The History Book Club discussion

Hello Everyone,

For the week of January 10th through January 16th, we are reading approximately the next 30 pages of Legacy of Ashes.

This thread will discuss the following chapters and pages:

Week Two - January 10th – January 16th -> Chapters FOUR, FIVE, and SIX p. 32 - 62
FOUR – The Most Secret Thing and FIVE – A Rich Blind Man and SIX – They Were Suicide Missions

We will open up a thread for each week's reading. Please make sure to post in the particular thread dedicated to those specific chapters and page numbers to avoid spoilers. We will also open up supplemental threads as we have done for other spotlighted reads.

We kicked off this book on January 3rd. We look forward to your participation. Amazon, Barnes and Noble and other noted on line booksellers do have copies of the book and shipment can be expedited. The book can also be obtained easily at your local library, on iTunes for the ipad, etc. However, be careful, some audible formats are abridged and not unabridged.

There is still a little time remaining to obtain the book and get started. There is no rush and we are thrilled to have you join us. It is never too late to get started and/or to post.

Welcome,

~Bentley

Week of
 January 10th (Week Two of Discussion)

Week Two - January 10th – January 16th -> Chapters FOUR, FIVE, and SIX p. 32 - 62
FOUR – The Most Secret Thing and FIVE – A Rich Blind Man and SIX – They Were Suicide Missions

This is a link to the complete table of contents and syllabus thread:

http://www.goodreads.com/topic/show/4...

We are off to a good beginning.

TO SEE ALL WEEK'S THREADS SELECT VIEW ALL

Tim Weiner

Remember this is a non spoiler thread.

I must say these sets of chapters were crazy. I never knew how well the Soviets and Chinese infiltrated the agency. The fact they sent men behind the iron curtain, China, and North Korea to end up prisoners or killed and they kept doing it. I was shocked.

The covert ops team really does not seem to know what it is doing. It became a "meat grinder." However, graduates kept coming to sign up. It does say a lot for their patriotism, sense of adventure, and the time period in history.

What I found most disturbing about sending people behind the iron curtain as described in these chapters is that they seemingly gave them no resources or plan. And then they were surprised when they didn't hear from these agents again and continued to send more people? Bryan, I too found that shocking.

What surprised me was how much better the Soviets and the Chinese were in turning the folks we thought were our spies into double agents or simply ones giving us the wrong information and the Soviets and Chinese our secrets.

Bentley wrote: "What surprised me was how much better the Soviets and the Chinese were in turning the folks we thought were our spies into double agents or simply ones giving us the wrong information and the Sovie..."

Absolutely, Bentley. We know they clearly had a much longer organizational history/experience since it was key to political control. So, by the time we walk in, they had mastered the game. It is liked you have Bobby Fischer play some random intermediate-level chess student.

I wonder what techniques they used to turn so many people.

Goodness knows - we may not want to know - maybe they threatened to hurt or execute their family. But they were masters of their game.

Bentley wrote: "Goodness knows - we may not want to know - maybe they threatened to hurt or execute their family. But they were masters of their game."

So true, both the Chinese and the Soviets can be cruel. They also used bribes, I'm sure.

But we used bribes too; I think it was some form of corporal threats.

Plus the CIA was recruiting people so quickly that they clearly had little time to prepare them about what to expect - even if they did know that people were being turned or being fed false information. It's mind boggling that they did not know to expect this. I am sure the Soviets and Chinese were well-acquainted with turning people but it seems so naive to think that the CIA did not even think of it.

For sure Alisa and a very good point.

I thought this part of Bedell Smith on Wikipedia is interesting as he became Director of the CIA:

Smith is remembered in the CIA as its first successful DCI, and one of the its most effective, who redefined its structure and mission. The CIA's expansive covert action program remained the responsibility of Frank Wisner's quasi-independent Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) but Smith began to bring OPC under the DCI's control. In early January 1951 he made Allen Dulles the first Deputy Director for Plans (DDP), to supervise both OPC and the CIA's separate espionage organization, the Office of Special Operations (OSO). Not until January 1952 were all intelligence functions consolidated under a Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI). Wisner succeeded Dulles as DDP in August 1951, and it took until August 1952 to merge OSO and OPC, each of which had its own culture, methods, and pay scales, into an effective, single directorate.[75] By consolidating responsibility for covert operations, Smith made the CIA the arm of government primarily responsible for them.[79] Smith wanted the CIA to become a career service.[80] Before the war, the so-called "Manchu Law" limited the duration of an officer's temporary assignment's, which effectively prevented anyone from making a career as a general staff officer. Intelligence was not taught in schools and staffs had little to do in peacetime. Career officers therefore tended to avoid such work unless they aspired to be military attachés. Smith consolidated training under a Director of Training and developed a career service program.
(source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walter_B...)

In our book, you sense Smith is trying to reform the CIA, but he gets frustrated with the poor results.

I think Smith wanted to develop a seasoned group rather than the revolving door policy he seemed to be left with. I am not sure that he wanted or liked Dulles but probably felt that he was not left with many good choices.

Bentley wrote: "I think Smith wanted to develop a seasoned group rather than the revolving door policy he seemed to be left with. I am not sure that he wanted or liked Dulles but probably felt that he was not lef..."

I agree Bentley and I'm not sure he liked Wisner either. You figure with all this inner-agency rivalry and insiders and outsiders wanting the top job, it add another layer of difficulty.

I think we know that he did not like Wisner at all; Dulles seemed to be a necessary evil.

Are any of you reading the notes for the chapters. I particularly like J Edgar's remark that the CIA was ....full of .. degenerates! (note for p40 in pb edition.

I, also, love the line from Maochun Yu (note for p66 pb) "locked in archives in the company of silence and rats.". This is note concerns American intelligence operations concerning China policy during the Korean and the failure to read and digest information being sent by agents in the field. It appears that the directors preferred to use the own "intelligence", "conjured up by wishful thinking"(p66). This is a flaw in the system that will
repeat itself again and again. In 2003 the CIA foretold that the Iraqis would greet with the waving American flags. It did not happen!

Mary, thanks for the post. The notes are very interesting and particularly insightful. Although J. Edgar is not one who should have thrown stones.

Yes, the CIA was very wrong about Iraq obviously.

Did it amaze anyone besides me that the Chinese could tell the U.S. exactly how many agents the U.S. had sent in, and how many were captured vs. killed? Our patriots were so ill prepared that they had no hope of going unnoticed and just blending into society.

The agency got off to such a terrible start it boggles my mind how it not only continued to exist, but to actually gain a fairly good reputation.

Yes, Kay that actually was scary to me. Boy do they have control or what.

I think it was trial and error learning and baptism by fire.

Several things came into my mind while reading these chapters. I do feel that many of these problems exist in any governmental agencies which are not created without these fundamentals.

Clearly Supported Mission: The entire agency needs to know it's mission and that mission needs to be agreed upon by both the executive and legislative branches. If this is not present, that agency is probably going to flounder, waste resources trying to defend it's existence, and generally be ineffective. Changes to an agency need to have wide spread agreement, otherwise the political pendulum will keep things going back and forth.

Responsible Leadership: Leadership of the agency, must understand the mission and carry it forward. More importantly, they need to have the ability to end what is not working. It is not wrong to have an ego, it's disastrous to have an ego that doesn't allow you to acknowledge something you proposed isn't effective.

It is just shocking to me how many lives this agency apparently just tossed away without even so much as an attempt to determine other options. Also, the need to pretty much cover-up the total failure of the agency under the guise that no one can know just how bad we are is very depressing.

Yes Rodney, without mission and goals supported from the top and across the organization, failure is certainly guaranteed.

And the author was fairly emphatic about the CIA and its leaders (the ones with the big egos) not ever having any lessons learned and modifying their approach based upon that input and feedback.

Sad, I agree, so many lives lost by young men and probably young women who were courageous and brave as a direct result of folks running the agency who felt they were expendable.

I made a lot of notes on this reading segment and cannot put it all here as it seems to ramble but I have to agree that there was a real failure of leadership and management and a dominance of egos or egomania in the initial management of the CIA.

A lack of taking real responsibility and the eventual arrival of Bedell Smith and then his failure to get rid of Wisner and Dulles to "protect" the image of the organization - that was such a failure - which prevented real overhaul is disappointing after a really disheartening reading segment for this book.

If anyone wants all my notes – about a full page let me know and I will send them individually.

Yes, Vince...it was too bad that Smith did not get rid of Wisner and secondarily Dulles - although Dulles I think was more "workable" if Bedell Smith had pushed.

By all means Vince, add your notes and comments; we all would like to see them.

Notes on Week two reading of Legacy of Ashes

This begins with me wondering if Wisner is a hero or an egomaniac – a patriot or a warmonger?

From the book it seems that he did not have a good risk vs. human cost judgment especially as his missions sent more and more men to their deaths. No reasonable expectation of success. I wonder if Truman or Ike or George Marshall would have done that and I really wonder if they would have continued.

Also Hillenkoetter, the CIA director and Dewey Short, the ranking Republican on the House Armed Services Community were both form Missouri. Did the appointment of Hillenkoetter, a Democratic machine man from Missouri I think, the machine that put Truman into politics and eventual power, get much initial and continuing support from Truman because of this and did Short being form Missouri lubricate the continuation of that support in congress?

This was a period when fear of the Russians was growing so it is hard for me to judge why such illegal and questionably moral extremism was permitted.

The use of ex-Nazis and the Ukrainian Lubed was only possible, I think, with tremendous arrogance on the part of the covert folks at CIA. The immigration exceptions granted to people who were finally only “approved” by Wisner and his boys? German Abwar agents/moles – The seemingly fiasco with the Albanian agents. Was there any real management or were there only people with the titles of managers?

And how much money was spent, so to say stolen from either the American people or the intended recipients? The CIA Athens station had their own airport? – Incredible.

The Angleton - Philby connection and Philby working so long. Initially I knew that he worked for the Brits but I had never thought how much he probably needed the gullibility of the American to succeed in his spying.

I had never known, or remembered anyway, that William Sloan Coffin had such a stint there at CIA.

The fact that we were seemingly confident that the Russians would not have an a-Bomb until years after they got it should have shaken the confidence in any of our intelligence.

The arrival of Bedell Smith did not improve the situation - it seems that the CIA, the real patriot workers there, worked frantically but accomplished less than nothing. Bedell Smith’s preference to protect the agency in its youth rather than causing an overhaul or replacement was more self-serving than either patriotic or his job for the President. Why didn’t he fire Wisner and Dulles?

This is an illustration of one of the fallacies of government incompetence. People work hard or not but do not have to succeed because there is no documentation of success or failure so often. Working hard is not a reason to pay someone or to keep them in their position and perks if they do not accomplish their job/mission. And I believe many support the value of their work to continue their personal power, income and position.

Sadly this seems not to have changed much. I don’t know whom if anyone was fired at CIA after the weapons of mass destruction never appeared in Iraq on our venture there in 2003.

Great notes Vince and I hope folks attempt to discuss some of the questions you raised as well.

I do want to comment on your last sentence:

Sadly this seems not to have changed much. I don’t know whom if anyone was fired at CIA after the weapons of mass destruction never appeared in Iraq on our venture there in 2003.

I was thinking exactly the same thing when I was reading this segment - where were the lessons learned - and why does the CIA fail to learn from their own history?

I would have to agree with the questioning of the CIA after the WMD call in Iraq. I was also thinking one basic question while reading. Has anything really changed? It still appears the CIA can not give accurate pictures of what is happening on the ground during the build up to flashpoint events.

After reading Decision Points and other books on the Middle East, it appears that CNN and Twitter feeds are giving a far more accurate picture of what is happening on the ground.

It leads me to believe that data mining social media may give a more accurate picture than the CIA can produce. If so, the entire way intelligence is done needs to be rethought.

Rodney, you raise some good questions which may not be answered by this reading. Would the American public really know what if anything has really changed?

I do think that when things are actually happening; news feeds and twitter feeds may give accurate accounts of what is transpiring; however none of these really can give substantial details of what is planned to occur in the future, and any other details of those plans yet to hatch. Trying to pre-empt those kinds of attacks is what is really important for the free world's safety.

Also, when citing any book or author on this site; we must post and use the goodreads software showing the bookcover, the author's photo if available and always the author's link. I am not sure who is the author of the book you cited; otherwise I would cite it here. Were you referring to the movie by the same name?

Bently, I am sorry about that, was posting quickly from my Ipad and had the incorrect book listed.

These would be a couple of books that I believe mentioned CNN having more accurate information on the ground than the CIA was providing.

http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/80...

Rodney,

Thank you first.

Let me show you how the citations should be:

by George W. Bush

by Norman Schwarzkopf

Also, when citing any book or author on this site; we must post and use the goodreads software showing the bookcover, the author's photo if available and always the author's link.

Rodney, there is a Help area on the site to help folks get the idea of how to cite books on our group site. We have rules and guidelines because we want to take advantage of the powerful goodreads software which then populates our site correctly.

Here is a link to the thread called Mechanics of the Board which should help:

http://www.goodreads.com/topic/show/2...

If you have any questions about this and need assistance; all of the mods are able to help. I can see that you got the bookcover up for the second book; but remember there are always three parts; bookcover, author's photo (when available) and always the author's link - the author's name in linkable text.

Hello Liz,

As an FYI:

The weekly threads are non spoiler threads. Any "known" spoilers are automatically deleted and moved to the glossary thread; where spoilers can be posted. Thank you for putting together some wonderful urls. The glossary thread is really a good place for these urls.


http://www.goodreads.com/topic/show/4...

No problem Liz.

I think the OSS was the precursor to the CIA:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_o...

I think the following delineates the groups:

http://ohmygov.com/blogs/general_news...

The origins of the NSA date to December 1951 when the then CIA director sent a memo to the National Security Council declaring that “control over, and coordination of, the collection and processing of communications intelligence had proved ineffective.” The Council then completed a study on the matter that confirmed the CIA’s conclusions. In June 1952 President Truman authorized the creation of the NSA to coordinate communications intelligence.

The main difference between the NSA and the CIA, FBI and DIA revolves around how each agency gathers its intelligence information. The NSA does not have field agents who do in-person intelligence gathering who travel the globe like 24’s Jack Bauer. Instead, employees work primarily in Fort Meade, Md., a few miles northeast of Washington, with a smaller work site in San Antonio.

The NSA likes to keep a low profile, even though its name has popped up in the news over its wiretapping work. Though the NSA’s mission and bylaws state that it is only to conduct “foreign” intelligence or counterintelligence, the NSA has been able to conduct some domestic surveillance that sparked a vigorous national debate over privacy and eavesdropping.

Since we are past discussing the origins of these groups; I have placed it here

Yes, sad to say that there are many areas where I think these agencies step into illegal and immoral territory which I personally do not agree with (not that anyone is asking me).

I do not agree with regime change and wiretapping without a warrant for starters. And it appears that for these agencies the ends justify the means. And I do not believe in that attitude either. Frankly, with some of the things they have been involved in; they made the world a more dangerous place for Americans. Not safer as they purport. Do not know what they are up to under Obama.

Amy, I think that the author is explaining the facts as has been revealed by the failures which have leaked out. Unfortunately, the history is the history and one cannot embellish or make better what has gone awry.

Maybe what this Pulitzer book really does portray is the truth or a semblance of the truth which we need to be made aware of. If everything is swept under the rug as some of these agencies would like to have happen; there is no impetus by Americans to force any change of the status quo.

Fortunately, we have joined forces with police organizations world wide to hunt down terrorists and those joint efforts seem to have foiled numerous terrorist attacks (thank goodness).

The CIA has been commended in the book thus far for its analytical skills and reports and for many rescues; unfortunately its covert actions and regime change activities have caused considerable bad publicity and fallout when they have gone sour. One cannot shoot the messenger because one does not like the message.

As with all of the books we discuss, we must respect the book first and foremost since this was a book selected by the group membership. At the end of the discussion, we will all have our opportunity to judge the book as a whole; but right now we are still at the beginning of our journey. I think the reason that the ship hasn't been sunk is because the majority of failings have been made in secret or swept under the rug and there is really nothing to take its place. I think the book is an attempt to tell the story as it is rather than the story that we might want to hear.

I understand your disappointment that our agencies do not seem to be living up to America's ideals and its better self. That part has disappointed me as well.

Liz, it is very true; we are reading about the failures which were supposed to also be secret; but like everything else in this world; when there is fall out - things leak out. So since this is allegedly a secret organization; we more than likely are not privy to everything. And it might be best as Liz suggests to look at the postings in the glossary (though the glossary is a spoiler thread) if you would like to see other points of view; including the CIA's rebuttal. However, having said that, I think that my post (message 38) responded fairly completely. Thank you also Liz for pointing out the rebuttal that I placed in the glossary at the beginning of this journey.

One reason, I think, we don't get a larger analysis so far on how the U.S. survives amidst the CIA failures is that this book is not on the CIA and its times. He really focuses on the agency and some on the Cold War and White House history when necessary. I think this is a building block for a book with more context. I won't get any further than this and leave it for the end of the readings.

The other thing to keep in mind is that there are certainly successes that we cannot hear about because they are still classified for whatever reason. We as a nation surely has an interest in keeping successful missions out of the public domain because they reveal tactics, people, and strategy that if revealed would jeopardize future or ongoing missions. It also seems clear from the notes that even though some of these events occured decades ago, it was not until recently that some of the documents themselves were only recently declassified. Every author is going to have his or her own bias, and undoubtedly that is also part of what we see. As Bryan points out, it's not a documentary, but a glimpse. I think we will learn a lot more as this book progresses, not only about the agency but its relationship with other branches of government. Not all of the CIA's failed missions are strictly their own doing.

Thank you Bryan; I think some of the comments made probably are best left to the Book as a Whole thread. And some folks just will not like what the author is saying plain and simple; the book for some folks will be like the US is unmasked and some of the things the CIA does are frankly repugnant; let us not forget that. And the muddled missions are the fault of the folks in charge (of all of the agencies, including Congress and the President). I guess it is the kind of book that you just have to hold your nose and read through. I know we all love our country; but that doesn't mean that our country has not done some things that we wish they hadn't. You have to ask yourself: are you one of those persons who does not want to hear about any of them; then I would say put down the book now; however, if you want to have a better perception of the warts and any glimpses of the agency and its history during mainly the Cold War; then I always say; it is better to know and get all input before deciding how you feel - then I would say read this book and a few others and then decide for yourself. But I think most of us who are reading the book do not want to be like ostriches sticking our heads in the sand; and every author has a bias or two; I guess that comes with the territory.

If I may kindly suggest as moderator that we move on to talk more about the subject matter itself in these chapters and/or what came before; I hope that I can count on everyone's cooperation. And if you would like to expand more on likes or dislikes; please post them on the Book as a Whole thread which is already open and available.

Here is the link:

http://www.goodreads.com/topic/show/4...

Thanks, Bentley, for steering us back to the topic at hand in this thread.

You are welcome Alisa. We really want to focus our posting on discussing the events which are recorded in the book and on the pages that have been assigned and our feelings about the events pro or con. Just rehashing about what we perceive to be the intent of the book or the author's point of view at this juncture is premature for sure; plus we always "respect both the author and the book" which are always group selected and voted upon by group members. I just want to add that I did not select this book but always feel that I learn something new in every book that has been selected by group members. So all of them have been immensely worthwhile. But now it is time to get back to the topic and the pages of this thread or any pages that came before. Thank you for your understanding.

One other thing that I would like to mention: let us assume for this discussion or maybe we "could assume" for this discussion that the author did not care for the CIA or had a not so hidden bias against them. We already know that the CIA was very upset with the book and at the beginning I posted their rebuttal. I think it still behooves us to listen to both sides of the story because like anything else - the truth lies somewhere in the middle. And then we can come back and revisit our first thoughts and see whether we still feel the same way. I think the book is riveting and for me is an eye-opener so far. But it is a fact that the CIA did not like this account one bit.

I read some of the criticism of the book before I decided to participate in this group read so I had some expectation of the author's bias. Like you, I find nonetheless am finding it a real page turner and learning quite a bit.

Getting back to these particular pages, the part that jumped out at me was sending people behind the iron curtain when that tactic was clearly not working. I am finding that difficult to comprehend. Maybe it is akin to sending men and women off to war. The choice to do nothing was not really a viable choice in this situation, was it?

Alisa, the book is riveting; I have to say; yet I feel a strong sense of revulsion while reading it (if you can understand what I mean). I believe that the author has a bias; yet the events and the end results of these events are the same.

Having said that, I believe that what he is saying is true; although as readers we are not privy to a potential equal set of positives which would balance some things out.

I am not so sure that even if everything was on the table so to speak though that it would be able to whitewash the events that the author is relating to us. I think that would be impossible to do and I am not saying that the CIA (if they could tell us their story) would not have a great many stories of folks that they have rescued.

But allowing all of those folks to perish behind the Iron Curtain knowing that their tactics were not working was appalling. I can understand trying these methods out; but not continuing the program after realizing that these folks would meet certain death. I am sure I cannot personally reconcile that. I don't see this in the same vein of sending men and women off to war. I think if they threatened to declare war; maybe Russia would have backed off and then again maybe not. Nobody wanted a nuclear holocaust for sure but the Soviets had not tested their first bomb until 1949; so from what I can see if the United States had pushed the war button and the bomb; maybe Stalin would have brought his tanks back to Russia. Hard to say. Maybe things fell apart when FDR died and Truman just did not have the abilities that his predecessor had; so there was a missed opportunity and time elapsed.

You are welcome Amy. There is no need to apologize; we just try to keep the discussion moving and on topic. Your impressions are valid ones and I doubt that folks would disagree with you; we did set expectations at the beginning because frankly we knew that folks would have some strong feelings. However, we keep the weekly threads moving and on point; whereas the supplemental threads like the Book as a Whole thread are maintained for these kind of side, expansive discussions because they are aptly named spoiler threads.

Everybody at one time or another forgets about the supplemental threads; but we are here to remind everyone of the differences and we do our best to be consistent. If we find that a post is a spoiler; we automatically move it to its proper location.

I'm confused as the rest of us about the fact the CIA kept sending men behind the Iron Curtain after they get lost over and over. Maybe you are right, Alisa, they had no other option, and maybe this person they are sending will be successful.

You have to figure someone had to realize it wasn't working. I wonder if the bureaucracy had a role to play. Maybe someone tried to tell them to stop, but the message never got to the highest operational level. I also wonder how many people within the organization knew it was a failure. You just sweep it under the rug and hope for the best on the next person going East.

Nicholas Dujmovic offers a fair comment regarding those missions, I think:

I actually agree with Weiner that at some point, though I am not certain where that point is, the dispatch of ethnic agent teams into denied areas was unconscionable, based on the fact—observable to CIA at the time—that so few (about 25 percent) were ever heard from again. At the same time, no one put a gun to the heads of these ethnic agents; they were nationalists, willing to risk their lives (many fought, unheralded, for years as guerillas against the Soviets in their homeland without US help), and we were willing to take the chance that sending them might yield good intelligence or otherwise harm our adversaries. In the high pressure of the early Cold War—when everyone was concerned about communist expansion and no one knew how the struggle would come out—these operations, ill-advised though they may have been, were far more understandable, if not forgivable, than Weiner allows.

I think Vheissu - I agree more with Bryan than Dujmovic. It is a fair comment but I cannot go as far as Dujmovic and say the operations were understandable; I also don't think they were forgivable; but it is what it is at this point in time. And of course the excerpt above comes straight out of the CIA rebuttal to the book. But if some folks want to let them off the hook; I guess we could use Dujmovic's explanation as well as anyone elses.

As an established and self-described "CIA critic" on this board, I also lean more toward Bryan than Dujmovic. Like Dujmovic, I think those operations were unforgivable, too. I certainly do not wish to let CIA "off the hook."

I am entirely open to the argument that CIA was more sinister than stupid. It is my understanding (and the historical experts on this board should please correct me if I am wrong) that many federal and secesh spies never returned from the Civil War. When people are willing to die for a cause, they can be rightfully condemned but probably not stopped.

I really did not know much about the CIA before beginning this book but did some research as the moderator so that I could present the opposing view since I did hear that the CIA was none too pleased. I posted their rebuttal early on with quite a few supplemental articles and videos. We are at the beginning of the book so I will reserve judgement until the end; but - like I said - Dujmovic did not move me much (smile). I think the problem is that I think there were some sinister men leading it. How could they not feel guilty about all of those men. Even if you are stupid you can feel empathy and sadness at losses. I think your last sentence does make a lot of sense though: When people are willing to die for a cause, they can be rightfully condemned but probably not stopped. I will remember that in balance.

Also Vheissu; whatever anybody's views are on the CIA and/or book are fine with me; I think though that all three of us are agreeing with each other (smile) which is of course not necessary at all.

I wanted to add something here. James Baker, former Secretary of Treasury under Reagan and former Secretary of State under George H.W. Bush remembers about 1952, the CIA came to recruit at Princeton. Here is what he said:

The CIA seemed a possibility until I had an on-campus interview. "Would you have any problem jumping out of an airplane with a parachute behind enemy lines?" I was asked.

"You bet I would." End of interview.

Classic. This is from:

by James Addison Baker

Yes, humorous but so true; on another side topic - these kinds of folks have no problem sending other folks to do just that and worse (not so humorous).