brain states ..."

Presumably, if science could discover every fact about the brain, then it should have no problem producing (or reproducing) brain states; or even developing 'shared states', where data freely passes between one mind and another.

But this is all fruitless sci fi hypothesis. That isn't how science works in the first place:

i>Tyler wrote: "no discovery of science can wipe out an observed phenomenon ..."

Science never overcomes phenomena, it never totally explains. A universal explanation might be the unreachable ideal of science, but it is not the form or function, any more than our desire to keep living represents a state of immortality.

Science is about using pieces of incomplete data to create useful theories about the world. We can't predict both the position and velocity of an electron, but that doesn't prevent us from comprehending how they work, or from providing workable, testable theories on the data we can gather.

Even if the information we get about the mind and its inner workings is limited, it's still enough that we can develop a basis for understanding. So far, there is nothing to indicate a necessary state beyond the physical, chemical brain, and so theorizing one is getting ahead of ourselves.

Think, for a moment, about planets, thousands of light years away. The data we receive from them is very little--bits of light, and these packets of data had to travel thousands of years to reach us, altered by dust clouds, gasses, and gravitational pull. Yet, we can use these data to say quantifiable things about the states of these remote, floating spheres of gas and rock.

But we don't theorize about what kind of music the natives listen to, because there's no data to work from. Theorizing, at that point, is just a game. We could reach no rational conclusion because we have no foundation from which to draw it.

Likewise, there's no reason to theorize about the free will of a phantom brain state, especially if it is, as you say, unmeasurable. If something cannot be measured, then it has no effect, and if it has no effect, how can it be said to exist?

Which leads me to my conclusion:

Tyler wrote: "Science cannot handle this issue, so the proper field by which to study it has to be philosophy..."

I have never seen a reason to separate science from philosophy. Philosophy gave birth to the sciences, and continues to drive them. If your definition of philosophy is the discussion of things which cannot be measured, then I'm afraid I'm not sure how we can come to any mutual understanding: we simply could not conclude anything about them.

I suppose we could develop a system that was entirely internally consistent, but without a foundation, this seems like a rather frivolous pastime. then again, that's often been my problem with metaphysics and theology. Aristotelian physics is only moderately useful outside an Aristotelian world.

I don't feel like you're alone in your definition, but I'm not sure how a purely metaphysical discussion is supposed to progress. It would also seem to preclude any discussion of any philosophical point between holders of these contrary definitions of philosophy, since they will all, ultimately, come down to a lack of data, which for me must be the endpoint, and for others, the start.

Tyler wrote: "The complicating fact seems to be that thought is not a material entity..."

I can't see any reason why thought isn't a material entity, and I'd need to see remarkable data to suggest this remarkable hypothesis. I might as well theorize about what music they play on Betelgeuse, which may prove a fun thought experiment, but ultimately, will not actually help my understanding of that distant star.

This is not an uncommon wall to hit in such discussions, but I must admit I'm more used to running into it with theologians. I agree with Bart that ultimately, I need to see an argument for how free will could enter our system, and more than that, an argument for why free will is necessary for our system.

And to Bart: I've been trying to focus on the notion of 'outcome', rather than 'choice', in order to distance myself from the limitations of the nomenclature; but even 'possibility' and 'outcome' can suggest some kind of freedom.

It's all rather fraught, innit?

Keely:

Even if events, in some sense that I don't understand, are objectively "deterministic", its also possible that we will never be able to determine whether those events are determined or actually random. The reason is because, no matter how precisely we measure, there is still room for chaotic activity beyond our ability to measure that will or could have a significant effect on the outcome. This sort of unknowable "randomness" applies to a whole host of dynamic systems.

If you can't decide whether a highly unlikely event is determined or random no matter how precisely you measure, then you also have no basis for saying that the outcome must have followed some law.

It gets even worse when you try to trace causes of events which have already occurred. Here's a simple example. You walk into a room and see a block of ice on a flat steel floor. There's a pretty good chance you could get a fairly close estimate of the puddle of water the ice would leave when it melts. Now, instead, lets backtrack. You walk into a room with a puddle of water on the floor. You know that the water came from an object made of ice. From the puddle of water, do you think you can deduce the shape of the object of ice from which it came. The latter is a much, much harder problem than the former.

Let's take a very, very simple example. When discussing determinism, people often bring up the model of balls on a pool table, a supposedly simple model. Lets take the idea of a break of enormous impact, with the object balls spread apart just slightly from one another. It's fairly easy to measure and predict what will happen when the cue ball hits the first object ball. The next collision requires considerably more knowledge, and knowledge with precision about the initial states of the balls. And the level of precision goes up by orders of magnitudes with every subsequent impact. By the 9th impact, you would have to start taking into account the gravitational pull of someone standing by the table. By the 56th impact (which can easily occur in a good break), your initial assumptions would need to take into account every single elementary particle in the universe. An electron billions of light years away would have a meaningful effect on the outcome of the break. (If you want to read about this, see Berry, Regular and Irregular Motion, in Topics in Nonlinear Mechanics" American Institute of Physics Conference Proceedings, No. 46.)

This isn't quantum mechanics, or even a particularly complicated dynamic system. It's just balls on a pool table. But the level of precision that you would need to know about the initial states makes the outcome of a decent break practically unknowable, and thus, for almost all practical purposes, inherently random. And as I said before, reasoning backwards from how the balls are arranged on a pool table, to how they were placed before the break, is an even more difficult and hence unknowable problem.

So, forget the metaphysical differences between free will and determinism. Even if the world were deterministic, that deterministic quality would remain inherently unknowable. And since it's unknowable, why accept it?

Keely --

So far, there is nothing to indicate a necessary state beyond the physical, chemical brain, and so theorizing one is getting ahead of ourselves [...:] there's no reason to theorize about the free will of a phantom brain state, especially if it is, as you say, unmeasurable.

By the same token, there's no reason to theorize about any mental activity at all. From the scientific study of the physical brain, you cannot deduce such a thing.

But I don't mean to imply that free will, if it exists, or for that matter any purely mental activity, cannot be measured. If they can be observed, there must be some way to do it.

So the disconnect depends on your starting point. Starting from brain science, you can't arrive at free will. So, then, is it invalid to instead start from the observation of mental activity?



If your definition of philosophy is the discussion of things which cannot be measured, then I'm afraid I'm not sure how we can come to any mutual understanding ...

Personally, my definition of philosophy is that it's an integrated view of the world. I like that one because it's simple and flexible, although many people don't agree with it and have different definitions of philosophy. Because I think of it as an "integrating science," I think it's too soon to declare an impasse. I'm throwing out ideas, but not digging in my heels on any one attitude about free will.


I'm not sure how a purely metaphysical discussion is supposed to progress.

I don't mean to suggest metaphysics if that involves a search for first and final causes, or some entelechy transcending the natural world. But I do think two branches of philosophy, ontology and epistemology, are suited to a discussion of brain states and whatever emerges from them.


I can't see any reason why thought isn't a material entity, and I'd need to see remarkable data to suggest this remarkable hypothesis.

I cannot disprove the proposition that thought is a material entity because I don't know what the evidence is that this is so. Thought is a property of brain states, much as red is a property of a rose. I can see the red, but it has no material existence that I know of.


I need to see an argument for how free will could enter our system, and more than that, an argument for why free will is necessary for our system.

I don't know what our system means. Is it the material world subject to science? If so, is it that and nothing else? If yes, I would conclude that no mental activity occurs because it has never been seen and no chain of deduction leads to it. Am I being too restrictive in my interpretation of science here?

There are arguments for free will, but they are philosophical ones, so they fall outside the scope of science. The one I'm most familiar with starts from the premise that thought is, strictly speaking, nothing; it has no material existence. One of its conclusions is indeed that free will is a logically necessary characteristic of human decision making.


Two questions come up. Does mental activity or does it not exist physically? Second, is there really no way to measure the phenomenon of brain states, or consciousness? You're right that if they don't exist, they'll have no effect on anything, and neither will any quality that depends on them, such as free will or even determinism in human actions. But for my part I question whether these qualities are really unmeasurable.

Perhaps a third question is more relevant. Is the science of neurobiology the only legitimate way to study the human mind?

Tyler wrote:
I like your first point -- could we be comparing apples to oranges?

I think we are. Which makes it hard for me to respond to any of the fine and interesting comments being made in the apples=oranges line of thinking -- for which I apologize.


But about the second (point), why can't it be said that We can WANT as we will, but we cannot Do as we will?

Well, that's just a reversal of the point I was making, as I'm sure you know... first, what indicates to you that we are able to choose our desires? And what indicates to you that we are unable to Do as we will? I see no solid evidence of either.


Duffy wrote:
It's just balls on a pool table. But the level of precision that you would need to know about the initial states makes the outcome of a decent break practically unknowable, and thus, for almost all practical purposes, inherently random. And... reasoning backwards from how the balls are arranged on a pool table, to how they were placed before the break, is an even more difficult and hence unknowable problem.

A good metaphor. And it illustrates some of what I've been saying -- just because we could, THEORETICALLY and with vast sums of data and perspective, go back and explain exactly why the break happened as it did... why does that have anything to do with whether the break could have happened any other way? We're talking about two separate contexts here.


Tyler wrote:
Thought is a property of brain states, much as red is a property of a rose. I can see the red, but it has no material existence that I know of.

Well said!


Really, to address the core of this discussion, I feel the need to go back to the original post.

Tyler originally wrote:
For example, say I want to take the day off of work today and go fishing, and ultimately, that's what I do. Was I able to go fishing because of my freedom to do so, or was it determined by a number of occurances that go back to before I was even born?

Whatever decision you make -- to skip work or to stay in the office -- there are motivations and reasons and justifications for it. That's why it's a decision you have to consider, weigh the reasons on both sides. Once you've made the decision of what to do, sure you can go back and trace the line of thoughts and reasons for why you made that decision, but that has nothing to do with whether you were able to decide in the first place.

Maybe I decide to go fishing because I was thinking of quitting my job anyway. Or maybe I stay and work extra hard because I'm hoping for a promotion. Either way, there's a reason that could be traced back and referred to as justification for calling the decision inevitable. But that's fuzzy logic.

It all smacks of a massive Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc fallacy to me. Or a backwards Appeal To Probability.

It's just not enough to look backwards at everything and say, "Since there were reasons it happened, it was inevitable, because of millions or billions of unknown factors throughout all past time that we could only be aware of if we were omniscient..." A convenient way to escape having any evidence supporting the claim that determinism has any bearing on free will.

Free will to me means that you choose whatever happens. Being that whatever you choose or not choose to do you are using free will. In your analogy you take the day off to go fishing, but while you are fishing are you thinking of your job or are you in the moment and enjoying fishing. Free will means the ability to do things but also knowing the ramifications of either doing or not doing what is expected of you, does this make sense?

Philosophy fans are going to ask what it means "to choose" in your example.


Free will means the ability to do things but also knowing the ramifications of either doing or not doing what is expected of you, does this make sense?

That sounds like a definition of "responsibility," rather than "free will." However, your remark raises the question of what link there might be between free will and responsibility. Could there be some connection between the two?

Oh I am sure, because if you are using free will you are taking responsibility for the outcome be it good or bad. It is like telling someone what they should do, and they decide to do something entirely different, they in fact are using their free will. So in that case they are taking the responsibility for whatever the outcome may be.

Reading the last two posts brings an interesting thought to mind. About a connection between free will and responsibility, one might make the point that we have a responsibility to make responsible decisions with our free will (whether this is merely a system of ethics or one thinks it is given to them by God), because we have it. I'm not saying that I agree with it, I'm just saying what came to mind in terms of a connection.

The connection between free will and responsibility is that they are both action based, meaning that if you use your free will than you are doing what you think is the right thing to do. But responsibility has to be included somewhere in this, because isn't one responsible for their actions, no one tells them what they should do, they have their own standards of beliefs.

"But responsibility has to be included somewhere in this, because isn't one responsible for their actions, no one tells them what they should do, they have their own standards of beliefs."

I agree, Robin.

True, my point exactly, What would this world be like if everybody just did whatever they wanted without any cause of punishment. The buck stops with each and everyone of us. We cannot go and commit crimes and not expect some sort of punishment, correct?

You are correct. But to expect punishment, there also has to be people willing to enforce laws. Although here we may be getting into the gray area of unjust laws and things like that.

I was just making my case for free will vs. responsibility, did not mean to get into law. I am just reiterating that you can have free will but there is a responsibility that goes along with that free will.

Who cares if determinism is true? It is certainly unjustified and that's all that should matter. It sure as hell seems like we have free will and that is more powerful than any argument in favor of determinism.